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PREFATORY NOTE
This book arose out of a workshop funded by the Academy of Social 
Sciences in Australia in 2018 at The Australian National University. 
At that workshop, we arrived at four implications of our findings:
1. That greater public policy attention and funding be directed towards 
community-controlled adult education and to supporting campaigns 
and programs aimed at raising adult literacy levels among Indigenous 
people on a mass scale. Adult literacy is the foundation both for 
financial literacy and sound governance for Aboriginal incorporations; 
a rise in literacy is essential to political capacity building and to 
advocacy of Indigenous interests. 
2. That the role of Indigenous interests within governments be 
expanded. This includes revisiting the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on Australian Government Administration that in 
1974–76 advocated both greater recruitment of Indigenous public 
servants and building the capability of Indigenous organisations.
3. That governments actively consider ways to build greater Indigenous 
control and influence, according to the decisions of Indigenous people, 
using the various extant capital funds (for instance, Indigenous Business 
Australia, Aboriginal Benefits Account, Indigenous Land Fund). 
4. That Australian governments legislate to ratify the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples so that any future 
debate about a ‘treaty’ (at any level of government or region) will know 
in advance what principles and terms of reference treaty processes 
would bring into play.

1
HOW SHALL WE WRITE 
THE HISTORY OF 
SELF‑DETERMINATION 
IN AUSTRALIA?
Laura Rademaker and Tim Rowse
The Uluru Statement from the Heart of May 2017 articulated 
an Indigenous vision for a better relationship between settler and 
Indigenous Australians: one ‘based on justice and self-determination’.1 
The culmination of years of consultation with Indigenous people about 
constitutional recognition, the statement proposed a referendum in 
which the Australian people could approve (or not) the formation of an 
Indigenous deliberative and advisory body – a Voice to Parliament. The 
government-appointed Referendum Council endorsed this proposal, 
but the Australian Government quickly dismissed it in October 2017. 
One prominent advocate of the Uluru Statement and member of the 
Referendum Council, Megan Davis, seemed to anticipate that response 
when, back in January 2016, she stated that ‘Australia has rejected self-
determination – freedom, agency, choice, autonomy, dignity – as being 
fundamental to Indigenous humanness and development’.2
Davis’s words are an example of a phenomenon that prompts the writing 
of this book: the interlacing of historical narratives into the discourse 
of Indigenous rights. As Bain Attwood has pointed out, Indigenous 
Australians’ political discourse about how they are entitled to be treated 
has long included a consciousness of history.3 For both Indigenous and 
1  Referendum Council, Uluru statement from the heart.
2  Davis, ‘Listening But Not Hearing’.
3  Attwood, Rights for Aborigines, see index entry ‘history, Aborigines’.
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non-Indigenous Australians, the propositions we exchange about our 
relationship resonate with frequently retold narratives of how the colonists 
and the colonised treated each other. Indigenous historical consciousness 
is rich in accounts of what Indigenous people have done: either to resist 
or to accommodate the colonists, and to assist (or sometimes to thwart) 
one another. Telling the truth about history has become so central to 
Indigenous politics that the Uluru Statement included recommending 
a truth-telling commission. Non-Indigenous historical consciousness, 
likewise, has recently become a contested awakening to difficult truths 
– how authority might have been used better, or perhaps shared through 
negotiation – pointing to possible paths of national repair.
Davis is not alone in decrying the failure of self-determination. As Patrick 
Sullivan notes, the failure of past policies for Indigenous Australia is 
something that ‘everybody knows’.4 Broadly, there are two versions 
of the failure thesis. One says that from 1973 to the final years of the 
Howard Government (1996–2007) all governments implemented ‘self-
determination’ but that this failed to empower Indigenous Australians 
and to reduce the socio-economic ‘gap’ between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians.5 The other version agrees that socio-economic 
differences have been stubbornly persistent, but accounts for it by saying 
that self-determination was never attempted or that, when attempted, 
it was crippled by underfunding and/or compromised by restraints 
imposed by Australian laws, policies, institutions and attitudes and/or 
unjustly terminated (with the Howard Government cast, usually, in the 
role of terminator). These competing histories of ‘failure’ not only point 
to contrasting prescriptions for future action but also marshal different 
understandings of what ‘self-determination’ is and could be.
Since both non-Indigenous and Indigenous Australians’ senses of political 
purpose are so saturated with narratives about what happened, what 
could have happened, and what might yet happen, the question ‘how 
shall we write the history of Indigenous Australian self-determination?’ 
is of more than simply academic interest. Answers to that question 
are inescapably political in their contribution to non-Indigenous and 
4  Sullivan, Belonging Together, 7.
5  Johns argues that had ‘self-determination’ not been attempted in Australia the following trends 
would have continued to create ‘more options and choices’ for Indigenous Australians: ‘movement 
off the land, intermarriage, general economic and cultural adjustment, and better education’. Self-
determination, he claims, has reinforced Aboriginal people’s ‘inability to adapt’. Johns, Aboriginal 
Self-determination, 66–67.
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Indigenous Australians’ understandings of their relationship and what 
that relationship might become. The aim of this book, therefore, is to 
enrich the historical consciousness in which Indigenous rights advocacy 
is embedded.
We can thus hear Davis’s January 2016 remark as a provocation to historical 
inquiry, posing the following questions for empirical investigation. How 
did Australia ‘reject self-determination’? Did ‘rejection’ take the form of 
specific actions by the state? If so, what were the dates and contexts of these 
decisive actions? Or was rejection less a set of specifiable state actions and 
more an entrenched posture of Australian society, manifest in many kinds 
of actions and attitudes? Before this ‘rejection’, did ‘Australia’ ever attempt 
‘self-determination’? If so, in what forms? And when? Why were they 
discontinued? Or has Australia never tried self-determination? If that is so, 
what would be a better description of what governments and people were 
doing when, in the 1970s, they called the new policy ‘self-determination’? 
Or was Davis’s January 2016 statement quite wrong? Perhaps Australia has 
commenced and continued to apply self-determination, so that the task 
for the historian is to narrate self-determination’s inevitable difficulties 
(including those bleak moments – such as the extinguishing of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 2004–05, 
or the Northern Territory Intervention in 2007 – when what was actually 
happening seemed far from self-determination). Implicit in all these 
questions is the likelihood that ‘self-determination’ has meant different 
things to different people at different times; a history of the contest of the 
meanings of ‘self-determination’ is a necessary part of the history of our 
recent times.
Such are the questions that the authors of this book tackle. In this 
introduction we seek to distinguish between two approaches to writing 
the history of self-determination: ‘self-determination’ as what individuals 
and organisations actually did when they said they were enabling 
self-determination, and ‘self-determination’ as an ideal – derived 
from international law, political theory and Indigenous demands – 
against which actions can be judged as succeeding or failing to enable 
‘self-determination’.
The first approach seeks not to endorse any a priori definition of 
‘self-determination’, but to treat ‘self-determination’ descriptively – 
examining what Australian governments did when they said their 
policy was self-determination. This immediately raises a question of 
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periodisation. We can say with certainty that on 6 April 1973 Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam stated to a conference of Commonwealth and 
state ministers concerned with Aboriginal affairs in Adelaide that ‘the 
basic object’ of his Aboriginal affairs policy ‘is to restore to the Aboriginal 
people of Australia their lost power of self-determination in economic, 
social and political affairs’.6 What his government then did can thus 
be studied as Australia’s approach to self-determination. But after the 
Whitlam Government … ? Has this policy ever been explicitly renounced 
by subsequent governments and replaced by a policy with a different 
name and aim? There is no universally agreed answer to this question. 
In her chapter, Johanna Perheentupa argues that ‘self-determination’ 
policy ceased in 1976, when the Fraser Government preferred the label 
‘self-management’ for programs towards Indigenous Australians. In her 
view, the shift from self-determination to self-management made a real 
difference to what was possible for Indigenous Australians under Whitlam 
(1972–75) and then Fraser (1976–83). Conservative governments since 
Whitlam have been cast as enemies of self-determination, and so many 
would assent to Jon Altman’s opinion that the Australian Government’s 
self-determination policy ‘de facto ended in 1996 with Howard’s first 
election and de jure with the demise of ATSIC in 2004’.7 Perhaps 
‘neoliberalism’ has been the nemesis of self-determination? A recent 
attempt to describe Indigenous public policy in the ‘neoliberal age’ argues 
that some features of neoliberalism (such as the vesting of property rights 
in Indigenous peoples and the promotion of their economic autonomy) 
are conducive to expressed Indigenous aspirations while other features 
(the intrusive management of the poor, the insistence that Indigenous 
organisations compete for government contracts with non-Indigenous 
providers) have eroded self-determination. Neoliberalism, according to 
this argument, has done much to promote self-determination as well as 
much to undermine it.8 
We doubt that government practices changed significantly when Fraser’s 
‘self-management’ replaced Whitlam’s ‘self-determination’, and we note 
Will Sanders’s point that, although the Fraser Government promoted 
‘self-management’ as different, the instances of self-management to 
which it pointed were the same as those that exemplified the Whitlam 
Government’s self-determination. They were: the formation of the National 
6  Whitlam, ‘Aboriginals and Society’.
7  Email to the editors, 24 October 2019.
8  Howard-Wagner, Bargh and Altamirano-Jimenèz, ‘From New Paternalism’.
5
HoW SHALL WE WRITE THE HISToRy of SELf‑DETERMINATIoN IN AUSTRALIA?
Aboriginal Conference in 1977 (as a successor to the National Aboriginal 
Consultative Committee); ‘the influence of Aboriginal organisations 
such as legal aid and Aboriginal health; the opportunity for Aboriginal 
councils to provide municipal services in the larger remote settlements; 
and the opportunity to choose “a traditional lifestyle” by movement to 
outstations’.9 The difficulty of deciding when Australian governments 
ceased to be committed to ‘self-determination’ is made even more evident 
if we note that as recently as 2007 one agency of the Howard Government 
urged ‘that any means of protecting Indigenous cultural and intellectual 
property is based on the principle of self-determination’.10 In sum, while 
there is little doubt that the Whitlam Government wanted its programs to 
be understood as embodying a policy of ‘self-determination’, the duration 
of the self-determination policy era remains a matter for interpretation.11
As editors, we welcome the approach taken by several of the authors 
in this book: that what the Whitlam and successor governments did – 
laws, reports, policies, institutions – can be understood as exemplifying 
Australia’s approach to ‘self-determination’. When this approach finds 
continuities between preceding policies – protection, assimilation – and 
Australian practices of self-determination, the inference is not necessarily 
that these residues are flaws in self-determination. In fact, there is no 
presumption, in this descriptive approach, that ‘self-determination’ 
should be a radical rupture with the colonial past. Even if some promoters 
of self-determination in the early 1970s emphasised the novelty of actions 
taken in the name of self-determination and celebrated them as the 
repudiation of a bad past, historians working from what we are calling 
a descriptive perspective are not obliged to agree. Issues of periodisation, 
continuity and rupture are open to debate.
9  Sanders, ‘From Self-determination to Self-management’, 8.
10  Australia Council for the Arts, Protocols, 8. The protocols declare: ‘Indigenous people have the right 
to self-determination in their cultural affairs and the expression of their cultural material’ (p. 12).
11  Just as it remains a matter for debate when ‘assimilation’ ceased to be Australian Government 
policy. In the 1960s, critics of ‘assimilation’ sometimes presented what they considered to be a less 
coercive policy, which they called ‘integration’. What distinguished ‘integration’ was professed respect 
for Indigenous choices about the pace and manner of their acculturation to the Australian way of life. 
‘Integration’ recognised value in distinctly ‘Aboriginal’ or Torres Strait Islander customs, including 
their senses of shared identity and their social solidarity or ‘group life’. Russell McGregor presents 
a well-documented and thoughtful discussion of the relationship between the terms ‘assimilation’ and 
‘integration’ in the 1960s. While the advocacy of ‘integration’ can be seen as paving the way for ‘self-
determination’ to be declared the new policy ideal in 1973, advocates of ‘Black Power’ were suspicious 
of ‘integration’, just as they were adamantly opposed to ‘assimilation’. McGregor, Indifferent, 177–78.
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The second approach to Indigenous self-determination is more explicitly 
critical, as it measures the practice of self-determination against what 
Indigenous Australians have said that they wanted (or what the historian 
infers that they wanted), or what human rights doctrines (in law or 
in political thought) say they are entitled to. This prescriptive use of 
‘self-determination’ seems to be the perspective that Davis voiced in 
2016. This approach views history from the standpoint of an ideal of self-
determination that arises from empathy with Indigenous Australians as 
an imagined subject of history and/or from doctrines of law or concepts 
in political theory to which the historian assents. The historian then 
gives a more judgemental account of what actually happened, enabling 
the reader to see the gap between the ideal and the reality of its flawed 
Australian practice. Comparison with other settler colonial societies 
may also inform histories that invoke international law. The historian 
working in this second perspective may give significance to questions 
of periodisation, continuity and rupture, arguing, for example, that 
it is a  political indictment of governments and others if elements of 
‘protection’ and ‘assimilation’ can be detected in practices whose stated 
intention was ‘self-determination’. For example, in her 1977 review of 
10 years of Australian policy innovation, Marcia Langton asserted that 
‘self-determination is a front for assimilation and exploitation’.12
In our invitations to participate in our October 2018 workshop, and in 
our subsequent conversations with authors, we welcomed both descriptive 
and normative approaches. Indeed, some chapters demonstrate different 
ways to combine the descriptive and the normative. We do not claim 
that this book is an Indigenous history of self-determination. Although 
it is produced in partnership with and includes contributions from 
leading Indigenous scholars, it does not represent the diverse views, 
experiences and ambitions of Indigenous people on questions of self-
determination. We hope that this book will be useful to Indigenous 
thinkers and activists, even as we anticipate learning from their insights 
and critiques. We also hope to see more feminist scholarship around the 
history of self-determination. We have questions about the gendering of 
self-determination policies, how they unevenly affected Indigenous men 
and women and played into (or challenged) existing gender politics of 
Indigenous and settler communities, that we were unable to address in 
12  Langton, ‘Self-determination as Oppression’, 5.
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this volume. There is likewise scope for further research in the history of 
self-determination and the arts as well as the international movements 
for Indigenous self-determination and their connections to Australia. 
Self‑determination as what was done
What were the policy innovations that the Whitlam Government called 
‘self-determination’ and that the Fraser Government subsequently 
endorsed as ‘self-management’? While no list is definitive, here is ours: 
• establishing a 1973–74 Royal Commission on land rights whose report 
led to a 1975 Bill and then to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976
• establishing a national agency, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 
represented by a minister in Cabinet and making grants to Indigenous 
organisations, including to remote missions and settlements that were 
evolving into Indigenous townships and to Aboriginal-controlled 
urban service organisations
• establishing the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee 
(NACC) as an elected advisory body in 1973, and replacing it with 
the National Aboriginal Conference in 1977
• establishing the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission, to purchase 
economic and cultural assets for Aboriginal people to own
• affirming the inherent worth of Indigenous cultures. This included 
support for bilingual education, and it required the Australia Council, 
the arts patronage body formed in 1973, to include an Aboriginal 
Arts Board, made up entirely of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people appointed by the minister for the arts
• outlawing racial discrimination (the Racial Discrimination Act 1975), 
while providing for lawful discrimination in favour of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people
• legislating to facilitate Indigenous Australians to form corporations, to 
enable their collective action (the Aboriginal Councils and Associations 
Act 1976)
• initiating consultation with Torres Strait Islanders about where to 
place the border between Australia and Papua New Guinea, and 
signing a treaty with Papua New Guinea in 1978 that made substantial 
concessions to Islanders’ demands.
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Each of these elements of ‘self-determination’ is dealt with both 
descriptively and evaluatively in this book.
Continuities with earlier practices
Many of these innovations had continuities with practices under 
the preceding policy of assimilation. Sana Nakata’s chapter reveals 
that changes to the Census (between the 1966 and 1971 censuses) that 
acknowledged the social, rather than biological bases of self-identification 
preceded the government’s commitment to self-determination. Sanders 
shows that the introduction of municipal government in remote regions 
began as an assimilatory policy and continued as a way to deal with 
the changes in land title mandated by self-determination. Similarly, as 
Rademaker demonstrates, the missions in the 1960s were rediscovering 
the nineteenth-century missiological concept of an ‘Indigenous church’: 
‘Aboriginal people taking responsibility for church life, expressed 
in their own languages, cultures and governance’. The missions also 
supported moves for Aboriginal political representation, considering all 
these as consistent with the government’s policy of assimilation. Chris 
Haynes reveals how Northern Territory Welfare Branch officers sought 
to respond to Aboriginal initiative during the ‘assimilation’ years, and 
he dates support for the outstation movement to the mid-1960s.13 
Perheentupa points out that some Aboriginal organisations funded under 
‘self-determination’ policy had been set up to deliver ‘welfare’ and that 
what government conceived as the goals of ‘welfare’ were similar to the 
aims of ‘assimilation’; how to practise ‘self-determination’ thus became 
an issue between these organisations and the government. Likewise, 
Boughton includes within his account of self-determination Aboriginal 
education collectives, such as Tranby, that date from the 1950s when they 
were supported as agencies promoting assimilation. Finally, as Simpson 
shows, mother-tongue education was central to the mission educations 
at Hermannsburg and Ernabella (admittedly, these missions were in the 
minority), long before Whitlam. 
13  This is amply demonstrated by some outstation histories. See Peterson and Myers, Experiments 
in Self-determination.
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So what distinguished Australian practices of self-determination from 
policy approaches before 1973? Was there a core policy logic that marked 
self-determination as a rupture with previous policy eras? Some would say 
that giving Indigenous Australians land title (mostly to former reserves) 
was self-determination’s defining rupture from ‘assimilation’, but against 
this view we make two observations. First, South Australia, Victoria, New 
South Wales and Western Australia were already beginning to vest reserve 
titles in Aboriginal trusts in the years 1966–72, arguably as an adjustment 
in their tactics of assimilation.14 Second, as Maria John argues in her 
chapter, to postulate land rights as self-determination’s prerequisite or 
distinctive feature ignores what urban Indigenous people have said about 
the struggle for Indigenous health.
As some of our authors note, steps taken in the name of self-determination 
were sometimes presented as primarily leading to economic independence 
and the amelioration of disadvantage. Jon Altman reminds us that the 
goal of ‘social and economic equality’ underpinned government support 
for land rights. To Justice Woodward, for instance, land rights were 
a ‘first essential step for people who are economically depressed’.15 Mike 
Dillon begins his history of capital funds in 1968, when the Australian 
Government, in the name of ‘assimilation’, created the Commonwealth 
Capital Fund for Aboriginal Enterprises. Some of the Aboriginal Cattle 
Enterprises supported under self-determination policy, Charlie Ward 
shows, began as ‘assimilation’ programs on missions and reserves. The 
Whitlam Government was ‘predisposed to support’ what it understood 
to be Gurindji aspirations to run their own cattle enterprise, giving 
‘insufficient thought to whether incorporated proprietary companies 
were appropriate vehicles for remote Indigenous aspirations’. As Ward 
points out, the increasing availability of welfare payments (according to 
assimilation’s quest for ‘equality’) contributed to the economic autonomy 
for individuals of the next generation, frustrating the Gurindji elders’ 
authority as managers. Other contributors suggest that the underlying 
logic of self-determination policy was to encourage ‘responsibility’, 
implying control and self-governance. In his study of the superintendency 
of John Hunter at Maningrida, Haynes identifies the desire to foster 
Aboriginal initiative, self-motivation and ‘responsibility’ as integral to 
a burgeoning self-determination in Arnhem Land. Rademaker suggests 
14  Rowse, Indigenous and other Australians, 325–28.
15  Woodward, Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, 2.
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that self-determination and assimilation as applied on Christian missions 
shared a common interest in Aboriginal people ‘taking responsibility’, the 
difference under self-determination being that they were to do so now 
rather than at some future date.
However, what was imagined as ‘control’ varied. In her chapter outlining 
the Royal Commission on Government Administration (RCAGA), 
Elizabeth Ganter explains that, for some, it was mere consultation and 
‘respect for Aboriginal aspirations’, while for others it required Aboriginal 
involvement in decision-making. In his analysis of the creation of 
municipal governance on discrete Indigenous communities, Will Sanders 
suggests we can see the limits of self-determination policy: were discrete 
communities on Aboriginal land made up of ‘self-governing landowners’ 
or merely ‘self-servicing landholders’?
The recognition of Indigenous peoplehood was central to the developing 
body of international law on self-determination, as Asmi Wood’s chapter 
shows. ‘Peoples’ are not statistically aggregated individuals; they enact their 
peoplehood as a capacity for collective action by forming institutions. 
It is therefore significant that one enduring Australian practice of self-
determination that distinguishes it from assimilation is to encourage the 
formation of groups – imagining Indigenous advancement as the work 
of potent collectives and not just of successful individuals. Katie Curchin 
and Tim Rowse trace the history of the statutory regulation of Indigenous 
corporations, arguing that the robust Indigenous sector is the product 
of self-determination. Mike Dillon also argues that self-determination 
continues to mean a government preference to engage with Indigenous 
people as groups, rather than as individuals. Tim Rowse argues that Torres 
Strait Islanders had long been treated as a collective political entity through 
Queensland’s practices of ‘indirect rule’. The Whitlam Government’s 
innovation in 1973 brought the Commonwealth Government into this 
scene, vying with Queensland as the government that would recognise 
and reward Torres Strait collectivity. 
If ‘self-determination’ meant recognising Indigenous peoples as collective 
actors, it also raised the issue of cultural difference: did government policy 
enable ‘groups’ only on the condition that their goals and methods depart 
from ‘custom’ in order to conform to non-Indigenous Australian norms? 
Jon Altman’s chapter is about the tension between landowners ‘becoming 
equal and remaining different’. At the same time as they have become 
landowners, the distinct peoplehood of Indigenous Australians in their 
11
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land use has come under pressure. In our two chapters on education 
(Bob  Boughton and Jane Simpson), the recognition of Indigenous 
people as peoples made for a new urgency in Indigenous control over 
training and education. No longer focused on educating the individual, 
the assumption under self-determination was that Indigenous people 
required language and literacy skills to represent themselves and pursue 
their interests as peoples.
Yet, well before Australian governments committed to self-
determination, they were professing respect for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander cultural  heritage. Rademaker shows that the protection 
of Aboriginal cultural life was key to missionaries’ re-imagining their 
role in Aboriginal communities in the 1960s. Self-determination meant 
that Aboriginal people were to be ‘free’ to be Christians in their own way. 
Part of the legacy of the missionisation of these communities, which 
Simpson identifies, is that Aboriginal people’s cultural rights to language 
received broader recognition from governments than their communication 
rights. Indigenous health services in both Australia and the United States 
were, as Maria John reveals, not only sites of Indigenous control but also 
environments where Indigenous people could be ‘proud to be themselves’. 
Self-governance of these organisations was not an end in itself; it was 
a means to create urban spaces where Indigenous cultures could flourish.
Given these complexities, as editors, we remain agnostic on the question 
of whether ‘self-determination’ had a ‘core’ that marked it as distinct. 
Perhaps what most marks the initiatives listed above as a break from the 
past was the rhetoric of their presentation and the matching enthusiasm 
and commitment of the Indigenous people who engaged.
Self‑determination as Indigenous project
The normative approach to writing the history of self-determination 
understands self-determination as an ongoing Indigenous ambition within 
a project of decolonisation. This understanding was reflected in the Uluru 
Statement and, before it, the Redfern Statement (2008) and Barunga 
Statement (1988), each demanding Indigenous ‘self-determination’. 
In his 1999 Vincent Lingiari lecture, Pat Dodson claimed that ‘Aboriginal 
peoples have the right to self-determination’, that is, the right to 
‘negotiate our political status and to pursue economic, social and cultural 
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development’.16 Despite the shortcomings of rights-based discourses 
(discussed further below), Indigenous people have harnessed the language 
and visions of self-determination discourses within international law and 
turned these to their own purposes. 
For many Indigenous people, ‘self-determination’ has meant not only 
choosing how they will relate to the settler colonial state and economy, 
but also making choices that would maximise autonomy, driven by 
a shared memory or imagined ideal of the autonomy they enjoyed before 
colonisation began. The Whitlam Government’s claim to ‘restore to the 
Aboriginal people of Australia their lost power of self-determination in 
economic, social and political affairs’ reflected this understanding.17 Many 
Indigenous Australians understand self-determination to refer to the 
political realisation of their inextinguishable sovereignty: they never ceded 
their sovereignty and never could or would cede it. By this understanding, 
Indigenous ‘self-determination’, though never entirely lost, was (and is) 
under continual attack by processes of colonisation. Consequently, for 
many Indigenous people, ‘self-determination’ could not be ‘bestowed’ by 
governments, it must be asserted, practised and maintained, often despite 
government policy. As Wiradjuri scholar Robynne Quiggin argued, 
‘we have a long history of “setting our own course” despite the rejection, 
confinement and cruelty of colonisation’.18
This question of who owns or confers self-determination (and whose 
interests it ultimately serves), has led some Indigenous thinkers to adopt 
other frames for Indigenous political mobilisation. As Borrows and Tully19 
recently articulated, Indigenous projects of decolonisation are being 
conceptualised either as projects of ‘reconciliation’ with the settler state 
that might, for instance, include demands for treaties, recognition, return 
of land, rights and reparations, or as what some call ‘resurgence’, that is, of 
reclaiming Indigenous cultures, lands and ways of being without reference 
to the colonisers. For those seeking resurgence, reconciliatory movements 
can entail colonising concessions. But where do claims to self-determination 
fit in relation to these projects? Are claims for self-determination claims 
of resurgence – because self-determination entails restoring to Indigenous 
people their authority? Or is demanding Indigenous self-determination 
16  Dodson, ‘Until the Chains Are Broken’, 29.
17  Whitlam, ‘Aboriginals and Society’ (emphasis added). See also Hocking, ‘A Transforming 
Sentiment’, S5–S12.
18  Quiggin, ‘What Does Democracy and Self-determination Mean’, S52–S53.
19  Borrows and Tully, ‘Introduction’, 1–6.
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an act of reconciliation – because it demands concessions from the settler 
state? The settler state has an incentive to make such concessions: these 
might give it the moral legitimacy it craves. Stephen Young points out that 
the state’s recognition of Indigenous people, their nationhood and self-
determination, also serves to legitimate its own assertions of sovereignty 
and nationhood.20 As Noel Pearson recently argued, restoring Indigenous 
people in Australia their right to ‘self-determination’ and ‘responsibility’ 
would create a ‘more complete Commonwealth’.21
For some, ‘self-determination’ is no longer the right way to conceptualise 
the pursuit of Indigenous interests. Cherokee political scientist Jeff 
Corntassel argues that the failure of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) to uphold Indigenous peoples’ 
land and water cultural relationships, favouring instead the territorial 
integrity of the state, is indicative of the false promises of rights-based and 
state-centred strategies for achieving decolonisation.22 Quiggin also noted 
that ‘self-determination has its origins in the processes of imperialism and 
the development of the nation state’, that is, the very processes that fuelled 
the dispossession of Indigenous people.23 For her, this is not a reason 
for Indigenous people to reject self-determination but a reason to assert 
their own self-determination more forcefully in the face of colonising 
authorities. As Anishinaabe scholar Aaron Mills similarly pointed out, 
‘self-determination is the language of our settler-colonizer’.24 Mills argued 
that self-determination undercuts Indigenous conceptions of selfhood 
and political community that value interdependence and relationship. For 
Indigenous people, freedom is not about ‘standing apart’ but ‘standing 
with’ the other.25 Where Indigenous people mobilise state-centric rights 
discourses that focus on the supposedly autonomous self, their demands 
cannot lead to a sustainable self-determination based upon spiritual 
foundations and on Indigenous peoples’ relationships and responsibilities 
to the natural world. Dene political theorist Glen Coulthard argued in 
2007 for Indigenous practices ‘less oriented’ to attaining ‘affirmative 
[forms] of recognition from the settler state and society, and more 
about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and 
20  Young, ‘The Self Divided’, 195.
21  Pearson, ‘A Rightful Place’, 72.
22  Corntassel, ‘Re-envisioning Resurgence’, 92.
23  Quiggin ‘What does’, S52.
24  Mills, ‘Rooted Constitutionalism’, 160.
25  Mills, ‘Rooted Constitutionalism’, 160.
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tradition in ways that seek to prefigure, alongside those with similar 
ethical commitments, a radical alternative to the structural and psycho-
affective facets of colonial domination’.26
Aileen Moreton-Robinson makes a similar critique while also distinguishing 
the Indigenous male from the Indigenous female as a self-determining 
subject. Her Indigenous feminist critique of self-determination as 
espoused by liberal settler colonial governments argues that Indigenous 
women give priority to the collective rights of Indigenous people rather 
than to the individual rights of liberal citizenship. This means that 
‘Indigenous women’s perceptions of self-determination and sovereignty 
are not consistent with the liberal idea that, through citizenship, self-
determination can be realised’.27 While she does not abandon the 
language of self-determination, Moreton-Robinson is sceptical of the 
ability of settler colonial governments’ policies of ‘self-determination’ 
to empower Indigenous women. Megan Davis has also differentiated 
the Indigenous subject by gender, arguing that ‘the right to self-
determination’ has ‘promoted an impoverished form of self-determination 
for Aboriginal women in Australia’.28 Davis’s argument is not so grounded 
in an assumption of Indigenous women’s cultural distinction: she draws 
on Martha Nussbaum’s argument that implementing human rights 
necessitates attention to the practical ‘capabilities’ of all humans, and 
she is more optimistic than Moreton-Robinson about the liberal settler 
colonial state’s ability to realise human rights.
For Indigenous activist and public intellectual Noel Pearson, self-
determination is best applied on the levels of both individual and 
community. ‘Liberty, responsibility and self-determination’ are, to him, 
‘basically the same’. They are all about ‘the freedom and power to choose’.29 
Pearson argued that the right of self-determination includes the ability 
and ‘right’ to ‘take responsibility’.30 Notions of ‘responsibility’ – both 
individual and collective – are familiar to many Indigenous people who 
feel a keen sense of responsibility to their country, ancestors and kin.31 
For many Indigenous people, these responsibilities are also the grounds of 
Indigenous sovereignty. Though Pearson is strongly committed to the idea 
26  Coulthard, ‘Subjects of Empire’, 456.
27  Moreton-Robinson, ‘Patriarchal Whiteness’, 70.
28  Davis, ‘Aboriginal Women’, 78–88, 79.
29  Pearson, ‘A Rightful Place’, 43.
30  Pearson, Up from the Mission. 167.
31  Corntassel, ‘Re-envisioning Resurgence’, 93.
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that Indigenous Australians are ‘peoples’, he does not use the language of 
‘sovereignty’. Pearson argues that an obsession with ‘self-determination 
and international law’ and ‘concepts of autonomy and sovereignty’ 
have distracted from the ‘practical realities of self-determination’.32 
By ‘practical realities’ he means the financial and social capital that would 
enable Indigenous people to make decisions about their lives. Decisions 
about how to take responsibility might even lead to ‘assimilation’, 
a possibility raised by Mike Dillon in this volume (considering the forms 
that Indigenous ‘wealth’ can take) as well as by Michael Mansell. Mansell 
identifies three political options for Indigenous Australians under self-
determination: ‘to form a new state through secession, agree to autonomy 
or association in a federal state, or to integrate or assimilate in a single 
unitary state’.33
But elsewhere ‘sovereignty’ has risen to prominence in Indigenous 
political discourse since it emerged in the 1960s.34 Sovereignty and self-
determination are often used together, presented as two approaches to or 
conceptualisations of a single struggle, as John’s chapter points out.35 While 
critiquing both ‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’ as European imports 
to Indigenous political discourses,36 Taiaiake Alfred described ‘the two 
most important strategies’ for Indigenous people as ‘assertion of prior and 
coexisting sovereignty’ and ‘the assertion of a right of self-determination’, 
describing these strategies as ‘woven together’.37 To  Leroy Little Bear, 
sovereignty is ‘about making your own decisions, following your own 
mind, being self-determining’ without forgetting our interdependence; 
sovereignty is ‘qualified by your dependence on other people’.38 
In Australia, Michael Mansell explained that ‘sovereignty’ underpins other 
Indigenous ambitions, including self-determination.39 In 2003, Larissa 
Behrendt described ‘recognition of sovereignty as an expression of distinct 
identity and a starting point for the exercise of self-determination as 
a way of achieving empowerment, autonomy and equality’.40 In 2013 she 
distinguished ‘self-determination’ (‘when Indigenous people are involved 
32  Pearson, Up from the Mission, 168.
33  Mansell, Treaty and Statehood, 165.
34  Moreton-Robinson, ‘Introduction’, 3.
35  Strelein, ‘Missed Meanings’, 85, 89.
36  Alfred, ‘Sovereignty’, 40.
37  Alfred, ‘Sovereignty’, 37.
38  Little Bear, ‘An Elder Explains Indigenous Philosophy’, 7.
39  Mansell, Treaty and Statehood, 74.
40  Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice, 115.
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in the setting of priorities within their community, the development of 
policy, the delivery of services, and the implementation of programs’) from 
‘sovereignty’ (‘when control is given centrally to Aboriginal people without 
constraint’). Indigenous Australians have sometimes practised both self-
determination and sovereignty: ‘many successful programs … [have been] 
developed by community members, often without government assistance, 
such as night patrols, dry-out areas, and safe houses’.41
Non-Indigenous Australians have sometimes responded defensively to 
Indigenous claims of ‘sovereignty’, despite its close association with self-
determination (which is seen as less threatening) and notwithstanding 
that sovereignties can be understood as multiple and overlapping.42 
Tim Rowse’s chapter is a caution against assuming that the Indigenous 
assertion of sovereignty necessitates the rejection of Australian sovereignty. 
When Torres Strait Islanders asserted their customary interest in the social 
and ecological relations of the border between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea, they insisted that their lands and seas be protected by continuing 
to remain under Australian sovereignty. Indigenous claims to sovereignty 
do, however, expose the fragility of the settler state’s own claims. As Asmi 
Wood explains, in law ‘there is no doctrinal answer to the question of how 
[non-Indigenous or colonial] sovereignty was acquired’. There is, therefore, 
‘both an opportunity and a space for negotiations and discussions on self-
determination without preconditions’, and ‘the principle of uti possidetis 
puts Indigenous Australians in a position to negotiate under international 
law’. Perhaps the growing appeal of the language of sovereignty to 
Indigenous activists is that they believe self-determination to have failed: 
they are looking for new ways to make settler colonial society pay attention 
to their claims.
Self‑determination and international law
Dylan Lino has summarised what extant international law offers to 
Indigenous Australians:
First, the established international law is very specific, entailing 
a limited number of legal remedies, for example decolonisation, 
that have no applicability to Indigenous peoples in settler-colonial 
41  Behrendt, ‘Aboriginal Sovereignty’, 171–72.
42  Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice, 115; Strelein, ‘Missed Meanings’, 85.
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states like Australia. Second, despite the presently limited nature 
of the established law on self-determination, the law is continuing 
to develop. It is true that legal rules applying the right of self-
determination to Indigenous peoples are yet to crystallise into 
a clear and cogent body of law, but there is certainly a space in 
international law – especially post-UNDRIP – in which to flesh 
out an Indigenous right of self-determination. Third, the direction 
in which the nascent law on Indigenous self-determination is 
developing is moving away from secession and independence and 
towards internal, intra-state configurations.43
Three chapters of this volume engage with international law as a resource 
for Indigenous political thought.
Asmi Wood points out that self-determination began to circulate as a 
concept of international law when Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin enunciated it, in their different ways, in 1918. The Charter of the 
United Nations in 1945 mentions ‘self-determination’, and the concept 
has been the focus of discussion and development in UN forums ever 
since. In 2007, the UNDRIP included:
Article 3.
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4.
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating 
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions.44
As Maria John observes in her chapter, the UNDRIP was deliberately 
unspecific about the scope of Indigenous peoples’ self-determination. 
It references only internal matters and ‘local affairs’, and it does not 
allow territorial sovereignty as a basis of Indigenous self-determination. 
Self-determination as a norm of international law has disappointed 
some Indigenous people who see it as too vague and imprecise to serve 
as a foundation for Indigenous claims.45 Wood argues that Australian 
43  Lino, ‘The Politics of Inclusion’, 850.
44  United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
45  Mansell, Treaty and Statehood, 194.
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Indigenous people should nevertheless continue to press for Australia to 
legislate to ratify the UNDRIP. This would compel Australian courts to 
adjudicate disputes around Indigenous self-determination with regard 
to international law and literature, giving Indigenous people greater 
opportunity to exercise their peoplehood under the law, as well as laying 
the ground for treaty negotiations.
Sana Nakata also refers to self-determination as a concept in international 
law, alluding – like Wood – to the UN Charter, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In her reading of the history 
of ‘self-determination’, there is a deep connection between the right of 
an individual to identify with a ‘people’ and the right of that ‘people’ 
to self-determination; that is, both rights make appeal to the values of 
‘Autonomy. Freedom. Sovereignty … concepts that attach as much to 
individual human beings as they attach to nations and states’. Nakata 
then argues that the institutional form of peoplehood can be evaluated 
according to its practice towards the autonomy of the individual. 
Nakata and others are therefore troubled by the way that the state has 
delegated the adjudication of individuals’ claims to be ‘Aboriginal’ to 
the Indigenous sector. In Australia, she argues, the colonial sovereign’s 
criteria for recognising a people are likely to result in the mis-recognition 
of some individuals. Nakata draws on Bronwen Carlson’s ethnography 
The Politics of Identity to illustrate Indigenous experiences of mis-
recognition that seem to have become increasingly common in the early 
twenty-first century – that is, of having one’s identity claims rejected by 
Indigenous organisations. If the purpose of ‘recognition’ is ‘justice’, then 
mis-recognition (rejecting a person’s claim to be Aboriginal) is injustice, 
Nakata argues. The injustice of such mis-recognition is compounded 
where the state empowers Indigenous organisations to give or withhold 
recognition. She also raises the possibility that, as Indigenous Australian 
claims give emphasis to constitutional recognition of peoplehood, there 
will be less need for any authority to judge an individual’s claim to be 
Indigenous. Nakata insists that Indigeneity is too dynamic historically to 
be contained by official criteria, not least because both colonisation and 
the pursuit of rights are ongoing disruptors of Indigeneity. 
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Failure narratives and self‑determination
Many accounts of self-determination have argued true ‘self-determination’ 
(variously defined) was never really attempted in Australia because, in 
valuing the preservation of Indigenous cultural difference, the policy 
set limits to Indigenous choices to change. Pearson, for instance, argued 
that self-determination failed because the ‘preservation of some kind of 
imagined cultural purity’ trumped giving Indigenous people real choices 
about ‘how to reconcile their cultures with the demands of development’.46 
In Peter Sutton’s view, the new rights of the self-determination era were 
not matched with measures ‘designed to assist people through the crises of 
occupation, discipline, motivation, conflict management and community 
trauma that soon erupted and by the 1990s had reached a crescendo, 
especially in the remoter regions’.47 Likewise, according to conservative 
commentator Gary Johns, self-determination was never really tried, 
because a commitment to an idealised version of Aboriginal cultures, 
together with an incoherent pursuit of both Aboriginal separatism 
and integration, prevented Aboriginal people from pursuing their own 
interests.48 Moreover, Johns argues that Aboriginal people lacked the 
capacity to manage their own affairs and to make decisions, meaning that 
they ‘won their freedom and lost their livelihood’: self-determination as 
practised in the 1970s was never true freedom.49
Refuting Johns and reviewing policy from 1972 to 2005, Stuart Bradfield 
argued that self-determination enacted ‘a logic of “domestication”, 
which acts to manage and curtail Indigenous separatism, rather than 
give expression to it’.50 Aboriginal political identities were ‘contained’ 
via ‘impotent representative bodies’ from the 1970s. Land rights were 
granted, but were always managed by the state.51 Even ATSIC, supposedly 
exemplary of self-determination, remained subject to federal control 
and was eventually dismantled, as Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Elizabeth 
Strakosch and Will Sanders also note.52 Moreton-Robinson argues that 
46  Pearson, ‘A Rightful Place’, 47.
47  Sutton, The Politics of Suffering, 58.
48  Johns, ‘The Failure of Aboriginal Separatism’, 18.
49  Johns, ‘The Failure of Aboriginal Separatism’, 12.
50  Bradfield, ‘Separatism or Status-Quo?’, 82.
51  Bradfield, ‘Separatism or Status-Quo?’, 84.
52  Bradfield, ‘Separatism or Status-Quo?’, 88; Moreton-Robinson, ‘Introduction’, 4; Strakosch, 
‘The Technical Is Political’, 126; Sanders, ‘Missing ATSIC’, 113–30.
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so-called ‘self-determination’ policy was only ever ‘self-management’.53 
This position is also reflected by some authors in this volume. Perheentupa, 
for instance, argues that the Department of Aboriginal Affairs never 
intended to give Aboriginal organisations the autonomy they claimed 
and that the  1975 shift to ‘self-management’ further undermined 
Aboriginal autonomy.
Many Indigenous intellectuals insist that Indigenous demands were 
not heard under self-determination. Gary Foley, for instance, lamented 
that Indigenous leaders were quickly disappointed by the gap between 
the Whitlam Government’s promises to Indigenous people and its 
actions, particularly its failure to enact its stated principle that Aboriginal 
people should run their own affairs (which Foley calls ‘sovereignty’).54 
Ian Anderson  traced a state of ‘chronic crisis’ in Indigenous policy 
and politics, dating back to the removal of barriers to citizenship for 
Indigenous Australians (presumably in the late 1960s).55 The perpetual 
crisis, Anderson argued, is attributable in part to institutional structures 
of our parliamentary system that have never required consultation with 
Indigenous people or representation of Indigenous interests.56 There was no 
structural mechanism to ensure self-determination for Indigenous people. 
Numerous scholars from an anthropological background have pointed 
to cultural barriers to self-determination. As Cowlishaw argued, under 
self-determination the ‘bourgeois ideal of autonomous, self-willed 
subjects’ drove policies and governance of Aboriginal people. Aboriginal 
communities were to learn to value independence, self-management and 
autonomy, whether these represented Aboriginal values or not.57 Tatz 
objected to the artificial formation of these ‘autonomous’ communities. 
These had previously been ruled as ‘total institutions’ (i.e. as missions or 
settlements), often consisting of tribal and language groups with conflicting 
interests, frequently rivalries, but were made to become ‘communities’, 
‘regardless of whether or not there was an actual communitas’.58 The 
forms of governance these communities were made to adopt bore little 
resemblance to Indigenous peoples’ own ways of governing themselves.
53  Moreton-Robinson, ‘Introduction’, 4.
54  Foley, ‘The Australian Labor Party’, 125.
55  Anderson, ‘The Crisis of Australia’s Indigenous Policy’, 54.
56  Anderson, ‘The Crisis of Australia’s Indigenous Policy’, 59.
57  Cowlishaw, ‘Erasing Culture and Race’, 150.
58  Tatz, Aboriginal Suicide, 27.
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Others suggest that self-determination was attempted, but later 
undermined. The shift in government focus towards ‘reconciliation’ 
in the 1990s, followed by the Howard Government’s emphasis on 
‘practical reconciliation’ and the policy of ‘closing the gap’, have eroded 
policies of self-determination by deliberately avoiding and undermining 
Indigenous claims to sovereignty and self-determination.59 Under the 
Abbott Government’s Indigenous Advancement Strategy, funding 
for non-Indigenous organisations with ‘Reconciliation Action Plans’ 
and ‘philanthrocapitalism’ ‘replaced self-determination as the path to 
modernisation’, argues Davis. What some call ‘neoliberal’ commitments 
reframed Aboriginal polities simply as the ‘Indigenous sector’, along with 
the ‘business sector’ or ‘education sector’. When understood as a mere 
‘sector’, Davis argues, Indigenous Australians are denied the right to self-
determination.60 With the return of a conservative national government 
in 1996, governments showed greater antipathy to rights-based policy 
agendas for Indigenous people. Indigenous services were instead to be 
‘mainstreamed’ and ‘normalised’ within a broader ‘neoliberal’ agenda.61 
As noted above, one of the effects of the ‘neoliberal age’ is a return to 
government intrusion in Indigenous peoples’ private lives.62 Chapters 
by Altman and Boughton are instances of this failure narrative, arguing 
that ‘neoliberal’ reforms beginning in the 1990s undermined previous 
gains for Aboriginal people. According to this understanding, the ‘deficit 
discourse’ that accompanied ‘practical reconciliation’ and the ‘closing the 
gap’ agenda further discredited self-determination. As Laurie Bamblett 
argued, describing and defining Indigenous people only in terms of 
disadvantage and deficit ‘makes it easier to deny Aboriginal communities 
self-determination on the grounds of incapability’.63
59  Ladner, ‘Proceed with Caution’, 250.
60  Davis, ‘Gesture Politics’.
61  Lovell, ‘Languages of Neoliberal Critique’, 223.
62  Howard-Wagner, Bargh and Altamirano-Jiménez, ‘From New Paternalism to New Imaginings’, 
14–15.
63  Bamblett, ‘Serious Whitefella Stuff’, 81.
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Self‑determination as a concept implicit 
in Indigenous action
The historian who wishes to compare the actual practice of self-
determination to what Indigenous Australians wanted (or to what, in 
the historian’s opinion, they were entitled) may search for statements 
by Indigenous people and/or by authorities concerned with formulating 
Indigenous rights or at least human rights. However, historians might 
also infer Indigenous conceptions of ‘self-determination’ from actions and 
from words that do not include the phrase ‘self-determination’.
The fact that Indigenous Australians have been a colonised people is, 
for some historians, sufficient basis for attributing to them a strong 
desire for self-determination. According to this approach, the task for 
the historian is to discover the contingent expressions of that desire in 
what Indigenous Australians said (or did not say) and what they did (or 
did not do) in specified times and places. Anthropological research has 
sometimes deciphered political messages in Indigenous Australians’ ritual 
innovation. Ronald Berndt, for instance, interpreted the Yolngu decision 
to display secret objects in 1958 as expressing a desire for a ‘greater 
measure of control over their own affairs, politically and religiously, 
and especially in relation to education and employment’.64 Berndt, 
however, did not call this a claim to ‘self-determination’; that concept 
in international law had not yet acquired the ‘domestic’ meaning it later 
gained. In some contexts, explicit programmatic statements by Indigenous 
Australians are discoverable in the archive and easy to interpret (some 
even use the word ‘self-determination’). In other contexts, however, the 
historian engages in reasoned attribution, finding what he/she considers 
to be ‘self-determination’ in certain words and actions. For example, Tim 
Rowse presents certain actions and words of Torres Strait Islanders in 
the 1970s as ‘self-determination’, notwithstanding their explicit demand 
to remain within Australian sovereignty. What the historian considers 
‘self-determination’ to mean is, therefore, an important question for 
historians’ practice, an aspect of the question that animates this book: ‘How 
shall we write the history of Australian Indigenous self-determination?’
64  Berndt, An Adjustment Movement, 87.
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Haynes’s account of Hunter is grounded in the view that Aboriginal 
people were ‘self-determining’ when they first came to the settlement 
at Maningrida and when they left for outstations. By characterising 
Indigenous agency this way, Haynes is able to describe the space that was 
open to Hunter’s prefiguring of self-determination, that is, a space defined 
by people sometimes not taking up what governments offered. The gap 
between white official (assimilationist) expectations and actual Aboriginal 
behaviour is sometimes described as Aboriginal ‘resistance’ to assimilation, 
and this indeed is the term Haynes chooses. In the story as Haynes tells 
it, the historian does not need to find evidence of an articulate Aboriginal 
concept of self-determination; ‘self-determination’ was prefigured in 
Hunter’s practice to the extent that he acknowledged and bent to realities 
(geographical, human) that were beyond government control.
If Indigenous agency is to be treated historically, the story of the 
emergence of Indigenous points of view will include discursive gaps, 
silences and hesitations. For example, reviewing gains made by Indigenous 
Australians in the period 1967–77, Nugget Coombs (chair of the Council 
for Aboriginal Affairs, 1967–76) celebrated Arnhem Land’s outstation 
movement as self-determination in action, before commenting that in 
several other domains of public policy – education, health and housing 
– self-determination had not yet displaced assimilation.65 By way of 
explanation, he mentioned government inertia, as well as Indigenous 
Australians not yet having had time to consider and to articulate 
their distinctive needs for education, health and housing. The point 
should not be missed by historians: willingness and capacity to speak 
programmatically has developed unevenly across Australian regions and 
across policy domains. Not every instance of Indigenous aspiration is as 
articulate as the statements from the Tent Embassy, cited by Jon Altman.
Elizabeth Ganter’s chapter exemplifies another way to attribute Indigenous 
conceptions of ‘self-determination’. The term ‘self-determination’ is 
nowhere in the 1977 Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration (RCAGA) report, yet Ganter shows how we might find it 
implicit. Some recommendations of the report were a (neglected) stimulus 
to ‘self-determination’, as she understands that concept. Ganter is explicit 
in deriving her conception of self-determination from recent political 
theories of representation that urge democratic states to recruit public 
65  Coombs, Australia’s Policy Towards Aborigines.
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servants diversely. A state committed to Indigenous self-determination 
would ask: how can Indigenous public servants be ‘both grounded … in 
their communities and empowered … in government decision-making’? 
Ganter argues that certain RCAGA recommendations in effect addressed 
that question: they looked positively on the possibility that Indigenous 
individuals would be mobile between public service employment and 
working in the Indigenous sector, thus ‘building relationships between 
Indigenous administrators on the inside and their communities and 
organisations on the outside’. Ganter reports from her own interviews with 
Indigenous officers of the Northern Territory Government that many of 
her interviewees were mobile between government and Indigenous sector 
employment, just as the RCAGA recommendations had imagined. Her 
task as historian is thus to theorise these peoples’ careers as an emergent 
practice of self-determination.
Mike Dillon’s chapter is a third example of the possibility of inferring 
Indigenous conceptions of ‘self-determination’ from the practices of 
Indigenous people. His question is: in what ways could public sector 
capital funds have contributed to Indigenous self-determination? Writing 
from a normative standpoint, Dillon’s history of Indigenous Business 
Australia and the Indigenous Land Corporation and its associated Land 
Fund affirms a procedural notion of self-determination: that decision-
making about the use of funds should maximise Indigenous participation 
at the highest level. When considering whether these investment decisions 
have achieved greater self-determination, he is more cautious. Noting 
that Indigenous people have different views about the forms that capital 
might take, he declines to say which uses of the capital funds he thinks 
would lead more to ‘assimilation’ than to outcomes more distinctively 
Indigenous. Instead, he alludes to ongoing debates among Indigenous 
Australians about how best to invest these funds. Such debates were 
crucial in defining what we might refer to as the Indigenous vision of 
self-determination, but little is yet known of them.
The limits of the settler colonial liberal 
nation‑state
Some narratives of the historical failure of self-determination in Australia 
are grounded in a theory of the limited ability of settler colonial states 
to enable Indigenous autonomy. Gillian Cowlishaw argued that 
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self-determination in Australia created only ‘a semblance of autonomous 
governmental structures’ that were always subject to state strictures and 
regulations: ‘self-determination did not mean laissez-faire or autonomy 
from the state at all’.66 In fact, self-determination policies had more to do 
with the settler colonial state repositioning itself as ‘the liberator from past 
oppression’ and disavowing its racist past than about eradicating racial 
inequalities.67 Francesca Merlan concluded that, under self-determination, 
the state replaced ‘overt coercion’ with a mode of seeking to ‘elicit from 
Aboriginal people … their own modes of organisation’ in order to ‘recast 
the management of Aboriginal affairs in what are seen to be indigenous 
terms’.68 That is, the state did not and perhaps cannot cease to authorise 
(or disallow) versions of Indigenous tradition.
It remains unclear whether the Australian case illustrates deep limits to the 
settler colonial state’s sympathetic recognition of Indigenous difference. 
If there were such limits, then self-determination would be marked by 
contradiction and failure. For Peter Sutton, clashes between custom and 
corporate accountability under self-determination were symptomatic of 
a deeper contradiction between ‘modernism and cultural traditionalism’ 
within the very idea of self-determination.69 Self-determination pursued 
Indigenous sameness in some ways and Indigenous difference in others, 
but the rationale for when or why one or the other was preferred was 
never articulated. In an influential critique of Australian multiculturalism, 
Elizabeth Povinelli has argued that the settler colonial state’s approach 
to culture – liberal multiculturalism – asserts the sovereign right to 
selectively approve differentiated aspects of Indigenous culture: there 
was no scope for Aboriginal practices that were contrary to governments’ 
agenda.70 Anthropologist Emma Kowal also argued that the contradictory 
pursuit of sameness and difference is inherent to liberal multiculturalism. 
The  ‘postcolonial logic’ that ‘prevailed in the self-determination era’ 
sought to eliminate inequality (which she calls ‘remedialism’) while 
also maintaining essential difference (‘orientalism’).71 Altman, in this 
volume, describes the ‘twin logics’ of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976, namely ‘justice by returning ancestral lands’ while 
66  Cowlishaw, ‘Helping Anthropologists, Still’, 53.
67  Cowlishaw, ‘Erasing Culture and Race’, 147.
68  Merlan, Caging the Rainbow, 150.
69  Sutton, The Politics of Suffering, 59.
70  Povinelli, The Cunning; Cowlishaw, ‘Helping Anthropologists, Still’, 53. 
71  Kowal, ‘The Politics of the Gap’, 338.
INDIGENoUS SELf‑DETERMINATIoN IN AUSTRALIA
26
also ‘improving socio-economic marginality’. These clashing logics 
mirror the ‘postcolonial logic’ that Kowal identifies. For Altman, these 
tensions within self-determination were exacerbated by recent Australian 
Government policies.
In this perspective, Australia, as a settler colony, must fail its projects of 
self-determination. A settler colonial state must continually contain and 
erase Indigenous sovereignty if it is to uphold its own legitimacy. In one 
version of this view, self-determination rhetoric was window-dressing 
for a new iteration of colonising policies. Elizabeth Strakosch refers to 
an unresolved ‘foundational sovereign conflict’; that is, an underlying 
clash of sovereignties between the settler colonial state and Australia’s 
Indigenous people. Although Indigenous policy may appear to pursue ‘self-
determination’, it does not and cannot address the underlying structures. 
Quite the opposite: by acting unilaterally on Indigenous people (treating 
them as legitimate subjects of the state), and by representing Indigenous 
people as problems for the settler colonial state to address, Indigenous 
policy entrenches the colonial relationship.72 This was also true ‘despite 
the rhetoric of the self-determination era’.73
It follows from this perspective that the settler state’s apparent concessions 
to forms of Indigeneity are always only ever strategic and that they render, 
eliminate or erase Indigenous people. In Patrick Wolfe’s theory, settler 
colonies are ‘premised on the elimination of native societies’.74 For him, 
‘a range of historical practices’ that ‘might otherwise appear distinct’ can all 
be understood through this lens.75 These practices include, more recently, 
Australian Government policies that appear to celebrate Indigeneity: these 
are ‘strategic pluralism’.76 According to this theory, government policies of 
self-determination, despite any benevolent appearances, further processes 
of elimination. It would, in fact, be impossible for the settler colonial 
state to genuinely pursue Indigenous self-determination as this would 
threaten its claim to legitimate sovereignty. It follows from this view that 
Indigenous self-determination can only ever be a project in opposition to 
the settler state.
72  Strakosch, ‘The Technical Is Political’, 116, 120.
73  Brigg and Maddison, ‘Unsettling Governance’, 6.
74  Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, 2.
75  Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, 163.
76  Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, 167.
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This theory of the settler colonial state presents the relationship between 
Indigenous and settler authorities in zero-sum terms, such that Indigenous 
engagement with policies of self-determination is destined to fail and/or 
be self-deluding. We feel wary of this theoretical framework because it 
supposes reconciliation to be impossible, a process of mutual self-delusion. 
What is the historian to say of Indigenous people who have sought to work 
with and gain concessions from the settler colonial state (as many still do), 
not seeing their gains as merely illusory? As Borrows and Tully comment 
in their critique of the limits of settler colonial theory, ‘independence and 
interdependence have characterised Indigenous–settler relationships for 
centuries’.77 We read the history of settler–Indigenous relationships as 
shaped by historical particularities, interdependence and political agency 
on each side, even as these can be understood within a broader colonial 
structure. We favour histories that offer Australians a broader range of 
political resources and possible futures as they pursue their interests.
The successes of self‑determination
Thus we question the thesis that self-determination has failed entirely. 
Of course, Indigenous people have consistently asserted sovereignty and 
have been ‘self-determining’ in their resistance to and engagement with 
colonising powers; this form of self-determination has persisted under all 
kinds of policy agendas and continues today. In addition to this, we can 
identify some ways in which the policy suite introduced by the Whitlam 
Government enabled Indigenous people wider choices and greater control 
for themselves and their communities.
Phillip Falk and Gary Martin point out the multiple ways in which 
Indigenous people today have rights to ‘self-determination and self-
management’.78 While they concede that there are always limits on 
Indigenous control, disputes and policy failures, they argue that Indigenous 
people are exercising authority across many domains in which, 50 years 
ago, they had little control. On territorial sovereignty, there is lands rights 
legislation, native title land and land granted through the Indigenous 
Land Corporation. In health, there are now Indigenous medical centres 
and Indigenous health professionals. In education there are Indigenous 
77  Borrows and Tully, ‘Introduction’, 8.
78  Falk and Martin, ‘Misconstruing Indigenous Sovereignty’, 40.
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pre-primary, primary and secondary schools, and Indigenous student 
support centres in TAFEs and universities as well as Indigenous education 
institutes. Indigenous people are now co-managers of some national parks 
and involved in land and water management beyond parks. The federal 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 has also enabled Indigenous 
people a degree of self-government on the local level.79 Moreover, on the 
level of the individual, many Indigenous people have more options in 
their lives than ever before. But, as Stan Grant remarked, Indigenous 
successes such as these are ignored in the face of an overwhelming narrative 
of failure:
65 per cent of Indigenous people in Australia (360,000) are 
employed and living lives, materially and socio-economically, 
like those of other Australians … There is a story here, a story 
largely untold. It is a story of success and how it is spurned like an 
unwanted child.80
Such achievements, on the individual and communal level, must have 
a historical explanation. We suggest they can be explained historically 
by the operation of three strands of self-determination identified in this 
book: international law, Indigenous political ambition and the policy 
suites that issued from the 1960s and were declared as ‘self-determination’ 
in the 1970s.
Of course, the achievements of self-determination have also been uneven. 
This very unevenness has, perhaps, contributed to the widespread view 
that self-determination failed entirely. On the level of the individual, 
many of those who were best able to take advantage of self-determination 
were those who had experienced policies of assimilation most intensely. 
We see this in the ways that mission and church leaders rose to positions 
of secular leadership under self-determination. We also see this in the ways 
that skills some gained under assimilation policies, particularly literacy in 
English, became useful and politically potent. Indigenous women have, 
perhaps, been better positioned to take advantage of self-determination 
on an individual level, despite their marginal role in some formal 
institutions of self-determination. The gendering of assimilation around 
feminine domesticity in some ways created employment opportunities for 
Indigenous women under the economic changes of 1980s as well as kinds 
79  Falk and Martin, ‘Misconstruing Indigenous Sovereignty’, 41.
80  Grant, ‘The Australian Dream’, 68.
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of jobs in demand (particularly in administration, health and education) 
under self-determination.81 It is also true, however, that women bore the 
brunt of what are often identified as self-determination’s failures: drug and 
alcohol abuse, family violence and community disorder. The gendering of 
self-determination is an area that requires further research.
In linking assimilation and self-determination in this way we are 
presenting a contestable history of ‘assimilation’. We would argue that, 
in many ways, assimilation policies created a class of people ready to 
take advantage of self-determination policies. But this was not because 
they were assimilated; on the contrary, many of them had already joined 
together to denounce and oppose assimilation. The political experience 
of resistance to assimilatory policies and the creation of pan-Aboriginal 
identities in opposition to assimilation laid the ground for even greater 
gains in the 1970s. As Grant put it:
Assimilation was about how government tried to control this 
‘problem’, but it was also about how we negotiated this new reality 
… It is a mark of the strength of Aboriginal people that they not 
only endured this, but responded with renewed demands for 
equality and rights. The Aboriginal political movement found its 
voice, campaigning for full citizenship and jobs.82
It was not necessarily easy for Indigenous people who were most 
acculturated to settler colonial society to adopt the empowered positions 
that self-determination policies created. Often these very people faced new 
challenges of legitimation to their communities under self-determination. 
They were sometimes seen as too ‘Aboriginal’ for the state, but too ‘white’ 
for many Indigenous activists. As Francesca Merlan points out, in the 
1970s, the very people who were ‘marching in the front ranks towards 
assimilation’ became, in some contexts, ‘marginal to a policy that now 
valorised Aborigines’ cultural continuity’.83 
81  Haebich, Spinning the Dream, 124.
82  Grant, ‘The Australian Dream’, 77.
83  Merlan, Dynamics of Difference, 163–64.
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The future of self‑determination
Self-determination continues as a topic for Indigenous Australian 
political theory.84 We conclude by pointing to two questions faced in such 
theoretical work.
First, the federal structure of the settler colonial state provides 
opportunities. As Will Sanders’s survey of local government reminds 
us, it is not only at the national level that significant policy decisions 
are made: Australian federalism also makes sub-national governments 
effective shapers of the processes through which Indigenous Australians 
are governed and through which they may govern themselves. At the time 
of writing, two jurisdictions (Victoria and the Northern Territory) are 
considering agreements with the Aboriginal people whose countries fall 
within their borders. Both jurisdictions will create models from which the 
other six sub-national jurisdictions will learn.
Second, the relationship between the individual ‘self ’ and the collective 
‘self ’ is becoming problematic as people enact the right to self-
identification. Mick Dodson declared in 1994 that ‘the right to control 
one’s own identity is part of the broader right to self-determination; that 
is, the right of a people to determine its political status and to pursue its 
own economic, social and cultural development’.85 In this formulation, 
the dual meaning of ‘one’ (a person, a people) presents a question of 
identity that remains to be resolved by Aboriginal communities.
The roots of this second problem are found in one of the policy changes 
that  blurs the temporal boundary between ‘assimilation’ and ‘self-
determination’ policy eras. Australian practices of self-determination 
include a census questionnaire, reformed between the 1966 and 1971 
censuses, that allows a person to identity as ‘Aboriginal’ without the 
respondent having to consider whether he or she is ‘half ’ or ‘one-quarter’ 
Aboriginal (as he/she was obliged to do in the 1966 Census). In confidential 
responses to the census, the claim to be Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander is not subject to any qualifying ‘blood’ test: the individual is truly 
autonomous in self-identification. However, Indigenous identity is also 
a public matter in that policy regimes attach finite, palpable benefits to 
successful assertions of Indigenous identity. Those who consider themselves 
84  For example Vivian et al., ‘Indigenous Self-government’.
85  Dodson, ‘The Wentworth Lecture the End in the Beginning’, 5.
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entitled, as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander persons, have an interest in 
policing the boundary between who can have the benefit and who cannot. 
Nakata is critical of the Australian Government’s identification protocol 
for conferring on Indigenous ‘community’ organisations a responsibility 
to inspect and verify (or not) an individual’s public assertion of Aboriginal 
or Torres Strait Islander status.
Alexis Wright recently asked: ‘What kind of people are we?’ She answered: 
‘We are becoming more complicated. Were we ever more individualistic 
in spirit than we are today?’86 One recent ethnographic inscription of 
‘Indigeneity’ highlighted the individual as the unit of ‘self-determination’. 
According to a study of cultural practice in the Melbourne home 
of an Indigenous woman named Maree: ‘Culture-making occurs in 
a  self-determined place where Maree has curated safety and belonging 
for informal, intercultural exchanges exemplifying decolonising 
co-production in contemporary, cosmopolitan Melbourne’.87 As well, 
Elizabeth Watt and Emma Kowal have used recently collected interview 
data to illustrate the terms in which ‘an increasing number of Australians 
are identifying as Indigenous later in life’ – terms that may not persuade 
invigilating Indigenous organisations.88 The question of who is the ‘self ’ 
of Indigenous self-determination, it seems, will become more complex 
with more possible answers in coming years.
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PART ONE: 
SELF‑DETERMINATION 







How John Hunter and Aboriginal people 
in Arnhem Land anticipated official 
policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s
Chris Haynes
Introduction
The central figure of this chapter, John Hunter, was superintendent of the 
Maningrida Settlement on the Liverpool River estuary in Arnhem Land 
for most of the period between 1963 and 1973. Only 25 years old when 
first appointed in an acting capacity, a decade later he left Maningrida 
as a polarising figure. As Dan Gillespie, with whom I worked at both 
Maningrida and, later, Kakadu National Park, noted:
Though shy and retiring Hunter had a strong personality, a fine wit 
and a huge capacity for work of all kinds; the Aboriginal people of 
Maningrida looked on him with respect and affection; [and] the 
European population’s reaction to him varied from considerable 
respect to an intense dislike.1 
1  Gillespie, ‘John Hunter and Maningrida’, 2.
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Respect and affection for him were commonly expressed by Aboriginal 
people around Maningrida when I conducted interviews there during 
2013; Wulaki man Ngaraidj Morogopina, for example: ‘He was the one 
… who helped us, always [to do what we wished to do]. He worked day 
and night and would always do what he said’.2
Gillespie went on to remark that ‘Hunter’s support in word and deed 
for Aboriginal people’s right to basic equalities’ generated the ire of the 
European population.3 Gillespie’s informed opinion, based on several 
years as a teacher and art and craft outlet manager at Maningrida in the 
early 1970s, takes us to major issues of this chapter: (1) the playing out 
of official policy, determined in Canberra, in this remote setting; (2) the 
issues that so polarised the ‘balandas’, that is, the European population; 
(3) the agency of a relatively junior, albeit locally powerful, official working 
in partnership with local Aboriginal people; and (4) Aboriginal people’s 
pursuit of ‘basic equalities’, but as they, not policymakers in Canberra or 
other balandas, perceived them. This last point is linked to the first, my 
argument being that Maningrida’s Aboriginal people, assisted by Hunter, 
expressed their self-determination through their decision to establish 
outstations. In this chapter we will see how Aboriginal people and 
Hunter’s actions together anticipated formalisation of self-determination 
as policy under the Whitlam Government; and that such actions made for 
structural change, affecting large groups of people. Before exploring these 
issues, I turn first to the historical background of the town and the forces 
that brought it to where it was in Hunter’s time.
Making Maningrida and its part in the 
assimilation program
It is difficult to imagine how remote Maningrida was when Hunter became 
acting superintendent in 1963; these days it is possible to drive from the 
Northern Territory capital, Darwin, to Maningrida in a matter of hours. 
Although a very rough exploratory track from Oenpelli had been cut in 
the dry season of that year, the settlement (as it was called back then) was 
reached only by boat or light aircraft. For many years after, the road trip 
from Darwin to Maningrida would take two or more days.4
2  Recently deceased people are identified here, and later, by subsection and clan names.
3  Gillespie, ‘John Hunter and Maningrida’, 2.
4  Long, The Go-Betweens, 130.
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The state established a permanent presence in 1957 when the first 
Government Manager, David Drysdale, sailed into the Liverpool River 
estuary with his wife, Ingrid, and two patrol officers, Ted Egan and 
Trevor Milikins.5 The details of Maningrida’s early years are well described 
by Ingrid Drysdale and, more recently, by a Darwin-based historian, 
Helen Bond-Sharp.6 They depict the evolution of a tiny bush camp into 
a  settlement, as it was officially proclaimed by the Director of Welfare, 
Harry Giese, in the Northern Territory Administration (NTA), in 1961.7
By 1961 Giese had articulated a coherent role for the settlements as 
a practical way of enacting the Commonwealth’s assimilation policy in 
places where more traditionally based Aboriginal people lived, as expressed 
in the Welfare Branch Annual Report for 1958–59:
The main purposes of these establishments are:
i. to bring natives together into a community and to teach them 
the habits and skills of living in such a community;
ii. to provide welfare services fitted to their needs and to their 
stage of social development;
iii. to provide the means whereby training may be given, 
particularly to children and adolescents;
iv. to introduce the general concept of ‘work’ as a worthwhile aim 
in life; and 
v. to develop in the younger and middle age-groups an attitude 
that the settlements and mission statements are there to 
provide health and education services for their children, so 
that the latter may be prepared for a future life as adults living 
in a wider community than the tribe.8
By the standards of today, these objectives were blatant social engineering 
that, as we will see, met with increasing resistance – at Maningrida and 
elsewhere. Yet they set the framework under which Hunter and other 
superintendents were required to work, especially in the early years. 
And so, consistent with such policy, by 1961 Maningrida had a ‘town 
plan’, with built up roads laid out on a grid. Tracks spidered out from 
the settlement into surrounding country and there had been considerable 
building and other development: a health clinic, school, government 
5  Drysdale and Durack, The End of Dreaming, 79.
6  Bond-Sharp, Maningrida, 52–95.
7  Drysdale and Durack, The End of Dreaming, 77.
8  NTA, Welfare Branch, Annual Report 1958–59, 30.
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offices, housing for government officers, a 4-hectare fruit and vegetable 
garden and a sawmill, for example. There was even a kitchen to provide 
meals for those people considered unable to fend for themselves. Out of 
town, a project to develop local forests was getting underway.
The NTA’s original vision for Maningrida did not materialise as intended. 
Consistent with the detailed strategies that had been developed before the 
Second World War by the NTA’s parent department, the Department of 
the Interior, and its minister, John McEwen, the initial intention had been 
to allow Aboriginal people on reserves such as Arnhem Land to remain 
undisturbed and the lands to be protected from exploitation.9 Arnhem 
Land had been made an Aboriginal reserve in 1931 and, although there 
had been a few patrols around Maningrida before and after the war, 
policymakers still considered it to be a very wild and untamed part of 
Australia in the early 1950s. Hence it seemed wise for the state to tread 
cautiously; besides, both financial resources and manpower in that postwar 
period were scarce. The small trading post that had been set up by patrol 
officers Syd Kyle-Little and Jack Doolan in 1949, although considered 
successful, was abandoned at the end of that year because these men were 
needed elsewhere.10
Yet, there were other aspects of the McEwen policy that called for 
intervention; for example, provision for the immediate medical and 
physical needs of all Aboriginal people, wherever they were.11 Patrol officers 
reported widespread chronic diseases, notably yaws and leprosy, among 
the hundreds of people living in the vicinity of the Liverpool River. Their 
treatment required frequent nursing care that could not be provided from 
Darwin or even Goulburn Island and Millingimbi missions. By 1956 
Harry Giese had decided the time was right to establish Maningrida as a 
station and, with the strong support of the Minister for Territories, Paul 
Hasluck, pushed ahead with its establishment the following year. Their 
intention had been to make a more permanent version of what Kyle-Little 
and Doolan had done in 1949; people from the bush could come in to 
trade crocodile skins and artefacts, receive healthcare and return to their 
homelands. Almost immediately, however, in an act of self-determination, 
they stayed around the new station, returning to homelands only for 
hunting and ceremonies. 
9  McEwen, ‘The Northern Territory’, 5.
10  Kyle-Little, Whispering Wind, 172–74; Long, The Go-Betweens, 85–88.
11  McEwen, ‘The Northern Territory’, 1, 11.
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The more or less permanent movement of the Aboriginal people to the 
station broadened the state’s ambition for Maningrida. The transition 
from trading post and health service provision to proclaimed settlement 
took place within very few years. With the permanent settlement of 
Aboriginal people it became possible for Maningrida to become a site 
for the implementation of the assimilation policy as articulated in the 
Welfare Branch’s 1958–59 policy on settlements, discussed above. Thus, 
very soon Maningrida was to see not only the small enterprises that 
Aboriginal people themselves had developed (sales of crocodile skins and 
artefacts) but also Western style (mostly primary) industries that could be 
undertaken by people without formal education. As can be seen from the 
annual reports of the Welfare Branch through the late 1950s and early 
1960s, there was an almost formulaic approach to primary industries.12 
Thus, nearly all settlements had gardens, piggeries, poultry, cattle runs 
and dairies. Maningrida, with its good rainfall and soils, seemed to offer 
much greater opportunity than many other settlements: big, ambitious 
projects in fisheries, forestry and sawmilling.
Hasluck had been pursuing forestry as a potential industry for the 
Northern Territory from when he took office in 1951. He got the scent 
of its possibilities after hearing mildly positive reports from foresters 
serving there during the war. The Commonwealth Forestry and Timber 
Bureau, the government’s official source of forestry advice, had sent 
a professional forester, Bill Bateman, to evaluate the prospects of forestry. 
His report was, to Hasluck’s disappointment, equivocal.13 It indicated 
only limited potential for commercial development of existing forests 
and urged caution about the possibilities of plantations. Notwithstanding 
Hasluck’s impatience for a positive story, G. J. Rodger, Director General 
of the bureau, followed up with blunt advice to the head of Hasluck’s 
department, C. R. Lambert, in February 1958. His opening sentence, 
‘there are no forests of consequence of economic value in the Territory 
at the present day and, at the best, the climate and soils are marginal for 
the growth of trees in forest’, set the tone for a critical appraisal of what 
Hasluck was pursuing.14 
12  See, for example, NTA, Welfare Branch, Annual Report 1963–64.
13  Bateman, Forestry.
14  Memo from G. J. Rodger, Director General, 19 February 1958, National Archives of Australia 
(hereafter NAA) A452, 1957/82 Part 1.
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Despite the advice, Hasluck pushed a forestry program for the Northern 
Territory through Cabinet later that year.15 The program was modest 
and ‘experimental’ but was the basis of a start to forestry operations at 
Maningrida in 1961. Operated initially by the Forestry and Timber Bureau 
itself and, after 1968, as a branch of the NTA – not under the Welfare 
Branch, as Hasluck himself emphatically, but quite incorrectly, claimed 
in his autobiography – it was (like fisheries) to prove a major cause of 
frustration and anguish for Hunter later in the 1960s.16 Although Hasluck 
had pushed the program largely as a means to benefit local Aboriginal 
people, the foresters took almost exclusive charge and, as we will see, not 
even Giese was able to influence their approach.17 The conceptualisation 
and management of both the forestry and fisheries programs were 
completely outside the experience of local Aboriginal people; and that had 
much to do with the ultimate failures of these programs some years later.
Hunter as the Welfare Branch man
One of the 1939 McEwen policies was to establish a cadre of patrol officers 
to bring some cohesion to contact between the state and Aboriginal 
people throughout the Northern Territory. By the time Giese started as 
director in 1954, a handful of such officers were in place, but there were 
not nearly enough of them to do what Giese considered necessary. Again, 
backed by Hasluck, Giese set about negotiating training for recruits 
to the service through the Australian School of Pacific Administration 
(ASOPA), already doing such work for Papua New Guinea. Recruitment 
was initiated at the same time but with disappointing results. Interest 
among the kinds of men he hoped to recruit was patchy and most of 
the applicants did not meet the high standards that Giese expected.18 
Although feminist critics of Commonwealth policies in the 1930s have 
since pointed to the advantages of appointing female protectors, neither 
McEwen nor his successors recruited women as patrol officers, and none 
had been recruited by the time the service was discontinued in 1973.19
15  NAA Cabinet papers, A4926, decision 1557.
16  Hasluck, Shades of Darkness, 114.
17  Hasluck, Shades of Darkness, 114.
18  NAA F1, 1956/557; NAA F1, 1956/2663.
19  Holland, Just Relations, 239–41.
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Raised on a small farm with oyster leases near Bega, New South Wales, 
Hunter knew many Koori kids as he grew up, contributing to his interest in 
working with Aboriginal people. Unusual for someone of a rural background 
at that time, he passed his Leaving Certificate and was thus immediately 
able to take up a clerical position in the Welfare Branch in Darwin, arriving 
only a few months after Giese in 1955. Too young to be a patrol officer, 
he waited 18 months before being selected to undertake the year-long 
Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) course in 1958. He 
passed only moderately well, but well enough to be sent to Alice Springs 
where he remained for most of the time until the late 1963 appointment 
to Maningrida. Although he had spent several months as superintendent 
at Areyonga, it was a big step for someone so young. He left the post after 
about 18 months, in April 1965. It is not clear whether he was pushed out 
or asked to be relieved. Perhaps it was by mutual agreement. He told me 
years later, ‘I made a mess of it, just too young for the responsibilities of 
the job’.20 In any event he went back to patrol work and a period as acting 
superintendent at Bamyili (now Barunga) before returning to Maningrida 
in September 1966. At first he was acting superintendent before he was 
confirmed in the position about a year later. He was still only 27.
Following assimilationist policy
By the time Hunter arrived, more than 400 Aboriginal people were 
living in the settlement. Their more or less permanent residence made 
it easier to  give people medical attention, but the continuing presence 
of such a large number of people in a small area created many social 
and administrative problems. Inter-clan tensions that were aggravated 
by the relatively cramped spaces of the settlement would often escalate 
into mass spear fights, for instance.21 Hunter and his predecessors seemed 
to take these in their stride, able to mobilise their experience as patrol 
officers and the clear authority vested in the position of superintendent. 
In  a  popular article in the National Geographic, journalist Kenneth 
MacLeish gives us a glimpse of how Hunter dealt with such an issue in 
1971 or 1972, towards the end of his term there:
20  The conversations to which I refer mostly took place either as we drove together in the bush 
around Maningrida or in one or the other’s houses between 1972 and 1977. I had got to know 
Hunter when, as a junior forester for the NTA, I approached him about ways in which the Forestry 
Branch could work better with Maningrida’s Aboriginal people in 1972.
21  Drysdale and Durack, The End of Dreaming, 102–4.
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After dark, superintendent John Hunter returned to his house 
looking tired and carrying three spears. ‘Family troubles again,’ 
he told his colleague [Assistant Superintendent] Wilders. ‘Brian’s 
mob were getting ugly. They’re Rembarnga. One of their women 
wouldn’t stay with her husband, who belongs to another tribe and 
speaks another language. He protested, and the Rembarnga got 
their spears. I had to take them away. What’s for tea?’22
The article captures the tiredness resulting from Hunter’s long days in the 
field and from the additional work after dark; it also conveys Hunter’s 
confidence in carrying out his tasks. Such fights, and domestic conflicts, 
were almost routine. From the point of view of the government, there was 
no doubt that settlement residents must follow the white man’s law. That 
was a matter Aboriginal people everywhere accepted only reluctantly.
The inter-clan tensions were accompanied by the not so well-known 
tensions among an already large population of balandas – nurses (who 
were present at the start of the settlement), schoolteachers, managers and 
foremen. Managers and foremen were there to teach and supervise tasks 
that required only minimal training for the industries discussed above. 
The balandas were also there to build and service the material apparatus 
of assimilation: the school, the clinic, public offices, houses (all for other 
balandas in those early days), the garden and all the rest. Some of these 
functions, for example, teaching, forestry and health, were performed by 
people who did not report to the superintendent; the officers in charge 
of such units sometimes having to deal with social and disciplinary 
problems that arose beyond Hunter’s responsibility and even, sometimes, 
his knowledge. All the same, the superintendent and the other balanda 
authorities needed to liaise – and Hunter had to deal with social tensions 
that were an inevitable feature of a colonial outpost, especially among 
those balandas who reported to him directly. 
The petty disputes that challenged his predecessors were an ever-present 
feature of Hunter’s tenure and they were among the reasons he left the 
post in 1965.23 Such disputes were still there when he returned in 1966, 
but he was now more confident about handling them. He often told 
me he did not expect to be backed by his superiors on matters of staff 
discipline, and he learnt to ignore all but the most serious trouble among 
22  MacLeish, ‘The Top End’, 171.
23  See, for example, Report on dispute by M. Ivory, 10 October 1961, NAA E460, 1976/460 Part 1.
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the balandas.24 Gillespie’s observation at the beginning of this chapter 
that ‘the European population’s reaction to him [Hunter] varied from 
considerable respect to an intense dislike’ reflects a population polarised 
before Hunter’s time.25 A minority were, like Hunter, seriously interested, 
even at times enchanted, by what we now call the ‘otherness’ of the local 
Aboriginal people, but most found relationships with Aboriginal people 
awkward and stilted, often expressing barely concealed attitudes of white 
superiority. Some even referred to Aboriginal people as ‘rock apes’ or 
used similarly outrageous terms. We might note that while Giese was 
very discerning in his selection of patrol officers, he did not scrutinise 
all settlement employees in the same way. The increasing polarisation in 
balanda attitudes was strikingly evident in the local paper, The Maningrida 
Mirage, through the late 1960s and early 1970s.26 In what I have called 
‘separate group discourse’, Europeans talked among themselves about 
Aboriginal people (and vice versa) and about the other Europeans who 
held alternative world views.27 Hunter’s understanding of this difficult 
sociality was more sophisticated than the rest of us held at the time; indeed, 
it is only much more recently that the outlooks of isolated populations of 
balandas have been the subject of academic study.28
The industrial arm of assimilation
Returning to the statement about the purpose of settlements, we see how 
major effort was being made to re-form Aboriginal social organisation 
around Western institutions. The logics of words and phrases like 
‘teaching’ and ‘the general concept of “work”’ flowed seamlessly into 
phasing out traditional hunting and gathering, for example, to be 
replaced by locally produced Western food. Such modes of production 
were to be taught and it was assumed that Aboriginal people would adopt 
them. When Hunter arrived, the settlement boasted a 4-hectare garden 
and arrangements were well underway for a cattle herd, poultry yard and 
some dairy cows, these being delivered soon afterwards. He dutifully kept 
all these activities propped up against considerable logistical and technical 
24  See also NAA F941, 1966/13.
25  Gillespie, ‘John Hunter and Maningrida’, 2.
26  ‘Newsletters (Maningrida Mirage)’, AIATSIS, accessed October 2019, aiatsis.gov.au/collections/
collections-online/digitised-collections/maningrida-mirage-newsletters/newsletters-maningrida-mirage.
27  Haynes, ‘The Value of Work’.
28  See, for example, Kowal, ‘The Politics of the Gap’; Lea, Bureaucrats.
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difficulties. These included maintaining a cadre of balanda managers and 
other technical experts, and the social problems associated with this group 
that I have already discussed; but there were also problems in simply 
getting systems to work productively. A major technical issue emerged in 
1964, early on Hunter’s watch, when the water supply for the settlement 
failed and much of the garden that had offered so much promise had to 
be abandoned.29 
Giese originally had ambitious plans for even more projects that would 
lead to Western style self-sufficiency. Just before Hunter arrived in 1963, 
he set out a manifesto for the development of projects that included 
the beef cattle herd mentioned above.30 Considerable work went into 
building fences, sowing pasture grasses and the introduction of a herd 
from Bamyili. By 1968, despite Hunter’s own particular interest in this 
endeavour, it was clear that the cattle were failing to thrive and the project 
would have to be abandoned. In what turned out to be a good example of 
fertile collaboration between the superintendent and the director, Hunter 
recommended that they find another location, well south of Maningrida, 
at Bulman. This is a story that we pick up again in a later section where 
I discuss Hunter’s capacity to turn assimilationist projects to ends that 
suited the Aboriginal people themselves. Meanwhile, this example also 
demonstrates that Giese was prepared to listen and adapt, an aptitude for 
which he has not always been given credit.
Good as he was at garnering resources for the settlements, Giese was often 
frustrated by the lack of technical expertise within the Welfare Branch, 
no more so than when confronted with the major projects located at 
Maningrida: forestry, sawmilling and fisheries. Notwithstanding Hasluck’s 
belief that forestry was under the Welfare Branch’s control, others had 
decided that these three projects would be controlled from other NTA 
branches. A sawmill was originally built and staffed by Welfare Branch 
personnel, but two years after the original mill burnt down in 1967, NTA 
Assistant Administrator Martyn Finger transferred control of the new mill 
to the Forestry Branch. Giese argued hard to retain control of the sawmill 
but was overruled.31 Hunter protested to Giese that at Maningrida he 
had no power to supervise the increasing band of local forestry people, 
let alone their superiors visiting from Darwin. To Hunter’s list of 
29  Bond-Sharp, Maningrida, 85–86.
30  NAA F1, 1962/287.
31  NAA F1, 1975/2181.
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complaints about the mill (over issues such as location and size) were 
added a growing number from out in the bush. Aboriginal people were 
increasingly distraught at the Forestry Branch invading sacred sites and 
ceremonial grounds and at branch attempts to stop fires that Aboriginal 
people considered part of traditional practice and ‘right’ for the country.32 
Ignoring these complaints, the Forestry Branch acted as if it had no need 
to consult people at Maningrida, continuing to offend both Hunter and 
the Aboriginal people whom he was attempting to represent.
Hunter also objected to the way that the administration promoted fisheries. 
In 1965, the government built a supposedly pilot fisheries factory. Like 
the sawmill, the factory was soon proven, in Hunter’s assessment, to be 
inappropriate for purpose, and it was hardly used. Although the potential 
Aboriginal fishers were keen and capable, the project was seriously 
underfunded by the NTA Primary Industries Branch, an important 
consequence of which was that the fisheries officer was at Maningrida 
for only half the time. This had a further consequence: that leadership 
and supervision of the project were inadequate.33 Moreover, the first 
boats were totally unsuitable, being too big and unwieldy for the local 
conditions, and they fell into disuse very quickly.
In 1969 the superintendent, exasperated by lack of meaningful response 
to his many memos to Giese, found a new way to express himself. Recently 
elected as first president of the newly formed Maningrida Progress 
Association (MPA), he used his new hat to approach William Charles 
Wentworth, minister with special responsibilities for Aboriginal affairs, 
appointed by Prime Minister Gorton earlier that year.34 Wentworth’s 
presentations to Cabinet often clashed with the Minister for the Interior, 
Peter Nixon (Country Party), who considered the Northern Territory 
a Country Party domain and resented Wentworth’s advocacy of new 
policy.35 Hunter was not to know that his representations to Wentworth 
would be just one of many issues already causing considerable tension 
between Wentworth and Country Party ministers. 
32  Haynes, ‘Submission’; Haynes, ‘The Pattern’.
33  NAA F1, 1967/1674.
34  In the early 1960s a group of welfare officers and others had formed a cooperative society, mainly 
to help them buy stores at cheaper rates from Darwin. Over the decade they opened a store which 
proved popular with Aboriginal people as well and by 1968 it was decided to broaden its franchise 
and reincorporate as the MPA. 
35  Rowse, Obliged to be difficult, 42–46.
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Hunter’s letter targeted both forestry and fisheries, expressing frustration 
that while these projects showed promise for economic independence, they 
paid too little attention to the needs of Aboriginal people.36 He invited 
Wentworth to come and see for himself. The letter caused a major stir 
because Hunter had sent a courtesy copy to Giese and it was passed up 
the line much faster than usual. Before Wentworth had read it he received 
a ‘warning off’ letter from Doug Anthony, Acting Minister for the Interior. 
Wentworth punched back, telling his ministerial colleague that he would 
go and see whatever he wanted and, in due time, he went to Maningrida. 
Simultaneously, embarrassed senior officers in the Department of the 
Interior intended to charge Hunter with a breach of the Public Service 
Regulations. Although eventually heeding the advice of their legal counsel 
that the charge would not succeed, they remained irritated by this junior 
officer’s cheeky intervention. When Giese reminded Hunter of the need 
to keep him informed, Hunter replied with another blast from the field: 
The inability, or unwillingness, of the Forestry to play their part 
in our work at Maningrida is a source of great disappointment 
to me. … [T]he timber development and the advancement of 
Maningrida people are well and truly bound together … but this 
is not being done to the fullest advantage. … In regard to fisheries 
the same comments will apply. I could not attempt to express the 
bitterness I have felt at being associated with such a monumental 
example of a good thing gone wrong. The plant is there, the fish 
are available, the people are enthusiastic, but the Government 
has been weak. If ever the spirit of the N.T. Administration were 
epitomised in one manifestation, then the Maningrida Fishery is 
just that.37
In the years following this episode Hunter told me (and anyone else willing 
to listen) that he saw forestry as a key part of Maningrida’s development, 
but ‘it was [also] a good thing gone wrong’. Although the enterprise 
employed (and trained) people and much of the roading done by forestry 
was widely appreciated, there was no consultation with Aboriginal people 
until much later. This is what Hunter meant by the project ‘not being done 
to the fullest advantage’. Regarding fisheries, Hunter found less cause for 
complaint when the government opted out of its failed enterprise and 
the MPA took over fishing. The MPA had the flexibility to better match 
technology with Aboriginal aspirations.
36  Maningrida Progress Association to Wentworth, 10 June 1969, NAA F1, 1967/1674.
37  Hunter to Giese, memo, 23 December 1969, NAA F1, 1967/1674.
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Self‑determination Maningrida style
Just as whole groups of people settling in Maningrida in the late 1950s 
were an act of Aboriginal self-determination, so were the choices of those 
who chose to remain in their homelands, living more or less as their 
forbears had for millennia. In deciding to eschew the settlement, these 
leaders made the tough decision to remain self-sufficient and relatively 
independent. Recognising and admiring these characteristics early in his 
tenure, Hunter made and maintained contact with these small groups 
for the whole time he was at Maningrida. He also admired the way 
hundreds of people would leave Maningrida to celebrate the Kunipippi 
and other ceremonies in their homelands. Right from his earliest days, 
back in 1963, when occasionally visiting people out at the ceremonies 
he noticed a remarkable change in demeanour in the very people who, in 
the settlement, would gather in supplication outside his office day after 
day. Here those same people were totally independent, going about the 
business in hand without a sideways look at the superintendent.
The opportunity to put the increased amenity afforded in the settlement 
together with the much greater energy and vigour that went with self-
reliance on the homelands came in 1968. The failures of the settlement 
water supply in 1964 and 1965 made it clear that the gardens were not 
a viable proposition in the long term. Hunter had begun an investigation 
of the country surrounding Maningrida from the time he had arrived, 
sometimes with other welfare staff and sometimes with Aboriginal guides 
alone.38 Sometime in the mid-1960s Aboriginal guides led him to a large 
waterhole on the Cadell River, about 50 kilometres from Maningrida, 
Gochan Giny-jirra, a central place for the Gun-nartpa language people.39 
Hunter persuaded Giese that this site, with its good deep loam and 
adequate water supply, would be ideal for a larger commercial proposition 
and, as Giese well recognised, an outstation.40 Access was aided by the 
expansion of the forestry road network in 1968, and in 1970 the newly 
formed MPA under the leadership of an energetic new manager, Glen 
Bagshaw, took over its running. (Later Senator) Bob Collins, the first on-
site manager, set up a garden that was as productive as the Maningrida 
38  See, for example, Long, The Go-Betweens, 130; England et al. Gun-ngaypa rrawa, 96–106.
39  I am following the orthography of England et al., Gun-ngaypa rrawa, for all Gun-nartpa language 
names.
40  NAA E460, 1983/487.
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garden had been years earlier. Its progress was accompanied by an almost 
complete exodus of Gun-nartpa people from Maningrida. Some, both 
men and women, worked for wages but, arguably as important, Gochan 
Giny-jirra was now a focus of decentralisation. A self-determining people 
had voted not with words or a ballot box, but with their feet.
In that same period (1968–71), Hunter took advantage of the failure of 
beef cattle husbandry at the settlement, discussed earlier. The fact that 
Bulman, where he found fertile soils, good water supplies and potential 
for both cattle and buffalo, was nearly 200 kilometres south did not worry 
Giese, who authorised good levels of funding for the trial.41 Ultimately 
that project lapsed, but it provided the opportunity for members of the 
group that Hunter considered troublesome, ‘Brian’s mob’ of the National 
Geographic article, to decentralise and live more independently.42 Both 
this group and those at Gochan Giny-jirra received minimal services that 
helped smooth the way back into bush living. Both cases represent a team 
effort: between the Aboriginal people themselves, who had to accept 
responsibility for their actions; Hunter, who acted as their intermediary, 
formulating plans that would be palatable to Giese; and Giese, who 
found the funds to support the enterprises. Giese’s decision implies that, 
by 1968 at least, the harshness of the settlement policy was softening 
and, incidentally, foreshadowed changes in policy under the McMahon 
Government in 1971.
The momentum towards this form of self-determination was unstoppable, 
with many other groups following the Gun-nartpa and Bulman groups 
back to homelands. As Jon Altman records in detail for the Kuninjku 
language group, many did not wait for financial assistance, simply going 
out with limited material benefits to build traditional bark huts and make 
use of traditional food and ‘stay on country’.43 They went for many reasons: 
to escape the constant inter-clan tensions noted earlier; to get beyond 
the constant gaze of the balandas who by 1968 were flooding into the 
settlement to drive the assimilatory apparatus there; to keep a necessary 
watchful eye on Forestry Branch balandas and the miners who were, in 
those days, starting to go wherever they liked within their untrammelled 
exploration licences; and, perhaps most of all, to gain succour from being 
on the country of their ancestors.
41  NAA F1, 1973/4731.
42  Most of them ultimately resettled in outstations closer to Maningrida. 
43  Altman, ‘Imagining Mumeka’, 283–87.
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It would be wrong to say Hunter and the movement around Maningrida 
were unique in this period. Missionaries to the east and west were 
supporting similar decentralisation movements. They did not have to 
report to the director in the same detail as the welfare superintendents, 
however. Nor did they contend with the antagonisms of balandas in the 
settlement who regarded the movement as a ‘step back into the stone age’, 
as I often heard. It would also be wrong to say that Hunter battled those 
balandas and many senior officers in the Welfare Branch on his own. 
As Gillespie notes, Hunter was encouraged by the continuous fieldwork 
of archaeologists-anthropologists, Rhys Jones and Betty Meehan, in 1972 
and 1973 with the Anbara Gidjingali people who had established an 
outstation at Gopanga on the mouth of the Blyth River.44 The Cadell is 
a tributary of the Blyth and it was possible to use the landing near the 
new gardens at Gochan Giny-jirra to gain access to the new outstation. 
Despite the hostility of the majority of balandas, Hunter was always 
supported from the time of his first arrival by Rev. Gowan Armstrong, 
the United Church of North Australia minister. From the late 1960s the 
list of supporters grew: Assistant Superintendent John Wilders; Progress 
Association manager Glen Bagshaw; Dan Gillespie himself and about 
a dozen teachers and others.
H. C. Coombs’s visit in 1972 also encouraged Hunter from the highest 
levels of government. Chair of the three-person policy advising group, 
the Council for Aboriginal Affairs, Coombs included Maningrida in 
his frequent travels to Aboriginal communities. The independence and 
demeanour of people living in the outstations, introduced to him by 
Hunter, made a strong impression.45 For Hunter, the contact with Coombs 
was very different from what he experienced within his own department 
and he told several people happily: ‘I’m on Nugget terms now!’ Coombs 
relished meeting outsiders. ‘I like people who don’t conform’, he had told 
the world on his retirement as governor of the Reserve Bank in 1967.46 
Hunter was content to be included in their number, and content also to 
have the admiration and encouragement of the relatively few balandas 
who were prepared to watch and learn from him. But, in the end, he 
was driven by the steely logic of the message he told anyone who was 
prepared to listen: ‘In all my years of working with Aboriginal people this 
[the outstation movement] is the only thing that has been initiated by 
44  Gillespie, ‘John Hunter and Maningrida’, 5.
45  Coombs, Kulinma, 65–66.
46  Rowse, Obliged to be Difficult, 3.
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them’.47 The regular visits to the outstations he was making after about 
1968 gave him the satisfaction of witnessing palpable independence and 
energy in self-determining groups. All the other industries and activities 
were dependent on initiative and supervision by the balandas who were 
increasingly dominant around the settlement.
Hunter finished at Maningrida in December 1973. The government had 
changed and ‘self-determination’ became the new government’s Aboriginal 
affairs policy. Although Hunter told me he welcomed the policy, that 
welcome was qualified because, like all the other superintendents, he was 
taken away from Maningrida for much of that year to attend reorientation 
courses for the ‘old welfare’ staff. He felt constrained by his enforced 
absences. Nevertheless, he was able to push through many requests that 
came from Aboriginal people, including those from the traditional owners 
of Maningrida itself, the Gunividji, who often complained to Hunter 
(and anyone else prepared to listen) that their country was being overrun 
by outsiders, both balandas and other Aboriginal people:
The Gunividji group at Maningrida are having more than their 
fair share of culture break-down problems being experienced at 
Maningrida. This is showing up particularly in child delinquency; 
e.g. petrol sniffing, minor crime, vandalism and promiscuity 
… I am afraid that the group are suffering an accelerated rate 
of breakdown because of impingement on their area by other 
Aboriginals and Europeans.48
He was gratified that most of the arguments he advanced (like this one) 
were accepted and that his requests were approved. But time was short, 
exacerbated by his promotion to a position in Darwin at the end of the 
year. He used that position to make great changes at Maningrida in 1974, 
but he left frustrated and disappointed at not being able to do more to 
assist Aboriginal people – at the very time that the self-determination they 
had all so courageously pursued in previous years now had the backing of 
the new government.49
In his parting message in The Maningrida Mirage, Hunter reflected, among 
many other issues, on the richness of Aboriginal culture, how we balanda 
had failed to listen and take note, and how Maningrida was a piece of 
47  Personal communication to author.
48  NAA E460, 1976/1108.
49  Bond-Sharp, Maningrida, 162–77.
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colonialism over which Aboriginal people had no say, concluding that 
his taking leave was encumbered by a sense of personal failure.50 With 
Gillespie, my view is that he achieved a great deal, much of which carried 
on in later years. He made structural changes that go to much more 
than individual choice. True, the passage of the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 allowed Aboriginal custom more influence, 
but I argue here the work of Hunter and his Aboriginal partners paved the 
way for self-determination by whole groups of people, not just individuals. 
The final words about him should be from an Aboriginal voice, the late 
Bangardi Mildjingi, who worked closely with Hunter:
He was a good man, you know, he was helping people, talk about 
land, everything, take you back home, where you belonging, you 
out from [the] Maningrida yard, like bulliki … and you go home, 
to make your own stations and that’s why this work, Hunter’s work, 
made everything good, you know, like go back to your outstation, 
establish your home, everything. And we did, yo, from him.51
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PROTESTANT DOCTRINE OF 
SELF‑DETERMINATION IN THE 
NORTHERN TERRITORY
Laura Rademaker
Australia’s introduction of self-determination policy under the Whitlam 
Government in 1973 is often portrayed as the end of both the ‘assimilation 
era’ and ‘mission era’. Yet Christian missionaries, while holding various 
views about the Whitlam Government’s policy, also formulated and 
instituted their own visions of self-determination for Aboriginal people 
over the 1960s and 1970s. In many cases, the key planks of what 
became known as the self-determination policy (e.g. forms of Aboriginal 
representation and self-governance, Aboriginal-controlled industries 
and mother-tongue education) were present or developing on Christian 
missions before the 1970s. Focusing on discussions at the Northern 
Territory’s Missions Administration conferences and drawing on the 
mission archives, this chapter tracks the missions’ shift over the 1960s 
and early 1970s from assimilation to self-determination.
Elsewhere, I have explored the changing approaches of Anglican 
missionaries to assimilation in the 1960s, arguing that change was forced 
upon them by financial and political circumstances.1 The  assimilation 
program on missions was becoming financially, politically and 
intellectually unviable by the mid-1960s. In this chapter I focus on the 
1  Rademaker, ‘“Only Cuppa Tea”’; Rademaker, Found.
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intellectual bases of the missions’ innovations, arguing that the seeds 
of a Christian self-determination were present within the Protestant 
missionary conceptions of assimilation as these included the establishment 
of an ‘Indigenous church’.2 Rather than a revolution in missionary theory 
and practice, I find a gradual shift in emphasis on the question of how the 
‘Indigenous church’ would be realised.
This chapter also brings ‘secular’ and ‘spiritual’ visions of self-determination 
together, placing the missionaries’ visions for self-determination in their 
wider context, but also revealing the ways in which missionaries’ distinctly 
Christian missiologies of self-determination flowed into ‘secular’ spaces. 
Most research into Aboriginal self-determination has neglected mission 
histories; however, there are exceptions. Miranda Johnson noted the 
Australian Council of Churches’ calls in the early 1970s for Aboriginal 
land rights and argued that the churches considered self-determination 
and Aboriginal land rights more as spiritual than economic concerns.3 
With regard to the missions, Noel Loos argued there was a gradual shift 
in approach of the Australian Board of Missions over the 1960s and 
a devolution of responsibilities for Aboriginal communities to governments 
in Queensland. In 1967, its new policy ‘Acceptance: The Next Step 
Forward’ envisaged cultural pluralism.4 John Kadiba, in his study of the 
Methodist Overseas Mission (MOM), argued that missionaries deemed 
their traditional ‘Indigenous church’ principle impossible in Arnhem 
Land until the 1970s due to their concerns to achieve assimilation.5
In the Northern Territory, Christian missions were the Australian 
Government’s agent for implementing a policy of assimilating Aboriginal 
people into white Australia. According to the Director of Welfare, Harry 
Giese, this partnership between Christian missions and government was 
special and ‘unique in the world’.6 Missions were almost entirely dependent 
on governments for financial support and selectively engaged with various 
funding schemes. The missions received an annual government subsidy. 
2  The Catholic missions did not subscribe to this theory of mission, due to their different 
ecclesiology. Following the Nostra Aetate Declaration of the Second Vatican Council in 1965, they 
too made moves towards celebrating Aboriginal cultures and promoting Aboriginal leadership. 
Nostra Aetate’s teaching on the good in all cultures enabled what became known as ‘incarnating’ and 
‘inculturating’ the liturgy. While taking a different theological route, the Catholic missions reached 
similar practical conclusions to the Protestants. See Rademaker, ‘Going Native’.
3  Johnson, The Land, 52.
4  Loos, White Christ, 139.
5  Kadiba, ‘The Methodist Mission’, 214.
6  Northern Territory Archives Centre, Northern Territory Records Series (hereafter NTRS) 53, 
box 3.
61
2 . AN EMERGING PRoTESTANT DoCTRINE of SELf‑DETERMINATIoN IN THE NT
From 1942, Child Endowment payments were made available by the 
Commonwealth for children in institutions, so missions with dormitories 
began receiving 10 shillings per week per child in their care (the MOM’s 
rejection of dormitories, therefore, came at a considerable financial 
cost). Over the course of the 1950s, there was heavy investment by the 
Northern Territory Administration’s Welfare Branch in the development 
of missions. Missions were eligible for capital grants that covered the costs 
of purchasing livestock, equipment, buildings and vehicles (although the 
Missionaries of the Sacred Heart refused capital grants, believing these 
entangled church and state). The Welfare Branch also covered the costs 
of individual mission staff in particular roles. The range of government 
subsidies for missionary staff expanded over the 1950s, from covering 
only teachers and nurses in 1951 to many other roles by the 1960s, 
including agriculturalists, mechanics and hygiene assistants. Missions 
then pooled the funds from their subsidised positions to cover the costs of 
unsubsidised roles, particularly their chaplains.
The first Missions Administration Conference was held in 1948. From 
1953 they were held biennially and hosted by the Welfare Branch 
with representatives from various mission societies and government 
departments working in the Territory. By 1961, government delegates 
present included representatives from the departments of Social Services, 
Civil Aviation and Health, the Crown Law Office and Welfare Branch 
(including Harry Giese and Jeremy Long).7 On the mission side, delegates 
represented the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart and Catholic Diocese 
of Darwin, the Church of England Diocese of Carpentaria, Church 
Missionary Society (CMS), Aborigines Inland Mission, MOM, Baptist 
Union Home Mission and Finke River Mission of the United Evangelical 
Lutheran Church.8 At the conferences, delegates discussed overarching 
Aboriginal policy, mission funding and responsibilities as well as questions 
around Aboriginal employment, industry and education. These biennial 
gatherings were the primary site for discussion across mission organisations 
as well as for airing missions’ concerns to government; the conference was, 
in Lutheran missionary Paul Albrecht’s words, ‘one of the best venues 
for a round the table type discussion of the differences’ between missions 
and the Welfare Branch on ‘the whole question of helping Aboriginals 
find their place in the Australia of today’.9
7  National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA) F1, 1959/3380.
8  NAA F1, 1959/3380.
9  Paul Albrecht to Harry Giese, 17 May 1971, NTRS 56, box 7.
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Aboriginal choice and hasty assimilation
Missionaries often expressed frustration at the vagueness of government 
policy around assimilation and what it meant for the long-term prospects 
of the communities in which they operated. After consulting the MOM, 
the CMS’s Acting Secretary for Aborigines, Bishop Clive Kerle, wrote 
to Giese with what would seem basic questions about the policy for 
clarification at the 1961 conference: ‘what is the Government policy 
concerning the future of the mission stations?’ and ‘where in their plan 
for assimilation does the Missions fit?’10
The answer caused a stir. At the 1961 conference, Paul Hasluck presented 
a paper informing missionaries that their days were numbered. Although 
missions had always presumed that in the distant future they would 
withdraw and hand their authority to Aboriginal people, mission 
representatives were shocked when Hasluck suggested this might happen 
in only 20 years time (although Hasluck anticipated that the final 
‘completing of assimilation’ would take ‘two generations’ or 60 years). 
Hasluck stated that missions and settlements should ‘work ourselves out 
of a job’ because their objectives were to ‘help [Aboriginal people] become 
self-respecting and self-supporting members of the Australian community, 
living and working wherever they choose to live and work’.11
Missionaries had long expressed concern over the ‘pace’ of assimilation. 
Hasty assimilation, they argued, was against the wishes of Aboriginal 
people themselves, so could never create the self-standing citizens for 
which it supposedly aimed. If assimilation were to enable Aboriginal 
people to become ‘responsible’ citizens, rather than ‘pauperised’ persons, 
missionaries argued, then surely the desire to change must come from 
Aboriginal people themselves. In 1953, the MOM’s Arthur Ellemor 
was already raising concerns that assimilation would be impossible 
because Aboriginal people did not want to assimilate.12 Again, in 
1955, he called for missions to have ‘much more discussion with the 
Aborigines concerning their own future’.13 The fear that assimilation 
might be ‘forced’ mirrored missionaries’ fears that they might be forcing 
Christian conversion and that, consequently, Aboriginal expressions of 
10  Clive Kerle to Harry Giese, 10 July 1961, NAA F1, 1959/3380.
11  Hasluck, ‘The Future’, 6.
12  NAA A452, 1955/368 Part 1.
13  NAA F1, 1954/1025.
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faith were inauthentic.14 The  question of Aboriginal choice (especially 
for evangelicals) was a sensitive issue. In 1959, the conference resolved 
that it ‘refutes any suggestion that compulsion is exerted upon aborigines 
on missions to enforce acceptance of Christianity’ and that the missions 
sought ‘voluntary acceptance of Christianity’.15 Through the 1950s and 
early 1960s, missions continued to assert that, although assimilation 
was merely a temporary phase, it should be a slow, almost imperceptible 
process that moved at a pace of Aboriginal people’s own choosing. At the 
1953 conference, for example, Catholic Bishop O’Loughlin anticipated 
that missions might even continue for another century.16
Hasluck’s 1961 announcement of an accelerated timeframe was therefore 
especially concerning. In response, F. H. Leske from the Finke River 
mission, commented that even 60 years was ‘optimistic’. Paul Albrecht also 
thought that ‘things are getting pushed rather fast’ and that ‘if you push the 
process of assimilation too quickly … people may revert to their primitive 
way of life’. To prevent a ‘throwback’, a degree of autonomy must be given 
to Aboriginal people and ‘take it at the pace which the people themselves 
develop’; that is, assimilation depended on a kind of autonomy. Laurie 
Reece of the Warrabri mission argued for Aboriginal people to be ‘given 
a sense of responsibility and a part in [their] own destiny’, and Leske 
queried ‘whether aborigines had any say in their destiny’. Ted Milliken, 
the Northern Territory Administration’s representative, responded that, 
‘if free choice were there, the result would be extinction’; at this stage, 
missionaries were more concerned than the administration about the 
degree to which Aboriginal people were conceded ‘choice’.17 By 1963, in 
a paper circulated among both Methodist and Presbyterian missionaries, 
Stuart Fowler of the United Aborigines Mission (UAM) concluded that 
assimilation was impossible to impose externally but could occur only 
through social forces from within a community.18
14  Rademaker, ‘“Only Cuppa Tea”’.
15  NAA F1, 1959/3380.
16  NAA A452, 1955/368 Part 1.
17  NAA F1, 1961/2151.
18  Fowler, ‘Apostolic’.
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The crisis of assimilation on missions
Given these concerns about Aboriginal ‘choice’ and the realisation that 
missions’ existing relationship with and support from governments would 
not continue forever, the question of withdrawing from the Northern 
Territory became a pressing concern for missions in the early 1960s.
Missionaries knew that the assimilation program was becoming unviable, 
as the scope of activities required on missions in pursuit of assimilation 
increased. Assimilation required not only schoolteachers and nurses, but 
now also builders, home management instructors, hygiene workers and 
preschool teachers. Though these positions were increasingly subsidised by 
governments, missions struggled to find recruits. With drastic changes in 
Australians’ religious participation and practice in the 1960s, missionary 
societies were facing difficulties attracting not only donations but also 
new missionary staff.19 Meanwhile, missionaries who had been drawn 
to their vocation for spiritual and evangelistic reasons found themselves 
overwhelmed by the administrative and practical concerns of running 
a small community. They often became disillusioned with the day-to-
day work of assimilation and frustrated by the seeming lack of spiritual 
fruit. Aboriginal people, so far as many could see, were not interested 
in assimilating, nor were they converting to Christianity in the numbers 
hoped. As one missionary wrote in 1964, ‘there is little evidence of any 
“break through” and, as far as I can see, not much sign of an Indigenous 
Church’.20 Worse still, some suspected that their approaches were actively 
harming Aboriginal societies by undermining Aboriginal communities’ 
own existing authority structures.21
Meanwhile, although the government was increasing the breadth 
of subsidies available, these did not match the increasing costs of 
assimilation, nor growing demands from Aboriginal people to manage 
their own money. When Aboriginal people insisted that they be paid 
pensions (available from 1959) and Child Endowment directly and in 
cash, missions acknowledged that Aboriginal people’s money could not be 
withheld for much longer. Some gave in to this demand. The CMS Roper 
River mission, for instance, began paying all subsidies, endowments 
and pensions to Aboriginal people in 1966. But without that income, 
19  Cole, A History, 31.
20  Mitchell Library (hereafter ML) MSS 6040/6.
21  Albrecht, ‘The Finke River Mission’, 10.
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the mission could not survive; all but its ‘spiritual ministry’ was handed 
over to Welfare Branch in 1968.22 As missions made greater moves to 
Aboriginal responsibility (understood as achieving the objectives of 
assimilation), these moves undercut their ability to continue assimilatory 
policies. Therefore, assimilation through missions, at least as envisaged at 
the time, seemed a social, spiritual and financial impossibility.
In the early 1960s, both the CMS and MOM commissioned inquiries 
into their work in the Territory, investigating the relationship of their 
work to the policy of assimilation. The CMS terms of reference were 
to recommend whether CMS should ‘continue its work as at present’ or 
‘hand over the work to the government’.23 When it asked its missionaries 
if the ‘policy of assimilation is capable of fulfilment under existing 
levels of government support’, all but one thought not.24 Its Federal 
Council resolved in 1964 to downscale and refocus the work. Rather 
than continuing the ‘industrial’ work, the CMS’s resources ‘should be 
concentrated on the pastoral, evangelistic and educational work’. For the 
Federal Council, ‘the demands of assimilation require that the civil 
administration be gradually assimilated to the common pattern of the 
Australian life’: that is, assimilation itself required that civil authorities 
replace church authorities in Indigenous communities. They would hand 
over mission administration to government.25
The MOM 1965 inquiry’s terms of reference were more focused on 
what they considered the paradox of assimilation and Aboriginal cultural 
identity. They sought:
To assess the proper relationship between the presentation of the 
Gospel, the life of the Church, education and social assimilation 
on the one hand and a continuing Aboriginal culture and 
language on the other.26
Like the CMS, the MOM commission recommended missionaries 
be relieved of ‘administrative details’ to free them for ‘evangelistic and 
pastoral ministry’ and that administration be passed to ‘local governing 
bodies’. It also recommended ‘active recognition of a universal truth’ that 
mission ‘is only effective … if it is taken up by the indigenous church’.27
22  ML MSS 6040/5.
23  ML MSS 6040/6.
24  CMS South Australia/Northern Territory office (hereafter CMS SA) Box 19.
25  ML MSS 6040/5.
26  NTRS 53, box 1.
27  NTRS 53, box 1.
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Assimilation and the Indigenous church
This rediscovery, or reimagination, of an old missiological vision of 
the establishment of the ‘Indigenous church’ was common across 
denominations in this time of reassessing missions. Protestant missionary 
thinking had long been shaped by the theory of nineteenth-century CMS 
missionary Henry Venn. He defined the ‘Indigenous church’ by what 
became known as the ‘three selves’: it was self-funding, self-propagating 
and self-governing, thereby embodying the culture and thought of the 
people. The marks of an ‘Indigenous church’, as opposed to a mission, 
would be that it was led by Indigenous clergy and governed and funded 
by Indigenous people. Missions would be ‘self-euthanising’, that is, they 
would eventually hand over all controls to local people, becoming a church, 
not a mission.28 This theory was revived by missiologist Roland Allen in 
the early twentieth century and gained new popularity in international 
mission circles in the 1960s.29 In Australia, UAM missionary Stuart 
Fowler argued in 1963 that the ‘indigenous church’ theory was ‘enjoying 
tremendous popularity in missionary circles’, it was time that ‘we who are 
involved with the Australian Aborigines … catch up with world trends’.30
The Indigenous church concept implied that mission churches would 
become self-determining as local people replaced missionaries. Yet the 
establishment of the ‘Indigenous church’ was not, at first, considered 
contrary to assimilation. Indeed, the development of an Aboriginal 
Christianity or ‘Indigenous church’ was, at first, to be an essential 
component of assimilation, as it bore a strong resemblance to Hasluck’s 
language of ‘self-respecting’ and ‘self-supporting’ Aboriginal communities 
and of missionaries ‘working themselves out of a job’.31 Of course, the 
implications of assimilation were open to different understandings 
and it was possible to see assimilation as overwhelming all vestiges of 
Aboriginal autonomy. For example, one CMS missionary doubted 
whether, in the face of what he considered to be the imminent and 
inevitable white settlement of the Northern Territory, the establishment 
of an ‘Aboriginal church’ was a worthwhile objective. He believed there 
could be ‘no separate future for Aboriginal people’.32 Most missionaries, 
28  Tippett, Introduction, 85.
29  Allen, Missionary Methods; Allen, Spontaneous Expansion.
30  Fowler, ‘Apostolic’, 2.
31  Hasluck, ‘The Future’, 6.
32  CMS SA Box 19.
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however, saw no contradiction between assimilation and the planting 
of an Indigenous church. For Fowler, the Indigenous church would be 
a ‘training ground’ to ‘prepare believers for assimilation’.33 In 1961, one 
chaplain described the CMS’s ‘immediate objective’ as ‘to train, teach 
and prepare the Aborigines for Assimilation in accordance with present 
Government policy’ as part of a long-term objective of ‘the establishment 
of an Indigenous Church’.34 Another commented that missions ‘should 
aim at establishing an indigenous church as soon as possible’, but in the 
same document he explained the necessity of preparing Aboriginal people 
for assimilation.35
In such visions of assimilation, it remained possible and, in fact desirable, 
for the world view of Aboriginal Christians to remain distinct from the 
world view of other Australians, both Christian and non-Christian. From 
the mid-1960s missionaries insisted that the Indigenous church had, so 
far, failed to develop in the Northern Territory due to their own failure 
to allow for authentic Aboriginal choice and cultural expression. This 
self-criticism was part of a broader cultural moment that emphasised 
the need for personal authenticity.36 If Aboriginal people were allowed the 
freedom to be authentically themselves and to choose their own path of 
development, the Indigenous church would soon emerge. Beulah Lowe, 
a MOM linguist and teacher, for instance, added ‘self-expression’ to Venn’s 
original ‘three selves’ when she wrote:
The indigenous church is self-supporting, self-propagating, self-
expressing and self-governing … Regarding self-expression. Firstly 
there is self-expression in worship patterns. These follow the 
indigenous culture and are not imposed from without.37
The version of assimilation missionaries articulated at the Missions 
Administration conferences in the early 1960s likewise reflects a greater 
concern for Aboriginal self-expression and cultural identity, in line 
with the ‘Indigenous church’ principles. Missionaries insisted in 1963 
that assimilation should not mean any loss of cultural distinctiveness 
or peoplehood:
33  Fowler, ‘Apostolic’, 8.
34  CMS SA Box 19.
35  CMS SA Box 19.
36  Taylor, A Secular, 473.
37  NTRS 871, box 127.
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Some groups are resisting assimilation because it has been 
presented to them as implying absorption and obliteration. 
A fundamental provision … is the full recognition that Aborigines 
are a distinctive ethnic group within the Commonwealth and have 
the right to remain as such.38
The ‘Indigenous church’ model also required that missionaries engage 
with Aboriginal languages to enable ‘self-expressing’ worship. The 1963 
conference was a watershed for the question of language. The CMS’s George 
Pearson raised the language question and, for the first time, convinced 
government authorities that missionary linguistics could be of secular use.39 
Language, he explained, was ‘part of the people’s cultural and spiritual 
inheritance’ and vital to ‘their status as a people, with a say in their own 
affairs’.40 The conference therefore resolved that since language ‘is part of 
their heritage and a factor of social and cultural importance’ governments 
must fund linguistic research and mother-tongue literacy programs.41
On the question of Aboriginal preparedness for leadership, the ‘Indigenous 
church’ model meant that missionaries were to trust that the Holy Spirit 
would guide Aboriginal people as leaders. Barry Butler, from the CMS, 
wrote in 1969 that ‘Missionaries must let Aboriginal Christians develop at 
their own pace as the Holy Spirit leads them’.42 Fowler made willingness 
to hand over authority to Aboriginal people a test of faith:
Faith would not require local skills before handing over – We are 
walking by sight and not by faith while ever we say ‘When I see 
sound local leadership operating I will be prepared to pull out.’ 
This is simply not the way of faith.43
Accordingly, across the missions there were moves to greater Aboriginal 
representation in leadership bodies (to varying degrees) and attempts 
to consult with Aboriginal people even at the Missions Administration 
conferences themselves. In 1961, Cecil Gribble from the MOM proposed 
that Aboriginal leaders from missions be invited to future conferences.44 
Giese suggested that Aboriginal representatives come as observers only, and 
that they be excluded from some sensitive discussions. Gordon Symons 
38  NAA A452, 1963/2353.
39  NAA F1, 1963/1989.
40  NAA F1, 1963/1989.
41  NAA F1, 1963/1989.
42  Butler, ‘Relationship’, 1.
43  Fowler, ‘Apostolic’, 2.
44  NAA F1, 1961/2151.
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from the MOM agreed with this arrangement.45 But Jack Langford from 
the CMS insisted that excluding Aboriginal people ‘would be a barrier to 
full cooperation of the Aboriginal representatives’ and ‘cause ill feeling’.46 
Aboriginal representatives were then invited in 1963 as full delegates.
On the issue of representation, the pace of change was markedly slower 
than what Aboriginal people themselves desired. The conference became a 
site where Aboriginal people from across the missions expressed demands 
to have a voice in government. The delegates – Nandjiwarra Amagula, 
Michael Tipungwuti, Deimbalibu, Harry Jagamara and Denis Daniels 
– were expected to ‘indicate quite clearly the thoughts and feelings of 
their own people in regard to the assimilation programme’. Jagamara 
told the conference that this move was insufficient: ‘it was no good 
sending two or three representatives like this’. He proposed a conference 
in which Aboriginal people formed the majority, but he was ultimately 
ignored.47 His idea was discussed again at the 1967 conference.48 In 1969 
the conference proposed the establishment of ‘regional conferences 
of representatives of the Aborigines’ and a ‘Northern Territory wide 
conference of representatives of Aborigines’.49 These did not take place.
Still, the Missions Administration Conference made gradual moves 
to increase Aboriginal control over missions (under white overseers). 
The Welfare Branch’s Senior Research officer, Jeremy Long, urged 
superintendents to be more ‘democratic’. Most missions developed some 
form of form Aboriginal leadership structure – a Village Council or Town 
Council – in the early 1960s.50 Aboriginal representatives on these bodies 
tended to be Christian converts who were also offered leadership roles in 
mission churches (again, according to the principles of establishing the 
‘Indigenous church’). At the 1963 conference, the CMS representative 
proposed that, given Aboriginal people had made valuable contributions 
in mission management on station councils, Aboriginal people should 
also be represented on the Northern Territory Legislative Council; there 
was some sense that Aboriginal people should be represented as a people, 
not only as individual citizens. Giese responded that Aboriginal people 
could be elected ‘like anyone else’ now that they had voting rights.51
45  Symons to Giese, 14 December 1962, NAA E460, 1974/773/33.
46  Langford to Giese, 31 December 1962, NAA E460, 1974/773/33.
47  NAA F1, 1963/1989.
48  NAA A452, NT1967/4400.
49  NAA F1, 1969/6123.
50  Long, ‘Some Problems’, 2.
51  NAA F1, 1963/1989.
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These moves were nonetheless considered consistent with assimilatory 
visions by both missionaries and government officials. Aboriginal 
participation and leadership in town councils, sports and social clubs, for 
instance, were to be ‘education for citizenship’, according to the ideals of 
assimilation.52 In 1965, the conference urged missions and governments 
to plan for Aboriginal people ‘to take increasing control of their own 
affairs as they are able’.53 It also resolved during this process that ‘mixed 
personnel’ (i.e. both public servants and missionaries) be employed on 
missions so that ‘Aboriginals may be better prepared for the inevitable 
encounter with the world which must be faced in years ahead’; missionaries 
still imagined themselves to be preparing Aboriginal people to meet 
(secular) white Australia, even in this process of devolution of authority.54 
In this vein, the 1965 conference resolved that the words ‘missions’ and 
‘settlement’ be abandoned and replaced with ‘suitable Aboriginal names’.55 
By 1969, the conference resolved that the word ‘mission’ be replaced with 
‘community’.56 Missionaries also used the conferences to urge government 
towards measures that might increase Aboriginal people’s ability to manage 
their own affairs. In 1961, Bishop Matthews suggested that Aboriginal 
people on missions could be made eligible for unemployment benefits. 
Bishop O’Loughlin agreed.57 By 1969, the conference proposed a kind of 
training allowance scheme: ‘a special grant of funds be made to missions 
to allow special projects to be commenced or developed … to occupy 
those employable Aborigines who cannot find gainful employment’.58
On the question of land rights, missionaries were more ambivalent. Arthur 
Ellemor, from the MOM, had been an early supporter of land rights. 
In a paper presented to the 1955 Missions Administration Conference 
he argued that, since the ‘actual land robbery has not yet occurred’ in 
much of the Northern Territory, there was still time to prevent it. Using 
the language of assimilation, he argued that land rights were essential 
to ‘fit [Aboriginal people] for citizenship’ because ‘attachment to their 
traditional territories’ was a ‘prerequisite for stability’ and could be the 
starting point for ‘newer concepts of land rights for agricultural, pastoral 
52  Long, ‘Some Problems’, 1.
53  NAA F1, 1965/3502.
54  NAA A452, 1965/8518.
55  NAA A452, 1965/8518.
56  NAA F1, 1967/3401.
57  NAA F1, 1961/2151.
58  NAA A452, 1965/8518.
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and home-building’.59 Yet, when Nabalco proposed a bauxite mine on 
Yolngu land near the Yirrkala mission, the MOM agreed to the mine 
in 1958 without consulting Yolngu people. The missionaries reacted to 
Yolngu concerns in diverse ways. Some joined the Yolngu in their protest 
(notably the superintendent of the mission, Edgar Wells, who the MOM 
later dismissed for his involvement).60
At the 1963 Missions Administration Conference, delegates debated the 
question of consultation and land. Giese ‘stressed’ that there had been 
‘full discussions’ between government, mining interests and mission 
authorities but conceded that ‘there should have been earlier consultation 
with the people’. Gribble, from the MOM, argued that it was missions’ 
responsibility to ‘consult with local people’. Pearson from the CMS 
suggested determining a date for the ‘eventual transfer of ownership of 
mission leases to the people’ to remove missions from negotiations around 
future land use.61 Yet, that year, the Groote Eylandt Mining Company 
also began operations, after negotiating with the CMS to pay royalties 
into a  trust for Aboriginal people. The Aboriginal landowners were 
consulted, but only after the mission had already reached this agreement.62 
For the missionaries, the mine was an answer to their prayers. Given the 
mission’s uncertain future, the jobs that mining would provide meant 
the community (and its ‘Indigenous church’) might survive into a post-
mission future.
The Missions Administration Conference reached few resolutions on 
land rights. The 1965 conference recommended that a ‘commission be 
established to examine claims by individuals or groups of Aborigines to 
ownership of land’.63 A resolution of the 1971 conference recommended 
that where mining leases are granted on Aboriginal reserves there be 
mandatory ‘special conditions after consultation with local Aborigines’ 
to protect Aboriginal interests.64 The United Church in North Australia, 
however, eventually changed its position from the MOM’s earlier 
approach.65 In 1972, it challenged Prime Minister McMahon’s Australia 
59  NAA A452, 1955/368 Part 2.
60  Wells, Reward and Punishment, 25–26.
61  NAA F1, 1963/1989.
62  ML MSS 6040/5.
63  NAA F1, 1965/3502.
64  NTRS 56, box 4.
65  The United Church in North Australia was a union of Methodist and Presbyterian churches 
that developed in Darwin during the Second World War and preceded the formation of the Uniting 
Church in 1977.
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Day statement, urging the government to ‘continue its examination of 
its policies’ and calling for ‘legislation to grant a proprietary right to any 
Aboriginal clan which can demonstrate “cogent feeling of obligation to 
the land”’.66
The conference’s failure to establish a position on land rights was 
partly because the ‘Indigenous church’ model did not give missionaries 
any direction on questions of customary land tenure. Whereas local 
governance and cultural programs were easily understood as in the 
interests of ‘self-governing’ and ‘self-expressing’ churches, land rights 
were not. Missionaries had long sought to uphold the spatial isolation of 
Aboriginal communities as they believed it aided community cohesion 
and cultural vitality and gave Aboriginal people a degree of protection 
from influences missionaries deemed ‘undesirable’. But they also wanted 
Aboriginal people to have jobs. It was never clear how maintaining 
isolation could be consistent with the long-term goals of assimilation. 
Mining was attractive because, missionaries believed, it would offer 
a  source of income for remote communities, without requiring people 
to leave. The expectation that the Indigenous church be ‘self-supporting’ 
also pushed missionaries towards mining, as mining might make these 
communities economically viable. While missionaries expressed concern 
that Aboriginal people be given a ‘choice’ about the use of their land, they 
presumed that Aboriginal people would choose economic development. 
Missionaries were eager that Aboriginal people live on their country but 
many had a limited vision of Aboriginal land rights. It was only after the 
Yolngu made their protest heard that missionaries argued that land was 
vital, not only for economic and social reasons, but also cultural survival, 
and land rights were integrated into missionary visions for the authentic 
Indigenous church.
Abandoning assimilation
By the late 1960s, missionaries increasingly felt that ‘assimilation’ could 
not capture their objectives for Aboriginal people because it did not allow 
for ‘choice’. By 1969, the government line was that assimilation meant 
that Aboriginal people ‘will choose’ to live like other Australians.67 At that 
year’s conference, Fr Leary commented that difficulties with Aboriginal 
66  NTRS 55, box 10.
67  NAA F1, 1967/3401.
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‘social development’ were due to Aboriginal ‘failure to accept the 
responsibilities that must be accepted’. The solution was ‘to aid him with 
his willing cooperation’; Leary was still thinking that Aboriginal people 
might be encouraged to ‘choose’ assimilation.68 Most other delegates 
thought otherwise. At the 1971 conference Paul Albrecht circulated two 
papers.69 He objected to the ‘imposition’ of assimilation and warned that 
‘social change’ must come from ‘within’ or else ‘it can lead to complete 
social disorganization’.70 He considered the government’s expectation that 
Aboriginal people ‘will choose’ assimilation disingenuous:
Although the present wording of the policy – ‘seeks that all 
persons of Aboriginal descent will choose to attain a similar 
manner and standard of living to that of other Australians and 
live as members of a single Australian community’ … the policy 
does not envisage Aborigines exercising this option, nor does it 
make any provision for them in case they wish to opt out of the 
assimilation programme.71
Albrecht proposed returning judicial authority to Aboriginal communities 
and instituting executive councils of both Aboriginal and non-Indigenous 
staff on each settlement to take over management from missions.72 
The missions’ evangelistic and pastoral roles would nonetheless continue; 
churches would still be heavily involved in ‘proclamation of the Gospel’ 
and social and economic programs in these communities.73
The United Church in North Australia also clarified its objectives 
for the 1971 conference. It saw itself as an adviser, advocate and 
mediator. Importantly, the church’s role of ‘preparing’ Aboriginal 
people – the purported reason Aboriginal people had been segregated 
from white Australia under assimilation – was dropped, as they 
acknowledged  Aboriginal people might not wish to ‘become involved’ 
with white Australia at all:
The aim of such development is to ensure that Aboriginal 
communities have the opportunity to make true and free 
choices as to their place within the Australian society … It is 
their right to decide whether they wish to become involved in 
68  Leary, ‘Developing’, 3.
69  Albrecht, ‘Social Change’; Albrecht, ‘Aboriginal Advancement’.
70  Albrecht, ‘Social Change’, 62.
71  Albrecht, ‘Social Change’, 51.
72  Albrecht, ‘Aboriginal Advancement’, 64.
73  Albrecht, ‘Aboriginal Advancement’, 8.
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the wider community. It is their right to decide the extent and 
form that involvement should take should they decide to belong 
to the wider community … Real decisions can only be made on 
adequate knowledge of what is possible and an appreciation of 
the implications involved in their decisions. It is the task of the 
Church to offer this help and to persuade the larger community to 
recognise the issues involved in Aboriginal development.74
At the 1971 conference, missions confirmed that the only way Aboriginal 
free choice could be ensured would be a full devolution of authority 
from missions and governments to local Aboriginal organisations and 
government agencies. Yet, contrary to Hasluck’s 20-year timeframe 
of 1961, the conference resolved that ‘no timetable [could] be set’ for 
this devolution as this was a matter for Aboriginal people.75 Now that 
missions were no longer conceived as urgently ‘preparing’ Aboriginal 
people for ‘inevitable’ contact with (secular) white Australia, there was no 
need to estimate a timeframe for change. Of course, this also effectively 
allowed missions to reserve the right to remain and continue indefinitely 
(many are still operating in some form today), claiming to do so according 
to the wishes of Aboriginal people.
The following year (1972), however, the Finke River mission did set an 
end date in a statement for the Lutheran General Synod. Perhaps this was 
in reaction to the Missions Administration Conference’s resolution that 
there could be no timetable and the fear that missionaries might linger 
longer than necessary:
There has been a marked emergence of the Aboriginal people 
in the spiritual and material spheres of life. This would indicate 
that the present policy of helping the Aboriginals to regain their 
lost dignity by encouraging them to make their own responsible 
decisions is meeting with success. These developments challenge 
the Church to recognise that the Finke River mission has reached 
that stage in its history when the aim of all mission work is being 
achieved, namely to establish an indigenous church. This means 
that ultimately functions and work carried out by white staff 
must be transferred to the Aboriginal people themselves … In the 
centenary year of 1977 it may be possible to hand over the major 
proportion of the work at Hermannsburg and on the Run to the 
Aboriginal people.76
74  NTRS 56, box 4.
75  NTRS 56, box 4.
76  Albrecht, From Mission, 42.
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Linking Aboriginal people’s self-determination in secular matters to their 
progress in the spiritual realm, they suggested that the achievement of the 
Indigenous church was so imminent that full authority in the community 
could be given to Aboriginal people by 1977 (though even this short-term 
target was not achieved).
The Indigenous church and the 
self‑determination era
The final Missions Administration Conference took place in 1971. 
In  September 1972, it was replaced by the Church and Mission 
Authorities Advisory Conference. From 1973, this conference was held 
quarterly with the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and various churches 
and other territory and federal government departments.77 Aboriginal 
representatives were no longer invited to contribute. Ironically, the formal 
arrival of ‘self-determination’ as a Commonwealth Government policy in 
1973 meant that Aboriginal people on missions lost the conference as 
a  site for airing grievances and raising their concerns. Rather than this 
single channel, they were instead to consult with a plethora of government 
agencies while the mission agencies continued their close relationship 
with the Northern Territory Administration.
The churches continued their efforts towards establishing authentic, 
self-determining ‘Indigenous churches’. Building on the relationships 
established through the Missions Administration Conferences, in 1973 
the MOM, CMS, Anglican Diocese and United Church in North 
Australia co-founded Nungalinya College in Darwin (later joined by 
the Catholics) to develop an Indigenous leadership.78 Its first principal, 
Keith Cole, described its objective in terms of the Indigenous church 
theory: training Aboriginal people for ‘ministries within the indigenous 
church’ and the precursor to ‘the final move in [Aboriginal parishes’] 
evolution from missions to churches’.79 In 1974, the United Church 
in North Australia compiled its most comprehensive statement on self-
determination in a report entitled Free to Decide, based on discussions 
with Aboriginal leaders across its missions. Its conclusions resonated with 
77  NTRS 559, box 78; NTRS 56, box 4.
78  Emilsen, ‘The United’, 16.
79  Cole, A History, 143.
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the missions’ fresh concern for authenticity; it claimed Aboriginal people 
had told them ‘we do want help, but not on terms which deny us the 
freedom to be Aboriginal people in an Aboriginal environment’.80 The 
official histories of the Finke River mission and the CMS in the Northern 
Territory are both titled From Mission to Church, reflecting the prominence 
of the Indigenous church theory to their authors’ understanding of the 
mission.81 As Albrecht explained in the foreword, the movement from 
‘mission to church’ meant Aboriginal people taking responsibility for 
church life, expressed in their own languages, cultures and systems of 
governance.82
This Christian self-determination policy grew out of a Christian 
assimilation policy conceived as a movement towards an Indigenous 
church. It focused primarily on the mission churches but flowed into 
‘secular’ spaces. Missionaries shaped ‘self-determination’ towards Christian 
and evangelistic ends. Yet their concern, first and foremost, for the local 
and ‘authentic’ Indigenous church, meant that their ‘self-determination’ 
was often limited to local Indigenous groups and privileged Aboriginal 
people who had embraced the missionary faith. Missionaries often 
rejected pan-Aboriginal movements associated with self-determination 
(some expressing frustration that Aboriginal people with non-Indigenous 
heritage might represent local communities in the Northern Territory). 
They also resented the coming in of consumer goods and alcohol to 
communities, seen as destructive of traditional culture. Many expressed 
nostalgia for a pre-assimilation mission time, which they saw as marked by 
authentic relationships, cultural richness and freedom from bureaucratic 
interventions. Missionaries’ Christian self-determination could, in some 
ways, be understood as a kind of Christian neo-protectionism, with 
missionaries envisaging their role as protectors of Aboriginal culture 
and local communities, and as mediators between Aboriginal people and 
outsiders, much as they had done in an earlier protectionist era. 
80  United Church, Free to Decide, 45.
81  Albrecht, From Mission; Cole, From Mission.
82  Albrecht, From Mission, x.
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This chapter describes the origins, development and operation of 
Aboriginal Cattle Enterprises (ACEs) as efforts by governments to assist 
Aboriginal self-determination in the Northern Territory of Australia. Few 
ACEs satisfied their Indigenous participants and bureaucratic champions. 
I draw on agronomist Stuart Phillpot’s study of Northern Territory ACEs 
in the period 1972–96 and on my own thesis research.1 After contextually 
assessing two ACEs (the Puraiya Cattle Company at Ti Tree and the 
Ngarliyikirlangu Pastoral Company at Yuendumu), Phillpot found that 
government support did not allow for ACEs’ multiple land use aspirations 
and that this led to those organisations’ decline. While Phillpot explains 
this outcome by pointing to poor communication, misunderstood and 
undiscerned cultural assumptions, and the inflexibility and variability 
of government funding, he does not assess the effects of the internal 
social dynamics of the Aboriginal groups involved in ACEs. I will 
argue that the growing gap between generations was also significant in 
determining the sector’s long-term viability. Drawing on analyses of social 
1  Phillpot, ‘Black Pastoralism’; Ward, ‘Gurindji people’.
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change among Aboriginal groups beyond the Territory, I will suggest 
that the lessons drawn by Phillpot and myself are of wider relevance in 
northern and Central Australia.
Origins
When the Labor Government, on the advice of the Council for Aboriginal 
Affairs, announced in 1972 that it would ‘restore to the Aboriginal people 
of Australia their lost power of self-determination in economic, social 
and political affairs’, a novel economic and geographic problem faced 
thousands of Aboriginal people in Australia’s remote centre and north.2 
During colonial settlement, Europeans had occupied Aboriginal people’s 
lands for the purposes of farming cattle and sheep. For decades prior 
to the mid-1960s, pastoralists relied on the presence on their leases of 
a pool of labour made up of Aboriginal traditional owners. Aboriginal 
people subsisting on pastoral leases had gained little or no cash income, 
as they were paid in rations or in small wage payments held in trust. 
It was rare, however, for their employment to exceed 30 weeks per year.3 
In the 1950s, the Australian Government increasingly took responsibility 
for Aboriginal people, resulting in the award of invalid, aged and nursing 
pensions to Aboriginal adults in 1959.4 Although pastoralists and 
missionaries continued to supply goods rather than pass on the entire 
benefit as cash, people were exposed to money from this time in the form 
of a small proportion of the government allowances and a low cash wage 
for employees. By the early 1960s in the Northern Territory, the amount 
paid to Aboriginal workers was still approximately only 20 per cent of the 
Cattle Station Industry (Northern Territory) Award 1951.5
By the late 1960s, this situation was changing, as investment in the 
beef industry reduced the demand for labour and as Aboriginal people 
explored opportunities to live in new ways on missions, government 
settlements and in towns. In line with assimilation policy, both the 
North Australia Workers’ Union and the Commonwealth Government 
argued that Aboriginal workers should get the same protection of their 
living standards that other employees enjoyed and, in March 1966, after 
2  See Whitlam, ‘Statement’.
3  Peterson, ‘Capitalism’, 90.
4  Hamilton, ‘Aboriginal Women’, 174; Rowse, White Flour, 133.
5  Berndt and Berndt, End of an Era, 71.
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weighing union and government submissions against the pastoralists’ 
warnings of dis-employment, the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission decided to include male Aboriginal workers in 
the Cattle Station Industry (Northern Territory) Award (while authorising 
lower wages for those classified as ‘slow workers’).
The ‘equal wages’ decision, as it became known, contributed to a decline 
in employer demand for labour and thus to a fall in the number of 
Aboriginal people employed and/or residing on Northern Territory 
pastoral leases. According to government figures, 4,676 Aboriginal 
people resided on pastoral properties in 1965, and by 1969 this figure 
had declined to 4,305.6 In the opinion of policymakers, the weakening 
attachment of many Aboriginal people to the pastoral industry created 
both problems and opportunities for them. Some people moved off leases, 
at either their own or the lessee’s initiative. Those station camps that 
persisted did so with great uncertainty about their future as a labour force 
entitled to unemployment benefits and as resident communities entitled 
to basic services (health, housing and education). Some Aboriginal groups 
that were reluctant to terminate their involvement with the pastoral 
industry wished to recast their pastoral activities on their own terms. 
As well, growing political support for the idea that Aboriginal people 
had customary rights to own land raised the question of the tenure of 
Aboriginal groups still resident on pastoral leases that included some or all 
of their traditional country.
To consider the future of Indigenous people on Northern Territory 
pastoral communities, in December 1970 the Gorton Government 
commissioned a team of experts, chaired by Cecil Gibb, Professor of 
Psychology at The Australian National University. The committee’s terms 
of reference included:
• To survey the situation of Aborigines on pastoral properties in 
the Northern Territory so as to identify problems and special 
needs;
• To examine ways by which [their] economic and social 
conditions may be improved;
• To see whether new or additional steps need to be taken to 
give effect to existing policies for Aboriginal communities on 
pastoral properties.7
6  Gibb, The Report, 34.
7  Gibb, The Report, 2.
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The Gibb Committee predicted that many Aboriginal people would in 
future have to find employment outside the pastoral industry, and it 
recommended strengthening ‘a wider ranging employment service to 
Aborigines to encourage and assist their training and placement in work 
in other areas as well as on pastoral properties’.8 For those who would 
remain on pastoral properties, the Gibb Committee proposed that land 
should be excised from pastoral holdings for residential and small-scale 
subsistence-type activities. Recognising the aspirations of some Aboriginal 
people to own, manage and be employed by their own cattle enterprises, 
the committee recommended that the government:
• [Encourage and help Aborigines financially] to establish 
enterprises in activities serving the cattle industry e.g. contract 
trucking, mustering, fencing and yard building, bore sinking, 
share farming etc (with experienced managers).
• [W]herever a coherent group of Aborigines indicates effective 
interest in establishing a group-owned enterprise it should be 
encouraged if the enterprises possesses reasonable prospects 
of success; [government grants] together with technical and 
managerial expertise could be justified.9 
The committee also recommended that the government legislate to ‘enable 
an Aboriginal Community Society to be loosely incorporated’, leading to 
the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976. Thus, the ACE became 
possible as legislation, and government land purchases and operational 
funding facilitated the participation of Aboriginal people in the pastoral 
industry through novel, hybrid enterprises. I argue that their (usually 
unanticipated, misunderstood and/or inadequately resolved) hybridity 
made them largely unsuccessful vehicles of self-determination policy.
The Aboriginal pastoral sector
The Gorton Government had established the Commonwealth Capital 
Fund under the Aboriginal Enterprises (Assistance) Act 1968 to assist 
Aboriginal people to establish business enterprises; this was the source of 
the government’s first land purchases for Aboriginal groups. In October 
1971, the McMahon Government was persuaded to allocate funds for the 
8  Gibb, The Report, 72–77.
9  Gibb, The Report, 72–77.
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purchase of pastoral leases for both economic and social purposes. Senior 
bureaucrats in the Department of the Interior and Liberal–Country Party 
Coalition politicians impeded grants to Aboriginal individuals and/or 
groups of individuals (rather than families, clan groups or ‘communities’).10
Among the Aboriginal groups frustrated by government resistance to 
arguments for Aboriginal land rights were the Gurindji, employed on 
Wave Hill Station in the Victoria River District of the Northern Territory. 
In the years 1966–72, Gurindji elders and their activist supporters had 
generated much publicity for their quest to own land on which they could 
make a living by raising beef cattle. On coming to power, the Whitlam 
Government favoured such aspirations and passed the Aboriginal Land 
Fund Act 1974, implementing a decision made in 1972 by the McMahon 
Government (following a Gibb Report recommendation). This established 
the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission (ALFC) – an expert statutory body 
to manage the purchase of pastoral land for Aboriginal people. The ALFC 
worked in liaison with the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA).
Under the policy of self-determination, government consulted groups such 
as the Gurindji and sought to adapt the laws and policies of the settler state 
to assist the realisation of their aspirations. I argue that the government gave 
insufficient thought to whether incorporated proprietary companies were 
appropriate vehicles for remote Indigenous aspirations. In the period of 
the Whitlam Government, the ALFC purchased three pastoral properties 
or parts of pastoral properties. One was made on behalf of the Gurindji: 
Wattie Creek, or Daguragu, which was then part of Wave Hill Station. 
These purchases by the Whitlam Government were the first of many. 
By 1993, 20 pastoral leases had been purchased, and cattle enterprises 
had continued or been initiated on a further 13 properties contained 
within former reserve land, now held under ‘Aboriginal freehold’ title 
granted through the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
(ALRA). During the period of the Fraser Government (1975–83), the 
ALFC’s land-buying passed in 1980 to the new Aboriginal Development 
Commission (ADC). In 1990, during the period of the Hawke and 
Keating governments (1983–96), the land-buying program passed from 
ADC to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). 
Such grants and purchases are summarised in the table below:
10  Palmer, Buying Back, 21–23.
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Table 3.1: Northern Territory Aboriginal communities with Aboriginal 
Cattle Enterprises (ACEs) on Aboriginal freehold or leasehold land with 
date of title (granted or purchased) prior to 1993.
Communities with Cattle Enterprise Year Freehold Granted or Lease Purchased
Murwangi ALRA 1976*
Gulin Gulin ALRA 1976*
oenpelli/Gunbalunya ALRA 1976*
Croker Island ALRA 1976*
yugal ALRA 1976*
Daly River ALRA 1976*
Lajamanu ALRA 1976*
yuendumu ALRA 1976*
Santa Teresa ALRA 1976*
Haasts Bluff Land Trust ALRA 1976*
Palumpa Pastoral Lease 1976
Peppimenarti Pastoral Lease 1976
Beswick (Jimboingal) Pastoral Lease 1976
Amanbidji Pastoral Lease 1973
yarralin Pastoral Lease 1973
Willowra Pastoral Lease 1973
Daguragu Pastoral Lease 1975
Ti Tree Pastoral Lease 1975
yuelamu Pastoral Lease 1976
Utopia Pastoral Lease 1976
Robinson River Pastoral Lease 1980
Mt Barkly Pastoral Lease 1981
Eva Valley Pastoral Lease 1984
McLaren Creek Pastoral Lease 1985
Atula Pastoral Lease 1989
Tanami Downs Pastoral Lease 1989
Hodgson Downs Pastoral Lease 1990
Elsey Pastoral Lease 1991
fitzroy Pastoral Lease 1991
Muckaty Pastoral Lease 1991
Mistake Creek Pastoral Lease 1992
Loves Creek Pastoral Lease 1992
Alcoota Pastoral Lease 1993
*ALRA 1976: In these communities, cattle enterprises were operated by mission or 
government authorities on land that was ‘reserve’ until the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976 
converted the tenure to Aboriginal freehold title .
Source: Adapted from Hanlon and Phillpot, ‘Rural Development’, 38–40 .
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To benefit from gaining title (either by purchase or as an effect of the 
ALRA), Aboriginal cattle enthusiasts were obliged to incorporate. Charles 
Rowley, founding chair of the ALFC, later reflected that ‘the transfer 
of land or other property to a group long dispossessed brings a  new 
upheaval, as new problems of its use, of leadership, and distribution 
of profit, are thrashed out’.11 Government policy was to vest grantees 
with the responsibility of a lessee. For instance, the Daguragu Pastoral 
Lease granted to Gurindji people in 1975 by the Whitlam Government 
(as codified by the Northern Territory Crown Lands Ordinance 1971) 
determined the tenure and terms, and thus the nature and timing, of 
the Muramulla Company’s improvements. It was a condition of ACEs’ 
funding that the grantees seek profit by selling beef. When government-
contracted consultant agronomists predicted that ACEs would be able to 
return a net profit with requisite monitoring and financial and ‘technical’ 
(practical) support, governments only committed to provide ACEs with 
financial support until they made a profit.
ACEs were typically led at a local level by a coterie of Aboriginal former 
stockmen, guiding the involvement of their families or clans. Those 
elders were commonly responsible to a much larger group of kin and 
other groups comprising the landholding body. Usually these groups were 
thoroughly proficient in all the physical operations of a cattle station, 
with comprehensive ecological knowledge of their leasehold. They did not 
usually possess the knowledge required to manage the businesses that they 
were funded to run, however. In most cases, they had been deliberately 
denied the opportunity to gain managerial knowledge during their earlier 
experiences as pastoral industry subordinates. 
The governmental rationale for support
While the Whitlam Government rushed to support remote incorporated 
Aboriginal groups with funding on the basis of its self-determination 
and Aboriginal land rights policies, in 1975 the DAA applied six criteria 
to assess eligibility to receive large developmental grants: precedents 
for government assistance, benefits to the community, consultation, 
implications of the request not being met, eligibility and economic 
feasibility. In Table 3.2, these criteria are presented (in bold); to illustrate 
11  Rowley, ‘Aboriginal Land Fund’, 259.
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their operational meaning in regard to the Gurindji, I have quoted the 
responses to each of a DAA Project Officer regarding the Gurindji’s 
Muramulla Company.
Table 3.2: DAA ‘Report on Application for Funds’, 1975, Aboriginal cattle 
project funding assessment, Muramulla Cattle Company.
1 . Precedents for Government Assistance: The Government has previously 
supported pastoral projects for Aboriginal community enterprises e .g . the Murin, 
Unia and yugal cattle projects . In addition, the Government has accepted the 
Gurindji claim to the land and has promised to support the project;
2 . Benefits to the community: The project will provide both regular and substantial 
employment and also provide significant long-term financial benefits, [such as] 
improved services for the community, resulting from the generation of funds from 
the pastoral project;
3 . Consultation: Departmental officers have been in close liaison with the Daguragu 
Community, and the proposal is in accordance with the desires and ambitions 
of the community;
4 . Implications of the request not being met [emphasis mine]: If the government did 
not provide funds to develop this area, the community would be most disappointed 
and perhaps even feel betrayed . There would undoubtedly be national publicity;
5 . Eligibility: The Muramulla Company has nine Gurindji people as directors, each 
holding a one dollar share in trust for the Muramulla Gurindji Association, which 
represents the full Aboriginal community at Daguragu . Thus the Muramulla 
Company is eligible to receive assistance from the government;
6 . Economic feasibility: The area involved was formerly part of the Wave Hill Station 
and this country is suitable for a pastoral property . Wave Hill Station has operated 
successfully for a number of years and the only factor that would vary the viability 
of the Muramulla Gurindji project from that of Wave Hill Station is its size . … 
The fact that the Department has divided Wave Hill Station lease may be construed 
as indicating that they consider the Muramulla Gurindji lease as being sufficient 
for a viable pastoral project .
Source: NAA E460, 1975/137 .
The project officer’s responses suggest a Whitlam Government 
predisposition to support the Gurindji’s Muramulla operation on flimsy 
or assumed grounds, as we see below:
1. Precedents for government assistance: The use of government 
assistance ‘precedents’ to justify the provision of further government 
assistance is largely self-supporting.
2. Benefits to the community: The ‘benefits to the community’ 
perceived by the DAA are listed without any evidence. They are 
apparently justified by the assumption that a private company 
(Muramulla) should or could legally fulfil a (municipal?) service 
provision role within a ‘community’.
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3. Consultation: Records show that prior consultation by departmental 
officers had not reflected ‘close liaison with the Daguragu Community’, 
and neither had it successfully identified the actual nature of ‘the 
desires and ambitions’ of the ‘community’. Instead, extremely rushed 
consultations conducted in 1973 had focused on determining whether 
the land sought by the Gurindji might possibly be converted into 
a conventionally managed, profitable cattle station.12 
4. Implications of the request not being met: While Wattie Creek 
had been the object of the ALP (Australian Labor Party)’s remedial 
intentions for eight years (1967–75), the bureaucracy was under 
pressure to resolve the Gurindji’s situation as quickly as possible.
5. Eligibility: In light of the intergenerational tension affecting many 
Aboriginal groups in the period (discussed below), any claim that 
an organ derivative of the elders’ Muramulla Company (or any 
other incorporated body) was representative of a ‘full Aboriginal 
community’ is highly suspect.
6. Economic feasibility: The claim that the Gurindji leasehold was 
‘suitable for a pastoral property [because] Wave Hill Station has 
operated successfully [on it] for a number of years’ fails to take into 
account both the larger size of the station and the variability of 
country within a financially viable pastoral lease. The area excised by 
the Vestey company for the Gurindji comprised the poorest pastoral 
country of Wave Hill Station.
The origins of many ACEs’ misfortunes can be gleaned from the DAA’s 
justification of the Muramulla Company’s initial funding. In 1975 the 
government believed that the use to which the Gurindji would put their 
lease had already been decided by the Gurindji and the government, 
and that this understanding had been developed with the Gurindji’s full 
knowledge and participation. By such means, pronounced contradictions 
and elisions characterised ACEs’ structure and operations.
The government’s confidence that the Gurindji knew what they wanted 
and that the government could provide it matched the new rhetoric of 
self-determination policy, but it was disingenuous to claim that the legal 
and financial terms of the Muramulla ‘proposal is in accordance with the 
desires and ambitions of the community’. While it was true that the entire 
12  ‘Visit of AACM Representatives … to Wave Hill Station, Libanungu and Daguragu’, 13–16 
June 1973, NAA F985, 1972/1049.
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Muramulla Board had signed a statement requesting ‘a big station … same 
as other people have got it’, there is no evidence that the full financial 
management, property development and corporate governance implications 
of such statements had been explained to this group of Aboriginal elders; nor 
is there evidence that the Gurindji grasped the extent to which the industry 
itself had changed in the decade since they had terminated their routine 
employment in it.13 In conversations with the Muramulla proponents, 
DAA and Australian Agricultural Consultancy Management (AACM) staff 
had proposed a conventional pastoral station business model, yet these 
conversations did not include the time-consuming, expert-facilitated process 
required to develop a shared understanding of what this might mean for the 
Gurindji.14 Wishing to minimise perceptions of financial indiscretion and 
profligacy, the Whitlam Government and its successor had also promoted 
a mainstream ‘non-Aboriginal’ model of animal husbandry. In 1973, DAA 
staff had opined that ‘the manner in which the Gurindji [operate] the project 
will … depend on the terms of the Government making finance available for 
securing the lease and establishing the project [emphasis added]’.15 For such 
officials, consultation about ACEs’ ‘manner’ of operation was ultimately 
unnecessary. According to its internal reasoning, the government could 
create an ‘Aboriginal’ project for the Gurindji simply by giving that label 
to a project designed on the government’s terms. Further, according to 
the DAA: 
The basis of costing and income estimation are [sic] determined as 
for a non-Aboriginal project. It is probable that the income of an 
Aboriginal-operated project will be less and the costs greater if 
professional management is not provided [emphasis added].16 
By requiring that the Muramulla enterprise be supervised by two literate, 
management-experienced, pastoral industry advisers, the government 
imposed a ‘non-Aboriginal project’ model on the Gurindji and other 
groups. For the DAA and the various governments that would deal with 
ACEs, financial accountability and profit-maximisation were paramount. 
How these were achieved and the extent of Aboriginal management was 
functionally unimportant.
13  Committee of Muramulla Gurindji Company to Managing Director of Vestey, [12 December 
1970], Oke Personal Collection.
14  ‘Visit of AACM Representatives … to Wave Hill Station, Libanungu and Daguragu’, 13–16 
June 1973, NAA F985, 1972/1049.
15  ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co Pty Ltd – Directors Report’, 1 June 1977, NAA F1, 1975/4091.
16  ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co Pty Ltd – Directors Report’, 1 June 1977, NAA F1, 1975/4091.
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Unarticulated and contrasting 
Aboriginal visions
In addition to lacking financial and governance knowledge, the 
Aboriginal leaders of ACEs pursued goals at cross-purposes with, and 
sometimes unknown to, government officials. They intended that any 
of their language group who sought food and/or an income from their 
cattle operations would be provided for, yet the companies they ostensibly 
managed were designed to employ fewer than a dozen individuals on 
each station, with negligible profits. Anthropologist Gillian Cowlishaw 
describes a common situation: the government-employed cattle adviser 
and consultant working with the Jandi cattle company at Jimboingal 
near Katherine were ignorant of the aims, priorities and social structure 
of the Aboriginal group that nominally led the enterprise.17 Officials 
were more indifferent to Indigenous cattle goals than the rhetoric of 
self-determination policy purported them to be, and it is questionable 
whether governments would have regulated ACEs more flexibly and/
or subsidised them more generously had they known Aboriginal cattle 
aspirations better. 
As board members of proprietary companies, Aboriginal elders were 
required to contribute to organisational governance, but their past 
experience had not equipped them to provide financial oversight. The 
implementation of self-determination policy therefore required apparent 
mistruths and elisions from them, solicited by those working in their 
name and resulting in implausible ‘Directors’ Reports’, which included 
statements from old Indigenous stockmen, lacking formal education such 
as the following: 
The Directors submit the accounts of the Company and report as 
follows: [We have taken] reasonable steps, before the profit and 
loss statement and balance sheet were made out, to ascertain what 
action had been taken in relation to the writing off of bad debts 
and the making of provisions for doubtful debts [etc.].18 
For such statements to be true, their signatories would have required 
training in English literacy and business. Rather than explain matters to 
Indigenous board members, non-Indigenous members of the enterprises’ 
17  See Cowlishaw, ‘Blackfella Boss’.
18  ‘Muramulla Gurindji Co Pty Ltd – Directors Report’, 1 June 1977, NAA F1, 1975/4091.
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advisory, funding, staffing and operational arms frequently attempted 
to retain their authority over what they perceived as their areas of 
operation. Very few individuals within the Gurindji enterprises or in the 
‘support’ organisations of their interlocutors possessed the local, financial, 
entrepreneurial, pastoral, ecological and Aboriginal/social knowledge 
required, yet the sectoral need for such training was not acted on until 
the 1980s.19
Even in domains in which Aboriginal workers believed themselves to 
be highly skilled, such as the management of herds, there were conflicts 
between ‘white’/‘modern’ and ‘Aboriginal’ approaches. Gurindji cattlemen, 
for instance, vowed that their enterprise would never muster by plane, 
despite sustained pressure from the Muramulla Company’s funding 
bodies, often relayed through the consultant agronomist they had been 
forced to employ.20 Their resolute refusal can be interpreted in different 
ways: as their failure to appreciate economic imperatives and as a public 
‘statement’ affirming the elders’ own abilities and their strong belief in 
the value of cattle work for their sons and nephews – whatever the cost. 
It is not clear whether the DAA’s officers appreciated that the elders’ true 
motives in ‘running cattle’ were more about the continuation of a certain 
culture of work than about the creation of a business enterprise.
Cowlishaw points out that the non-Indigenous protagonists of ACEs 
frequently failed to realise or underplayed the fact that conflicts within 
ACEs took place in a context of unequal power that ‘[was] created by, 
and effectively protects, the wider economic and political structures’.21 
The conflicts that plagued ACEs were not, in other words, only ‘between 
cultures, but between groups of people with different access to resources’.22 
ACEs’ non-Indigenous intermediaries either did not understand that 
they embodied Anglo-European governmental values or did not wish to 
question those values; rarely did they explain or question the regulations, 
statutes, social conventions and laws in which these values were encoded. 
Rather, the encoding of these cultural principles revealed to the Aboriginal 
people that their own values and knowledge were of limited importance. 
This recognition frequently hastened the withdrawal of Aboriginal people 
from what they saw as essentially ‘whitefella’ operations.
19  Lovegrove [DAA] to Muramulla, 3 March 1976, NAA E460, 1981/256, Part 2.
20  ‘Report and Financials …, September 1978’, NAA E629, 1978/7/7581.
21  Cowlishaw, ‘Blackfella Boss’, 68.
22  Cowlishaw, ‘Blackfella Boss’, 61.
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In addition to being somewhat handicapped by their hybridity, ACEs 
could not control global beef prices or governments’ policies and financial 
support. The Fraser Government (elected 13 December 1975) reduced 
funds to the entire Aboriginal Affairs portfolio, and a phase of increasing 
emphasis on profitability by funding bodies began.23 This increasingly 
adversarial political and ideological environment was exacerbated when the 
Australian Parliament granted self-government to the Northern Territory 
in July 1978.24 More challenging to ACEs was the federal Brucellosis and 
Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign (BTEC), however. 
Brucellosis and Tuberculosis 
Eradication Campaign
BTEC required that all pastoralists in the nation would capture and 
test every beast on their land (a feat never achieved before), destroy any 
infected animals, and build any fencing required to properly manage their 
herd in the future.25 Although the federal government assisted landholders 
with the costs of de- and re-stocking, the Commonwealth reported that, 
‘as the campaign proceeds into the difficult parts of northern Australia, 
the costs of eradication rise rapidly, raising doubts about the ability of 
cattle producers to meet these costs and remain viable’.26 Experts described 
BTEC as ‘undoubtedly the most significant factor to impact on the 
industry since World War II’.27 At the time, one experienced consultant 
warned that it might ‘destroy’ the Aboriginal pastoral sector.28 According 
to an expert:
BTEC’s approach to disease eradication forced the modernisation 
of the pastoral industry, with disproportionate impact on the 
Aboriginal sector. The historical mode of pastoralism in the NT was 
deemed no longer adequate to meet the demands of the modern 
international cattle market. Until the 1970s, cattle control in 
Northern and Central Australia had been sporadic and incomplete. 
The owners of most properties had made their living from irregular 
harvests of what were essentially feral populations. Other stations 
23  Lovegrove [DAA] to Muramulla, 3 March 1976, NAA E460, 1981/256, Part 2.
24  Jaensch and Loveday, Under One Flag, 5.
25  Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, ‘Eradication Success’.
26  Stoneham and Johnson, ‘Australian Brucellosis’, 2.
27  Hanlon and Phillpot, Rural Development, 28.
28  Hanlon, ‘Aboriginal Pastoral’, 187.
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had generally mustered once a year, with no expectation that all 
cattle would be accounted for. Very few stations had the yards, races 
and crushes needed for branding; stockmen lassoed the calves and 
pulled them to the ground. Even on company-owned stations in 
the most productive cattle country, there had been virtually no 
separation of different classes of cattle.29 
Corporations owning multiple properties had already modernised before 
the BTEC. According to Graeme Fagan, the manager of Wave Hill 
Station, by the early 1980s the station’s wealthy owner had ensured that: 
[Cattle] were mustered twice a year, regardless of BTEC. … We 
did four rounds a year of branding and weaning. We had paddocks 
where we could isolate cattle – ‘tail-tag’ paddocks they were called. 
You could have three or four [such paddocks, and] cattle couldn’t 
move out of them … until you tested them.30
Such standards remained far beyond the reach of the Muramulla 
Company and most ACEs. Instead, their board members were increasingly 
marginalised and alienated by the industry’s growing, technologised 
managerialism – a characteristic of the ‘new pastoralism’ of which they 
had no previous experience.
Generally, the position of Aboriginal cattle operations in a marginal 
industry was more tenuous than that of their competitors. They were 
usually new and relatively undeveloped leaseholds, and were thus required 
to do more work to meet the campaign’s requirements. Their proponents 
also had little or no experience with the financial aspects of long-term herd 
management on which they could rely to ‘ride out’ the effects of BTEC. 
Nonetheless, unlike other ‘mandatory’ conditions placed on pastoralists 
by the state, non-compliance with BTEC was not an option. The primary 
condition of an approved plan was that a lessee be able to reliably test their 
entire herd. When the lessee was unable to do so, the government killed 
untested animals and paid the lessee compensation for their loss.31 Unable 
to commit themselves to an approved disease eradication plan, all but 
three of the ACE leases in the Northern Territory were fully or partially 
destocked during BTEC.32
29  Lehane, Beating the Odds, 230.
30  Graeme Fagan interviewed by Charlie Ward, September 2012, NTRS 3609, BWF 42, Northern 
Territory Archives Service, Darwin.
31  Lehane, Beating the Odds, 196.
32  Phillpot, ‘Black pastoralism’, 338–39. 
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We should not assume that BTEC affected all ACEs in the same way. 
Like the Daguragu lease, the holdings of the Puraiya Cattle Company 
were destocked under BTEC during 1980–83. By 1996 it had recovered 
sufficiently to achieve some commercial viability, albeit on the basis of 
substantial subsidies. According to Phillpot, while the terms under which 
the company was established and its leasehold purchased were inimical 
to the Anmatyere people’s self-determination and self-management, the 
shareholders of the company (six Anmatyere families) received ongoing 
material benefit.33 In contrast, the Ngarliyikirlangu Pastoral Company 
at Yuendumu met BTEC requirements. Despite this success, its variable 
funding arrangements, staffing issues and a lack of training combined with 
poor markets and climatic conditions to render it unviable by 1996.34
Intergenerational dissociation
Regardless of the significantly ‘European’ composition of their cattle 
operations, ACEs’ elderly Aboriginal leaders commonly intended to transfer 
the management of their enterprise to their descendants. Complicating this 
process was a combination of economic, social and technological factors 
that combined to hasten processes of intergenerational social dissociation, 
however. To understand how these disaggregative social processes 
impacted ACEs and other government-funded Aboriginal organisations, 
it is necessary to describe the clash between the structure and social norms 
cohering Aboriginal societies and the social policies of the Whitlam 
Government that were then integrating remote Indigenous Australians 
into Australia’s economy. Increasing monetary income of Aboriginal 
people from wages and social welfare enfranchised and individualised 
them as consumers. Many remote Aboriginal people, especially the young, 
embraced aspects of this social change with enthusiasm, while the older 
cohort were commonly resistant.
A disaggregative impulse had been present within remote groups such 
as the Gurindji for decades. Anthropologists in the 1930s–50s observed 
that young Gurindji men and women were reluctant to fully participate 
in the ceremonial life valued by their elders.35 Another significant source 
of intergenerational tension was the monopolisation of young women’s 
33  Phillpot, ‘Black Pastoralism’, 237.
34  Phillpot, ‘Black Pastoralism’, 280.
35  Berndt, Women’s Changing, 63.
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sexuality by older men, according to Aboriginal societies’ systems of kinship. 
Polygyny was practised, and kinship systems – mostly as interpreted and 
enforced by male elders – determined which man a woman might marry. 
Anecdotal evidence and ethnographic research across remote regions of 
Australia suggest that, increasingly in the post-contact era, many young 
women harboured resentment towards male elders for forcing them into 
unwanted unions, and many young men likewise resented the same 
elders for ‘taking’ their potential partners.36 Catherine Berndt believed 
such tensions were so widespread that she described ‘young people who 
were enticed by the prospect of brighter lights and greener pastures’ as the 
‘Trojan Horse’ compounding the difficulties of older Aboriginal people in 
resisting what they saw as the damaging effects of their society’s engagement 
with the settler mainstream.37 Anthropologist Les Hiatt argued that the 
inequitable distribution of power within Aboriginal society made it 
‘vulnerable to external challenge and susceptible to internal collapse’.38 
Similar tensions within Gurindji society were paralleled in hundreds 
of other Indigenous groups across Australia.
Rapid dissociation among members of Aboriginal societies occurred in 
the 1970s–80s, exacerbated by the payment of award wages to Aboriginal 
male pastoral workers from December 1968. More jobs outside the 
pastoral industry were available in the 1970s, mostly in the new 
‘Aboriginal’ organisations, and unemployment benefits were also easier 
to obtain. The increasing availability of cash had powerful equalising and 
destabilising effects on remote societies, which were unaccustomed to 
regular surplus. Notwithstanding the obligations of remote Indigenous 
people’s kinship-based, demand sharing economies, this equalisation of 
income empowered young adults in relation to their powerful elders.39 
According to anthropologist David Martin, among the Wik people in 
North Queensland, ‘having an independent income allowed individuals 
– if they so choose – to obtain basic necessities such as food outside the 
network of reciprocal rights and obligation of the Wik domain’.40 These 
changes greatly facilitated young people’s independence from their parents’ 
generation and bolstered their ability to resist the demands of their elders 
regarding their employment and much else.
36  McKnight, Going the Whiteman’s, xix–xxvi.
37  Berndt, ‘Out of the frying pan’, 403.
38  Hiatt, Arguments About, 98.
39  Sansom, The Camp, 254; Rowse, ‘From Houses’, 56.
40  Martin, ‘Autonomy’, 117.
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Intergenerational transfer of leadership within ACEs was also undermined 
in other ways. Young Aboriginal men who worked or who may have 
wished to work in the industry found that mainstream cattle stations paid 
better than ACEs subsidised by the federal government’s Community 
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme. By the early 
1980s, Muramulla employed their Indigenous staff via participation 
in Daguragu Council’s CDEP scheme. Under CDEP arrangements, 
a subsidised allowance was paid to company staff via Daguragu Council, 
but even with ‘top-up’ from Muramulla, the amount was short of the 
award paid on mainstream commercial stations. In addition, Aboriginal 
youth, increasingly influenced by Western values and by their long-term 
occupation of housing, were less interested in pastoral work.41 
Conclusion
In 1986, members of the Muramulla Board conceded privately that 
the Gurindji’s cattle enterprise – and their property – was getting away 
from them. Muramulla remained a ‘strictly European legal animal’, 
and by the time governance training – its board members’ first – was 
planned, cattle work had become an occasional, recreational pursuit.42 
When Muramulla was liquidated in the late 1980s after being destocked 
by BTEC, the elders’ most valued ‘pillar’ of Gurindji self-determination 
collapsed. Other ACEs also declined, as Phillpot describes. In 1980, 28 
ACEs were operating in the Northern Territory; by 1988, there were 12.43 
By the mid-1990s, there were only six subsidised ACEs functioning in 
the Territory. In combination with drought, lower beef prices and BTEC, 
funding bodies’ exclusive criterion of commercial viability made an 
increasing number of ACEs unviable. 
Although ACEs were created to cater to the cattle-related aspirations of 
Aboriginal leaders, they were corporate entities built on unstable and 
incongruous foundations. ACEs were designed by government officers 
and their advisers to function, if need be, without the input or labour of 
their Aboriginal protagonists and intended beneficiaries. The regulatory 
and funding framework for ACEs differed little from that guiding their 
mainstream competitors. What distinguished ACEs from the rest of the 
41  Graeme Fagan interviewed by Charlie Ward, September 2012, NTRS 3609, BWF 42, 110–14.
42  Eames [CLC] to Muramulla, 19 January 1977, NAA E242, K9/2/3.
43  Phillpot, ‘Black Pastoralism’, 350.
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pastoral industry was their greater engagement with government, by virtue 
of their reliance on government funding. While governments intended 
to build Aboriginal capacity and accountability under self-determination 
policies, ACEs’ often experienced government intervention as directly 
inimical of their own decision-making and authority. The social policies 
of the era and the internal dynamics of the remote Indigenous social 
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The Commonwealth Indigenous managed 
capital funds and self-determination
M . C . Dillon1
Introduction
Since the late 1960s, a strand of Indigenous policy has focused on the 
establishment of separate capital funds for a number of related, but 
conceptually distinct purposes. This chapter focuses on the development, 
rationales and operations of two longstanding and largely Indigenous 
managed Commonwealth entities: Indigenous Business Australia (IBA); 
and the Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC) and its associated Land 
Fund (LF).2 There are similar entities operating in state and territory 
jurisdictions, and Indigenous interests have themselves established 
a number of capital funds in different contexts.
1  I wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Tim Rowse, Laura Rademaker, Neil Westbury and 
Jon Altman on earlier drafts of this chapter. Of course, responsibility for the content is entirely mine.
Declaration of interest: The author was personally involved in a number of the matters discussed 
in this paper: he worked on the development of the ATSIC legislation, including the Commercial 
Development Corporation (CDC), and on the development of the Native Title Act and the subsequent 
LF legislation. He worked for three federal ministers responsible for Indigenous affairs at various 
times between 1986 and 2011, and worked for the ILC from 2013 to 2015.
2  Each of these entities has undergone various name changes. IBA was originally named the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation. While this book was in 
press, the ILC was renamed the Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation. The LF, which was originally 
named the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund and is currently titled the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Land Account was, as of 1 July 2019, renamed the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Land and Sea Future Fund.
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This chapter explores the effectiveness of IBA and the ILC/LF in 
contributing to Indigenous self-determination to identify approaches that 
may operate more generally to advance self-determination in public sector 
capital funds.
Capital funds and self‑determination
For almost 50 years, the notion of self-determination has been at the heart 
of Indigenous policy in Australia. Facilitating Indigenous citizens to make 
choices about the ways in which they engage with the wider Australian 
society has been a key driver for policy design and policymakers’ rhetoric 
since the establishment of the Council for Aboriginal Affairs in 1967.3 
Self-determination through increased involvement in decision-making at 
all levels has been a longstanding aspiration of Indigenous people.
The salience of self-determination for both policymakers and Indigenous 
people has varied, but the idea of self-determination retains significant 
normative force throughout this period, notwithstanding the varying 
definitional interpretations, emphases and levels of commitment 
that infuse any discussion of the concept. While the policy of self-
determination replaced policies directed to assimilation, in substantive 
terms, self-determination does not rule out Indigenous choices to 
assimilate. In addition, the ‘shadow’ of assimilationist policy continued 
well into the era of self-determination, embedded in institutions both 
formal and informal. For present purposes, therefore, assimilation ought 
not to be seen as the opposite of self-determination.
In tracing the evolution of IBA and the ILC/LF over the past half-century, 
the present analysis identifies the policy intentions behind the multiple 
innovations and reforms wherever possible, but is more concerned to 
identify their actual outcomes against the yardstick of strengthening 
self-determination.4 The specification of such a yardstick is itself open 
to multiple formulations. The broad approach adopted here focuses on 
substance rather than rhetoric and, following Wilson and Selle, emphasises 
two complementary elements of self-determination: degrees of autonomy 
3  Rowse, Obliged, 30.
4  Because most policy innovations are the product of negotiation and iterative development 
processes, it is extremely rare for there to be a single policy intention involved. As well, most policy 
innovations have unintended consequences both positive and negative. These factors reinforce the 
utility of focusing on outcomes over intention.
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or self-rule, and levels of participation and influence over decisions on 
matters that affect Indigenous people.5 While these elements can operate 
at local, regional or national levels (both IBA and the ILC/LF are 
Commonwealth entities with nationwide remits) the yardstick is applied 
at a national level.
There are at least two ways in which government-established capital funds 
might facilitate self-determination of Indigenous citizens. The first, and 
potentially most significant, emerges if the funds raise the economic and/
or political status of Indigenous peoples generally. Even an ostensibly 
compensatory fund such as the ILC/LF can have the effect of advancing 
Indigenous interests economically and politically (and thus advancing 
self-determination) through the restitution of expropriated assets. This 
focus on the achievement of substantive and formal policy aims could be 
termed the ‘outcomes perspective’ on self-determination. Implicit in it are 
assumptions regarding Indigenous world views and choices that may not 
in fact be accurate for all Indigenous groups or individuals.
The second way these funds might facilitate self-determination is 
by enabling Indigenous representatives to make decisions related to 
each capital fund’s operations and, in particular, the disbursement of 
investment income. This might be termed the ‘process perspective’ on 
self-determination. Government-appointed boards, which comprise 
a  majority of Indigenous members, govern both IBA and the ILC, 
raising fundamental questions regarding self-determination. But who 
do those appointed represent, to whom are they accountable, and how 
independent can they be from ministers and the government (even  if 
legislation provides for formal independence)? Importantly, the LF 
was originally conceptualised as holding funds in trust for Indigenous 
interests, akin to a  fiduciary relationship. The statute establishing the 
LF specified automatic drawdowns of funds from the LF to the ILC that 
were not subject to ministerial discretion. Nonetheless, the executive arm 
of government, assisted by an advisory committee that included ILC 
representation, retained control over the LF’s investment policy. 
The ‘outcome’ and ‘process’ senses of self-determination are often in 
tension, so that IBA and the ILC/LF have needed to trade off desired 
‘outcomes’ against adherence to ideal ‘process’.
5  Wilson and Selle, ‘Indigenous’, 8–12.
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Indigenous Business Australia
The genesis of IBA is the Aboriginal Enterprise (Assistance) Act 1968. 
This law established a fund to which Aboriginal people could apply for 
business related loans.6 Tim Rowse describes this legislation as one of the 
Council for Aboriginal Affairs’s (CAA) ‘few political victories of 1968’.7 
He documents the role of the CAA in advocating for ‘programs to develop 
and strengthen the capacity of Aboriginal people to manage their own 
affairs’ and notes that this terminology was soon referred to by others as 
‘self-determination’.8 From the very beginning, the capital fund policies 
were intended by the CAA to advance self-determination broadly defined. 
This capital fund was rolled into the Aboriginal Loans Commission in 
1974, which in turn was subsumed within the Aboriginal Development 
Commission (ADC) in 1980. 
The continuing policy thread or rationale weaving through each of these 
institutional iterations was to help Indigenous business operators to access 
capital. A deeper, and questionable, policy assumption that emerged 
over time was that Indigenous economic development must involve the 
development of Indigenous-owned or controlled commercial enterprises, 
rather than merely raise Indigenous income levels. This assumption has its 
origins in assimilationist or anti-communal ideas as well as in progressive 
ideas linked to self-determination and Indigenous aspirations for 
autarky (at least in economic terms). The increased focus on Indigenous 
procurement policies over the last decade is the most recent embodiment 
of this assumption. A parallel issue (discussed below) is the tension 
between communally based land acquisitions and more individualised 
support for housing loans and finance.
In 1985, the Report of the Committee of Review of Aboriginal Employment 
and Training Programs (the Miller Report), which included Mick Miller 
as chair and Dr H. C. Coombs as a key member, provided the first 
major policy assessment of federal government economic programs in 
Indigenous affairs. The Miller Report was explicitly critical of the ADC 
for prioritising the funding of housing over enterprise development. 
The report recommended that the government transfer responsibility 
6  I will refer to IBA as a ‘fund’ because it comprises a significant and growing financial asset 
embedded within a statutory corporation with a remit to use its resources for Indigenous benefit.
7  Rowse, Obliged, 40.
8  Rowse, Obliged, 107.
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for the support of commercially viable small businesses from the ADC 
to a new unit in the Commonwealth Development Bank.9 While this 
recommendation was never adopted, the analysis fed into the momentum 
for a new approach to supporting Indigenous economic development.
In 1989, the Hawke Government established the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commercial Development Corporation (CDC) at the same 
time as it legislated the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC). Breaking from the previous approach, the CDC was a largely 
Indigenous-led corporation with a statutory remit to invest and take up 
equity positions in commercial projects relevant to Indigenous interests. 
A small capital base ($10 million (m) per annum over four years plus 
the transfer of ADC assets of around $10m) funded these investments. 
The rationale for this new approach was less to provide access to capital 
for Indigenous businesses (an autonomy focus) and more to build 
Indigenous political and economic influence at local and regional levels 
(a participation focus). CDC sought to make strategic investments in 
key businesses within regional economies, and thus gain access to the 
business and political networks that had excluded Indigenous interests. 
The prototype was an Indigenous-owned corporation, Centrecorp, 
that invested a proportion of royalty revenues in businesses that would 
particularly benefit Indigenous residents of Central Australia.
In 2001, the Howard Government renamed the CDC ‘Indigenous 
Business Australia’. In 2005, the abolition of ATSIC led to further 
legislative change. ATSIC’s enterprise loan function, and the housing loan 
function that ATSIC had inherited from the ADC, transferred to IBA.10 
These changes added programs, funded by budget appropriations, that 
duplicated, albeit in concessional terms, a private sector bank’s lending 
operations. They were therefore a reversion to the earlier ‘access to capital’ 
policy rationale. While IBA’s investment remit was not affected, the 2005 
changes returned IBA – at least in some years – to the annual budget 
appropriation process. Since its lending capability was based on funds 
appropriated by government, IBA was more beholden to government.
9  Miller, Report, 303–11.
10  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Amendment Act 2005 (Cth).
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In practice, IBA continued to favour housing over enterprise. By June 
2017, IBA controlled net assets of $1.33 billion (bn), up from $987m in 
2008–09 and $81m in 2003. Over half ($679m) were concessional home 
loans, only $30m (or 2 per cent) were enterprise loans, with the balance 
in a range of investments and cash, term deposits and an unspecified 
category termed ‘other’.11 Thus, IBA ignored the Miller Report’s critique of 
underinvestment in enterprise support. Furthermore, while these lending 
decisions built an asset base, they also made IBA primarily a housing loan 
provider, changing and undermining IBA’s character. Notwithstanding 
this emphasis on housing finance, IBA continues to support Indigenous 
entrepreneurs and small business owners and also invests directly in 
commercial opportunities via partial or full ownership of around 20 active 
subsidiary corporations.12 
In recent years, IBA has also become a fund manager. In 2013, 
it established an Indigenous Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT), and in 
2015 it established a number of ‘prosperity funds’. IBA’s intention in each 
case was to provide a secure vehicle for Indigenous investors to invest in 
a diversified and actively managed portfolio. The minimum investment 
is set at $500,000, suggesting that IBA is primarily seeking to support 
Indigenous landowners and native titleholders who gain money from 
agreements with resource developers. According to the IBA website, as at 
June 2016, the IBA REIT was invested in six commercial properties and 
had a value of $102m; the prosperity funds comprise separate growth, 
income and cash funds, and have a gross asset value of $78m. According 
to its 2017 Annual Report, IBA provided investment support to 109 
Indigenous organisations, and co-invested with 36 Indigenous investors 
holding a total of $129m in equity.13 This suggests that the IBA equity 
contribution to the funds is $51m ($129m minus $78m).
How should we assess the performance of IBA in relation to its statutory 
remit, and the overarching policy challenge of Indigenous economic 
development?
11  Indigenous Business Australia, Annual Report 2016–17, 105.
12  Indigenous Business Australia, Annual Report 2016–17, 156.
13  Indigenous Business Australia, Annual Report 2016–17, 9.
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IBA’s three major programs are all worthwhile, and its design is 
fundamentally sound. However, over its 30-year history, IBA has made 
only a marginal contribution to improving Indigenous economic status 
and it has not increased significantly the political and economic influence 
of regional Indigenous interests. Not only has IBA been under-capitalised, 
but also its boards have concentrated on concessional home loans at the 
expense of making strategic commercial investments. While concessional 
home loans do build Indigenous wealth, it is unclear whether the same 
quantity of home loans could have been provided by private sector 
institutions. If IBA home loans are merely substitutes for loans that could 
be obtained from other lenders, then perhaps it would have been better 
for IBA to give priority to strategic investments. However, governments 
have encouraged the IBA Board’s emphasis on concessional home loans, 
and this may also be what Indigenous Australians prefer IBA to do, as the 
benefits of home ownership accrue in much more targeted ways than the 
more abstracted political benefits of increased commercial engagement. 
An Indigenous constituency favouring IBA home loans over strategic 
commercial investment may be growing as the Indigenous population in 
south-eastern Australia grows.14 
While IBA continues to give priority to home lending, it has also renewed 
focus on the investment portfolio and on managed funds. The Indigenous 
corporations that face the challenge of managing their financial assets 
sustainably welcome both. However, IBA and its predecessor the CDC 
have never been funded sufficiently to lift the economic status of the 
Indigenous population generally (around 650,000 individuals in the 2016 
Census). Moreover, the impact of IBA’s strategic investments in changing 
the structural underpinnings of Indigenous economic and commercial 
exclusion has been slight, given the magnitude of the challenges facing 
Indigenous Australians. In terms of self-determination, IBA has been 
unsuccessful in driving major improvements in Indigenous autonomy 
and has been unable to increase substantially Indigenous influence within 
mainstream decision-making.
14  Markham and Biddle, ‘Indigenous’, 2017.
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Indigenous Land Corporation and the 
associated Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Land Account
The antecedent of the ILC and the associated Land Fund was the Aboriginal 
Land Fund Commission (ALFC), established in 1975.15 Notwithstanding 
its name, and the formal creation of a ‘fund’, the ALFC got its money 
from annual appropriations of the Australian Government Budget. While 
there was a commitment to make $50m available over 10 years,16 even 
in its first year the ALFC was allocated only $2m. Palmer outlined the 
ALFC’s five-year struggle for funding: when the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs (DAA) decided in 1976 to offer up $1m of the original allocation 
as savings, the ALFC refused to repay the funds.17 In this dispute, the 
DAA and the ALFC were in conflict over policy. A series of ministerial 
directives constrained the ALFC’s ability to acquire properties without 
consulting the department and gaining the minister’s approval.
The ADC replaced the ALFC in 1980. Four functional responsibilities 
came together within the ADC: enterprise support, housing, training and 
land acquisition. Because of the ADC’s commitments to enterprises and 
housing – inherited from the Department of Aboriginal Affairs – ADC 
funds for land acquisition were limited. The Miller Report lamented that 
in the transition from ALFC to ADC the concept of a fund dedicated 
to supporting land acquisition had been lost. The need for land was 
even greater than when first noticed in 1972 and the report argued that 
the economic status of Aboriginal people had continued to deteriorate: 
‘We therefore recommend that immediate action be taken to re-establish 
a specific land fund vote within the ADC’.18
The overarching pressure of recurrent housing needs and the significant 
funding and policy effort involved in making even small land acquisitions 
pushed the ADC away from capital acquisitions and towards investment 
in a recurrent housing program. From 1980 to 1985, ADC expenditures 
totalled $279m. Of this, $178.7m or 64 per cent was allocated to housing 
15  Ian Palmer’s book Buying Back the Land recounts in detail the establishment of the ALFC and 
the bureaucratic policy struggles which dogged the ALFC’s short lifespan (1975–79). Palmer, Buying.
16  Miller, Report, 318.
17  Palmer, Buying, 50–56.
18  Miller, Report, 319.
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loans and grants, $38.2m or 13.6 per cent to enterprises, and only $9.5m 
or 3.4 per cent to land acquisition.19 The Miller Report noted that, against 
the 1972 commitment to allocate $50m to land acquisition over 10 years, 
actual expenditure had been merely $17.5m.20
In 1989, the establishment of ATSIC effectively absorbed the ADC. 
Sections 14 and 15 of the Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission Act 1989 empowered the commission to purchase 
and grant land. In addition, Section 68 established a Regional Land Fund 
(RLF) that enabled the regional councils that were constituent parts of 
ATSIC to accumulate funds for land acquisition. The RLF provisions 
were largely not utilised. ATSIC’s major programs were the Community 
Development Employment Projects (CDEP) program, the community 
housing and infrastructure program and the law and justice program, and 
it continued the ADC approach of allocating little for land acquisition. In 
1994–95, from a budget of around a billion dollars ATSIC spent $22m on 
the acquisition of 21 properties and on 282 land management projects.21 
Following the High Court of Australia’s Mabo no. 2 decision in 1992, the 
Commonwealth legislated to respond to the implications of ‘native title’. 
The Keating Government’s response to the High Court’s recognition of 
‘native title’ was intended to provide greater certainty for all interests, 
whether native title claimants, Indigenous landowners or third parties 
with potentially invalid titles. Certainty was no problem for most titles 
issued by the Crown, because the High Court had found that native 
title was entirely vulnerable to actions by the Crown that resulted in the 
issue of a title to a third party. However, titles granted by the Crown 
over native title since the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (RDA) were now suspect. Any title issued since the RDA came 
into force on 31 October 1975 would be invalid because – without the 
Crown compensating for native title loss – such acts of extinguishment 
were inconsistent with the RDA’s requirement that governments not act 
in a racially discriminatory way. This new obligation primarily affected 
titles issued by the states and territories since 31 October 1975, as the 
states and territories are primarily responsible for land administration 
and the Commonwealth Parliament has the power to amend or override 
19  These figures were calculated from data provided in Palmer, Buying, 157. The balance of 19 per 
cent presumably related to administrative costs of the ADC.
20  Miller, Report, 319.
21  ATSIC, Annual Report 1994–95, chapter 4.
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the RDA. One purpose of the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) was to set 
up a process that would validate any grants of title by the Crown that 
might be suspect, subject to the provision of ‘just terms’ compensation. 
However, the NTA offered nothing to native title owners whose native 
title right had been extinguished prior to the commencement of the RDA. 
By  law, no compensation was due to these owners, because the High 
Court’s judgement was that the Crown’s extinguishment of native title 
had always been lawful. However, it was arguable that the difference 
between the native title holders who had to be compensated and those 
who did not have to be compensated was essentially arbitrary.22 
The Keating Government agreed with Indigenous negotiators that 
governments had a moral and political obligation to purchase land for 
those legally dispossessed. Accordingly, Section 201 of the NTA established 
a Land Fund to assist Indigenous peoples to acquire land and to manage 
the acquired land in a way that provides economic, environmental, social 
and cultural benefits to the new owners. The Act effectively made clear that 
the purpose was not a narrowly defined focus on economic development. 
The operational details and quantum of funding allocated were to be set 
out in subsequent regulations. Within two years, the parliament enacted 
the Land Fund and Indigenous Land Corporation (ATSIC Amendment) Act 
1995, which repealed and replaced Section 201 of the NTA. The process 
of parliamentary consideration was both long and contentious.23
The Keating and Howard governments built up the LF over 10  years, 
beginning with a payment of $200m and followed by payments of $121m 
(indexed) in each of the subsequent nine years. After 10 years, the value of 
the LF stood at $1.4bn. In the following 14 years, it has grown to just over 
$2bn.The establishment of the LF (which was renamed the Land Account 
in 2005) has raised three issues.
The first is how quickly the LF can accumulate funds and thus spending 
power. At the insistence of the Department of Finance, the legislation 
limited LF investments to a range of very conservative options – term 
deposits, government bonds and the like – that severely restricted the 
fund’s potential growth. The ILC Board under each of the last three 
chairs (Shirley Macpherson, Dawn Casey and Eddie Fry) requested 
22  Dillon, ‘Emerging’.
23  Tickner provides a detailed account of the legislation’s contentious passage. See Tickner, Taking, 
221–36.
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the government of the day to broaden the LF’s investment parameters. 
The boards’ persuasive arguments were that the Commonwealth Future 
Fund had performed well without such restrictions on its portfolio, over 
a period of strong performance since the 2007 global financial crisis, and 
most recently that the Commonwealth had found it necessary in its 2016 
Budget to include a package rescuing the ILC from its debts. In early 2018, 
Prime Minister Turnbull announced that the government would widen 
the Land Account’s investment parameters. It did so in November 2018 
by transferring the Land Account and its management to the Future Fund, 
with broader investment parameters.24 While the change in investment 
parameters will enable the LF to grow faster, this improvement is arguably 
23 years too late. The Commonwealth has not compensated the LF for 
the foregone revenues over the past quarter century. Moreover, in a global 
economic environment in which growth rates are slowing, there is no 
guarantee that the Future Fund managers will achieve the levels of return 
enjoyed since 2007. When Prime Minister Turnbull predicted that the 
changed arrangements would make Indigenous interests ‘better off’ to the 
tune of $1.5bn over 20 years, he was optimistically assuming that global 
economic growth would be so high as to enable a real rather than a merely 
nominal improvement in the fund’s growth.
The second policy issue is how much money the LF is allowed to transfer 
to the ILC so that the ILC can acquire lands, divest them to Indigenous 
Australians and then support Indigenous owners in their land 
management. Policymakers have struggled to devise a workable formula 
that both protects the capital base (the LF) and allows ‘drawdowns’ to the 
ILC that are not subject to wide fluctuations. Drawdowns were previously 
determined by a formula, but the most recent amendments provide for 
ministers to control the drawdowns on an ad hoc basis. This will diminish 
the scope for the ILC to plan its program strategically over several years.
The third, and least obvious, policy issue is the question of the 
underlying purpose of the LF. The legislative intention in 1995 was 
clearly to give a  government agency, rather than Indigenous interests, 
the responsibility for managing the LF’s assets, while providing for the 
ILC’s majority Indigenous board to decide what lands to acquire and 
what land management projects to support. A Consultative Forum that 
included ILC Board members advised the LF on its investment policy. 
24  This was effected by amending the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth) and by 
enacting the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund Act 2018 (Cth).
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While there was no explicit statutory requirement that the government 
limit itself to the role of fiduciary trustee, it is clear that the  intention 
of the LF’s architects was that the ILC Board have wide scope to make 
decisions. The  Commonwealth, as fiduciary trustee, took a back seat. 
Yet the transfer of the LF into the Commonwealth Future Fund not 
only failed to acknowledge this fiduciary intention, but also further 
diluted that relationship by embedding the LF more deeply within the 
Commonwealth’s financial architecture.
Taking into consideration the ways that the Australian Government has 
dealt with the three issues discussed – investment portfolio, drawdown 
decisions and the role of the ILC Board – it is apparent that, since 1995, 
the original intentions underpinning the creation of the LF have been 
progressively diluted. The tension between whether the ILC exists to 
fulfil the purposes of the compensatory LF, or the LF exists to fulfil the 
remit of the government-influenced ILC, has increasingly been resolved 
in favour of the latter. The ILC is now conceived by policymakers as just 
another Commonwealth statutory corporation (nominally independent, 
but in practice subject to substantial ministerial influence) rather than 
an independent statutory mechanism to deliver compensation within 
a fiduciary policy context. In fact, to align with the original policy 
intentions, both entities ought to be considered intertwined strands of 
the same independent institution.25
Finally, the operations of the ILC require brief assessment. The ILC 
has, over 20 years, acquired hundreds of properties, large and small, 
for Indigenous groups and communities and provided significant and 
innovative assistance towards the management of Indigenous lands, 
including path-breaking work on carbon farming in northern Australia. 
A recent ILC media release indicated that the ILC had invested $1.0bn 
in the Indigenous estate over the life of the ILC (1995–2018) and 
purchased 257 properties totalling 6 million hectares.26 However, the ILC 
has slowed the pace of its property acquisitions. In its first eight years, 
the ILC had acquired 151 properties totalling over 5 million hectares.27 
In the following 12 years, it acquired only another 75.28 The slowdown 
25  Michael Dillon, ‘The Devil in the Detail: The Government’s Proposed Indigenous Land Fund 
Legislation’, A Walking Shadow (blog), 2 April 2018, accessed 24 October 2019, refragabledelusions.
blogspot.com/2018/04/the-devil-in-detail-governments.html.
26  Indigenous Land Corporation, ‘Indigenous Land Corporation Welcomes New Era’.
27  Indigenous Land Corporation, Improving, 8.
28  Indigenous Land Corporation, Land, 15.
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can be attributed to a number of factors. First, there has been an increased 
demand for land management as native title claims came to fruition and 
as the ILC’s own former acquisitions have sought assistance. Second, the 
ILC has focused more on the operations of its own subsidiaries. Third, 
the financial commitments arising from the 2010 purchase of the Ayers 
Rock Resort (ARR) have been huge. The second and third of these factors 
are arguably strategic mistakes by successive ILC boards.29
Under its statutory remit, the ILC must consider land not only as an 
income-generating asset but also as meeting an Indigenous need to 
hold land in accordance with broader social and cultural aspirations.30 
In considering land as an income-generating asset, the ILC has used its 
power to establish subsidiaries to build a commercial portfolio on its own 
behalf (rather than in partnership with landowners as was  originally 
intended). By establishing and operating subsidiaries in pastoral 
operations,  tourism and cultural support, the ILC has sought to create 
jobs and economic opportunities. As Sullivan persuasively argues, the 
architects of the ILC’s initial and amended legislation intended that 
any subsidiaries would work in partnership with Indigenous groups 
of landowners.31
The most egregious example of the ILC’s misplaced confidence in operating 
unilaterally via its subsidiaries has been the $300m acquisition of the 
ARR. The ILC paid a price above commercial valuation for this asset and 
borrowed significant sums to finance the acquisition. Servicing this debt 
has effectively crippled the ILC’s ability to fulfil its primary legislative 
remit. Even if the ARR eventually becomes commercially successful, and 
the ILC’s outstanding bank borrowings are repaid, there will have been 
an effective 20-year hiatus in land acquisition and management across the 
nation, with all the opportunity costs which that entails.
The ILC has also faced problems in its relationship with pastoral 
operations. Contrary to its statutory obligations, the ILC has not always 
divested acquired pastoral leases in cases where it wished to directly 
29  In a related vein, a 2010 Strategic Review of Indigenous Expenditure commissioned by Cabinet 
noted that the ILC’s then current emphasis had been on employment and training (effected through 
its subsidiaries) rather than land acquisition. While noting the ILC’s independence, the review 
recommended a reorientation towards support for the management of land acquired under native 
title settlements. Department of Finance, Strategic Review, 278.
30  Altman and Pollack, ‘The Indigenous’, 77.
31  Sullivan, ‘Policy Change’.
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manage the enterprise. This has antagonised local groups whose lands 
were acquired but not divested to the traditional owners. More recently, 
the ILC has changed tack and is now in the process of withdrawing from 
direct involvement in pastoral operations. That is, it is divesting those 
pastoral stations it retains to their traditional owners, selling its substantial 
cattle herd (which less than six years ago was among the 15 largest herds 
in the country) and returning management of pastoral operations to local 
communities, notwithstanding that they will face significant challenges 
given low economies of scale. The ostensible reasons for this process of 
divestment include the high capital costs of operating a national business 
and the pressure of local Indigenous communities.
It is a mistake to retreat from managing a national pastoral enterprise 
that returns economic benefits to local communities. While the ILC has 
a statutory obligation to divest land it acquires to local Indigenous groups 
within a ‘reasonable period’, there is nothing to stop the ILC leasing the 
lands back on a commercial basis to build a single integrated enterprise 
managed in cooperation with local communities that has economies of 
scale and access to the ILC’s expertise and capital. Most successful pastoral 
operations in northern Australia operate across multiple properties and 
have access to professional management and adequate capital. One effect 
of the divestment of the national pastoral enterprise is that substantial 
ILC capital is freed up: the ILC herd of around 68,000 head is worth 
around $38m. However, the sale of the cattle herd has reduced the value 
of the herd by almost $18m.32 The ILC’s desire to free up funds through 
asset sales is a direct result of the financial pressures flowing from the 
misguided acquisition of the ARR.
Perhaps the ILC would not have made (or would not be making) these 
strategic mistakes were its boards more accountable to broader Indigenous 
interests such as land councils and other peak bodies. The process of 
Indigenous self-determination is compromised by the power of ministers 
to appoint directors. This opens up risks of politicised appointments and, 
ultimately, inappropriate or informal interference.
From this review of risks and failures we can draw three conclusions 
relevant to the quest for greater Indigenous control over the ILC and 
related institutions.
32  Indigenous Land Corporation, Annual Report 2017–18, 102.
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First, the tension between acquiring land for economic development and 
acquiring land in order to compensate dispossessed people is ongoing. 
While both goals are important and intertwined, there is also a history – 
and thus ongoing risk – of ministers and bureaucrats substituting a focus 
on economic development that is invariably interpreted in narrow terms 
focused on individual entrepreneurship (or worse, a focus on the rhetoric of 
economic development) for an ongoing substantive policy of compensation 
via the operations of the ILC. Both prospectively focused economic 
development and retrospectively focused compensation for dispossession 
(if the quantum aligns with the prior loss) will contribute to Indigenous 
self-determination. They will facilitate both Indigenous autonomy and the 
capacity to participate in wider decisions from a position of greater strength 
and resilience. It seems likely that uncompensated loss of identity, culture, 
land and political agency is a core factor in the creation of intergenerational 
deep-disadvantage and the high-level policy failure seen in the failure of 
successive governments to make progress in ‘closing the gap’.33 If so, the 
failure to pursue substantive and effective policies focused on compensation 
risks undermining policy efforts across the breadth of the Indigenous affairs 
domain. This failure is a potential contributor to the ongoing high-level 
policy failure in Indigenous affairs over recent decades.
Second, the establishment of the ILC/LF within the public sector has clear 
drawbacks for self-determination: in setting policy for the LF, governments 
have wound back Indigenous influence and increased government control. 
The obvious alternative is to establish the ILC/LF outside the public sector 
as a truly independent and self-determining entity.
Third, accountability between government, ILC directors and the broader 
Indigenous community has been a systemic problem. The operation of 
the LF and the ILC has lacked transparency, and this has contributed 
to strategic missteps that have disadvantaged Indigenous interests and 
led to both sub-optimal outcomes and processes in terms of advancing 
Indigenous self-determination. The missteps have weakened Indigenous 
autonomy and reduced Indigenous capacity to influence mainstream 
decision-making.
33  Morrison, Closing, 2019.
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Conclusion
This chapter has examined two models of statute-based Indigenous capital 
accumulation – IBA and the ILC/LF. Neither led to a leap from capital 
accumulation to broadly based self-determination, either in terms of 
greater autonomy or in terms of greater political influence for Indigenous 
interests. Nor does it appear likely that, either separately or together, they 
have the capacity to make this leap. While each has a majority Indigenous 
board and Indigenous chair, board members have not been accountable 
to the wider Indigenous community. Reasons include the ‘light touch’ 
regulatory oversight of all Commonwealth statutory corporations, the 
informal control exercised by ministers derived from their powers of 
appointment and reappointment, and the variable quality of boards over 
time arising from the political lens applied to board appointments by 
ministers. In addition, in the case of the LF, government control over 
investment strategy and, in the case of IBA, governments’ use of budget 
appropriations as an incentive to shape board decisions, have militated 
against Indigenous self-determination.
Both IBA and the ILC/LF have been starved of start-up capital and revenue 
flows. Each has confronted management and governance challenges that 
are a systemic source of under-performance. Strategic mistakes by both 
organisations have constrained their long-term impact. Importantly, each 
has been the subject of serious and sustained bureaucratic and political 
pushback. Statutory land rights and native title have had more impact 
than the capital fund institutions. Legislation to recognise land rights 
(including ‘native title’) has returned very substantial areas of land to 
Indigenous ownership and control and this has increased the political and 
social leverage of Indigenous interests vis-a-vis other interest groups and 
governments at all levels.
However, to compare policies related to capital funds and land rights 
in this way ignores the synergies between land and capital. We should 
assess the impact of the array of economic, social, cultural and political 
institutional frameworks established since 1966 as a systemic whole, 
each element contributing to the extent and quality of the Indigenous 
domain. It is likely that these capital funds do contribute to increased 
self-determination through their synergistic and largely intangible 
supplementation of the value of land rights and native title to 
Indigenous interests.
117
4 . UNMET PoTENTIAL
In the medium term, these capital funds would contribute more to 
self-determination – in terms of both increased autonomy and greater 
capacity to influence public policy – were governments to give them more 
money and to transfer control to an appropriate Indigenous ownership 
structure outside the public sector.34 Clearly, such a policy turnaround 
would require a shift in public sentiment and strong political commitments 
at a government level.
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Discrete Indigenous communities 
in the self-determination era1
Will Sanders
Introduction
Growing up in the northern suburbs of Sydney in the 1960s, my 
interactions with Indigenous Australians were few. Passing Purfleet 
community as we drove the Pacific Highway to our annual north coast 
beach holiday was one minor regular encounter; buying sandworms for 
fishing from the small group of Aboriginal houses at our destination 
of South West Rocks was another. In the 1970s, family beach holidays 
moved to the south coast of New South Wales, to a house near Jerrinja 
community, formally known as Roseby Park reserve or mission. While 
I did not come to know Indigenous Australians personally through these 
fleeting encounters, I did come to appreciate that there were small discrete 
Indigenous communities scattered across New South Wales. Known in the 
past as reserves and missions, these communities seemed to be changing 
1  My research for this paper draws on conversations with many public officials in Indigenous land 
councils, local governments and their associations, and state and territory governments. I thank them 
all for sharing their time and knowledge with a researcher from The Australian National University who 
just approached them out of the blue. You have maintained my faith in open public administration. 
My ANU colleague Ed Wensing must also be acknowledged for sharing his encyclopaedic knowledge 
of land law and local government. This paper’s interpretations and inaccuracies are of my own 
making, but the knowledge on which it is based has been generously shared by others.
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during the Whitlam Government years of my adolescence. New housing 
and related infrastructure started appearing at Purfleet, Jerrinja and 
other discrete Indigenous communities funded by the Commonwealth 
Government.
The land rights and self-determination era in Australian Indigenous 
affairs offered new potentialities for discrete Indigenous communities. 
From restrictive reserves and tutelary missions under ‘protection’ and 
‘assimilation’, these places were becoming small self-servicing settlements, 
and some new discrete Indigenous communities were developing,  as 
I  became aware when attending the University of Sydney in the 
mid-1970s.  The Block in Redfern, owned by the Aboriginal Housing 
Company, was then newly emerging as an urban centre of services and 
residence for Indigenous people.
This paper surveys discrete Indigenous communities during the first 
half-century (c. 1970–2020) of the self-determination era in Australian 
Indigenous affairs. It begins with the changing Commonwealth role as 
infrastructure funder for these communities nationwide. Developments 
in each state and territory are then discussed separately. While there 
is no single clear story nationally, there are commonalties in what 
has emerged conceptually from different policy histories. Discrete 
Indigenous communities have everywhere become ‘self-servicing 
corporate landholders’. Note that I do not use the terms ‘landowners’ or 
‘self-governing’, though in some jurisdictions these terms may be justified. 
Some discrete communities have formed local governments, while others 
have adopted more ‘private’ corporate forms. How and why this has 
occurred will emerge during the survey of jurisdictions.
Commonwealth benevolence 
and withdrawal
The Commonwealth funded infrastructure for discrete Indigenous 
communities from 1972, first through the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs and then via the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC) established in 1990. Programs with the words infrastructure, 
community and housing in their titles funded water, electricity, roads 
and housing in both long-established and new discrete Indigenous 
communities across Australia. Commonwealth authorities also developed 
surveys of these communities to scope the task and identify priorities. 
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Map 5.1: Geographic distribution of 1,187 discrete Indigenous 
communities by population size, 2006.
Source: francis Markham (Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The Australian 
National University), using data from the ABS 2006 Community Housing and Infrastructure 
Needs Survey .
Table 5.1 shows findings from three surveys conducted by ATSIC and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in 1992, 1999 and 2006. In the four 
south-eastern jurisdictions, numbers of discrete Indigenous communities 
were relatively stable, around 70, or possibly slightly in decline. In the 
four more sparsely settled jurisdictions, numbers of discrete Indigenous 
communities and their populations were more substantial and growing, 
at least in the first half of these 15 years. Somewhere between 1,100 and 
1,200 communities with between 90,000 and 100,000 residents was 
the finding around the millennium for South Australia, Queensland, the 
Northern Territory and Western Australia combined.
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New South Wales 65 7,930 67 9,103 57 5,082
Australian Capital Territory 1 240
Victoria 1 165 2 320 2 270
Tasmania 1 38 1 1 76
South Australia 94 4,549 106 5,254 91 4,567
Queensland 77 23,885 149 29,440 124 27,446
Northern Territory 489 36,299 681 48,716 641 41,681
Western Australia 178 15,342 285 17,161 271 13,838
Australia 906 88,448 1,291 109,994 1,187 92,960
Source: Australian Construction Services, 1992 National Housing; Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Housing and Infrastructure 1999; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Housing and 
Infrastructure 2006 (Reissue) .
Table 5.2: Numbers of discrete Indigenous communities reporting 
resident populations <50, 50–199 and 200+ in four jurisdictions, ATSIC 
and ABS Survey, 1999.
Pop. <50 Pop. 50–199 Pop. 200+
South Australia 79 18 9
Queensland 105 9 35
Northern Territory 550 67 64
Western Australia 200 65 20
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Housing and Infrastructure 1999 .
Table 5.2 divides the 1999 survey findings in the four more sparsely settled 
jurisdictions by size of population in discrete Indigenous communities. 
There were eight to 10 times as many ‘small’ Indigenous communities 
(population <50) as ‘large’ ones (population 200+) in the Northern 
Territory (550/64), South Australia (79/9) and Western Australia 
(200/20), while the ratio in Queensland was a lesser factor of three 
(105/35). Queensland’s relative preponderance of large communities 
reflects its practices of the ‘protection’ and ‘assimilation’ eras that moved 
many Indigenous people far off their land into large, consolidated and 
isolated Indigenous settlements. This relative concentration in a few, large 
discrete Indigenous communities has continued under Queensland’s 
approach to land rights and self-determination.2
2  Queensland policy has long distinguished strongly between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
circumstances. While Islanders have remained in small, discrete communities, Aboriginal people were 
moved during the early decades of the twentieth century into just a few, large consolidated communities.
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While jurisdictional differences will emerge further in later analysis, an 
important commonality is the withdrawal of Commonwealth support for 
infrastructure in discrete Indigenous communities after the abolition of 
ATSIC in 2004–05. Since 2006, the Commonwealth has pressured state, 
territory and local governments to take responsibility for infrastructure 
in these communities. Responses have varied and have been complicated 
by a 10-year Commonwealth commitment to public housing in remote 
Indigenous communities under the 2008 National Partnership Agreement 
on Remote Indigenous Housing. Commonwealth withdrawal has stopped 
the surveys of discrete Indigenous communities and their infrastructure 
needs since 2006, so no more recent comparative data exists across the 
eight sub-national jurisdictions.
New South Wales: Conflict over local 
government rates
Aboriginal land rights reform in New South Wales occurred in two 
stages over a decade. In 1973, a Liberal–Country Coalition Government 
legislated to establish an Aboriginal Lands Trust (ALT) that would hold 
title to Aboriginal reserves.3 In 1983, after six years preparatory work, 
the Wran Labor Government legislated a new structure of Aboriginal 
land councils. The landholders of former reserves and other claimed land 
would now be 120 Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs), overseen 
by the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (NSWALC) that 
would be divided into nine regions for purposes such as the election of 
representatives.
In 60 established reserve communities across New South Wales on the 
edges of towns or cities or in more isolated locations, the land rights reforms 
meant that LALCs began receiving rates bills from encompassing local 
governments – a surprise to some of them. The argument that they should 
be exempt wholesale from rates has been resisted, both by local governments 
and by the New South Wales Government.4 While Aboriginal land deemed 
‘vacant’ and/or of ‘cultural or spiritual significance’ can be exempted from 
rates, Aboriginal land used for residential or commercial purposes incurs 
3  Peterson, Aboriginal Land Rights, 16–27.
4  Sanders, ‘Local Governments’.
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the obligation to pay rates.5 When providing ‘social housing’, LALCs can 
also gain exemptions from local government rates  as ‘public benevolent 
institutions’, though they must still pay for water and sewerage.6
What infrastructure services could discrete Indigenous communities expect 
from local governments in return for rates? The question arose in 1987 when 
strained relations between Toomelah community and the Moree Plains 
Shire Council were the subject of a report by the Commonwealth’s Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC). After noting that 
the ‘reserve era for Toomelah ended only in 1977 when the last manager 
left’ and that ‘in the decade since, the community has had to come to terms 
with a vast array of new rights and responsibilities’, the report found that:
The Toomelah community of five hundred Aboriginal people 
endures appalling living conditions which amount to a denial to 
them of the most basic rights taken for granted by most other groups 
in society, and by other Australian communities of a similar size.7
The report compared Toomelah with Boggabilla, a town 25 kilometres 
away, where the shire provided infrastructure services in return for rates. 
The shire argued not only that resource constraints prevented such 
servicing at Toomelah, but also that it was a ‘private settlement’ on a single 
communal block of land.8 
Conflict over rates and services at Toomelah in 1987 pointed to unresolved 
policy issues in New South Wales. Local governments had not provided 
services to discrete Indigenous communities when they had been ‘reserves’ 
managed by the state government; in the 1980s, they were still coming 
to grips with their new responsibilities to Indigenous landholders as 
rate payers, and to the LALCs acting on behalf of discrete Indigenous 
communities. As well as resource constraints, there were some legal 
impediments to local governments providing infrastructure services on 
land held by others.
While conflict over rates has settled, the abolition of ATSIC threw into 
high relief the resources it had contributed to infrastructure in the discrete 
Indigenous communities in New South Wales. In 2008, NSWALC 
5  ‘Rate Exemptions’, NSW Government, Aboriginal Affairs, 2018, accessed 1 January 2020, 
www.aboriginalaffairs.nsw.gov.au/pdfs/land-rights/Rates-Exemptions-July-2018.pdf.
6  New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, Submission, 7–8.
7  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Toomelah Report, 3, 61.
8  Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Toomelah Report, 34.
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entered into a partnership with the New South Wales Government called 
the Aboriginal Communities Water and Sewerage Program. Overseen 
by that government’s Industry department, this program aimed to 
invest $200 million over 25 years in 62 eligible Aboriginal settlements.9 
Other programs developed in conjunction with the state’s Planning 
and Environment authorities attend to waste management and other 
infrastructure issues in these discrete Indigenous communities.10
This new model for resourcing infrastructure in discrete Indigenous 
communities in New South Wales recognises that, under the land rights 
system introduced in 1983, LALCs are independent landholders, overseen 
and supported by NSWALC.11 These statutorily independent Aboriginal 
land interests now partner with New South Wales Government agencies 
and, to some extent, with local governments, to sustain infrastructure. 
While responsibility remains shared and unclear, infrastructure services 
in the former reserves and missions are being managed through these 
partnerships, albeit at lower standards than in urban areas. 
The number of discrete Indigenous communities in New South Wales 
seems stable during the self-determination era. Apart from the Block in 
Redfern, Sydney, which lasted for about 40 years from the mid-1970s, 
before being reduced to vacant land in the 2010s, the 60 or so discrete 
Indigenous communities, having once been reserves and missions, are 
longstanding.12 The physical infrastructure of such settlements does 
not quickly spring into existence or disappear, and it is likely that the 
variation for New South Wales shown in Table 5.1 reflects changing 
survey procedures as much as actual growth or decline.
9  ‘Aboriginal Communities Water and Sewerage Program’, NSW Government, accessed 1 January 
2020, www.industry.nsw.gov.au/water/water-utilities/infrastructure-programs/aboriginal-communities.
10  ‘Aboriginal Community Lands and Infrastructure Program’, NSW Department of Planning, 
Industry and Environment, updated 14 June 2019, accessed 1 January 2020, www.planning.nsw.
gov.au/About-Us/Our-Programs/Aboriginal-Community-Lands-and-Infrastructure-Program; 
‘Aboriginal Communities Waste Management Program’, NSW Environment Protection Authority, 
updated 22 February 2019, accessed 1 January 2020, www.epa.nsw.gov.au/working-together/grants/
illegal-dumping/aboriginal-communities-waste-management-program.
11  One indication of independence from government is the web domain of the NSW Aboriginal 
Land Council, accessed 1 January 2020, alc.org.au/. A 15-year levy on land tax from 1983 also gave 
NSWALC considerable financial independence.
12  The Block in Redfern has been vacant land for the last few years. The Aboriginal Housing Company 
has been seeking approval for a major residential redevelopment. The Block may yet re-emerge as a 
discrete Indigenous community, but this is far from certain.
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Victoria and Tasmania
In the ATSIC/ABS surveys reported in Table 5.1, Victoria had two 
discrete Indigenous communities and Tasmania had one. These are readily 
identifiable, of longstanding and remain to this day as self-servicing 
corporate landholders.
Lake Tyers and Framlingham were reserves, until Victoria’s Aboriginal 
Land Act 1970 made them into statutory trusts and self-servicing 
landholding communities. Each was included in a local government area 
and pays rates, as a single landholder, to that local government. This has 
not led to conflict, as in New South Wales, perhaps because, along with 
ATSIC, the Victorian Government has always contributed significantly 
to the two trusts for community self-servicing. But both the Lake Tyers 
and the Framlingham Aboriginal Trusts have had periods of imposed 
administration, when Victoria’s minister for Aboriginal affairs intervened 
to safeguard public resources. Nevertheless, the basic model of a statutory 
trust that is a landholder and responsible for internal community servicing 
is well established in Victoria. Thus, two former missions have survived to 
become modern discrete Indigenous communities.
In Tasmania, the long-recognised discrete Indigenous community is Cape 
Barren Island, declared a reserve under the Cape Barren Island Reserve 
Act 1912. Title over most of Cape Barren Island was transferred to the 
Aboriginal Land Council of Tasmania in 2005. However, the Aboriginal 
residents of Cape Barren Island live on land that had been alienated to 
Housing Tasmania (for public housing) and to some private owners of 
residences. The Cape Barren Island Aboriginal Association, established 
in 1975, owns a civic/cultural centre and service assets through which its 
annual turnover has been $1.8 million in recent years.13 These landholders 
pay local government rates to Flinders Council, which conducts most of 
its service activities on the adjacent Flinders Island. Rates on Cape Barren 
Island are set lower than on Flinders Island, in recognition of differences 
in service levels and of landholder self-servicing. The Aboriginal Land 
Council of Tasmania (ALCT) pays rates for the airstrip on Cape Barren 
Island, but not for the vast majority of its landholding. This larger portion 
13  ‘Cape Barren Island Aboriginal Association Incorporated’, Australian Charities and Not-for-
profits Commission, accessed 1 January 2020, www.acnc.gov.au/charity/d266a6e09 e89b603b9f48 
aaee 45bc21f#overview.
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of the ALCT landholding is seen as ‘land used principally for Aboriginal 
cultural purposes’ and is exempt from local government rates under 
Section 19(c) of Tasmania’s Land Tax Act 2000.
Wreck Bay and Australian Capital Territory
Originally a reserve community in New South Wales, Wreck Bay was 
transferred to the Australian Capital Territory in 1915 and became 
part of the Commonwealth’s responsibility in Indigenous affairs. The 
Commonwealth returned land at Wreck Bay to the Aboriginal community 
in two stages under the Aboriginal Land Grant (Jervis Bay Territory) Act 
1986. First was the village settlement of 403 hectares, then second, in 1995, 
a much larger area of land to be co-managed with the Commonwealth as a 
national park. The Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council (WBACC) 
was established as a Commonwealth statutory authority in 1986 as the 
governance structure to service the community. Since 1995, WBACC has 
also undertaken land management services for the national park, at an 
annual turnover of $4 million, according to recent annual reports.14 While 
laws of the Australian Capital Territory apply at Wreck Bay, WBACC has 
power to make by-laws and is, in practice, a small separate local, or even 
territory, government for this land area.15 This village settlement of some 
200 people is possibly the most autonomous and self-governing discrete 
Indigenous community in Australia.
Northern Territory: Challenging 
Commonwealth land rights by 
encouraging local government
In 1978, the Northern Territory was granted limited self-government 
by the Commonwealth. One matter over which the Commonwealth 
maintained clear control was the Aboriginal land rights regime instituted 
just two years earlier. The new Country Liberal Party (CLP) Government 
14  ‘Publications’, Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council, accessed 1 January 2020, www.wbacc. 
gov.au/publications/.
15  ‘Jervis Bay Territory Governance and Administration’, Australian Government Department of 
Infrastructure, Transport, Cities and Regional Development, accessed 1 January 2020, regional.gov.
au/territories/jervis_bay/governanceadministration.aspx.
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in the Territory fought against this limitation, including challenging 
particular land claims and pushing for statehood, which it envisaged 
would give the Territory government control over land. As well, the 
Northern Territory Government challenged the land rights regime by 
promoting local government across the Territory.
Under direct Commonwealth administration up to 1978, formal local 
government in the Territory had been restricted to Darwin, Alice Springs, 
Katherine and Tennant Creek. The new Northern Territory Government 
began to offer local government incorporation to smaller urban centres 
and to remote communities under its Local Government Act 1978, which 
provided for flexible schemes of ‘community government’.
The Northern and Central land councils, established under the 
Commonwealth’s land rights statute, resisted this offer of local 
government. Their academic consultant argued that, by giving too 
much control to the Northern Territory minister for local government, 
community government schemes ‘subverted’ the authority of ‘traditional 
owners’ under Commonwealth land rights legislation.16 A visiting 
Canadian academic agreed, suggesting that the ‘objective’ of community 
government was the extension of the Northern Territory Government’s 
‘jurisdictional authority’; she advised Aboriginal communities to exercise 
‘caution’ and to consider ‘more autonomous and self-determining forms of 
government’.17 The land councils’ consultant argued that more powerful 
forms of incorporation for Indigenous communities were available through 
the Commonwealth’s Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976.
Despite these criticisms, Aboriginal communities across the Territory 
adopted community government schemes, so that by 2000 there were 32 
community governments in the Northern Territory: five in small open 
highway towns and 27 in discrete Indigenous communities, either singly 
or in small regional groups.18 These were in addition to the Northern 
Territory’s six municipalities and 29 ‘association councils’. Association 
councils were community associations that had been recognised since the 
late 1980s as performing some functions of local government; as such, 
they received local government funding, though they did not have formal 
authority over a land area. By 2000, 80–90 per cent of Territorians were 
16  Mowbray, Black and White; Mowbray, ‘Subverting’, 12.
17  Wolfe, ‘That Community Government Mob’, 171.
18  Sanders, Local Governments, 3.
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covered by 67 local governing bodies, though only 10 per cent of the 
Territory’s land area was. Of these, 56 were Aboriginal-majority councils 
governing discrete Indigenous communities.19 Among the Territorians 
not covered by local governments were pastoral leaseholders who provided 
their own housing and infrastructure and many homeland Aboriginal 
communities that relied on ‘resource agencies’.20
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Northern Territory 
governments reformed local government arrangements for small, 
Indigenous-majority communities. Initially, CLP and Labor governments 
encouraged amalgamations to create larger regional groupings, of 
which two emerged in 2001 and 2003. Judging progress too slow, the 
inaugural Territory Labor Government under Clare Martin abandoned 
persuasion and announced in late 2006 that the government would 
amalgamate remote area local governments into shires covering about 
5,000 people. During 2007, nine potential shires were identified, 
alongside the Territory’s six municipalities. Under pressure from urban 
fringe settlers, Labor dropped its plan to create a shire on the outskirts 
of Darwin, but proceeded with amalgamations that created eight shires 
in more remote areas in 2008. While the new shires still had Aboriginal-
majority constituencies and were focused primarily on governing discrete 
Indigenous communities, many also embraced an unprecedented mix of 
non-Aboriginal interests, such as pastoralists and open highway towns.21 
The critics of community government in the 1980s had been prescient 
in pointing to the power of the Northern Territory minister for local 
government. Indigenous Territorians felt betrayed and overridden as they 
lost the small local governments they had been encouraged to develop 
over the previous 30 years.22 The new shires were local governments not 
only for discrete Indigenous communities, but also for large tracts of land 
between communities and for settler interests as well.
19  Sanders, Local Governments, 3.
20  Altman, Gillespie and Palmer, National Review, 23.
21  Sanders, ‘Changing Scale’.
22  Sanders, ‘Losing Localism’.
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Queensland: Becoming local governments 
to challenge Commonwealth policy, then 
as part of state policy
In Queensland’s discrete Indigenous communities we see both parallels 
and contrasts with the Northern Territory from the 1970s to the 
2010s. When the Whitlam and Fraser Commonwealth governments 
were exploring practices of Indigenous self-determination and self-
management, Queensland, under National Party Premier Joh Bjelke-
Petersen, offered the most resistance. The Australian Parliament passed 
two laws focused on Queensland: the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 
(Queensland Discriminatory Laws) Act 1975 and the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islanders (Queensland Reserves and Communities Self-Management) 
Act 1978. In the latter the Fraser Coalition Government sought to support 
new councils of residents in two discrete Aboriginal communities that 
had been missions on reserve land: Aurukun and Mornington Island. The 
Queensland Government’s response was to de-gazette the two reserves and 
to pass the Local Government (Aboriginal Lands) Act 1978, creating local 
government shires at Aurukun and Mornington Island, thus moving the 
two communities outside the terms of the Commonwealth legislation.23
In the 1980s, the Bjelke-Petersen Government changed the status of 
reserves and created small local governments in another 32 discrete 
Indigenous communities. Community Services legislation in 1984 
established 15 Aboriginal councils and 17 Island councils. A change from 
‘reserves’ to ‘trust areas’ was enabled by amendments to the Land Act in 
1982 and 1984 and then, in 1986, Deeds of Grant in Trust (DOGITs) 
were issued to most of the 32 Aboriginal and Island councils.
Three aspects of the Queensland National Party’s approach to discrete 
Indigenous communities drew criticism: the maintenance of reserve by-
laws until the new councils made new ones, the exclusion of residents 
of trust areas from participation in the larger local government areas 
surrounding DOGITs, and the closer oversight of Aboriginal and Island 
councils compared to Queensland local governments more generally.24 
Responding to some of these criticisms became part of land rights reform 
under the Goss Labor Government in the early 1990s.25 Although 
23  Tatz, Race Politics, 66-81; Lippmann, Generations, 84-89.
24  Human Rights Commission, Community Services (Aborigines) Act 1984.
25  Brennan, Land Rights, 121–68.
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Aboriginal people and commentators such as Frank Brennan remained 
critical of the Goss Government for not pushing land rights further, it 
was generally acknowledged by 1991 that the councils in Queensland’s 
34 officially recognised, discrete Indigenous communities had secure titles 
to land and, as local governments, were establishing a greater presence in 
Queensland public life.26
After the millennium, the Beattie Labor Government made further changes 
to local government in Queensland’s discrete Indigenous communities. 
The Local Government (Community Government Areas) Act 2004 instituted 
a  four-year transition period through which the 15 Aboriginal and 17 
Island councils were to become more fully included in and compliant with 
the general Local Government Act 1993. As this transition was coming to an 
end, Beattie established a Local Government Reform Commission to make 
a case for amalgamations. This commission argued that Queensland’s 157 
local governments should be reduced to 73, and this happened in 2008.27 
Two of the 34 community governments – the Aurukun and Mornington 
Island local governments – remained, but the other 32 (known as Aboriginal 
and Island Councils) were reduced to 14 in the following ways. Fifteen 
Island councils were combined into one Torres Strait Island Regional 
Council.28 Two Island councils on the tip of Cape York were combined 
with three Aboriginal councils to become a single unit, the Northern 
Peninsula Area Regional Council.29 Twelve other Aboriginal councils with 
unchanged borders were renamed shires.30 In short, in 2008, Queensland’s 
34 Indigenous community governments reduced to 16.
26  Brennan, Land Rights, 173.
27  Four amalgamations were reversed in 2013 under the Newman Liberal National Party 
Government, taking the total number of Queensland local governments up to 77. Queensland, Local 
Government Reform Commission, Report.
28  This new local government under Queensland legislation should not be confused with the 
Torres Strait Regional Authority that was created in 1994 as part of ATSIC. This regional elected 
Commonwealth Indigenous statutory authority survived the abolition of ATSIC in 2005, more by 
good luck and distance than strategy. Nonetheless, its survival is important and worth understanding, 
though that would be another paper.
29  This was effected by the Local Government and Other Legislation (Indigenous Regional Councils) 
Amendment Act 2007 passed by the Queensland Parliament in November 2007. The previous Acts 
from 1978 and 1984 were much reduced at this time and renamed the Aurukun and Mornington 
Island Shire Leases Act 1978 and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities (Justice, 
Land and Other Matters) Act 1984. A rewrite of legislation at this time also produced a new Local 
Government Act 2009, which applied to all local councils across Queensland.
30  Longland described these ‘donut’ arrangements of Aboriginal shires within the land areas of 
larger encompassing shires as having ‘inherent structural inefficiencies’, and only argued against 
their amalgamation on the grounds of unresolved issues relating to DOGITs land and ‘additional 
responsibilities undertaken by Aboriginal local governments’. This was a rather weak defence of the 
discrete Aboriginal shires. Local Government Reform Commission, Report, vol. 1, 64.
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It should also be noted that Queensland has about a dozen discrete 
Indigenous communities that have not become local governments. 
For example, Mossman Gorge sits on two parcels of land, one of which 
is still a reserve held by a Queensland Government department and the 
other a block of private freehold held by an Aboriginal corporation. Just 
80 kilometres from Cairns, Mossman Gorge has a successful tourism 
operation. The Aboriginal corporation delivers infrastructure services to 
around 30 households in the settlement, with funding assistance from the 
Queensland Government, and pays rates to Douglas Shire on its freehold 
block. The corporation and the encompassing local government work in 
collaboration on rates and services. In other parts of Queensland, however, 
there have been tensions between these discrete Indigenous communities 
and local governments over rates and services.
South Australia: Land rights leads to 
some local governing bodies and some 
self‑servicing settlements
In South Australia, pushes for land rights, rather than reactions against 
it, have resulted in discrete Indigenous communities becoming local 
governing bodies.31 In the early 1980s, parliament legislated title to 
reserves in the north-west of the state: the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 
1981 and the Maralinga Tjarutja Land Rights Act 1984. Each law raised the 
question of whether the resulting Aboriginal landholding corporation was 
also a local governing body. In 1987, amendments to the 1981 legislation 
gave the body corporate, Anangu Pitjantjatjara, the power to make by-
laws.32 In later years by-law-making power was extended to Maralinga 
Tjarutja and to the renamed Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara.
These policies of the 1980s built on an earlier wave of reform: a 1966 law 
creating the ALT, a statutory authority holding title to reserves in the south 
and east of South Australia. This led to the emergence of eight Aboriginal 
community councils in discrete Indigenous communities on these reserves 
in the 1970s.33 Three of these community councils emerged outside 
31  South Australia maintains a distinction between local governments under the Local Government 
Act, of which there are 68, and some other organisations recognised as local governing bodies.
32  Tedmanson, Shifting State, 73–76.
33  See Peterson, Aboriginal Land Rights, 117. Also Rowse, Rethinking, 62–79.
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existing incorporated local government areas; they provided for their own 
internal infrastructure and public order in conjunction with the ALT, the 
Commonwealth DAA and later ATSIC. Five others fell within existing 
incorporated local government areas but did not pay local government 
rates. These five, too, have attended to their own internal public order 
and infrastructure services in conjunction with the trust, Commonwealth 
funders and, sometimes, encompassing local governments on a negotiated 
contract or fee-for-service basis. Although these arrangements continue 
to the present day, the Commonwealth has reduced its funding in the 
last decade. 
Conceptually these 10 sets of governance arrangements for discrete 
Indigenous communities in South Australia push strongly towards the 
status of local government, particularly when considered in conjunction 
with the resources and authority of the ALT.34 This is reflected in the 
three community councils on ALT land outside existing local government 
areas (Gerard, Nepabunna and Yalata) having been members of the Local 
Government Association of South Australia since the early 1990s. They 
are notably identified on the association’s website along with Anangu 
Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara and Maralinga Tjarutja.35 In contrast, the 
five ALT communities and community councils within existing local 
government areas are not listed as members of the association, but they 
do still function as self-servicing corporate landholders and somewhat like 
local governing bodies.
Western Australia: Self‑servicing 
settlements searching for resources
Like South Australia and New South Wales, Western Australia in 1972 
created an ALT to hold title to lands reserved for Aboriginal use.36 Unlike 
other jurisdictions, Western Australia went no further with land rights. 
Aboriginal reserves, covering about 10 per cent of this large jurisdiction, 
have remained outside the rateable land base of local governments though 
formally within their incorporated land areas. This has meant that Western 
34  Sanders, ‘Local Governments’, 171. The ALT of South Australia has powers to make regulations for 
these communities and has done so in a number of instances, in consultation with community councils.
35  ‘Council Maps’, Local Government Association of South Australia, accessed 15 August 2020, 
www.lga.sa.gov.au/sa-councils/councils-listing. 
36  Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 (WA), section 10.
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Australia’s many discrete Indigenous communities have developed little 
relationship with their encompassing local governments and have looked 
to other public authorities to assist them with infrastructure and public 
order.
Western Australia’s Aboriginal Communities Act 1979 gave by-law-making 
power to councils of residents in reserve communities. Together with 
program resources from the Commonwealth DAA and later ATSIC, 
this enabled councils on reserve land to service themselves with basic 
infrastructure and public order. Since 2005, these arrangements have 
become fractious and contested. The new Commonwealth Indigenous 
affairs authorities have demanded that state and local government 
authorities pay for infrastructure services, and these authorities have 
typically argued that they cannot afford to do so. 
In a 2016 report, the Western Australian Government insisted that it could 
not provide infrastructure services for all 305 identified discrete Indigenous 
communities. The government differentiated two groups of communities 
by location and policy ‘direction’. One was ‘37 town-based reserves across 
20 towns’ with ‘up to 3,000 Aboriginal residents’. For these, the policy 
‘direction’ was to ‘receive the same service opportunities, and share the 
same payment responsibilities, as other residents of the relevant town’.37 
The other group was 274 ‘remote communities’ (each with about ‘12,000 
Aboriginal residents’), ‘about 165’ of which the government claimed to 
have ‘been supporting [with] essential and municipal service delivery’ 
since 2015. In these communities, the policy ‘direction’ was ‘progressively 
to meet minimum standards for essential and municipal services in larger 
remote Aboriginal communities’.38 While cast positively, this was in fact 
a threat to withdraw infrastructure support by the Western Australian 
Government for most of the remote communities it then identified (274) 
or claimed to help service (165). Only 50 of these communities with over 
50 permanent residents were clearly admitted to the ‘larger’ category, and 
beyond this the Western Australian Government’s commitment was weak.
On public order in reserve communities, Brady has recently documented 
how a 2005 Law Reform Commission inquiry in Western Australia 
initially argued for abolition of the Aboriginal Communities Act 1979, but 
later supported its retention in light of Aboriginal community support 
37  Regional Services Reform Unit, Resilient Families, 18.
38  Regional Services Reform Unit, Resilient Families, 16.
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for its by-law-making power. The by-laws were, in the words of one 
council chair, ‘our law in that we requested it for the protection of our 
well-being’.39
Because Western Australia did not progress land rights in the 1980s, 
it is now experiencing land reform through the implementation of the 
Commonwealth Native Title Act 1993. Discrete Indigenous communities 
are slowly being recognised as having native title over the reserve lands 
on which they sit, and their prescribed bodies corporate are being 
recognised as landholders within the Australian land governance system. 
Discrete Indigenous communities in Western Australia are becoming self-
servicing corporate landholders searching for resources to support their 
infrastructure and public order. Conceptually, such communities push 
towards a parallel, but impoverished Indigenous local government system. 
They have by-law-making power under the Aboriginal Communities 
Act  1979 and some corporate authority under the Commonwealth 
Native Title Act 1993, but no secure resource or fiscal base like general 
local governments.
One regional group of discrete Indigenous communities on reserve 
lands in the central desert in the far eastern parts of Western Australia 
managed  to become a general local government in 1993. This process 
commenced in 1984, when Aboriginal residents were included in the 
local government franchise in Western Australia. Ngaanyatjarra residents 
in 10 discrete communities with a total population of around 1,000 
used this new voting right to gain representation on the Shire of Wiluna, 
first as a minority of councillors and then as a majority in 1987.40 Their 
leadership then resulted in a move to form the Shire of Ngaanyatjarraku 
as a ‘community of interest’ distinguishable from the predominantly 
pastoral Wiluna Shire.41 Twenty-five years on, Ngaanyatjarraku is the 
only instance of discrete Indigenous communities in Western Australia 
being able to use electoral power to establish a local government under 
general legislation. 
39  Brady, ‘Law Reforming’, 44.
40  Fletcher, Aboriginal Politics, 114–38.
41  McLean, ‘Aboriginal Local’, 139–46.
INDIGENoUS SELf‑DETERMINATIoN IN AUSTRALIA
136
Conclusion
While Commonwealth governments of the last half-century have 
sometimes been ambivalent about applying the term self-determination 
to Indigenous policy, Indigenous people around the world have been 
adamant that this right of peoples in international law applies to them. 
The resounding 2007 vote in the United Nations General Assembly 
in favour of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has 
confirmed this stance. It is now possible to talk of the self-determination 
era in Indigenous policy as established fact, as much as hopeful claim. 
Together with developments in land rights and native title, this right 
of peoples in international law is slowly opening new potentialities for 
Indigenous people in Australia, both in discrete Indigenous communities 
and beyond.
My brief history of the eight sub-national jurisdictions demonstrates 
the diversity and the commonalities in the developing potentialities for 
discrete Indigenous communities. In three south-eastern jurisdictions, 
New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania, about 70 discrete Indigenous 
communities have become ‘private’ corporate landholders, paying rates to 
encompassing local governments and seeking resource partnerships with 
parts of government to sustain internal community infrastructure. In the 
fourth south-eastern jurisdiction, Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community 
Council has developed partnerships with Commonwealth authorities 
that give it the status of a local government or small territory government 
operating under the laws of the Australian Capital Territory.
In the four more sparsely settled jurisdictions, over 1,000 discrete 
Indigenous communities have been left outside the rateable land base of 
existing local governments. As newly recognised corporate landholders, 
these discrete Indigenous communities have sought ways to sustain their 
infrastructure and public order and this has often been through becoming 
local governments, or quasi local governing bodies. This is not a settled 
solution, as major local government restructuring showed in Queensland 
and the Northern Territory in 2008. But it does create a public corporate 
form in which majority Indigenous populations can lead to Indigenous 
participation and influence, as voters and elected members.
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Map 5.2: Local government areas by percentage Indigenous 
residents, 2016 Census.
Source: Heather Crawford (Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The Australian 
National University), using data from the ABS 2016 Census of Population and Housing .
Using 2016 Census data, a map of local government areas differentiated 
by Indigenous proportion of residents (Map 5.2) shows that, of the 539 
recognised local government areas in Australia, 37 have Indigenous-
majority populations, 18 in Queensland, 10 in the Northern Territory, 
6 in Western Australia, 2 in South Australia and 1 in New South 
Wales.42 The majority of these are instances in which discrete Indigenous 
communities have become recognised as local governments. In others, 
Indigenous majorities have emerged demographically in long-established 
local government areas. In both cases, Indigenous voters can hopefully use 
this demographic fact to both stand for public office and influence local 
government policies. While this is not Indigenous self-determination 
per  se, these local governments should be acknowledged as public 
governance contributors towards that goal.
42  None of the Aboriginal Land Trust of South Australia communities is included in this ABS 
categorisation. Neither is Wreck Bay, which like the rest of the Australian Capital Territory is treated 
in this ABS categorisation as ‘unincorporated’ in a local government area. 
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I began by noting that as a child my first encounters with Indigenous 
affairs were through occasional observations of discrete Indigenous 
communities. Known as reserves and missions in past policy eras, these 
residential concentrations of Indigenous Australians appeared, in my 
adolescence, to be developing new potentialities in the emerging policy era 
of land rights and self-determination. After four decades of professional 
involvement in Indigenous affairs, these early impressions still strike me 
as having merit, though my faith in a benevolent Commonwealth has 
been strongly tested in the last 15 years. Under the combined influences 
of market liberalism, contractualism, new public management and a less 
centralist federalism, the Commonwealth has withdrawn resources for the 
infrastructure services of discrete Indigenous communities. To discrete 
Indigenous communities, the Commonwealth must now look fickle and 
unpredictable, rather than a benevolent provider. Indigenous corporate 
landholders, emerging in all jurisdictions across Australia, need assured 
financial resources to be self-servicing providers of infrastructure and 
public order in their discrete settlements. This is the big missing element 
in current arrangements, and has been since the abolition of ATSIC.43
Residents of discrete Indigenous communities are probably a declining 
proportion of the total Indigenous population. We do not know for 
sure because the Commonwealth has not surveyed discrete Indigenous 
communities since 2006. My guess, as a professional observer, is that 
the number of discrete Indigenous communities and their populations 
have remained constant or declined just slightly. Meanwhile, the national 
Indigenous population has increased significantly from 455,028 in 2006 
to 649,171 in 2016.44 This means that the proportion of Indigenous 
people living in discrete Indigenous communities has probably declined 
from one in five to one in seven. Despite this relative decline in proportion 
of Indigenous population, discrete Indigenous communities are still 
an important part of Indigenous policy and politics. Their continuing 
physical dominance of even small portions of the Australian landmass is 
suggestive of Indigenous peoplehood and the right to self-determination. 
43  This point was made quite strongly in Queensland Productivity Commission, Service Delivery.
44  See Time Series Profile at ‘2016 Census Community Profiles’, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
updated 12 July 2019, accessed 1 January 2020, quickstats.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/get 
product/census/2016/communityprofile/036?opendocument.
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ATSIC AND THE 
INDIGENOUS SECTOR
Katherine Curchin and Tim Rowse
Introduction
Funding organisations controlled by Indigenous Australians and dedicated 
to serving them, in the name of ‘self-determination’, has created risks both 
for governments (who must satisfy the public that ‘taxpayers’ money’ is 
being well spent) and Indigenous leaders (who must not only meet service 
expectations of Indigenous Australians but also acquit funding according 
to government criteria). This chapter compares two experiments in 
governance: the Indigenous sector (thousands of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander corporations) and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC).
Australian governments have encouraged Indigenous Australians to form 
corporations in order to hold title to Indigenous property, advocate, deliver 
services and manage employment programs. The federal (conservative, 
led by Malcolm Fraser) government passed the Aboriginal Councils 
and Associations Act 1976 (henceforth ACA Act) in 1976. The Howard 
(conservative) Government replaced the ACA Act in 2007 with the 
Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (henceforth 
CATSI Act). Both Acts authorised the Registrar of Aboriginal/Indigenous 
Corporations to report publicly on Indigenous corporations’ financial 
accountability and organisational integrity. At the same time, Australian 
governments created national, elected Indigenous representative 
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organisations: the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC, 
1973–76), the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC, 1977–85) and the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC, 1989–2005).
ATSIC, unlike its predecessors, administered programs – mostly 
infrastructure, housing and employment, but not health, education 
and security programs. Under the Howard Government (1996–2007), 
the increasing political embarrassment of ATSIC led to a 2002–03 
review and then ATSIC’s abolition in 2004–05. Critical attention to the 
Indigenous sector took the form of amendments of the ACA Act in 1992, 
reviews of the Act in 1996–97 and 2001–04 and new legislation (the 
CATSI Act) in 2005–06. Why was one experiment in the delegation of 
public expenditure to Indigenous Australians (ATSIC) terminated while 
the funding of Indigenous organisations has continued as a permanent 
adaptation of Australian government to Indigenous political mobilisation? 
Expectations of the ACA Act
Although some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had formalised 
their collective action before the 1960s (sometimes in the context of 
long-lasting missions), we begin our story in 1970 with Charles Rowley’s 
suggestion that the Aboriginal ‘group’ would no longer be treated by 
governments as a ‘disappearing liability’ (as assimilation policy tended to 
assume), but as ‘an asset, to be endowed, by its own efforts, with enduring 
legal personality’.
The ‘fringe group’ was ‘the raw material for a corporation in perpetuity’.1 
When Prime Minister McMahon spoke on Aboriginal policy in January 
1972, he promised to investigate ‘a simple flexible form of incorporation 
for Aboriginal communities’.2 Justice Woodward’s advice to the Whitlam 
Government on land rights in 1973 included recommending that an 
incorporation statute be easy to understand, flexible enough to meet 
the needs of a variety of situations in which Aboriginal people would 
find themselves, not liable for taxation of its income, open to Aboriginal 
customs of decision-making and open to government intervention 
‘if things go wrong … through corruption, inefficiency, outside influences 
or for other reasons’.3 
1  Rowley, ‘Outcasts’, 425.
2  McMahon, Australian, 12.
3  Woodward, Aboriginal, para. 332, p. 65.
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Barrie Dexter, Secretary of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs from 
1973, recalled in 2015 that Aboriginal-controlled incorporated bodies were 
‘crucial to so much we were trying to do’.4 However, as they came under 
scrutiny, ‘Parliament and the community at large seemed to have become 
more interested in correct, detailed accounting than in the outcome of 
programs’, making the Department of Aboriginal Affairs ‘more reluctant 
to fund Aboriginal groups and let them learn by making mistakes, since 
we would certainly be further roasted by Parliament and our critics for 
any failures’.5 An incorporation statute designed to empower Indigenous 
Australians would also have to be a means of accountability and tuition.
Introducing a Bill for Aboriginal Councils and Associations in September 
1975, the minister for Aboriginal affairs (Lesley Johnson) linked it to land 
rights in the Northern Territory; the Act was to provide ‘a method of 
incorporation that would safeguard Aboriginal tenure of land’. He went 
on to list ways that the Act would also enable collective action not related 
to land tenure: receiving grants, holding and disposing of real and personal 
property, contracting, operating enterprises, and ‘generally to conduct 
their affairs in an orderly manner’ so that Indigenous Australians could 
fulfil their ‘obligation to acknowledge responsibility for the consequences 
of their actions’. The Act would be especially helpful to ‘remote, tradition-
oriented communities where the understanding of Western European 
legal concepts is very limited’; for such people, Johnson believed, the 
existing corporations laws were not helpful.6 Speaking in support, 
Manfred Cross remarked that ‘Aborigines do not have the sophistication 
and business experience to comply with many of the complex and 
technical requirements of State laws’.7 In establishing the Registrar 
of Aboriginal Corporations, the government intended to ‘advise and assist 
Aboriginal corporations and to supervise their activities in much the same 
way as a Registrar of Companies supervises the affairs of companies’.8 
Johnson’s bill lapsed when parliament dissolved in November 1975, but 
the Fraser Government saw the ACA Act through the parliament in 1976.
4  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 336.
5  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 336.
6  Johnson, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives (CPD HoR), 30 
September 1975, 1410.
7  Cross, CPD HoR, 4 November 1975, 2762.
8  Johnson, CPD HoR, 30 September 1975, 1410–11.
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We note several themes in the justification of the ACA Act: to acknowledge 
overlooked Indigenous political capacity by giving it a formal vehicle, 
to acknowledge cultural difference in Indigenous ways of associating, to 
bring order and transparency to group life, to make Aboriginal collective 
actions legally and fiscally accountable, and to spare Aboriginal people the 
burden of understanding complex legislation. 
An emerging sense of political risk
Incorporation was not only a means to Indigenous political development, 
it also became a resource for political elites (Indigenous and non-
Indigenous) to manage a new political risk that arose partly from different 
views about what Australia owed Indigenous Australians. For some 
Aboriginal people in the 1970s, as Johanna Perheentupa has shown in 
her chapter, government grants were compensation for dispossession and 
ill-treatment, so that Aboriginal people were not accountable to anyone 
but themselves in their spending of such funds. This view persisted among 
many Aboriginal people. In 1981, the NAC – the Fraser Government’s 
representative, elected assembly – called for the compensatory payment 
of 5 per cent of Australia’s gross national product to Aboriginal people to 
meet Aboriginal needs.9 Such claims were sympathetically acknowledged 
in 1991 in the National Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
Deaths in Custody:
What, to non-Aboriginal people, is a citizens’ right (which is 
subject to assessment, monitoring and may be taken away if the 
citizen fails to meet administrative and other criteria) should be 
available for them on a basis rather like that which might apply 
if compensation payments were made for past injustices. Given 
that sense of injustice, many Aboriginal people regard it as an 
added insult that payments made, either directly or through 
Aboriginal organizations, to meet basic needs should be subjected 
to the minute and suspicious scrutiny which accompanies such 
payments. At this level, Aboriginal people would see the whole 
process of delivery of such services as being one of further control 
of their lives and not one which offers autonomy.10 
9  ‘Aborigines Want Land, Self-Rule’, West Australian, 23 September 1981.
10  Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC), National Report, vol. 2, 
525–26.
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The national commissioner’s impression was that Indigenous Australians 
‘have accepted the concept of representation through organizations’, and 
he predicted that they would come to trust their organisations more, 
allowing their leaders more scope for decision-making.11 For trust to 
develop, he advised, governments would have to moderate or cease their 
close inspection of organisations’ use of public money.
By then, the minister for Aboriginal affairs had initiated discussion of 
the Act, circulating a review paper in February 1990.12 There were 1,024 
corporations registered under the ACA Act and supported by government 
grants. The registrar proposed amendments to the ACA, resulting in the 
Keating Government’s Aboriginal Councils and Associations Amendment 
Act 1992. The changes were intended to strengthen the rights of ordinary 
members and to improve public accountability. Governing committees 
could no longer include bankrupts or certain categories of persons 
sentenced to imprisonment; members of governing committees would 
disclose financial interest in matters before the committee; the registrar 
would arbitrate internal disputes and enforce dissenting members’ right 
to request that governing committees convene a special meeting; the 
registrar could now issue statutory notices, seek injunctions, appoint 
administrators and petition for a corporation’s wind-up. In June 1993, 
the Keating Government tabled further amendments that would have 
increased state discipline.13 
These changes addressed perceptions that Aboriginal corporations might 
use grants improperly if not more closely monitored. Adding to the 
perception that public money was at risk, there was now another layer 
of Indigenous control over money, as ATSIC assumed responsibility 
for programs that had been administered from 1973 to 1990 by the 
Department  of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA). While ATSIC officials, like 
DAA officials, were Commonwealth public servants, ATSIC policies 
were set by  elected Indigenous Australians. The Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander electorate voted in regions (at first 60, but reduced to 36 
in 1993) to select regional councillors, and regional councils formulated 
development plans. To select ATSIC’s national leadership, regional 
councillors were grouped into 17 electoral zones, each zone electing 
one commissioner. The  government appointed three commissioners 
11  RCIADIC, National Report, vol. 2, 525–26.
12  Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (ORAC), Annual Report 1989–90.
13  Mantziaris, ‘Beyond’.
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(including  the chair), to make a board of 20. Regional Councils 
had discretion over grants  to Indigenous organisations delivering 
housing, infrastructure and employment, subject to policies set by the 
commissioners. ATSIC was thus a hybrid of two previously distinct kinds 
of agency: program delivery (formerly DAA’s responsibility) and the 
work of political representation and policy advice previously carried out 
by the NAC and its predecessor the NACC.
Debating the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 
1989, conservative members of parliament had doubted that an agency 
controlled by elected Indigenous Australians would handle public money 
responsibly. The shadow minister for Aboriginal affairs (Warwick Smith) 
criticised ATSIC as excessively centralised, adding:
This integration of representative and administrative functions 
[would leave the commissioners] torn between doing the best 
for their constituents and administering hundreds of millions 
of dollars for grants with bureaucratic impartiality. That is 
a fundamental conflict, a conflict in which lie the seeds of ATSIC’s 
destruction.14
Conservative misgivings about ATSIC went even deeper than this. 
The  very idea of a distinct Indigenous institution seemed wrong in 
principle to John Howard. On 11 April 1989, before the bill’s ‘first 
reading’, he warned that:
If the Government wants to divide Australian against Australian, 
if it wants to create a black nation within the Australian nation, 
it should go ahead with its Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) legislation and its treaty.15
The Hawke Government did not yield to Howard’s point, but it did 
address the worry that elected persons might use public money to 
ingratiate  Indigenous constituents. The Act prescribed an Office of 
Evaluation and Audit (OEA) within ATSIC. The intended functions 
of the OEA paralleled those of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations.
14  Smith, CPD HoR, 23 May 1989, 2714.
15  Howard, CPD HoR, 11 April 1989, 1328.
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The registrar becomes active
Though not obliged to issue annual reports, the Registrar of Aboriginal 
Corporations began to do so in 1989–90, ATSIC’s first financial year, 
listing corporations subject to the new regime of ‘enforcement’ enabled 
by the 1992 amendments to the ACA Act. Registrar Nourredine Bouhafs 
(appointed in January 1993, after two periods ‘acting’ in 1991 and 1992) 
justified his powers:
When the Act was originally drafted in the 1970s, the emphasis 
was on keeping the incorporation process simple, allowing for 
the flexible operation of Aboriginal Corporations and keeping 
the ongoing reporting requirements to a minimum. The Act was 
particularly oriented towards the needs of remote communities 
receiving one-off grants for special purposes. Legislators at 
the time could not have foreseen the size and range of funding 
now flowing to Aboriginal Corporations, the complex business 
activities in which many are now involved and the considerable 
assets accumulated by Corporations over the past 16 years.16 
Bouhafs advised further amendments to the ACA Act, finding the 
Keating Government receptive. When ATSIC was asked to comment in 
1994, the commissioners persuaded the minister to defer amendments, 
pending a review of the ACA Act to be conducted by ATSIC. The review 
(by  Dr  James Fingleton for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies) recommended relaxation of restrictions 
on the design of Indigenous corporations, to align them better with 
Indigenous custom.17 Fingleton’s 1996 recommendations did not persuade 
the Howard Government to change the ACA Act.
While Fingleton was conducting his review, the election of the Howard 
Government in March 1996 brought to power members of parliament 
still sceptical about whether Indigenous people other than public servants 
should be spending public money. Publicised instances of dishonesty 
and/or incompetence illustrated for many Australians that public money 
allocated to elected Indigenous Australians could bankroll political 
patronage by an emerging Indigenous political class. Accordingly, there 
was an audience for Bouhafs’s continuing reports. Enforcement statistics 
for July 1994 to June 2000 (the period in which Bouhafs was Registrar) 
are shown in Table 6.1:
16  ORAC, Annual Report 1993–94, vii.
17  See Rowse, ‘Culturally’ for a discussion of the Fingleton Report.
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Table 6.1: Acquittal lapses and corrective actions, ORAC, 1994–95 to 
1999–2000.
Year 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–2000
Administrators
appointed 



















48 30 22 44 14 32
Subject to 
winding up




2,389 2,654 2,816 2,999 2,853 2,703
Source: oRAC, Annual Reports 1994–95, 1995–96, 1996–97, 1997–98, 1998–99, 
1999–2000 .
Examinations enabled the registrar to provide ‘feedback’, usually in the 
form of a letter detailing a list of required improvements. Corporations 
in serious trouble were sent a formal notice requiring them to ‘show 
cause’ why ORAC (Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations) 
should not appoint a ‘special administrator’ to take temporary control of 
the corporation. Administration did not usually include liquidating the 
corporation’s assets, negotiating a plan to pay its debts and winding it up. 
More often, ‘administration’ sought to enable an Indigenous corporation 
to continue on a more sustainable financial footing, so that the surviving 
Indigenous corporation could be handed back to its directors.
The registrar continued to press for reform, noting significant changes 
in the Act’s environment in the 1990s: Australian lawmakers at the state 
and the national levels had been forced by a High Court ruling in 1990 
to engage in a major reconstruction of corporate regulation, resulting 
in the Corporations Act 2001; and the implementation of the Native 
Title Act 1993 was giving rise to many prescribed bodies corporate, as 
title-holding entities. In November 2000, the registrar commissioned 
a review of the ACA Act by a multidisciplinary team headed by Corrs 
Chambers Westgarth, Lawyers. The review’s consultation paper asked 
whether a  specific Indigenous incorporation statute was still necessary, 
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and (if so) whether it should be for all Indigenous corporations, regardless 
of size. Consultations found widespread support for such a statute with 
no restriction on the size of the organisations to which it would apply; 
as well, according to the registrar, supporters wanted the Act to be both 
‘more flexible’ about the design of corporations and more consistent with 
the Corporations Act, while enabling the registrar’s office to focus more on 
‘capacity building and assistance’.18 The final report and recommendations 
of the Corrs review were released in December 2002. Before we describe 
the legislation that flowed from the report, it is necessary to note what was 
happening to ATSIC.
ATSIC’s demise, 2002–05
From the inception of ATSIC, its leaders had faced a problem of 
legitimacy in the eyes of Indigenous Australians, as the first appointed 
chair of ATSIC, Lowitja O’Donoghue, acknowledged in 1995:
Certain Indigenous organisations have also been critical of ATSIC’s 
role and representativeness. They have challenged its decisions 
or sponsored challenges in public debate, in courts or tribunals 
or through the Ombudsman. To a great extent these challenges 
should not be regarded as surprising or necessarily reflecting on 
ATSIC’s competence. It is only natural that other organisations 
may have agendas that differ from the Commission’s. It should 
not be assumed that indigenous Australia will always speak with 
one voice. But ATSIC as the only national structure of indigenous 
representation will endure. Above all, ATSIC represents a challenge 
for Indigenous Australians, a challenge to get involved, to make 
processes work for them.19 
On assuming office, the Howard Government modified but did not 
extinguish the Hawke government’s and Keating government’s defining 
Indigenous policies: ATSIC and native title. In April 1996, the Howard 
Government appointed a special auditor to ATSIC. Before grants or 
loans to organisations could be made, a clearance from the special auditor 
would be required. ATSIC disputed the legality of this innovation and the 
Federal Court ruled that the government was not empowered to direct 
the commission in this way. By the time this judgement was announced, 
18  ORAC, Annual Report 2001–02, 3.
19  ATSIC, Annual Report 1994–95, 34.
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the special auditor had already examined 1,122 organisations, clearing 
95 per cent of them for further funding. ATSIC was pleased to report the 
opinion of the special auditor that many accountability problems related 
not to dishonesty but to the small size of the organisations and to their 
lack of training.20 In its first budget (1996–97), the Howard Government 
reduced ATSIC’s funding by 6 per cent.
Constrained by the new national ideology of ‘reconciliation’ (which 
Howard described as ‘an unstoppable force’), the Howard Government 
seemed cautiously to explore what legacies of Labor to reject and what 
to ‘live with’, pragmatically.21 Affording ATSIC greater autonomy, the 
government in 1999 allowed that the chair of ATSIC be elected by the 
Board of Commissioners. In December 1999, the board elected Geoff 
Clark, whose commitment to Indigenous rights made him one of many 
critics of the Howard Government’s 1998 amendments to the Native 
Title Act. Howard and Clark were thus on opposite sides of a 1990s 
debate about whether recognising distinct Indigenous rights was essential 
for reconciliation.22 While both agreed that ‘reconciliation’ included 
reducing Indigenous Australians’ socio-economic ‘disadvantage’, ATSIC 
(and Clark) argued that the key to overcoming disadvantage was greater 
government recognition of Indigenous Australians as self-determining 
peoples within the Australian nation. The Howard Government dismissed 
distinct Indigenous rights as a distraction from the interests of Indigenous 
Australians: the ‘practical reconciliation’ that would result from 
government programs in housing, health, education, security services, 
employment and Indigenous enterprise formation.
Clark, like O’Donoghue, sensed that ATSIC was politically vulnerable. 
At ATSIC’s policy conference in April 2002 he reminded his audience 
that, even though ATSIC spent less than half of the Commonwealth’s 
Indigenous program budget, it was conspicuous (to the public) as the 
paramount Indigenous agency, and easily blamed for not achieving socio-
economic equality (‘practical reconciliation’).23 Exacerbating ATSIC’s 
problem were the diminishing reputations of Clark and his Deputy 
Chair Ray Robinson. In July 2002, police in Victoria decided not to 
prosecute Clark for rape, after 12 months of investigating well-publicised 
20  ATSIC, Annual Report 1996–97, 25.
21  Howard, Howard, 252.
22  For a content analysis of federal MPs’ uses of the ‘reconciliation’ see Pratt, Practising.
23  ‘Systemic Ignorance over ATSIC Budget: Clark’, National Indigenous Times, 22 May 2002, 9.
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accusations. He was also being prosecuted for ‘riotous behaviour’ after 
a fight in a hotel. Some observers questioned the political judgement of 
ATSIC’s Board of Commissioners for covering the costs of his defence 
by a top Melbourne QC. In Queensland, Ray Robinson began legal 
proceedings against the Courier Mail for alleging his improper financial 
dealing, while the Office of Evaluation and Audit investigated the claim.24
Without referring to these problems of individual standing, in June 2002 
the minister (Philip Ruddock) announced a review of ATSIC. He justified 
the inquiry as a response to Indigenous disquiet, quoting Marandoo 
Yanner describing ATSIC as a ‘hopeless, powerless, useless organisation’. 
While that was harsh, the minister commented, it ‘speaks of the sort of 
frustrations that are there’.25 Two weeks later, the National Indigenous Times 
reported a young Aboriginal man, Joe Hedger, saying that ATSIC was in 
the newspapers ‘for the wrong reasons’ and that young people such as 
himself were not attracted to it for a political career.26 In July 2002, Clark 
acknowledged that some Indigenous Australians were so alienated from 
ATSIC that they might not participate in its fourth election (scheduled 
to be held on 19 October 2002). Voter registration, he acknowledged, 
was a test of ATSIC’s significance to Indigenous Australians.27 Clark and 
John Ah Kit (an Indigenous member of the Northern Territory Legislative 
Assembly) were quoted as saying that, while they respected the choice 
not to vote, Indigenous Australians should vote.28 The October election 
produced a new board and, in December, Clark and Robinson persuaded 
commissioners that they should continue as chair and deputy chair.
Criticism of ATSIC came from Indigenous people whom the minister 
could not ignore. At the time of the election, Patrick Dodson (former 
chair of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation) was reported as calling 
for ATSIC to be phased out; ATSIC was tarnished, he reportedly said, by 
24  Chris Graham, ‘ATSIC Launches Inquiry; Robinson Claims Innocence’, National Indigenous 
Times, 31 July 2002, 1, 4.
25  Chris Graham, ‘Ruddock Calls for Debate on ATSIC’s Future’, National Indigenous Times, 5 June 
2002, 1, 4.
26  Chris Graham, ‘A Fiery Political Welcome for Young “Warrior”’, National Indigenous Times, 
19 June 2002, 1, 9.
27  Chris Graham, ‘ATSIC Enters Election Mode’, National Indigenous Times, 31 July 2002, 1, 17.
28  Chris Graham, ‘To Vote or Not to Vote? That Was the Question’, National Indigenous Times, 
9 October 2002, 1, 4. Table 8 in Sanders, Taylor and Ross, ‘Participation’, 508 shows that voter turn-
out, as a proportion of voting age Indigenous population, was 23.7 per cent in 1993, 24.1 per cent in 
1996 and 22.9 per cent in 1999. 
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the actions of its leaders.29 At the same time, newspapers reported a court 
case in which Clark’s predecessor as chair, Gatjil Djerrkura, was accused of 
sexual harassment. Commissioner Jenny Pryor was quoted as saying that 
a woman should lead ATSIC, given the behaviour of its male leaders.30 
In November 2002, Minister Ruddock announced rules that would allow 
him to remove a commissioner ‘for a variety of behavioural offences, 
including causing public embarrassment to an Aboriginal organisation, 
seriously disrupting meetings and sexual harassment in or out of the 
workplace’.31 In December the new CEO of ATSIC, Wayne Gibbons, 
was quoted as saying that:
A lot of what you hear about ATSIC is not too favourable. There’s 
a perception of poor administration and of waste. That’s got to be 
dealt with or ATSIC does not have a future.32 
Lowitja O’Donoghue wrote to Ruddock asking him to state his reasons 
for not sacking Clark.33 
Meanwhile, on 12 November 2002, the minister had announced the 
ATSIC inquiry’s terms of reference and the panel that would conduct 
the  review: Bob Collins, John Hannaford and Jackie Huggins. Within 
weeks, he had pre-empted their recommendations in one respect. 
In order  to deal with perceptions of conflict of interest, he announced 
on Christmas Eve 2002 that ATSIC could no longer fund organisations of 
which ATSIC full-time officeholders were directors or in which they had 
a controlling interest.34 The review recommendations were further pre-
empted, in April–June 2003, by a ministerial command that radically 
redesigned ATSIC: removing nearly all staff and almost the entire budget 
from the control of the Board of Commissioners and handing them over 
to a new body, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS). 
ATSIS was to be made up of former ATSIC public servants, answerable 
to the minister and making all decisions about individual grants (within 
policy guidelines formulated by ATSIC’s Board of Commissioners). 
Debating this change in April 2003, Ruddock and Clark had been unable 
29  Chris Graham and AAP, ‘Dodson Comments Sour Grapes: Sugar’, National Indigenous Times, 
23 October 2002, 1.
30  ‘Pryor Says ATSIC Needs a Woman at the Helm’, National Indigenous Times, 23 October 2002, 10.
31  Chris Graham, ‘Tough New Rules for ATSIC Board’, National Indigenous Times, 20 November 
2002, 1, 11.
32  Chris Graham, ‘ATSIC Needs an Overhaul: CEO’, National Indigenous Times, 18 December 2002.
33  ‘ATSIC under Fire’, National Indigenous Times, 30 April 2003, 4.
34  ATSIC, Annual Report 2002–03.
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to agree on a model that would deal – to the government’s satisfaction – 
with perceptions that persons elected to ATSIC had a conflict of interest 
if they participated in grant decisions.35 In the formation of ATSIS, the 
minister had asserted his authority – ‘a gun pointed at our head’, as Clark 
later described it.36 ATSIS commenced on 1 July 2003.
The Howard Government received the report of the ATSIC review in 
November 2003. Explaining Indigenous Australians’ estrangement as 
an effect of ATSIC’s concentration of power at the national level, the 
panel sought more power for elected regional councils. At the national 
level, the Board of Commissioners should be split into a deliberative, 
policymaking body of 38 that would delegate day-to-day leadership to 
a ‘national executive’ of up to 10 members, serviced by policy committees. 
Seeking to reduce expectations of ATSIC, the review pointed to the small 
role assigned to ATSIC in relieving Indigenous Australians’ immense 
problems. Finally, the panel suggested that the elected and administrative 
arms (ATSIC and ATSIS) be reintegrated, but with a clearer delineation 
of their roles.37 
The federal Opposition (the Australian Labor Party) contributed to the 
debate about these reforms by announcing on 30 March 2004 that it would 
abolish ATSIC if it won the 2004 election and replace it with a directly 
elected national Indigenous body. This emboldened the government 
to announce (on 15 April 2004) that it would abolish ATSIC, appoint 
a National Indigenous Council (NIC), devolve Indigenous-specific 
programs to mainstream departments, establish forums (Ministerial 
Taskforce, Secretaries Group, Indigenous Coordinating Centres) 
for intergovernmental and cross-agency cooperation, and negotiate 
agreements on service delivery with communities. Invoking their right to 
self-determination, around 200 Indigenous leaders gathered in Adelaide 
from 11 to 14 June to call for a new national Indigenous representative 
body, though they did not specify how representatives should be chosen. 
The Howard Government’s response in November 2004 was to appoint 
a small, advisory NIC. Chaired by Aboriginal magistrate Sue Gordon, the 
NIC was not a representative but an ‘expert’ body, advising the Ministerial 
Taskforce on Indigenous affairs. 
35  Chris Graham, ‘A Painful Separation for ATSIC’, National Indigenous Times, 16 April 2003, 6.
36  Brian Johnstone interview with Geoff Clark, ‘An Assault on Me Is an Assault on Us All: Clark’, 
National Indigenous Times, 23 July 2003, 7.
37  Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Report.
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What caused ATSIC’s downfall? Perhaps ATSIC demonstrated the 
limits of Australian governments’ commitment to self-determination. 
Australian governments could have funded ATSIC more generously, 
broadened its program responsibilities and secured its seat in the higher 
forums of federated government so that it could call other federal and 
state/territory agencies to account. Against that view, we note that it 
was in response to Indigenous criticism (by Aboriginal community-
controlled health services)  that the Keating Government had removed 
health program funding from  ATSIC (in which regional councils had 
much say about money for health programs) to the Commonwealth 
Department of Human Services and Health in July 1995. Another 
explanation of ATSIC’s demise was that its inception was ‘a classic pre-
emption of Aboriginal choice’ – that is, a national institution imposed on 
a political culture in which affiliations are local and in which mobilisation 
is necessarily episodic.38 Yet another explanation is to point to cynicism 
(the venality and naivety of certain individuals who had been empowered 
by national structures) and naivety (unrealistic expectations by Indigenous 
voters about what ATSIC’s programs could achieve and how quickly). 
A fourth explanation points to genuine philosophical differences about 
what it means to represent and serve ‘your mob’, with resulting unclarity 
of norms about ethical dealing (‘conflicts of interest’). Here we note the 
novelty – within Australia’s settler colonial political culture – of the very 
idea of Indigenous rights in governance. Whereas Indigenous property 
rights have been relatively easy to encode in legislation (though never 
without controversy), it has not been so clear how ‘Indigenous rights’ 
in governance should be operationalised. As well, the norms relevant to 
government funding (compensation or ‘taxpayers’ money’?) have been 
contested. The dispute about what counted as a ‘conflict of interest’ in 
ATSIC’s processes had little to do with the criminality (real or alleged) 
of this or that individual and more to do with unresolved issues of 
jurisdiction and political culture. 
38  Wootten, ‘Self-determination’, 17–18.
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The CATSI Act39
According to the 2002 Corrs review, the rationale for an Indigenous-specific 
incorporation statute was that most Indigenous corporations had social 
rather than commercial objectives. The review sought to recognise greater 
diversity among those social purposes, acknowledging the possibility of 
different constitutions and reporting requirements, and it recommended 
that the registrar have discretion to modify the latter.40 Meanwhile, the 
responsibilities of directors and officers could more closely align with 
the Corporations Act 2001. The Howard Government’s legislation largely 
followed these recommendations, and members of parliament from 
Labor and the Coalition had few differences to debate. Some Opposition 
speakers recalled that the Fingleton review had criticised the ACA Act for 
being too prescriptive of the internal structure of registered corporations. 
While they welcomed the new legislation’s expanded options, they 
called for vigilance, so that actual Indigenous control did not slip away: 
improved  corporate practices, they warned, should not be effected by 
‘experts’ supplanting Indigenous people. Another reservation expressed 
by  Labor speakers was that the registrar should be obliged to obtain 
a court order before ordering appointment of an administrator.
The Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 is a special 
measure for the advancement and protection of Aboriginal peoples and 
Torres Strait Islanders under Paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the Convention for 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975. The Act sets out rules about membership, elected office-holding, 
meeting procedures and record-keeping; it specifies corporate obligations 
about the timing and content of reports to the Office of the Registrar 
of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC); it defines ORIC’s powers of 
enforcement and specifies offences; it demarcates the jurisdiction of courts 
as allies of the registrar in enforcement, enabling ORIC to prosecute. Thus 
empowered, ORIC has provided formal training in corporate governance 
to members and directors of Indigenous corporations and information 
and advice to members who have grievances about their corporation. 
In 2017–18 ORIC completed examinations of 53 corporations (out of 
39  In October 2006 parliament considered a package of bills: the Corporations Amendment 
(Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations) Bill 2006; the Corporations (Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander) Consequential, Transitional and Other Measures Bill 2006, the transitional 
bill; and the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2005, the amendment bill.
40  Corrs Chambers Westgarth et al., Modern Statute.
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3,046 registered corporations at 30 June 2018). On 5 July 2017 the 
Australian Government announced additional funding of $4 million over 
four years for ORIC (roughly a 12 per cent increase in ORIC’s budget, 
each year) for additional training, examinations and investigations.
The CATSI Act focuses on organisational soundness and financial 
transparency, but Indigenous organisations are also subject to program 
accountability to the government departments that fund them. 
Departments influenced by new public management have moved away 
from funding not-for-profits through block grants, instead contracting 
with not-for-profits for the delivery of services in accordance with precise 
program expectations. Many Indigenous corporations rely on income 
from programs administered by more than one department, making 
reporting complex and demanding advanced English literacy. Curchin’s 
interviews with corporations elicited concern about the time diverted from 
service delivery to reporting. In 2010, the Commonwealth Ombudsman 
Allan Asher warned that ‘promising Indigenous programs in rural and 
remote communities risk failure due to complex and onerous government 
reporting requirements’.41
The abolition of ATSIC also created problems insofar as mainstream 
departments that took over ATSIC’s programs were reluctant to continue 
funding small highly localised Indigenous organisations. They encouraged 
the formation of larger regional Indigenous organisations or made 
contracts for the delivery of Indigenous services with non-Indigenous 
organisations including international non-government organisations. 
In 2012, ORIC reported that the ‘move towards mainstreaming and 
regionalisation of service delivery for remote communities and away 
from funding for community organisations is affecting the solvency and 
long-term viability of many community-based Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander organisations’.42 ORIC was called on to assist in the 
restructuring and winding up of many organisations that had lost their 
most important funding stream.43 At times, government departments 
were clawing back control of assets that had originally been funded by 
government programs, assets that Indigenous people see as belonging to 
the Indigenous community.
41  Commonwealth Ombudsman, ‘Red Tape Causes Indigenous Programs to Fail’, Media Release, 
10 December 2010, www.ombudsman.gov.au/media-releases/media-release-documents/commonwealth-
ombudsman/2010/146.
42  ORIC, Yearbook 2011–12, 6.
43  ORIC, Yearbook 2011–12, 6.
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Conclusion
Indigenous organisations have been crucial to ‘self-determination’, and 
ATSIC and the Indigenous sector (made up of thousands of Indigenous 
corporations) have been experiments in governments’ funding of 
Indigenous Australians to administer services to other Indigenous 
Australians. Within 15 years (1990–2005), ATSIC acquired and lost 
political support for reasons both structural and contingent. If the 
Indigenous sector has proved comparatively robust, it is not only because 
the benefits of local service organisations have been more obvious to 
Indigenous Australians than the benefits of national representative 
institutions, but also because the Australian state has been tutelary 
and disciplinary, providing a statutory environment that facilitated the 
Indigenous sector in three ways: enabling the exit of organisations that 
fell into disuse or into irreparable dysfunction, encouraging the formation 
of new organisations (including many formed as prescribed bodies 
corporate pursuant to the Native Title Act), and submitting organisations 
to oversight and training in what Australian governments and many 
Indigenous Australians considered good governance. The ACA and 
CATSI Acts both enabled and constrained the autonomy of Indigenous 
collectives. While the regulatory regime that has evolved since 1976 still 
sees persisting Indigenous communality in a positive light, it demands 
good governance.44 Much of the CATSI Act mirrors the Corporations Act 
2001, so that directors of Indigenous corporations must meet expectations 
derived from Western corporation law. 
Among Indigenous leaders who see a governance gap that must be closed 
by encouraging Indigenous Australians to run corporations in better 
ways, we find Mick Dodson. In 2003, he and Diane Smith evoked an 
ethical culture that would result in profitable Indigenous enterprises 
44  The embrace by some Indigenous public figures of the concept of good governance followed 
recognition by international financial institutions in the 1990s that good governance promotes 
economic growth and hence that international development assistance should be made conditional 
on good governance. ‘What is Good Governance?’ United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific, 10 July 2009, www.unescap.org/resources/what-good-governance; ‘The IMF’s 
Approach to Promoting Good Governance and Combating Corruption – A Guide: Why Does the 
IMF Care So Much about Good Governance?’, International Monetary Fund, last updated 20 June 
2005, www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm#care; World Bank, Governance and the 
Law, World Development Report 2017 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), www.worldbank.org/ 
en/publication/wdr2017.
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and ‘political and business stability’.45 They proposed ‘a clear separation 
between the powers and responsibilities of leaders and boards, and the 
daily management of community businesses and services’.46 They listed 
core ingredients and principles of good governance, including respect 
for the ‘rules of the game’, such as those found in publications of the 
Australian Stock Exchange; commitment to procedures of appeal and 
dispute resolution; and ability to explain financial management systems 
to governing boards.47 They hoped that Indigenous organisations could 
grow in size without losing effectiveness – scaling up beyond the local.48 
Based on his empirical investigation of Aboriginal community councils, 
Limerick considered that the conventional Western-derived practices 
and principles of good governance ‘are not only relevant in the unique 
cultural context of Indigenous governance, but perhaps have even greater 
importance in this context’.49 In his view, Indigenous governance must 
be especially robust to survive members’ and directors’ family-oriented 
cultural values.
The Australian regime enacts protectionist and assimilationist policy 
logics. Sanders has noted the return of ‘protection’ and ‘guardianship’ 
to Indigenous affairs in the Howard era.50 Indeed, protectionist logic 
has been evident in the regulation of Indigenous corporations since the 
1970s. Indigenous collectives have been viewed as especially vulnerable, 
requiring a conscientious guardian (the registrar) against threats internal 
and external. However, Indigenous Australians are not unique in their 
subjection to protective and civilising powers, as we can see in the 
similarities of ORIC’s functions with those of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC). Both ORIC and ASIC protect 
corporations’ creditors by preventing corporations from trading while 
insolvent, and both have the power to investigate and prosecute directors 
and senior officers of corporations. ORIC is far more tutelary, setting 
limits to acceptable customary difference; it can supervise problematic 
organisations more closely than ASIC, in what Sullivan calls the larger 
45  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 15, 20.
46  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 15.
47  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 14–17.
48  Dodson and Smith, ‘Governance’, 19.
49  Limerick, ‘What Makes’, 424.
50  Sanders, ‘Ideology’.
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‘attempt to normalize Aboriginal people by concentrating on Aboriginal 
deficit’.51 ASIC possesses no power equivalent to ORIC’s authority to 
examine Indigenous corporations’ books.
Do protection and assimilation, persistent in this regime, compromise 
self-determination? One of this chapter’s authors has argued that: 
Self-determination, no less than assimilation, implies 
Indigenous acculturation. Capacities are not culturally neutral. 
Self-determination affords new pressures and opportunities 
for Indigenous Australians to be more like non-Indigenous 
Australians, in many ways. This does not demand the surrender of 
Indigenous identity (quite the opposite), but it stimulates changes 
in Indigenous ways of reckoning their obligations to one another.52 
But what if the ‘Indigenous identity’ of a corporation includes norms 
and practices that amount to a ‘polity’, a colonised ‘jurisdiction’ not yet 
extinguished and demanding recognition? Indigenous political theorists, 
encouraged by ‘mounting evidence of Indigenous polities increasing their 
authority over their Country and citizens’, implicitly challenge Rowse’s 
view.53 They argue that, since the 1970s, Indigenous polities have adopted 
incorporation as a legal device to deal with the settler colonial state and civil 
society, an ‘accommodation to colonizer law’ that ‘can create confusion 
between the governance of Indigenous community organisations and 
the governance of Indigenous communities’. Indigenous collectives need 
‘to transition from “corporate governance” (management of community 
organisations) to “political governance” (governing of polities)’ a shift that 
‘might also be described as a transition from self-management to self-
determination’.54 Indigenous commentary on the CATSI Act is, therefore, 
ambivalent. Speaking at a forum convened by ORIC, Harold Furber 
complained of ‘the imposition of Western systems upon an existing 
governance process … I think ORIC is attempting to do it, and doing it 
to a certain extent well, but in the end what it is talking about is Western 
systems of governance and in the end it’s an imposition’.55
51  Sullivan, ‘Disenchantment’, 354.
52  Rowse, Indigenous, 231.
53  Vivian et al., ‘Indigenous’, 220. For an older (1996) Indigenous critique see Widders, ‘On the 
Dreaming’.
54  Vivian et al., ‘Indigenous’, 227.
55  Harold Furber speaking at an ORIC forum on Indigenous Corporate Governance in Alice 
Springs in 2010, Curchin field data.
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The Indigenous sector has enacted Rowley’s vision of (what Batty calls) 
‘linkages between the mechanisms of government and a collective 
Aboriginal subjectivity or agency’ such that Aboriginal people would 
‘incorporate the administrative procedures of government into their own 
sense of communal personhood’.56 Aboriginal ‘communal personhood’ has 
bent to fit the mechanisms of government, far more than the mechanisms 
of government have bent to fit with Aboriginal ‘communal personhood’.
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PART TWO: 
SELF‑DETERMINATION 






LAND RIGHTS AND 
SELF‑DETERMINATION
Bob Boughton
Self-determination can be understood as a policy of the Australian 
settler state, in a particular period. But it is also a key demand of the 
social movement for Indigenous rights, and a set of practices within 
the organisations that comprise that movement. This chapter outlines 
a view of that movement’s history based on my work within it as a non-
Indigenous activist, and as a practitioner and academic in the field of adult 
education and development. I began my activism in Sydney in the 1970s 
as a member of the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Rights Support 
Group. In the 1980s I worked for Tangentyere Council and the Institute 
for Aboriginal Development (IAD) in Alice Springs, and in the 1990s for 
Tranby Aboriginal College and the Federation of Independent Aboriginal 
Education Providers (FIAEP). Currently, I work with the Literacy 
for Life Foundation (LFLF), an Aboriginal organisation established in 
2013 by three Aboriginal education leaders, Pat Anderson, Donna Ah 
Chee and Jack Beetson, to lead a national adult literacy campaign across 
Aboriginal Australia.1
The achievement of self-determination involves the collective exercise by 
Aboriginal peoples of a high degree of control over their social, political 
and economic development. This has entailed a long political struggle in 
1  The Foundation’s website is at www.lflf.org.au.
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and with the apparatus of the Australian colonial settler state, a struggle to 
mobilise and engage the Indigenous population in the process of retaking 
control of the conditions of their existence. It included the struggle to 
establish an independent economic base, since political independence 
requires a degree of economic independence to sustain it; and so the 
history of self-determination in NSW, the focus of this paper, is inseparable 
from the struggle for land rights and compensation. At the same time, 
the colonial state on which these demands are being made is also not 
autonomous, but must to some extent serve its economic base, by taking 
responsibility for the institutions of social reproduction that sustain the 
settler-capitalist economy, including the formal education system.
Indigenous peoples, the ‘self ’ in self-determination, constitute themselves 
as a collective historical subject through the actions of the social 
movement for Indigenous rights. As E. P. Thompson said of the English 
working class, they are present at their own making. Moreover, like the 
working class of classical Marxism, while they are making history, it is 
not in conditions of their own choosing. Each generation struggles to 
achieve, and to practice, self-determination under conditions and within 
limits inherited from the past. Most importantly for this chapter, these 
inherited conditions include the ‘level’ and type of education to which 
people have had access. In New South Wales (NSW), while the formal 
education system has served the settler economy well for generations, it 
has, over the same period, left the majority of the Aboriginal peoples of 
rural and remote areas with minimal education levels, and with minimal 
understanding of their rights, as peoples.2 This has been despite the best 
efforts of Indigenous peoples themselves, through their organisations and 
with their allies, to make it do otherwise.3
‘Closing the gap’ in enrolments and outcomes from existing education 
institutions is not enough. Education for Indigenous self-determination 
can only be provided when Indigenous people are themselves exercising 
control over that education. How could it be otherwise? The reproduction 
(and in the case of a colonised people, the reconstruction) of all 
societies requires them to control their own systems of educating future 
generations. This is why community-controlled education plays a central 
role in the movement for land rights and self-determination. In NSW, 
the intimate connection between community-controlled education and 
2  Audit Office of NSW, Improving the Literacy. 
3  Fletcher, Clean.
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the achievement of the right of self-determination is demonstrated most 
clearly through the role of Tranby Aboriginal College.4 However, Tranby 
College and its courses were central parts of a ‘system’ that extended well 
beyond the walls of its classrooms in inner-Sydney Glebe, including the 
social and political activities of the wider movement as an integral part of 
its ‘curriculum’ and pedagogy.
Since reaching a high point in the late 1990s, Aboriginal community-
controlled education has suffered a series of defeats, part of the wider 
neoliberal roll back of the social democratic self-determination/land 
rights model legislated in 1983 by the NSW Labor Government.5 Two 
decades on from those defeats, this still-emerging system of ‘education 
for self-determination’ is now addressing one of its most significant 
challenges, a challenge common to decolonising movements all over the 
world – namely, how to raise the level of literacy among the majority adult 
population, especially in rural communities.
Adult education, adult literacy 
and self‑determination
In Australia, as in much of the world, adult education has several traditions. 
From the universities sprang a liberal tradition of adult education, 
sometimes called ‘extension studies’, dating back to the late nineteenth 
century. In recent decades, this tradition has become less prominent, as 
more people entered university education directly from school. A second 
tradition that began with working men’s colleges and mechanics institutes 
eventually became what we now know as the vocational education 
and training (VET) system. This includes public TAFE colleges and, 
increasingly, private and not-for-profit registered training organisations. 
In the 1950s, these two traditions, liberal and vocational, combined 
to provide a model of adult education for countries of the Global 
South, in the field known as adult education and development, which 
is strongly supported by United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). A third, more radical variant of 
adult education originated with the Chartist movement in Britain and 
was taken up by socialist and communist tendencies within the labour 
4  Goodall, Invasion to Embassy; Cook and Goodall, Making Change.
5  Austin-Broos, ‘Brewarrina’.
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movements of the Global North, and by anti-colonial movements in the 
Global South. Originally known as independent working-class education, 
this is today more commonly referred to by its Latin American name, as 
popular education,6 or as social movement learning.7 
In this popular education tradition, the right of self-determination became 
part of the ‘curriculum’ of the Aboriginal rights movement in the early 
years of the twentieth century,8 and it first appeared in policy statements of 
the communist and socialist workers’ movement in the 1930s.9 University 
adult education did not seek to develop leadership for self-determination 
until much later. According to Rowse, Indigenous Australians were ‘not 
visible as political agents’ to the university-based historians and political 
scientists of the 1950s and 1960s.10 He cites Charles Rowley, writing in 
Oceania in 1962:
We cannot produce leadership; what we can do, in situations 
where it is not too late, is to provide some of the conditions in 
which it becomes possible; and to provide assistance on request to 
potential leaders.11
Rowley’s background was in liberal adult education. He was an adult 
educator in the Australian Army Education Service (AAES) and, in 1949, 
he was a member of the Australian delegation to the first UNESCO 
CONFINTEA, a world conference on adult education.12 In 1950, he 
wrote about his experiences as an army educator, and took part in debates 
at that time about the ‘tasks of adult education’. He was among the 
first adult educators in Australia to promote ‘community development’ 
as integral to adult education.13 In 1962, as principal of the Australian 
School of Pacific Administration in Sydney, he was still an adult educator, 
training patrol officers to work in Papua New Guinea, the Northern 
Territory and the Pacific. 
6  Boughton, ‘Does Popular’.
7  Choudry, Learning Activism.
8  Maynard, Fight for Liberty.
9  Boughton, ‘The Communist Party’.
10  Rowse, ‘The Reforming State’, 66.
11  Rowley, ‘Aborigines’, 263.
12  The AAES was under the command of Bert Madgwick, who, before the war, was a Sydney 
University Extension lecturer. He became the first vice-chancellor of my university, the University 
of New England (UNE), and Founding President in 1961 of the Australian Association of Adult 
Education. Dymock, Sweet Use of Adversity.
13  Inglis, ‘Charles Dunford Rowley’.
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Although Rowley looked to adult education agencies in 1962 to overcome 
‘peculiar difficulties in urban areas’ for Aboriginal development, he did 
not mention an active adult education agency in inner Sydney that was 
already developing Indigenous leadership courses to help people take 
more control of development in their communities. In 1958, Tranby 
Aboriginal Cooperative College had opened in the Sydney suburb of 
Glebe, pioneering structured education for Aboriginal leaders in how to 
use cooperatives to take over economic and social development on reserves 
and missions. Cooperatives were a product of the independent working-
class education tradition, initially promoted by nineteenth-century 
English Chartists and taken up by the early socialist movement. Their 
adoption in Australia at this time was due to the work of an Anglican 
minister and missionary, Alf Clint, Tranby’s first director, who had a long 
association with the radical working-class movement dating back to his 
experiences ‘actively supporting pastoral workers during the big 1930s 
strikes around Brewarrina and Bourke’.14 Clint’s work at Tranby drew 
also on a progressive Anglican tradition, which had seen programs of 
adult education and cooperative development established on Queensland 
missions in the 1950s.15 The liberal tradition eventually took some 
interest in the model, as when H. C. Coombs corresponded in 1968 with 
Stan Davey and Don McLeod, two non-Indigenous leaders in the Federal 
Council for Aboriginal Advancement (FCAA), seeking information about 
the Pindan Co-operative that McLeod (a communist) had helped the 
Pilbara strikers to establish in north-west Western Australia in the 1940s. 
In his address that same year to the FCAA, Coombs also referred to the 
Cabbage Tree Island Co-operative, the establishment of which Tranby had 
supported, calling it one of the organisations that ‘may help Aboriginal 
Australians to cope with the contemporary world by their own efforts’.16
In the last three decades of the twentieth century, in NSW as in many 
other parts of Australia, the independent tradition of adult ‘popular’ 
education played a key role in the movement for land rights and self-
determination. Tranby was the base from which the first NSW Aboriginal 
Land Council (NSWALC) was established in 1977; Kevin Cook, 
a former builder’s labourer who took over from Clint as Tranby’s director, 
was the land council’s first convenor. The college assisted several NSW 
communities to prepare land claims well before any legislation was 
14  Goodall, Invasion to Embassy, 299.
15  Loos and Keast, ‘The radical promise’; Loos, White Cross, 119–24.
16  Boughton, ‘The Communist Party’; Rowse, Obliged, 31–32.
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in place. Tranby played a central role in NSWALC’s campaign to get the 
NSW Labor Government to legislate land rights, which it did in 1983. 
The college and its supporters were also deeply involved in the campaign 
against Black Deaths in Custody, which led to the establishment of the 
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in 1988. Some of 
this history has found its way into accounts of the period, but the direct 
connection between the kind of adult education that Tranby offered and 
the growing strength of the social movement for land rights and self-
determination is rarely acknowledged.17 Once the NSW land rights regime 
was established by legislation in 1983, Tranby continued to provide adult 
education programs specifically designed to support and strengthen the 
capacity of Aboriginal communities to win back more of their lands and 
secure greater control over their own affairs. 
The educative work of Tranby and the movement’s other organisations 
occurred against a backdrop of the continuing failure of mainstream 
formal education to adapt its goals and methods to the policy of self-
determination announced by the Whitlam Government in 1973. 
The  Aboriginal Consultative Group’s (ACG) report to the Schools 
Commission in 1975 reflected both the liberal and the independent 
traditions of adult education:
We see education as the most important strategy for achieving 
realistic self-determination for the Aboriginal people of Australia. 
We do not see education as a method of producing an anglicised 
Aborigine but rather as an instrument for creating an informed 
community with intellectual and technological skills, in harmony 
with our own cultural values and identity. We wish to be Aboriginal 
citizens in a changing Australia. …
Our vision of education is not compatible with the current 
education system with its over emphasis on manpower orientated 
goals that most Australian people know.18
The ACG lamented the fact that, in 1971, out of a population of ‘between 
106,000 and 150,000’, there were only 55 Aboriginal students attending 
university. It drew specific attention to the lack of administrative expertise, 
proposing a School of Aboriginal Affairs Administration. 
17  Norman, ‘What Do We Want?’, 82–83.
18  Aboriginal Consultative Group, Education for Aborigines.
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Thirteen years later, the 1988 Aboriginal Education Policy Task Force was 
more strident, finding that, ‘as a result of the lack of education provided 
for Aboriginal people it can be assumed that at least one half of the 
Aboriginal population is illiterate or functionally illiterate’. It called on 
the Commonwealth to negotiate with states and territories to ‘develop and 
implement a national Aboriginal literacy strategy aimed to significantly 
increase the opportunities available to Aboriginal adults to improve 
their literacy skills’.19 The Commonwealth’s response, the 1990 National 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Education Policy, remains today the 
only national education policy ever adopted.20 Two of its 21 goals are 
relevant to the current analysis:
Goal 18: To provide community education services which enable 
Aboriginal people to develop the skills to manage the development 
of their communities.
Goal 19: To enable the attainment of proficiency in English 
language and numeracy competencies by Aboriginal adults with 
limited or no educational experience.21 
However, as critics at the time pointed out, responsibility for 
implementation of the policy was left almost entirely to state education 
systems, and there was very little government funding for independent 
Aboriginal-controlled adult education.
The lack of adult education services to support self-determination 
continued as a major theme of numerous inquiries and academic papers 
in subsequent years. In August 1990, the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs report Our Future, Our Selves: 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Control, Management and 
Resources noted that many submissions ‘pointed to Aboriginal people’s 
lack of skills – such as English literacy, numeracy, etc – and their lack of 
19  Hughes, Report, 33.
20  The members of the ACG were: David Anderson, NAC, Vic.; Jill Churnside, Pre-School teacher, 
WA; Roslyn Ella, Teacher, NSW; Walter Fejo, NAC, NT; Rex Granites, Teaching Assistant, NT; Eric 
Hayward, Community Worker, WA; Nita Koolamatrie, Teacher, SA; Verna Langdon, Community 
Worker, Tas.; Ted Loban, NAC, Torres Strait Islands; Bruce McGuiness, NAC, Vic.; Natasha McNamara, 
Lecturer, SA; Michael Miller, Teacher, Qld; George Mye, NAC, Torres Strait Islands; Wiyendji Nunggula, 
Housefather, NT; May O’Brien, Teacher, WA; James Stewart, Teacher, SA; Margaret Valadian, Social 
Worker, NSW. Special Advisers: John Moriarty, Department of Aboriginal Affairs; Eric Wilmott, 
Department of Education. See Australia, Aboriginal Consultative Group, ‘Report’.
21  Department of Social Services, ‘National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Education Policy, 
1989’.
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knowledge about how the governmental system works, as major obstacles 
to the achievement of self-determination or self-management’. It said 
that ‘high levels of adult illiteracy similarly restrict the usefulness of the 
public exhibition of draft community government schemes’.22 The final 
report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in 
1991 similarly recognised the ‘historical educational disadvantage which 
Aboriginal people have experienced’ and recommended that governments 
support ‘Aboriginal community controlled education institutions and 
other institutions which provide a program of courses which have the 
support of the Aboriginal community’ (Recommendation 298). In 2000, 
Gray, Hunter and Schwab identified ‘community development and 
training including English literacy and numeracy for indigenous adults’ 
as an unmet need ‘where attention should be concentrated in attempts 
to improve outcomes in indigenous education’.23 In 2004, Diane Smith, 
writing about governance in the Northern Territory, made the same point: 
Grossly inadequate literacy and numeracy levels, and poor health, 
mean that Indigenous people will continue to remain reliant upon 
others for important aspects of their community management and 
decision-making. Poor outcomes in these areas will continue to 
substantially impede Indigenous aspirations for self-determination, 
meaningful participation and effective representation.24
A high point
In the 1990s, Tranby began working closely with other independent 
colleges, including the Institute for Aboriginal Development in Alice 
Springs and Tauondi College in Adelaide. Together with several smaller 
organisations, they established the Federation of Independent Aboriginal 
Education Providers (FIAEP), which lobbied nationally and internationally 
for the addition of a different model of provision to that offered through 
state systems, to give people a choice. The Foundation President of FIAEP, 
Jack Beetson, joined Tranby in the early 1980s, becoming director of 
studies in 1991. When Kevin Cook became too ill to continue as Tranby’s 
director, Beetson took over and held this position until 2003. Beetson 
worked with Donna Ah Chee, IAD’s director, and Bill Wilson, Tauondi’s 
22  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Our Future, Our Selves.
23  Gray, Hunter and Schwab, ‘Trends in Indigenous’, 115.
24  Smith, From Gove, 14. 
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director, to convince the Commonwealth to direct more of its Aboriginal 
post-school education budget towards the independents, resisting the 
growing trend at this time towards the ‘mainstreaming’ of Aboriginal 
services. In  post-school education, mainstreaming would have meant 
governments funding only public state-run TAFEs and non-Indigenous 
registered training organisations.
In 1997, Beetson attended UNESCO CONFINTEA V, the Fifth World 
Conference on Adult Education, the same forum that Rowley had 
attended in 1949. This was the first time the Australian Government’s 
delegation included an Indigenous representative, and Beetson used the 
opportunity to call on UNESCO to support the Draft Declaration of the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, referring in particular to Article 15, which 
declares the right of Indigenous peoples to establish and control their 
educational systems and institutions providing education in their own 
languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching 
and learning. Addressing the conference, Beetson spoke of the need for 
Indigenous-controlled education:
Indigenous education has to mean something different from 
education FOR indigenous peoples. If our education is conceived 
as simply something we can get from the non-indigenous 
mainstream system, by increasing our ‘access’ and ‘participation’, 
then education will remain what it has been for us for over 
200 years, a continuation of our colonisation …
The non-indigenous colonial state has used education as a major 
arm of its strategy for more effective government administration 
& control of indigenous peoples, and we have always struggled 
against this. This struggle has seen the emergence, alongside our 
informal indigenous educational practices, of a new and now 
officially-recognised indigenous community-controlled education 
sector. Today, this sector struggles to survive on inadequate 
funding and a lack of acknowledgment of its expression of 
a  fundamental right of indigenous peoples, the right to control 
our own education.25
In the late 1990s, the campaigning work of the FIAEP leadership began 
bearing fruit, due in part to the support of a sympathetic Aboriginal 
education leader working inside the Department of Education, 
Employment and Training, Peter Buckskin, who had a long association 
25  Beetson, ‘Address to the UNSECO Confintea’.
INDIGENoUS SELf‑DETERMINATIoN IN AUSTRALIA
176
through Tauondi with the independent tradition. With increased 
Commonwealth funding, and responding to the growing need for 
an educated leadership inside the Aboriginal community-controlled 
organisations, the independent colleges introduced new courses designed 
to develop local leaders, courses that included narratives of Australia’s 
colonial history and of the movements of Indigenous resistance, including 
the land rights campaigns, drawing on movement leaders as guest lecturers 
and mentors for their students.26
By 2004, this independent model of adult education for self-determination 
was rolled back, as Commonwealth and state governments implemented 
two articles of neoliberal ‘common sense’: that post-school education 
should be ‘vocational’, endowing students with nothing more than 
the skills demanded by employers; and that providers of post-school 
education would be more efficient if they were enterprises responding in 
a competitive market to student demand for vocational training.27 While 
such neoliberal reform initially made it possible for non-government 
providers, including the independent colleges, to access government 
funding, all providers soon had to surrender a significant level of control 
of their curriculum and courses. The colleges were eventually forced to 
offer, under pain of losing all funding, national ‘training packages’ with 
mandated ‘competency standards’, developed by industry training boards 
dominated by representatives of employer associations and the training 
bureaucracy. These uniform ‘training packages’ were to be utilised by 
all public TAFEs, and by both non-government and private for-profit 
registered training organisations. 
Aboriginal colleges continued to make some space in their courses for 
the political, historical and cultural education that had been central to 
their curriculum in previous decades. Yet the demobilisation of the wider 
land rights movement that was also occurring at this time made things 
more difficult. In NSW, the state government introduced much closer 
supervision of the state’s land council, especially the Local Aboriginal 
Land Councils; in this regime, governance focused much more on 
compliance with norms of public sector management than on community 
education and development.28 As the movement became more defensive, 
forced to make compromises to protect the gains it had won in the 1980s, 
26  Durnan and Boughton, Succeeding Against; Cook and Goodall, Making Change, 390–95.
27  Munro, ‘The Indigenous’.
28  Morris, Protest, Land Rights, 44–48; Norman, ‘What Do We Want?’, 137.
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the education programs that gave the movement its energy and mass 
support slowly lost their radical edge. At the same time, the increasing 
professionalisation of community organisation leadership and staffing saw 
the majority of their ‘base’, the rural Aboriginal population, become more 
removed from day-to-day decision-making, as the land councils became 
more accountable to government than to their social base, a process that 
the international social movement literature has dubbed ‘NGOisation’.29 
Self‑determination, community control 
and adult literacy
Aboriginal people and their allies rightly claim that Aboriginal 
community-controlled organisations are the building blocks of self-
determination. Megan Davis, writing in the Indigenous Law Bulletin 
about the United Nations Declaration (UNDRIP), asks: ‘What does 
the right to self-determination look like in practice in Australian 
communities?’ Her answer is: ‘It looks a lot like “community control”’, 
and her illustration is the Aboriginal Community Controlled Health 
Organisations (ACCHOs).30 However, self-determination via community 
control is not achieved once and for all. As the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Mick Dodson said in his first 
report, it is a process, and it develops over time, involving not only the 
relationships between organisations and government agencies, but also 
the organisations’ relationships with their own communities.31
In April 2009, the Lowitja Institute convened a Roundtable on Adult 
Literacy in Alice Springs. Among the Aboriginal leaders attending were 
John Liddle (CAAC), Donna Ah Chee (IAD), Pat Anderson (Lowitja), 
Mick Dodson (The Australian National University/Australian Institute 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies), Marcia Langton 
(Melbourne University) and Jack Beetson. Stephanie Bell, then director 
of one of Australia’s largest ACCHOs, Central Australian Aboriginal 
Congress (CAAC), outlined the difficulties of achieving effective 
community control:
29  Choudry and Kapoor, NGOization.
30  Davis, ‘Community Control’.
31  Dodson, ‘First Report 1993’, 41.
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It is a struggle to find enough people to sit on health boards 
and to work in clinics – to negotiate with government agencies, 
and to make decisions and give some leadership about health 
development. This means it is hard for the community to take 
control … Moreover, each year, the challenges of service delivery 
and good governance seem to get more complex, and require even 
more education and training.32
Bell cited the Northern Territory Education Department’s own self-critical 
inquiry (over a decade earlier) to argue that the school system was failing 
to graduate young people with education sufficient to play an effective 
role in community governance. In particular, she argued that ‘one of the 
biggest barriers’ to Aboriginal control of their own organisations was 
‘the very low levels of English language literacy we see every day in our 
communities. People can’t read, and don’t read’.33
However, Bell doubted that the formal system would deliver the kind 
of education that adults needed: 
The majority of adults never access this system sufficiently to get 
even a basic education, a basic understanding of how the world 
works and what you have to do if you want to change things for 
the better … We see the majority of people continuing to live in 
intolerable conditions, and no one is helping them learn what they 
need to know to get out of that situation … non-literate and semi-
literate people have got almost no chance of taking control of their 
health, or of becoming leaders in their communities.34
Bell pointed out that, unlike the organised Aboriginal presence in the 
Territory’s health system, ‘we don’t have a community-controlled 
education sector’. 
The Lowitja Institute subsequently funded another round of work, to 
secure Commonwealth Government support to pilot an adult literacy 
campaign in Australia, utilising a Cuban model that was then operating 
successfully in Timor-Leste. Over two years later, in February 2012, the 
first campaign was launched in the western NSW town of Wilcannia.35 
32  Bell, ‘Opening Address’.
33  Bell, ‘Opening Address’.
34  Bell, ‘Opening Address’.
35  Boughton et al., ‘An Aboriginal Adult’.
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Literacy and land councils in western NSW 
The campaign has continued for the past seven years, supported by 
a combination of government and private funding, and much voluntary 
labour. Having reached eight NSW communities, in 2019 it moved into 
Central Australia. A key to the model’s success is that it requires the local 
community to provide the leadership to run it, including the people who 
mobilise the community behind the campaign and the people who teach 
the classes. It is thus continuing the tradition of independent Aboriginal 
community-controlled adult education, and the campaign’s three national 
leaders – Jack Beetson, Donna Ah Chee and Pat Anderson – have all had 
a long association with this tradition. Likewise, many of the community-
based campaign activists in NSW have previously been participants in 
education and political action initiated through Tranby, or are the children 
and grandchildren of people who were.
There is not space here to tell the story of the campaign over the last seven 
years in any detail. However, the campaign’s action-research, a component 
of its popular education approach, has confirmed that low levels of adult 
literacy inhibit people’s participation in their community-controlled 
organisations. In each community, locally recruited researchers conduct 
household surveys to raise awareness of the campaign and identify people 
who want help to develop their literacy. At the time of writing, almost 
800 adults have been surveyed, of whom more than 70 per cent have 
self-identified as having difficulty with basic reading and writing tasks. 
This appalling statistic is confirmed by professional literacy assessments 
of a sample of the 300 adults who have joined the literacy classes to date. 
The assessment utilises the national VET system standard known as the 
Australian Core Skills Framework. On this standard, well over half the 
adult population in these communities are at Level 1 or below, compared 
with 14 per cent of the Australian population as a whole.36 Given that 
most written texts utilised in workplaces require at least Level 2 and 
often Level 3 to produce and comprehend, it is not surprising that the 
majority of the people who join the campaign report that they play little 
or no role at all in the management of their local community-controlled 
organisations.37 As Sullivan has shown in communities in the Kimberley 
36  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies.
37  The data in this paragraph are based on research as yet unpublished, from an ARC Linkage 
project being conducted jointly by UNE, University of NSW, LFLF and the Lowitja Institute.
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in Western Australia, the increasing complexity of the accountability and 
compliance regimes in which local organisations receiving government 
funding must now operate exacerbates this problem.38 
The NSW movement for land rights and self-determination must 
now address low literacy levels. Across NSW, there are about 16,000 
members of the Local Aboriginal Land Councils (LALCs) set up 
under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW). The members elect 
the directors of their LALC, as well as the councillors who comprise the 
leadership  of the statewide NSW body, NSWALC. Table 7.1, below, 
traces the membership and voting participation figures for the state body 
over the period 1991–2015.
Table 7.1: NSW Aboriginal Land Council membership and voting.
1991 1996 1999 2007 2011 2015
NSW Aboriginal 
population 18+
42,011 86,886 91,617 110,026 123,371 128,000
NSWALC membership 12,412 19,287 20,539 16,643 16,136 15,718
Memberships as % of adult 
population (density)
30% 22% 22% 15% 13% 12%
Voters 6,574 7,031 6,148 4,663 4,120 5,106
Participation rate (voters as 
a proportion of members)
53% 36% 30% 28% 26% 32%
Increase/decrease in 
participation rate
 ‑17% ‑6% ‑2% ‑2% 7%
Voters as % of 18+ popn 16% 8% 7% 4% 3% 4%
Sources: ABS Census data and relevant NSWALC Election Reports and Annual Reports 
of the NSW Electoral Commission .
Table 7.1 demonstrates, first, that the NSW Aboriginal adult population 
grew very rapidly in the first period (1991–96); second, and in part 
because of this, the proportion of the adult population who are land 
council members (density) is quite low and falling; and third, that even 
among members, the participation rate in terms of voting is also very low. 
Given that both the LALCs and NSWALC were established to lead the 
movement for land rights and self-determination, the low membership 
and participation relative to the total Aboriginal population is a serious 
problem. As one NSWALC councillor said, in a workshop with literacy 
38  Sullivan, ‘The Tyranny’.
181
7 . ADULT LITERACy, LAND RIGHTS AND SELf‑DETERMINATIoN
campaign participants in Brewarrina: ‘The leaders of the movement from 
the 1970s might have trouble recognising what they fought for in what 
we now have’.39
As people become more literate, they become both more informed and 
more confident to engage with the local land council and other community 
organisations, including the ACCHOs. Follow-up surveys conducted as 
part of a longitudinal study of the campaign’s impact show there has also 
been some increase in membership and participation in land councils and 
other local Aboriginal organisations among campaign graduates. In one 
community, Enngonia, where the local Murruwarri Land Council is 
the only on-site Aboriginal organisation controlled by local community 
members, the campaign coordinator has now taken on the role of LALC 
CEO, and is mobilising the campaign graduates to play a greater role in 
LALC meetings and in developing and implementing small-scale local 
development projects.40
Conclusion
Dealing on equal terms with government in modern Australia requires 
a level of formal education denied to the majority of the Aboriginal 
population. The historical movement for self-determination that began 
with Maynard’s Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association in 1924 
faced what development theorists call a problem of scale-up when, from 
the 1970s onwards, governments began to entertain the possibility of 
increased self-determination. Commonwealth and state government 
policies that created an expanded role for Aboriginal organisations 
increased the demand for people to staff and lead these organisations. 
Each government agency also began to foster the development of their 
own specific Aboriginal body or bodies to which they could turn for 
advice, and to partner the provision of their services. The work of such 
bodies, however, required people in communities to have much more 
formal education than that to which they had previously had access.
Advisers to governments in the 1960s and 1970s such as Rowley, who had 
international experience in the political economy of adult education and 
development, should have seen the problem coming. In UNESCO forums 
39  Boughton, field notes in author’s possession.
40  Lee, ‘Remote Disadvantaged’.
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at the time, the problem of majority populations in the colonised world 
having minimal education was already well-known, as was the fact that 
formal schooling, no matter how much was invested in it, could not, on 
its own, overcome the problem.41 There had also to be a systematic system 
of popular adult education, one that could bring the people who had little 
formal education into the development process as active participants. 
This is why, in every decade of the second half of the twentieth century, 
most newly independent countries mounted mass literacy campaigns, 
which became the subject of an international literature of research 
and evaluation.42
A more intractable problem, however, faced minority Indigenous 
populations in modern settler states (the peoples of the Fourth World). 
Simply increasing Aboriginal peoples’ access to formal education was not 
sufficient, because the formal education system of schools, vocational 
colleges and universities was so implicated in the colonising practices 
of the previous decades that it could not simply reinvent itself; such 
a  thorough-going transformation would have to be informed by self-
reflective critique. As Paulo Freire had written in his 1972 book, Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed, people oppressed by particular social institutions cannot 
overcome their situation simply through a process of inclusion in those 
same institutions. The solution Freire proposed was revolutionary or 
transformative ‘praxis’, that is, direct political action to change those 
institutions, combined with constant critical reflection (i.e. research and 
theory-building) on what was being learned.43 In the context of education 
systems of the Australian settler state, this ‘revolutionizing practice’ 
would require what is now commonly called a ‘decolonising education’.44 
Because the Literacy for Life campaigns are run with a high degree of 
local as well as national Indigenous control, the acquisition of literacy is 
inevitably embedded in, and contextualised to, the life experiences of the 
Indigenous teachers and students. Literacy is a social practice, never just 
a technical skill, though acquiring and using it requires one to develop 
skills (e.g. spelling, reading, writing and so forth). The literacy that people 
acquire through the Literacy for Life campaign may well turn out to be 
different from the literacy they did not acquire through the school system. 
41  Rowley, The Politics.
42  Bhola, Campaigning; Arnove and Graff, National Literacy.
43  Freire, Pedagogy.
44  Hickling-Hudson, ‘Beyond Schooling’.
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This is exactly Paulo Freire’s point – people will read the world, from their 
own standpoint, and what they write and say as they become literate will 
be informed by their experiences.
In the 1970s, the struggle to decolonise the formal education system 
in Australia had barely begun, and it would be the work of decades. 
The formal education system could not, in the form it took in Australia 
in the late twentieth century, prepare people adequately for the tasks of 
self-determination, because the social sciences taught within universities, 
the disciplinary bases of modern theories of governance and organisation, 
were and still are the intellectual products of twentieth-century colonialism 
and imperialism.45 As Torres Strait Islander educator Martin Nakata has 
argued, the education to be gained within the formal system has to be 
critiqued from ‘an Indigenous standpoint’, that is, from the point of view 
of the knowledges and experiences of Indigenous peoples, rather than 
simply taken over as a set of neutral ideas and technical skills.46
The failure of the formal education system to accommodate a more 
independent self-determining Aboriginal education has now produced 
a new contradiction within the movement for self-determination itself. 
On the one hand, the Aboriginal organisations which set out to become 
the foundation of self-determination, and the public service agencies 
with which they must interact to achieve their goals, are increasingly 
managed, staffed and led by Aboriginal people who have succeeded 
in formal education. On the other hand, a significant minority of the 
Aboriginal people from whom these organisation derive their mandate 
and legitimacy, and the majority of the people whose daily needs are most 
urgent, struggle to participate in their deliberations, due to their lack of 
success in formal education and, most importantly, their very low levels 
of English language literacy.
The policy of self-determination was, for Coombs, ‘an experiment’, 
requiring us to view government as ‘an activity of knowledge-production’.47 
This chapter has sought to show that the social movement for Aboriginal 
self-determination in NSW also was, and still is, a process of knowledge 
creation, of learning-in-action. The Aboriginal adult literacy campaign can 
thus be seen as a further stage in this movement ‘experiment’, one which 
45  Connell, Southern Theory.
46  Nakata, Disciplining.
47  Rowse, Rethinking, 196.
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both exposes and clarifies a new contradiction, while at the same time 
employing an Aboriginal-controlled self-determining education process 
to move beyond it.
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Aboriginal organisations  
and self-determination in  
Redfern in the 1970s
Johanna Perheentupa1
This chapter examines the tensions between some Aboriginal 
understandings of self-determination and the Whitlam Government’s 
policy of self-determination. These tensions became evident in the 
context of Aboriginal organisations set up in the inner-Sydney suburb 
of Redfern in the 1970s: the Aboriginal Legal Service (ALS), Aboriginal 
Medical Service (AMS), Black Theatre, Murawina preschool and childcare 
centre, and Aboriginal Housing Company (AHC). These organisations 
had been founded before the Labor Government came to power. Their 
central principle was Aboriginal control, which was supported by ideas 
of Black Power and of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. 
Thus, the organisations’ ideas about self-determination differed from the 
one introduced under the policy of self-determination, which emphasised 
the need to address Aboriginal disadvantage in order to achieve their 
equal treatment. In the case of Redfern, the Whitlam Government’s self-
determination policy reflected the way in which the underlying belief in 
equal treatment and modernising Aboriginal people remained strong in 
the Department of Aboriginal Affairs.2 Accordingly, it treated the self-
determination policy ultimately as a temporary solution.
1  I would like to thank the editors, the participants of the workshop funded by the Academy of 
Social Sciences in Australia and Sacha Davis for their generous feedback.
2  Rowse, Remote, 131.
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Emphasis on Aboriginal control was a continuing aspect of Aboriginal 
political activism since the establishment of their first political 
organisations, the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association, in 
1924. Charlie Leon, who was active in Sydney-based Aboriginal rights 
organisations and the Redfern community, called for Aboriginal-owned 
cooperatives as well as an Aboriginal-led federal organisation in his article 
for the Aboriginal Progressive Association journal Churinga in 1965.3 
By the 1970s, the objective of Aboriginal control was rearticulated in calls 
for Aboriginal self-determination.
Although Fred Maynard had already used the concept in Aboriginal 
politics in the 1920s, Gary Foley, who participated extensively in 
Aboriginal activism in Redfern, suggested that self-determination became 
their central goal following the formation of the National Tribal Council 
(NTC) when it broke away from the Federal Council for the Advancement 
of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) in 1970.4 The NTC 
had developed as part of a shift in focus from equal rights to Indigenous 
rights and a growing sense of shared national Aboriginal or pan-Aboriginal 
identity in the 1960s. Indigenous people from different parts of Australia 
were able to explore their shared histories under colonisation, as well as 
common causes such as land rights and the right to self-determination 
as they got together at the FCAATSI annual general meetings.5 The Tent 
Embassy protestors, flying the Aboriginal flag as a symbol of nationhood 
for the first time, brought Aboriginal claims for self-determination and 
sovereignty to the awareness of a wider public in 1972.6 
Even though Aboriginal nationalism was strongly culturally oriented in 
the 1970s,7 Aboriginal activists also demanded control over Aboriginal 
peoples’ social, political and economic development within the Australian 
nation-state, as we can see in the case of Redfern in the 1970s. As Foley 
defined it in 1975: ‘Self-determination means the fundamental right of the 
Aboriginal people to have at their disposal the facilities and the resources 
that will enable them to be in full control of their own lives, their own 
destinies’.8 The concept of self-determination allowed Indigenous peoples 
to identify as culturally distinct from the settler colonial societies in which 
3  Leon, ‘Memories’, 17, 19.
4  Maynard, Fight, 53–54; Foley, ‘Self-determination’, 18.
5  Anderson, ‘Introduction’, 18; Attwood, Rights, 279, 330.
6  McGregor, Indifferent, 163–82; Attwood, Rights, 343; Martinez, ‘Problematising’, 140.
7  McGregor, ‘Another’, 345.
8  Foley, ‘Self-determination’, 17.
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they lived, and to create political institutions that promoted their specific 
interests.9 In Australia, grassroot organisations, or ‘self-determination 
organisations’, such as the ALS and AMS, took the role of Aboriginal 
political institutions in the 1970s.10
As Aboriginal articulations of nationhood and arguments for self-
determination started to take form as part of Aboriginal political 
discourse, increasing numbers of Aboriginal people migrated from rural 
areas to urban centres in New South Wales and elsewhere in Australia. 
While in 1950 around 3,000 Aboriginal people lived in Sydney, estimates 
of Sydney’s Aboriginal population ranged from 14,000 to over 20,000 
by 1976.11 Many Aboriginal people sought better employment and 
education opportunities in the city. Yet, they also faced discrimination 
and problems in health, education and housing, akin to the life they had 
hoped to escape.
Most Aboriginal people in Sydney lived in the inner-city suburbs of 
Redfern, Newtown, Glebe and St Peters.12 In fact, Aboriginal people 
defined ‘Redfern’ fluidly to include Waterloo, Alexandria and even 
Newtown.13 Inner Sydney, in the vicinity of Central Station, was attractive 
for its easy access to public transport and its location near the central 
business district. There was also employment available in local industry, 
for example at the Eveleigh Railway Yards. Furthermore, many Aboriginal 
migrants found support and accommodation with family and kin already 
living in the inner city. Since Aboriginal people were largely excluded from 
mainstream welfare benefits in Australia until the 1960s,14 they also relied 
on the local welfare organisations. One such support base was the Redfern 
All Blacks Rugby League Club, which symbolised resistance for the whole 
Aboriginal community and challenged the contemporary discourses of 
assimilation. As a model of Indigenous self-help it also advanced the 
welfare of the community.15 
9  Weaver, ‘Self-determination’, 53.
10  Foley, ‘Self-determination’, 17.
11  Wait cited in Morgan, Unsettled Places, 47; Broome, Aboriginal Australians, 173–74; Foley, 
‘An Autobiographical’, 94, 132.
12  Beasley, ‘The Aboriginal’, 137–39; Department of Health, Workshop on Aboriginal Medical 
Services, 65.
13  Chicka Dixon, interviewed by the author, La Perouse, 26 June 2000.
14  Sanders, ‘Citizenship’, 142; Cass, ‘Contested’, 100–101.
15  Hartley, ‘Black, White’, 154–59.
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Although in the middle of an affluent city, Redfern was poverty stricken 
and even described as a slum in the contemporary media.16 Local welfare 
organisation South Sydney Community Aid reported that Redfern had 
the ‘heaviest concentration of Aboriginal population, living in the worst 
housing conditions’.17 Finding accommodation was difficult because 
landlords were hesitant to rent to Indigenous people. The housing they 
were able to find was poor and crowded; consequently, twice as many 
people occupied Indigenous residences compared to the regional average. 
Aboriginal people suffered from diverse health problems; for example, 
high infant mortality and malnutrition among Aboriginal children.18 
The police maintained an unofficial curfew on the streets of Redfern, 
and so violent was the harassment that, in the early 1970s, visiting New 
Zealand anthropologist Leith Duncan deemed it a calculated attempt 
to break down Aboriginal resistance to assimilation in Redfern.19 Yet, it 
had the opposite effect, shaping a stronger sense of a distinct and shared 
Aboriginal identity in Sydney. 
In response to this wide range of socio-economic challenges, Aboriginal 
activists set up Aboriginal-controlled organisations providing welfare 
services by Aboriginal people for Aboriginal people. These organisations 
provided free, culturally specific services, thereby overcoming the 
difficulties preventing Aboriginal people from seeking help from 
mainstream services. As Foley noted, ‘since we got started doing things 
for ourselves, we’ve got Legal Service, Medical Service, we’ve got survival 
programs, we’re providing services for the community’.20
In establishing their organisations, Aboriginal activists adopted ideas of 
Black Power, which for Indigenous peoples in the Pacific embodied a form 
of decolonisation.21 Gary Williams, co-founder of the Tent Embassy 
and the first vice-president of the Aboriginal Legal Service, emphasised 
that Black Power was not about violence, but about reclaiming power 
to pressure the government to meet demands from Aboriginal people. 
He further explained Black Power as ‘a statement that we are finding our 
16  ‘Rats and Water in Aborigines’ Homes’ Sydney Slums’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September 
1964, 4.
17  University of New South Wales (UNSW) Archives, Hollows, 97A48/69.
18  W.D. Scott & Co., Problems, 6-37, 8-3, 8-11; Beasley, ‘The Aboriginal’, 184–86.
19  Duncan cited in Howell, ‘Black Power’, 68.
20  Cavadini, Ningla A’Na.
21  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 197.
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own feet and want to control our own lives in our own way’.22 Black Power 
helped Aboriginal people to undermine the sense of powerlessness they 
experienced and to take control of their lives, politically, economically, 
socially and ideologically.23 
The Aboriginal Legal Service (ALS), set up in 1970, is perhaps the most 
famous example of the influence of Black Power ideology in Redfern. 
Inspired by the Black Panthers’ ‘pig patrols’, young Aboriginal activists 
such as Gary Foley, Gary Williams and Paul Coe started to record and 
confront the police for using unnecessary violence and indiscriminately 
arresting Aboriginal people. Once established with a shopfront office, 
the ALS, with the support of non-Indigenous volunteer lawyers, made 
legal representation accessible to Aboriginal people for the first time. The 
Aboriginal Medical Service (AMS) soon followed in 1971. It was initiated 
by Gordon Briscoe, a field officer for the ALS, and Shirley Smith, a highly 
respected member of the Sydney Indigenous community who worked 
with Aboriginal prisoners. Murawina Preschool and Childcare Service 
started as the breakfast program run from the AMS in 1972. Aboriginal 
women took full control of the program in early 1973, forming Murawina 
to target the disadvantages that Aboriginal children faced in education. 
The Black Theatre, ‘the cultural spearhead’ of the Aboriginal movement, 
had its first performance in 1972.24 The Aboriginal Housing Company 
(AHC) answered the desperate need for Aboriginal-controlled housing 
and strengthened the geographic base for Aboriginal people in inner 
Sydney. It was set up by Aboriginal activists and their supporters, such as 
Bob and Kaye Bellear and Father Ted Kennedy from the local St Vincent’s 
Presbytery in 1973.
All these Redfern Aboriginal organisations lobbied for Aboriginal self-
determination and argued for their right to have control over their 
operations. Foley explained in a contemporary newspaper interview: 
‘We always see ourselves in the context of the political struggle because 
we’re simply an extension of that struggle, working in a positive way to 
ease the plight of the people we are politically working for’.25 While access 
to culturally appropriate services was Aboriginal organisations’ initial and 
central aim, they all also extended their activities beyond service delivery. 
22  ‘Interview with Gary Williams’, Arena 6, September 1973, 22.
23  Lothian, ‘A Blackward’, 9, 50.
24  Bob Maza in Cavadini, Ningla A’Na.
25  Prokopovich, ‘Aboriginal Health’, 8.
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For example, the members of the AMS emphasised the need to alleviate 
poverty as it led to poor nutrition and hygiene, substandard housing and 
lack of clean water, all of which contributed to poor health. They also 
pointed to police violence and colonisation as causes of ill health and 
noted the impossibility of taking care of Aboriginal health ‘without being 
drawn in to the many, [v]aried, and serious other problems suffered by the 
community’.26 In response to this diversity of problems, the organisations 
(the Black Theatre included) employed field officers to address social and 
economic disadvantage in the community.27 Paul Coe later reflected that 
Aboriginal field officers were a way to reintroduce Aboriginal cultural 
structures in their practice.28
Community building and strengthening urban Indigenous identity were 
also important elements of Aboriginal activism for self-determination in 
Redfern. As Paul Coe stated, the revitalisation of Aboriginal culture was 
the ‘only possible means of counteracting the present government policy 
of assimilation’.29 The Black Theatre assumed a central role in this process 
through its theatre and dance performances as well as workshops and art 
exhibitions.30 However, other Aboriginal organisations also affirmed the 
shared identity of Aboriginal people, who had migrated from different 
parts of New South Wales and elsewhere in Australia to live in inner 
Sydney. Murawina women working with Aboriginal children expressed 
their hope that ‘we Aboriginal mothers can at last provide our children 
with a strong identity and an opportunity for both mothers and 
children to be part of an Aboriginal dream of self-determination’.31 The 
medical service wanted to improve Aboriginal self-esteem by developing 
their cultural identity and thus improve Aboriginal health. For example, 
the AMS organised a display of Aboriginal material culture in celebration 
of Aboriginality.32 Furthermore, the mere existence of Aboriginal services 
run and staffed by Aboriginal people affirmed Indigenous identity as they 
became established in the urban streetscape.
26  UNSW Archives, Hollows, 97A48/69.
27  National Archives of Australia (NAA) C1696/10, R76/59 and R76/4; Lester Bostock interviewed 
by the author, Marrickville, 14 December 2000.
28  Coe, ‘The Early’, 30.
29  Coe cited in Tatz, Black Viewpoints, 105.
30  NAA C1696/10, R76/36.
31  NAA C1696/10, R76/2.
32  NAA C1696/10, R76/59; UNSW Archives, Hollows, 97A48/66.
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Although Aboriginal organisations such as the AMS in Sydney drew 
mainly from pan-Aboriginal identity, rather than a territorial base, in their 
justification for self-determination, as Maria John discusses elsewhere in 
this book, there was a territorial element to Aboriginal self-determination 
in Redfern. The geographic location of the organisations in the heart of 
Redfern was significant for the developing sense of community among 
the local Aboriginal people. For example, Coe envisioned in 1972 that 
he and other Aboriginal people in Redfern were working towards an 
Aboriginal village in the centre of Sydney. He suggested that this could be 
achieved with government funding paid as compensation for the effects 
of colonisation, particularly the loss of land. Coe described ‘an Aboriginal 
type of village, where … you have Aboriginal controlled community, both 
politically and economically’.33 The AHC, bordered by Louis, Eveleigh, 
Caroline and Vine streets, with its design around Aboriginal communal 
living, was the most salient aspect of this vision of an Aboriginal village 
and the territorial element of self-determination in Redfern.
Aboriginal activists in Redfern continued to frame their desire for 
Aboriginal control as self-help in the 1970s, following the earlier approach 
of organisations such as the Redfern All Blacks.34 Norma Williams noted 
in 1975 that ‘self-help is our object’ when describing the importance 
of Aboriginal volunteer staff in supporting Murawina’s non-Indigenous 
teaching staff.35 However, emphasis on Aboriginal self-help now aligned 
with contemporary social radicalism and a new understanding of self-help 
designed to empower people on a collective level to manage their own 
affairs, rather than the older and more conservative idea of self-help that 
advocated individual and family responsibility as a means of cutting public 
cost and responsibility.36 Importantly, a more progressive understanding 
of self-help supported Aboriginal control and demanded public funding 
to support Aboriginal empowerment, while at the same time, strategically, 
the rhetoric of self-help continued to appeal to the potentially more 
conservative sections of their non-Indigenous support base, such as the 
150 barristers who volunteered to roster with the ALS in 1971.37 After 
the Tent Embassy protest with its call for self-determination and land 
rights, and the election of the Whitlam Government, the rhetoric of self-
33  Coe, in Coe and Sykes, ‘Monday Conference’, 146.
34  NAA C1696/10, R76/4; NAA C1696/10, R76/59.
35  Gare, ‘Aboriginal Woman’, 50.
36  Lane, ‘The History’, 7.
37  NAA C1696/10, R76/4.
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help, however, started to give way to that of self-determination in Redfern 
Aboriginal organisations. Murawina had expressed its wish to be part of 
‘an Aboriginal dream of self-determination’ in 1974,38 while Bobbi Sykes, 
a Redfern-based Black activist who also worked for the AMS, stated that 
Aboriginal organisations: ‘Have tremendous political function … they 
are the Blacks working to alleviate their own problems – the power of 
self-destiny – the power of self-determination’.39
In response to Aboriginal calls for control and self-determination, the 
Whitlam Government introduced a policy of self-determination once it 
came to power in December 1972. It also established a Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs (DAA, replacing the Office of Aboriginal Affairs) and 
boosted its budget by $13 million in early 1973.40 Aboriginal organisations 
in Redfern were among the first to experience this new policy in practice. 
They benefited from the generous funding and from some weaknesses in 
government oversight during the early stages of the self-determination 
policy. The DAA, for example, gave advance payments of the entire 
allocation and policed audits loosely, which allowed Aboriginal activists to 
take greater control of their organisations and to expand their operations 
more than was intended by the government and its officials. Thus, 
Redfern Aboriginal organisations were able to achieve, to a limited extent, 
self-determination as they defined it under the Whitlam Government.41
However, it soon became apparent that the Labor Government and 
Aboriginal activists in Redfern had different views of the aims and delivery 
of self-determination policy.42 The DAA was ultimately accountable 
to their minister and parliament, rather than to Aboriginal people. 
Following formal scrutiny of the DAA operations and the auditor-
general’s supplementary report in 1974, it established funding structures 
and started to apply stricter financial controls on organisations, such 
as mandatory quarterly reports.43 Furthermore, DAA officials saw self-
determination as limited to Aboriginal control in service delivery, and 
already in 1973 criticised the ALS for not limiting their activities to legal 
38  NAA C1696/10, R76/2.
39  Sykes, ‘Bobbi Sykes Talks’, 6.
40  Long, ‘The Commonwealth’, 110.
41  Perheentupa, ‘Whitlam’.
42  Gillian Cowlishaw makes similar observation in relations to self-determination as policy and 
practice in Rembarringa, Northern Territory. Cowlishaw, ‘Erasing Culture’, 163.
43  Rowse, Remote, 6–7.
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aid.44 As the 1970s progressed, the DAA increasingly sought to curtail 
the organisations’ spending and limit their activities to what the DAA 
considered to be within their field of operations.
DAA officials saw self-determination policy ultimately as a solution to 
Aboriginal disadvantage that would elevate Aboriginal people to an equal 
level with the mainstream population. In this they followed their minister’s 
framing of self-determination policy with heavy emphasis on its ability 
to work towards equality. For Gordon Bryant, ‘the basic object of my 
Government’s policy is to restore to the Aboriginal people of Australia their 
lost power of self-determination in economic, social and political affairs’; he 
referred to a statement Prime Minister Whitlam had given to a conference 
of Commonwealth and state ministers in Aboriginal affairs in Adelaide in 
April 1973.45 This was to be achieved, Whitlam had stated, by:
Encouraging and assisting Aboriginal groups and incorporated 
organisations in the metropolitan areas and groups and 
communities in the Central Australian and other reserves to 
develop their own programs and to manage their own affairs.46 
Whitlam’s definition of self-determination had the potential to align 
with Indigenous views. However, his statement did not clearly frame 
‘self-determination’ in the context of Indigenous rights and, when 
executing the policy, as Bryant explained in July 1973:
Our programs are designed to restore to the Aboriginal people 
their lost power of self-determination, their self-respect and 
dignity. They are designed to eliminate their handicaps in health, 
housing, education and vocational training and to promote 
their enjoyment of civil liberties and remove remaining laws 
discrimination against them.47
Thus, even if self-determination policy was clearly a shift from the policy 
of assimilation, in that it supported the continuity of Aboriginal cultures 
and Aboriginal people as distinct from the settler colonial population 
with different needs, it was set up as a policy with a strong emphasis on 
elimination of disadvantage, rather than to assure the right of Indigenous 
peoples to self-determination.
44  Aboriginal Legal Service, Conference.
45  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 April 1974, Question no. 437, 
Gordon Bryant.
46  Whitlam, ‘Aboriginals’, 3.
47  Bryant, ‘Government Policy’, 899.
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Framing self-determination in the context of Aboriginal disadvantage 
rather than Indigenous rights made it vulnerable to being viewed as 
temporary in the inner city, where Indigenous people could not demand 
self-determination on a territorial or linguistic basis. Bryant likened self-
determination policy to pre-existing policies and legislation that targeted 
disadvantage, such as those governing aged pensions, widowed pensions 
and child endowment.48 He also justified the establishment of the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs on the high level of need of Aboriginal 
people, whom he considered special citizens, similar to veterans, needing 
departmental advocates.49 However, unlike the financial support required 
by pensioners or persons with disability, Aboriginal disadvantage could 
arguably cease to exist, and thus would end the rationale for supporting 
Aboriginal self-determination policy.
The tendency to see self-determination policy as temporary, and as one 
of several possible policy approaches, was reflected in the early threats to 
mainstream the services under the Whitlam Government. Jim Cavanagh, 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs after Bryant, raised the possibility of an 
alternative service to the ALS in New South Wales in November 1974.50 
Barrie Dexter, Secretary of the DAA, in his letter to Kevin Martin, Regional 
Director of the DAA, in November 1975, considered that the Australian 
Legal Aid Office could provide an alternative to the ALS. He wrote:
Even if the Aboriginal Legal Service were, as it threatened, to close 
down when funds run out, I have no doubt that we could provide 
an adequate service to NSW Aboriginals without it – and indeed 
such a situation would be advantageous to us.51 
Dexter noted in 1975 that the self-determination policy’s rationale was 
to allow Aboriginal communities to decide the pace and nature of their 
development within the government framework, but this development was 
to take place within ‘the legal, social and economic restraints of Australian 
society’.52 Dexter’s definition of self-determination emphasised the way in 
which he felt accountable to the Australian public for administering the 
policy of self-determination and defining its limits.
48  Bryant cited in Nettheim, Aborigines Human Rights, 156.
49  Rowse, Obliged, 111.
50  NAA C1696/10, R76/4.
51  NAA C1696/10, R76/4.
52  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 320.
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Redfern activists felt that ‘the Labour [sic] Government has betrayed 
the Black Community’, and they protested against the government’s 
interpretation of self-determination policy and control by the DAA in 
1974, when they re-established the Aboriginal Tent Embassy on the 
Lawns of Parliament House.53 For Aboriginal people, the crucial areas of 
policy were ‘self-determination and land rights’, according to a statement 
released by a Redfern-based Organisation for Aboriginal Unity at the 
time.54 The statement further claimed that neither ‘Black people nor 
their representatives have any say in the funding or its allocations’, and 
demanded a greater role for Aboriginal people in making decisions. 
Gordon Briscoe, who had been involved with both the ALS and the AMS, 
criticised the restrictiveness of government policy in 1975: ‘anything that 
has the slightest suggestions of policies of “a nation within a nation”, 
or “self-determination”, or “Black Power”, or “separation”, is rejected’ 
by governments.55 As far as the Indigenous activists were concerned, 
their organisations were an avenue towards a lasting Aboriginal self-
determination, not merely a pathway to equality with the mainstream 
population. In his memoir, Briscoe reflected that: ‘In the 1920s [self-
determination] meant “the rights of nations” and in the 1970s it meant the 
“rights of Indigenous peoples and decolonised groups”’.56 Accordingly, 
the Redfern organisations took part in the continuing Aboriginal resistance 
to colonisation and were accountable to Aboriginal people.57 
In their correspondence with government, Redfern organisations 
emphasised their demand for Aboriginal control of their operations. 
The ALS 1974 submission underlined the role of government in funding 
the organisation, while asserting full independence in its operations: 
We see the venture as a joint enterprise in which the Government 
contributes the necessary funds and the ALS contributes the 
necessary organisation, know-how, experience, professional 
expertise, drive, enthusiasm, identification with Aborigines, and 
independence.58 
53  UNSW, Hollows, 97A48/69.
54  UNSW, Hollows, 97A48/69. Organisation for Aboriginal (or Black) Unity comprised of AHC, 
Black Theatre, the AMS and ALS (NAA C1696/10, R76/4).
55  Briscoe cited in Tatz, Black Viewpoints, 100.
56  Briscoe, Racial Folly, 177.
57  Briscoe, ‘Aboriginal Health’, 16.
58  NAA C1696/10, R76/4.
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Accordingly, Aboriginal organisations in Redfern resisted DAA officials’ 
attempts to supervise and monitor spending; for example, by not 
submitting all reports required by the DAA. They treated government 
funding as compensation for colonisation and thought of it as Aboriginal 
money.59 Redfern organisations also resisted government attempts to limit 
their operation to service delivery and continued to pursue a wider role in 
serving their community.
The DAA under the Whitlam Government was not entirely opposed 
to the idea of the revitalisation of Aboriginal culture in the city. It saw, 
for example, the development of the Black Theatre and an urban 
arts program as vital to Aboriginal people in Redfern. Barrie Dexter 
specifically hoped that a cultural centre would help to solve problems 
of alcohol abuse and violence in the inner-city area.60 Thus, the DAA’s 
emphasis was on alleviating social disadvantage via cultural revitalisation, 
effected only through the operation of a cultural centre. Meanwhile, from 
the government’s perspective the AHC provided solutions to Aboriginal 
housing problems, but it also fitted the popular rhetoric of ‘slum clearance’ 
that the government had adopted.
While sharing a struggle for self-determination, the Aboriginal 
organisations in Redfern differed in the way they responded to the 
opportunities and challenges of the DAA’s self-determination policy. 
The ALS had a unique position compared to the other organisations in 
Redfern. Together with other Aboriginal legal services in Australia, it had 
responsibility for providing free legal representation for Aboriginal people 
as pledged by the Whitlam Government.61 However, as the government 
did not yet have funding structures in place, the ALS in Redfern seized the 
opportunity to expand its operations to other parts of New South Wales. 
It refused to seek government permission for the resulting expenses, 
submit to government conditions or negotiate the limits of its activities 
with government. 
The medical service, like the ALS, expanded the kinds of services it offered 
under the government’s self-determination policy. However, the DAA 
rejected its plans to operate statewide, preferring to fund separate medical 
services in different parts of New South Wales. Members of the AMS 
59  NAA C1696/10, R76/4; NAA C1696/10, R79/16.
60  NAA C1696/10, R76/36.
61  Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Aboriginal Legal Service’.
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protested at the way the DAA controlled its activities. Naomi Mayers, the 
administrator of the AMS, wrote in her correspondence to the DAA in 
May 1975: ‘I feel that the AMS seems to be banging its head against a brick 
wall whenever we submit for funds to enlarge our activities’.62 There were 
at least two possible reasons why the DAA opposed AMS plans to expand 
outside Redfern, while it funded the ALS’s statewide operations. First, the 
AMS competed for funding with the state’s mainstream health services 
that also arguably serviced Aboriginal people, while the ALS was the only 
legal service available to Aboriginal people. Second, the DAA perhaps 
wanted to limit the influence of the Sydney-based Aboriginal activists 
in other parts of New South Wales. Thus, the DAA also prevented the 
AMS from becoming as powerful an organisation as the ALS, which DAA 
officials had difficulty in making comply with government requirements 
and regulations.
The DAA also expected the AMS, unlike the ALS, to do voluntary 
fundraising to support its activities. The AMS became very efficient at 
fundraising and used the independent funding to set up medical services 
elsewhere in New South Wales, thus circumventing DAA control. 
In 1975, the AMS financed the opening of a clinic at Mt Druitt and was 
also directly involved in setting up a medical service at Kempsey.63
Reliance on donations and non-Indigenous supporters who volunteered 
their time and expertise, however, made the AMS dependent on its 
non-Indigenous supporters, doctors and other medical practitioners, to 
a different degree than the ALS. Thus, it was important that AMS members 
defined Aboriginal control in such a way that it allowed cooperation with 
non-Indigenous people. Individual non-Indigenous supporters, such as 
Fred Hollows, who respected the principles of Aboriginal control and 
the AMS’s desire for self-determination, remained active members of the 
AMS throughout the 1970s. Hollows, a professor of ophthalmology at 
the University of New South Wales, assisted in setting up the service and 
became its medical director. The ALS, however, did not rely on donations 
or volunteer lawyers and legal practitioners once it started to receive 
funding under the Whitlam Government. It decided to exclude non-
Indigenous people from its council membership in 1974 and, later, in 
1975, they were also excluded from attending council meetings.64
62  NAA C1696/10, R76/59.
63  NAA C1696/10, R76/59; AMS Newsletter, no. 16, June 1975, 3.
64  ML MSS 6222/1, Vivienne Abraham papers.
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With the election of the Liberal Government in December 1975, and 
in line with its principle of small government, federal Aboriginal affairs 
policy shifted from self-determination to ‘self-management’. Once DAA 
officials started to further emphasise accountability, Aboriginal activists 
strengthened their call for self-determination while opposing the changes 
in government policy. However, as before, the organisations responded 
differently to the challenges presented by the changes to government 
policy. The ALS continued to refuse to provide the DAA with financial 
reports or report on its activities. Nor did it follow its budget or the DAA 
guidelines. The ALS was able to maintain this position for two more 
years, as there were no alternative legal services available for Aboriginal 
people and the DAA was unwilling to fund breakaway Aboriginal legal 
services. Coe reflected confidence in the ALS’s position in his letter to 
Ian Viner, then minister for Aboriginal affairs, in 1977: ‘your depriving 
us of funds leaves us no option other than to close office immediately 
leaving the Aboriginal community to your tender mercies. All clients of 
the service will be referred to you personally’.65 However, later in 1977 
the government decided to fund three breakaway legal services in different 
parts of New South Wales, thus limiting the ALS’s power to decide its 
own agenda and to resist DAA control.
The AMS, unlike the ALS, provided the DAA with the minimum 
necessary information to fulfil government requirements of accountability 
and to assure continued funding. In their negotiations with government, 
the AMS, like the other Aboriginal organisations, ultimately tried to 
maximise their level of funding and the level of Aboriginal control under 
changing government policies, maintaining the argument that funding 
for Aboriginal organisations was compensation. Bobbi Sykes stated 
in the Aboriginal Medical Service Newsletter in 1977: ‘funding of Black 
organizations should not be considered an act of charity – compensating 
the Black community for historical land loss would merely be an act of 
JUSTICE’.66 The same year, the DAA listed the AMS, together with the 
ALS and Murawina, among the most politically sensitive organisations 
with which the DAA Area Office had dealings. DAA officials disapproved 
of the way these organisations employed ‘radical’ Aboriginal activists who 
used the organisations for political purposes.67 The government’s views 
65  NAA C1696/10, R76/4.
66  AMS Newsletter, October 1977, 2.
67  NAA C1696/10, R76/59.
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about the management of Aboriginal affairs had drifted even further away 
from the idea of self-determination advocated by Redfern Aboriginal 
organisations.
Although the Aboriginal organisations in Redfern started as ‘self-help’ 
organisations relying on non-Indigenous support, self-determination 
became their defining principle once the Whitlam Government came to 
power. However, the Aboriginal view of self-determination differed from 
that introduced by the Whitlam Government and its Department of 
Aboriginal Affairs. Aboriginal activists in Redfern argued for Aboriginal 
control of their organisations based on their rights as Indigenous peoples 
and, with the means available and in their multiple ways, strove to establish 
the organisations as long-term elements of community governance and 
platforms for political activism. They tended to see government funding 
as compensation for colonisation. Meanwhile, the government ultimately 
saw self-determination policy as a way to address Aboriginal disadvantage 
and achieve equal opportunity. Its framing of self-determination policy 
in the context of Indigenous disadvantage, rather than as Indigenous 
rights, set it up as reliant on public funding and opinion, and thus as 
potentially temporary. While the Liberal Government’s shift to a policy of 
self-management further undermined the organisations’ autonomy, they 
nonetheless continued to fight for their own views of self-determination 
and to maintain control over their operations.
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Indigenous health and self-determination 
in an age of urbanisation
Maria John
This chapter examines how Indigenous peoples in the United States and 
Australia worked out the potential for their self-determination beyond 
claims to land or territory – that is, in the pursuit of self-governance over 
two interconnected realms: health services and individual bodily health. 
In doing so, the chapter seeks to make a case for the significant role 
played by urban Indigenous health struggles in reframing and reshaping 
the broader project of Indigenous self-determination in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.
In the context of past and continuing colonisation, the political projects 
of sovereignty and self-determination have long been touchstones for 
Indigenous communities. One might assume, however, that these terms 
have come to hold special (and potentially new) significance over the last 
30 years or so. Within Indigenous political discourse, the language of 
sovereignty was invoked almost exclusively in relation to legal and territorial 
claims until around the 1990s, but even a cursory glance at recent protest 
placards from Indigenous political rallies across the globe, or at new 
monograph titles containing the word ‘sovereignty’ within Indigenous 
studies, reveals a vastly broadened discourse around this term. Diverse 
conceptual sovereignties including cultural, intellectual, visual and sexual, 
to name a few, have now become prevalent within Indigenous studies. For 
instance, in her important work theorising ‘visual sovereignty’, Michelle 
Raheja (Seneca) defines this as a ‘creative act of self-representation that 
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has the potential to both undermine stereotypes of Indigenous peoples 
and to strengthen … the intellectual “health” of communities in the wake 
of genocide and colonialism’.1 In one of the fastest growing research areas 
within Indigenous studies, scholars and communities are defining ‘food 
sovereignty’ as ‘the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate 
food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and 
their right to define their own food and agriculture systems’.2
In part, I think these changes reveal that, in recent decades, there has 
been some blending of the terms ‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’. 
They are often used interchangeably. More than this, however, we are also 
seeing that what increasingly is meant by ‘sovereignty’ is self-determination 
because self-determination can refer to matters of ownership, control and 
access. Within Indigenous politics, self-determination is commonly 
understood as a right Indigenous communities and individuals have to 
determine their economic, social and cultural development. Illustrating 
the ways in which self-determination has become central to Indigenous 
peoples’ ideas about, and practices of, sovereignty, we might note that 
a seminal 2005 monograph edited by Indigenous Studies scholar Joanne 
Barker (Lenape) blends the terms sovereignty and self-determination 
even within the book’s title: Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation 
and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination.3 In her 
Introduction Barker explains:
Following World War II, sovereignty emerged not as a new but as 
a particularly valued term within indigenous political discourses 
to signify a multiplicity of legal and social rights to political, 
economic, and cultural self-determination … It has come to mark 
the complexities of global indigenous efforts to reverse ongoing 
experiences of colonialism as well as to signify local efforts at the 
reclamation of specific territories, resources, governments, and 
cultural knowledge and practices.4
While Barker is also rightly at pains to emphasise that not all Indigenous 
peoples share ‘the same understanding of what sovereignty is or how 
it matters’, her discernment that sovereignty has come to encompass 
both legal and social rights to self-determination in multiple realms 
1  Raheja, ‘Reading Nanook’s’, 1161.
2  Nyéléni, ‘Declaration of Nyéléni’, Forum for Food Sovereignty, 27 February 2007, accessed 
15 August 2020, nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290.
3  Barker, Sovereignty.
4  Barker, Sovereignty, 1.
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(economic, cultural, etc.) and, crucially, to refer to the conjoined projects 
of reversing (ongoing experiences of colonialism) and reclaiming (specific 
resources, lands, practices, etc.), underscores not only the very broad 
contexts in which sovereignty is now a meaningful concept and project 
for Indigenous peoples, but also the very central role that a principle of 
self-determination plays within this expanded pursuit of sovereignty.
And while it would be another two years before the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was signed 
in 2007, given the centrality of the language of ‘self-determination’ within 
that document, it is important to clarify here that the model of self-
determination established by the declaration sits at odds with the much 
broader visions of sovereignty and self-determination to which I refer in 
this chapter, and which are discussed by Barker (and by others). As many 
critics of the declaration point out, a close reading of the rights protected 
by the UNDRIP shows that they are both less powerful than they appear 
and that they are limited and superseded by the human rights framework 
in which  they are embedded. Legal scholar Karen Engle expresses this 
last problem succinctly when noting that the Indigenous right to self-
determination recognised by the UNDRIP takes the form of ‘a collective 
human rights demand rather than a  claim for statehood’.5 While the 
document has been lauded by many for its recognition of collective rights, 
the right to culture, and self-determination for Indigenous peoples, it is also 
heavily critiqued for not doing enough. Most problematically, it was clear 
the UN system actively sought to adopt a stance of ambiguity towards the 
meaning of self-determination as specifically applied to Indigenous peoples. 
The result has been that the declaration is clear in limiting its recognition 
of Indigenous self-determination to ‘internal’ matters only, stating: the 
right to self-determination guarantees only ‘the right to autonomy or 
self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs’.6 This 
language makes it clear that strong forms of Indigenous self-determination, 
which might threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-
states, would not be recognised or protected by the United Nations.
In contrast, the melding of the political language and goals of sovereignty 
and self-determination, which I seek to address in this chapter, includes 
within the wider purview of an ‘expanded’ sovereignty, the goals of 
reversing and reclaiming as described above. While the sovereignty and 
5  Engle, ‘On Fragile’, 148.
6  United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, at Article 4.
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self-determination of which Barker speaks are not exclusively or even 
primarily about these two goals (goals that certainly might be seen to more 
explicitly challenge the sovereignty of nation-states), the fact that reversing 
and reclaiming are a part of Indigenous peoples’ projects of sovereignty 
and self-determination means we must understand this in a different light 
to the kind of self-determination expressed within the UNDRIP. One 
might even speculate that the recent rise in the use of the language of 
‘sovereignty’ has been a strategy to escape the limitations of the UNDRIP. 
Within this chapter, I distill the strengthening conceptual tie between 
sovereignty and self-determination into the idea that both concepts have 
become increasingly interchangeable, since both are increasingly used, 
most crucially, to refer to the ability to be self-governing (understood 
broadly). This is the core of the many different ways in which Indigenous 
political actors and theorists are invoking sovereignty in new ways and in 
new contexts. 
The shift towards something more closely resembling self-determination 
when speaking of sovereignty, and the frequent interchange we now see 
between these terms, should also be understood against another key 
development. That is, a critique that argues for the necessity of rewriting 
or ‘decolonising’ the concept of sovereignty within Indigenous political 
discourse. As the critique goes, the concept of sovereignty (and the 
modern nation-state) is rooted in European monarchies, hierarchical 
power structures and traditions of jurisprudence. As such, because 
these kinds of governing structures were typically foreign to Indigenous 
peoples, sovereignty is said to be ill-suited to their political conceptions of 
community. Mohawk activist and scholar Taiaiake Alfred is an oft-cited 
proponent of this critique, calling for the rejection of state sovereigntist 
discourse in Indigenous politics because of its connection to European 
colonialism:
The next phase of scholarship and activism, then, will need 
to transcend the mentality that supports the colonisation of 
Indigenous nations, beginning with the rejection of the term and 
notion of Indigenous sovereignty.7 
In this sense, one might again speculate that the recent rise in the use 
of the language of self-determination when discussing ‘sovereignty’ has 
also been a strategy to escape the colonial implications of traditional 
‘sovereigntist’ discourse.
7  Alfred, ‘Sovereignty’, 39–40.
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Although such critiques might help us understand the supplanting, or 
at least the converging of sovereignty talk with the language and goals of 
self-determination, this shift has not been universally accepted. Influential 
scholar and activist Vine Deloria Jr (Standing Rock Sioux), for instance, 
memorably critiqued the growing ubiquity of the concept of sovereignty 
within Indigenous politics and its straying from non-legal matters: ‘Today 
the definition of sovereignty covers a multitude of sins, having lost its 
political moorings, and now is adrift on the currents of individual fancy’.8
My interest in this convergence and expansion of the ways in which 
Indigenous peoples, scholars and communities are engaging with concepts 
of sovereignty and self-determination is, in the first instance, less about 
what has been gained or lost in this endeavour. As a historian, I seek to 
bring to light the lived experiences and historical contexts out of which 
this discursive and political reconfiguring has emerged. In particular, my 
attention is drawn to a neglected context in which the language of self-
determination has always been central to Indigenous political struggles: 
health. Health and medical contexts also emerge as a logical place to 
look for the political configurations around contemporary Indigenous 
claims to self-determination and sovereignty once we recognise the 
potent ways in which health statistics have steadily become one of the 
starkest means of illustrating levels of historical and continuing injustice 
experienced by Indigenous peoples in places like the United States, 
Canada and Australia. This chapter considers recent rearticulations of 
Indigenous self-determination and sovereignty within health contexts by 
Indigenous  communities in settler states. In particular, I ask what the 
example of urban Indigenous community-controlled health services in 
the  United States and Australia can tell us about a new and distinctly 
urban, non-territorial form of Indigenous self-determination that emerged 
in these nations during the 1970s. What happens to our understanding 
of self-determination if we attempt to decentre, or if we look beyond, 
land claims?
I compare the establishment of the Seattle Indian Health Board (Seattle) 
and the Aboriginal Medical Service (AMS) (Sydney) in this chapter, as 
these clinics were among the first Indigenous community-controlled 
health services in their respective national contexts, and formed in 
response to similar struggles. Although they did embrace a diasporic and 
8  Deloria, ‘Intellectual’, 26–27.
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multiethnic vision of the future (marking a distinct departure from forms 
of Indigenous political community that formed the basis of sovereignty 
claims in the past), I argue that the ideals of self-determination these clinics 
represented were not inconsistent with forms of sovereignty pursued by 
Indigenous communities tied to traditional homelands. By considering 
the political discourse and the events from which these clinics emerged, 
we see that the activists who created these health services, and who 
advocated for a model of self-determination distinct from land claims, 
stood in solidarity with rural and urban traditional landowners, even as 
they argued for the urgency of reimagining the project of Indigenous self-
determination as governance over social services. The history and legacy of 
these two health organisations becomes, I argue, a vivid example of how 
Indigenous people reconfigured the terrain upon which their claims to 
sovereignty and self-determination (understood as self-governance) could 
be pursued.
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will first trace the origins 
of the Seattle Indian Health Board and the AMS. Though having little 
direct connection to each other at the time of their founding, I suggest 
these clinics might nonetheless be understood within the same historical 
frame given the political struggles and health crises that led to their 
development. Finally, by making a case for the importance of recognising 
the simultaneous emergence of these separate clinics as markers of a 
shared historical and political experience, this chapter uses their histories 
to foreground a view of Indigenous self-determination as a non-territorial 
project, and a transnational Indigenous response to government policies 
of urbanisation and assimilation pursued across settler states.
A catalyst for change: Indigenous 
urbanisation and a crisis of health 
care access
Beginning in 1970, in major US and Australian cities, urban Indigenous 
communities in places like Seattle, Minneapolis, Sydney and Melbourne, 
started establishing their own grassroots, community-controlled health 
services. These clinics aimed to provide free medical care by Native people, 
for Native people. To this day, Indigenous community-controlled health 
services are still operational. Health experts agree this model of healthcare 
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delivery has been transformative for the Indigenous communities they 
serve.9 Indeed, evidencing this, Indigenous community-controlled health 
services have grown steadily since the 1970s.10
Two of the first such clinics were established in Seattle and Sydney: the 
Seattle Indian Health Board in 1970 and the AMS just six months later, 
in 1971. In both cases urban Indigenous people faced a common issue 
of structural invisibility that prevented them from accessing mainstream 
health services. Two factors worked symbiotically to exclude urban 
Indigenous people in Seattle and Sydney from accessing medical care in 
all but emergency cases before 1970. On the one hand, free government 
healthcare afforded to Indigenous people as part of historic agreements 
applied only to Indigenous residents of reserves or reservations; a person 
thus effectively ‘lost’ their Indigenous rights to healthcare as soon as they 
moved off the reserve or reservation. On the other hand, mainstream 
doctors in cities often refused to treat Indigenous patients, either 
assuming they were entitled to free government services or on the basis 
of blatant racism and indifference. So common was this experience, 
a well-known joke referenced it in the American Indian community in 
Seattle during the 1960s. It concerned an urban Indian seeking a room 
at a hospital: ‘Did you hear the one about the Indian who couldn’t get 
a room? He didn’t have a reservation’.11 In short, in the postwar period, 
Indigenous people who relocated from rural to urban settings in both the 
United States and Australia (often at the government’s encouragement) 
were simultaneously forced into mainstream healthcare on the one hand 
while they were actively excluded from it on the other. By the 1950s and 
1960s, Indigenous people in cities were thus growing increasingly wary of 
mainstream health services because they were proving to be fruitless and 
inhospitable – often outright discriminatory – environments.
A comparison of this shared struggle across two different national contexts 
reveals a much larger political challenge faced by pan-Indigenous urban 
communities at this time: they were unable to gain federal government 
support and recognition as Indigenous peoples. As a result of moving into 
cities (and thereby ‘assimilating’), it was argued they had forfeited any 
9  Panaretto et al., ‘Aboriginal’, 650.
10  For example, 41 urban Indian health clinics now exist across the United States. In Australia, 
Indigenous community-controlled health services now serve both rural and urban populations, and 
thus a significantly higher number exist than in the US. There are 141 clinics currently operational 
in Australia.
11  Indian Center News, American Indian Women’s Service League (AIWSL), 3, no. 1, February 1963.
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rights to special treatment as Indigenous peoples. Put simply, when urban 
Indigenous communities in these cities tried to make their grievances and 
health struggles heard in the late 1960s, they were told by municipal 
and federal authorities alike that they could and should access mainstream 
health services like all other citizens, or else they should access resources 
set aside for other ‘minorities’. Not satisfied with being told they had 
essentially ‘lost’ their Indigenous rights and identities simply by virtue 
of relocating into cities, and not content to let the health issues of their 
communities worsen, activists in Seattle and Sydney alike were compelled 
by the early 1970s to take measures into their own hands. Pan-Aboriginal 
and pan-Indian activists therefore created their own free grassroots medical 
clinics run by, and exclusively for, their own people.
The stories of how these clinics got off the ground and eventually won 
government support are fascinating and inspiring, but too lengthy to be 
reproduced here. Instead, I turn to what these clinics stood for, what they 
hoped to create and/or change, and how we might be able to read them 
as evidence of a political vision that enlarges the traditional scholarly 
focus on the history of Indigenous self-determination as a land-centric 
political project.
Beyond land
In 1967, Seattle resident and Indigenous activist Pearl Warren (Makah) 
told a reporter from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer that, in striving to create 
a place where urban Indians could receive free social services from their 
own people, the city’s Indian community did not desire ‘a reservation 
right in the middle of town’. All they wanted was a place ‘where in our 
most vulnerable times of feeling unwell, we could feel free and proud to 
be ourselves’.12 Warren expressed a special regard for the importance of 
Indigenous people’s freedom simply to be Indigenous at all times and 
places, but most especially when they were not in good health. Rather 
than seek jurisdictional control over territory, Warren asserted they 
were pushing back an assimilationist agenda that encroached into even 
the most vulnerable and private moments in an Indigenous person’s 
life. The  creation of their own social services was seen to be essential 
in achieving this political goal. Soon after the opening of their Indian 
12  Pearl Warren in Bryant, ‘Loneliness Is the White Man’s City’, 51.
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(Cultural) Center, in 1965 Warren again underscored the significance 
of their own community services in a lengthy message to members of 
the Seattle Indian community: ‘For too long we have depended upon the 
non-Indians to do for us, the time has come when we must start doing 
more for ourselves and each other’.13
Compare Warren’s comments here with those made in Australia by 
celebrated Aboriginal activist Ruby Hammond (Ngarrindjeri). During 
the 1980s, Hammond wrote an op-ed for the Sydney Morning Herald 
reflecting on the close relationship between Aboriginal land rights and 
community-run health services. She lamented the difficulties encountered 
by Aboriginal activists and communities across Australia who were 
struggling to achieve land rights: ‘We are adapting every day. We have 
to adapt because we are living in a changing society’. And yet, precisely 
because of these challenges, she underscored the vital necessity of the 
work being done by Aboriginal health activists in cities: ‘But the only way 
we will survive is if we have community-based services’.14
Warren and Hammond both underscored a subtle but important 
difference between the politics of territorial sovereignty (or ‘land rights’ 
in Australian parlance) and the model of Indigenous sovereignty that 
I  suggest urban Indigenous health activists were striving to create with 
their medical services. Hammond’s and Warren’s comments call our 
attention to the ways we might read the actions of Indigenous activists 
in both nations as attempts to make an important distinction within 
the political project of Indigenous sovereignty, even if they were not 
yet using the language of self-determination. In their respective efforts 
to articulate and create a means by which their communities could start 
living in accordance  with their own political, cultural and social goals 
and needs, Warren and Hammond shared a commitment to the idea that 
Indigenous peoples in their respective communities had to be in charge 
of their own affairs – that is, be self-determining. Yet, the strategy each 
advocated for achieving this was not the acquisition of territory, but rather 
the creation of their own community-controlled services. In their focus on 
self-governance, self-control and self-reliance through their community 
services, Warren and Hammond both challenged the statist assumption 
13  Warren, ‘Pearl’s Message’, 2.
14  Hammond, ‘Land Rights: Key to Aboriginal Health’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1982. (Precise 
date unknown, but newspaper clipping can be found in Hannah Middleton Papers, ML MSS 5886, 
Box 7, New South Wales State Library, Sydney.)
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that legal monopoly over a territory must necessarily be the only or even 
most effective way by which a group collectively governs itself or, as we 
might say, achieves self-determination. In fact, the innovative character 
of their political ambitions is evident in how Warren and Hammond 
each proposed a new and different social mechanism that would allow 
Indigenous people who had no recourse to nationhood status or to land 
claims as a group (such as many people in cities), to nonetheless find 
ways to exist as a recognisable community, exercise self-governance and, 
eventually, make claims on the federal government for financial support. 
In Warren’s words, this could be achieved, not by creating a reservation 
in the middle of town, but by creating another kind of space that would 
allow Native people to practise their culture freely and to feel a sense 
of community, especially during difficult times. In Hammond’s words, 
this could be achieved explicitly by creating community-controlled 
organisations. 
This move serves as an important reminder that many urban Indigenous 
people do have a claim to nationhood status in cities. For some, fighting for 
recognition of urban communities as authentic Indigenous communities 
with rights as such, thus can be about demanding urban territory 
as Indigenous territory. Second, it underscores that, in the case of the 
activism that created Indigenous health clinics, it is clear these claims were 
pressed on the basis of a pan-Indigenous identity rather than a national 
or tribal one. Third, Warren’s and Hammond’s comments might be read 
in ways that suggest the irrelevance of particular location to the status of 
these ‘non-reservation’ spaces as Indigenous, and thus they evinced the 
non-territorial basis of the underlying rights they were meant to uphold.
It is important to note in both examples that urban Indigenous health 
activists made a distinction between, on the one hand, what we might 
regard as the right of the community to be self-determining, and on the 
other hand, the right of the community to be able to be self-determining 
on a specific piece of territory under their control. For ease, we can 
refer to the former as recognising the right to ‘self-governance’ or ‘self-
determination’, and to the latter as the right to ‘territorial sovereignty’ 
(although, both ideas still fall under the broad concept of sovereignty in 
the sense I have been using the term). As a practical matter, by seeking the 
right to be self-governing as opposed to the right to territorial sovereignty, 
urban Indigenous health activists made a substantive claim about the 
goals of Indigenous sovereignty as a whole. Their efforts supported the 
idea that securing territory, rather than being the only goal of Indigenous 
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sovereignty, was just one aspect of it – to be sure, an undeniably important 
one. But, as their actions demonstrate, they believed a meaningful form 
of self-determination could be realised for peoples who did not seek 
territorial control or claims to nationhood.
In pressing for forms of de-territorialised control over their own affairs, 
urban Indigenous health activists did not seek to displace the importance 
of land claims (it was never an ‘either/or’ argument), they simply 
intended to make room for other political endeavours. Their goals were 
thus ultimately expansive; they sought to extend the reach of Indigenous 
self-determination such that it could be realised by Indigenous people in 
all contexts at all times, not only when they were within the bounds of 
recognised Indigenous territories.
Understanding how postwar urbanisation and the ensuing growth of an 
Indigenous diaspora in cities brought on these changes in the political 
goals of those Indigenous communities means reframing the history 
of Indigenous political activism in the 1960s and 1970s. Although at 
this time urban Indigenous communities led the way in political and 
social movements to protect sovereign homelands (Red Power, Alcatraz, 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy), these experiences only sharpened a collective 
realisation among urban communities that their pan-Indigenous political 
and cultural life in cities was neither represented nor protected by 
territorial sovereignty. They imagined a common terrain linking separate 
reservations/reserves with the growing urban Indigenous communities 
hailing from diverse origins. They imagined their community this way 
because it actually represented how many of them lived – with family 
members split across rural and urban locales, and with many urban 
migrants travelling back and forth. Indeed, a continuing connection with 
rural homelands was, for many urban people, an important reason to 
stand in solidarity with struggles for land rights and territorial sovereignty 
in the first place. That is, even though territorial sovereignty may not have 
benefited them directly in cities, urban pan-Indigenous activists fought 
for it since territorial sovereignty benefited their families, friends and 
communities. Indeed, they saw urban and reserve/reservation populations 
as part of the same community, and as sharing in the same political struggle. 
Bearing this out, in the 1960s, Aboriginal urban migrants in Australia 
came to speak of themselves and of all Aboriginal people as ‘Black’.15
15  Jones and Hill-Burnett, ‘Political Context of Ethnogenesis’; McGregor, ‘Another Nation’; 
McGregor, Indifferent Inclusion.
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Similarly, as urban Indian communities grew in US cities in the late 1950s, 
community members initially made contact with other Indians in the city 
via pre-existing networks from reservations, tribal nations and boarding 
schools. Gradually, these contacts combined with the exigencies of urban 
life to create a pan-Indian or what sociologist Stephen Cornell calls 
a ‘supra-Indian’ identity: a ‘pan-ethnic’ identity based on shared histories 
of responding to racist federal Indian policies and on a syncretic culture of 
tribally specific, intertribal and newly invented traditions.16 Much like 
the language of ‘Black Power’ in Australia, the language of ‘Red Power’ 
in the United States drew little distinction between how this politics and 
a generalised ‘Indian’ identity applied to urban versus rural communities. 
By speaking generally of Red Power, urban Indian activists also asserted 
their communities and rural Indian communities were linked; in fact, 
they were the very same community.
In both the Indigenous Red Power and Black Power movements, a vocal 
anti-colonialism with ties to the global decolonising struggles of the 
postwar era blended with a new awareness of local constructions of race 
(‘Black’ and ‘Red’). Activists in Seattle and Sydney used their community-
run clinics to assert ideas about their identity and rights as Indigenous 
peoples that provided alternative plot lines to the fiction of assimilation 
that falsely dichotomised rural and urban Indigenous communities and 
erased the realities of continuing political, social, cultural, familial and 
economic ties between them. Remembering back to their strategising in 
the 1970s, Dr Walt Hollow (Assiniboine-Sioux), one of the Seattle Indian 
Health Board’s first physicians, recalled the emphasis the early founders 
of the clinic placed on their treaty rights, even as urban Indians living off-
reservation: ‘The treaty said we were to get healthcare. And here we could 
demonstrate that there were a group of Indians living in Seattle, who 
were not getting regular healthcare’.17 Drawing little distinction between 
the political struggles of urban and rural communities, urban Aboriginal 
activists often spoke up on behalf of rural communities, referring to people 
within those communities as ‘our brothers and sisters’.18 And, in defending 
territorial sovereignty even when it did not directly stand to benefit their 
pan-Indigenous communities in cities, activists in the postwar period 
pursued a pan-Indian and pan-Aboriginal politics that connected cities 
and reservations, as a counter-narrative to the romances of assimilationist 
16  Cornell, The Return, 33.
17  Walt Hollow, interviewed by the author, Seattle, WA, 18 August 2013.
18  Black News Service 3, no. 3 (1977).
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‘melting pots’ imagined by Australian and American national history and 
federal policy. Ruby Hammond, for example, in her work advocating for 
the importance of Aboriginal health as a political priority, often spoke of 
how ‘land rights is fundamental to any improvements in the health 
of Aboriginal people’.19
Ironically, the visibility of the territorial struggles urban activists fought 
for on behalf of rural communities in the 1960s and 1970s often obscured 
efforts to protect their own (non-territorial) sovereignty in cities. The shift 
towards imagining Indigenous self-determination in forms that could 
exist apart from territorial politics also took place slowly, which made 
it harder to observe. However, the community-controlled health clinics 
(and the political struggles that built them) were key contexts in which 
this vision took shape, and hence I suggest that these clinics ultimately 
became an expression and embodiment of this de-territorialised politics. 
Even when the clinics later pushed for federal funds as a means of more 
explicitly advancing their claim that their communities had a right to 
government support, they insisted they would only take government 
funds free of restrictions. This was a reiteration of their concern for 
autonomy from government control but was simultaneously a means to 
assert the government’s obligation to support their communities given the 
special obligations owed to Indigenous peoples by the US and Australian 
federal governments.
With the clinics themselves embodying the ideal of a ‘de-territorialised’ 
form of sovereignty, they might also be considered as mobile mini 
sovereign zones or ‘hubs’, where Indigenous people were in control 
of their own affairs and free to gather and associate as a community on 
terms they set. In using this language of the ‘hub’, I draw from the work 
of anthropologist Renya K. Ramirez, who writes:
The hub suggests how landless Native Americans maintain a sense 
of connection to their tribal homelands and urban spaces through 
participation in cultural circuits and maintenance of social 
networks, as well as shared activity with other Native Americans 
in the city and on the reservation.20
19  Hammond, ‘Land Rights: Key to Aboriginal Health’.
20  Ramirez, Native, xx.
INDIGENoUS SELf‑DETERMINATIoN IN AUSTRALIA
222
As a cultural, social and political concept, for Ramirez the hub ultimately 
has the potential to ‘strengthen Native identity and provide a sense of 
belonging, as well as to increase the political power of Native peoples’. 
She also describes ‘hub-making activities’ as practices that ‘bridge tribal 
differences so Native Americans can unify to struggle for social change’.21 
I borrow this language of the hub, with its emphasis on urban and rural 
mobility, diasporic Indigenous identity and connection, as well as political 
and social innovation, to conceptualise the social, cultural and political 
significance of urban Indigenous health clinics as a kind of ‘native hub’. 
On this reading, referring to the clinics as ‘health hubs’ (indexing a shift 
away from specific land/territories), and which in theory could be located 
anywhere, registers how they freed the project of Indigenous sovereignty 
considerably and provided Indigenous peoples a capacious means to 
exercise their self-determination wherever they lived.
If this constitutes one way in which urban health activists de-territorialised 
the project of Indigenous sovereignty through their clinics, their health 
activism also served to drastically reconfigure the political goals of 
Indigenous sovereignty by directing the concern for self-determination 
to the level of individual bodies. (Here, arguably, we can trace the most 
direct line of connection to ways in which the language of sovereignty 
now functions with increasing frequency in twenty-first-century 
Indigenous political discourse.) In a certain sense, of course, this concern 
that individual Indians/Aboriginals exhibit agency and control over 
their bodies and medical affairs looks similar to the liberal concern that 
individuals have sovereign control over their own bodies. I contend, 
however, that the health activists’ concern with the bodily sovereignty 
of their respective community members was distinctive in a number of 
important respects.
First, in the case of Indigenous peoples, health activists did think 
Indigenous bodily sovereignty required a particular social, political and 
cultural context in order to be fully realised. Namely, it was believed what 
was needed, instrumentally speaking, to ensure the self-determination 
of Indigenous individuals, was precisely the kind of social and political 
environment provided by services run by and for Indigenous people. 
In other words, the dignity and autonomy of Indians and Aboriginals in 
their medical affairs, and their concomitant capacity to exercise bodily 
21  Ramirez, Native, 3–8.
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integrity, required a set of institutions that catered to their Indigenous 
identity. Thus activists were concerned to ensure their community 
members could enjoy individual dignity and bodily control in their 
medical affairs as Indians and as Aboriginals. This is perhaps what Pearl 
Warren meant, when she said all the Seattle Indian community wanted 
was a place ‘where in our most vulnerable times of feeling unwell, we 
could feel free and proud to be ourselves’.
Second, while many activists no doubt shared the ‘liberal’ aspiration that 
individual Indigenous persons enjoy autonomy over their own bodies 
and medical care qua individual subjects, I contend the activists’ concern 
with the bodily integrity and sovereignty of their communities’ members 
manifested a distinct set of Indigenous normative concerns. Structures of 
colonial governance decimated and undermined Indigenous communities 
in the United States and Australia, and, importantly, this was often 
manifested most acutely at the level of individual Indigenous bodies. In 
this context, ensuring the health and integrity of individual Indigenous 
persons became a form of resistance to continuing colonisation in the 
twentieth century (assimilation) that worked to undermine the integrity 
of Indigenous communities. In other words, the health of the Indigenous 
community and its own capacity for self-direction was predicated on 
ensuring the health and bodily sovereignty of its individual members, 
just as the concern for the self-determination of individuals within that 
group was also advanced by the health of the group as a whole. Hammond 
expressed precisely this when she extolled the work of the AMS in 
1980, writing:
The Redfern Service, however, offers an impressive example of 
the advantages of such community run organisations – their 
total commitment to the task [of self-determination], their 
acceptance by the target population and their vital role in the 
total development of the Aboriginal community by supporting 
individual people and the larger community.22
Providing for the health of individual members in the way specified – 
through Indigenous-run organisations – was thus thought to be necessary 
to the self-determination of the community. Seeing the clinics in this 
light points to the important role health issues played as part of the 
wider narrative sweep of Indigenous activism in Australian and United 
22  Hammond, ‘Land Rights and Aboriginal Health’, 13.
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States history. Many scholars have recently recognised that, as Indigenous 
people in both the United States and Australia moved off reserve or rural 
land in the second half of the twentieth century and started living in ways 
that complicated and defied a simple binary between urban and rural 
communities, the meanings of Indigenous sovereignty were reconfigured 
in response to these demographic and geographic changes. Typically, the 
imprint of these social and political shifts has been recognised in advocacy 
for self-determination that came to be associated with land rights or 
territorial claims and associated efforts to prove ongoing attachment to 
specific lands and waterways in the late 1960s and 1970s. Scholars have 
already noted how, as Indigenous communities became more diasporic 
in the postwar period, the need arose to protect ongoing attachments to 
specific territories. By contrast, I argue the concurrent efforts to protect 
Indigenous health in cities put forward a new and different set of ideas 
about Indigenous self-determination both in response to and to expand 
upon the limited reach of a territorial model of Indigenous sovereignty. 
Rather than developing in separate and isolated ways, ideas about 
Indigenous sovereignty were multifaceted, responsive and contested 
in the postwar world. In particular, Indigenous migration and mobility in 
Australia and the United States in the 1950s and 1960s raised all sorts 
of questions – for the newly transplanted in particular – about the status 
of any rights and recognitions enjoyed by Indigenous peoples in their 
new settings. Did Indigenous rights travel along with the people? Was 
Indigenous identity lost outside of the reserve and traditional territories?
I argue here and elsewhere that urban Indigenous communities’ fight for 
healthcare as Indigenous peoples in the 1960s and 1970s elevated the 
significance of self-governance and articulated a politics of the body that 
offered alternative foundations for Indigenous sovereignty to what they 
perceived as a limiting and limited focus on land and jurisdiction, both 
of which, the federal governments of Australia and the United States 
sought to enforce. In their struggle to assert urban Indigenous rights to 
healthcare, and to be recognised in the cities as communities that were 
culturally continuous with reserve and reservation communities, pan-
Indigenous urban activists in Seattle and Sydney grappled head-on with 
the reality that the project of colonisation and assimilation was never 
only about land. In postwar cities, where Indigenous people lost even the 
modicum of territorial sovereignty they had on reserves and reservations, 
resisting colonisation and defending Indigenous sovereignty turned on 
defying assimilation and asserting the continuities of their cultural and 
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political identities regardless of where they resided. They aimed to show 
that Indigenous communities remained cohesive even if they lived in 
ways that cut across geographic borders and even if their cultures changed 
(became ‘pan-Indigenous’) in new settings. These health activists made 
the argument that, by moving off recognised Indigenous lands, urban 
migrants were not forfeiting their Indigenous rights but, rather, were 
expanding the boundaries of Indigenous life and thus of Indigenous 
rights. Urban Indigenous health activists recognised the extension of 
assimilationist and colonial pressures into even their most private spaces 
(seeing a doctor), and thus pressed a case for reconceptualising the ‘terrain’ 
through which, and on which, Indigenous sovereignty could be asserted. 
They de-emphasised territory and elevated the significance of their own 
organisations and their own bodies in the struggle for Indigenous self-
determination. In setting their sights beyond land in these specific ways, 
it is unsurprising health struggles became a key site for the political 
reconfiguration of Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination in the 
twentieth, and into the twenty-first centuries.
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The Commonwealth’s Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
(ALRA) is a statutory instrument designed to deliver a form of social 
justice – that is, to arrest and even reverse the illegal land dispossession that 
occurred in Australia since British colonisation. The ALRA was developed 
and passed during the same period (1972–77) in which the Australian 
Government established a policy of Indigenous self-determination; as 
Justice Woodward stated when presenting the framework of the ALRA, 
‘Aborigines should be free to choose their own manner of living’.2 Both 
conservative and Labor governments expected that land title would be 
a means for remote living Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory 
to eventually attain economic and social equality with other Australians.
The ALRA remains the most progressive and comprehensive land rights 
law in Australia. It has delivered a form of inalienable collective title over 
an estimated 48–50 per cent of the Northern Territory (635,000–650,000 
sq kms) – with exact acreage remaining difficult to calculate because some 
claims are still being legally resolved. Ownership of land has afforded many 
1  I would like to thank Sana Nakata, Melinda Hinkson, Shino Konishi, Michael Dillon, Karrina 
Nolan and the editors of this book for critical engagement with an earlier version of this chapter.
2  Woodward, Commission, 10.
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Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory the choice to live differently 
in accord with diverse elements of their traditions and customs. I use the 
term differently here in two senses: differently to mainstream Western 
ways, and differently to how they had lived on government settlements 
and missions. However, the expectations that the ALRA raised are 
fundamentally contradictory. On the one hand, traditional owners may 
wish to live differently on Aboriginal-owned land. Such ‘difference’, from 
an Indigenous standpoint, might emphasise the protection of sacred sites in 
a sentient ancestral landscape and the use of the land’s natural resources for 
sustenance and wellbeing. On the other hand, individuals might aspire to 
attain socio-economic equality; to strive for equality as sameness – assessed 
from a political or bureaucratic standpoint using conventional social 
indicators and statistics – that might make it impossible to live on one’s 
ancestral land. Assessment of whether the ALRA has met its objectives is 
thus relative to one’s choice of a wide spectrum of standpoints – ranging 
from that of a recognised traditional owner of land who might be focused 
on maintaining difference to that of a member of Australia’s political, 
corporate or bureaucratic elites who often emphasise sameness.
By all statistical accounts, the ALRA has failed to deliver socio-economic 
equality between the Northern Territory’s Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people, measured as two distinct populations. Could land title ever have 
simultaneously satisfied the Aboriginal aspiration to live differently 
and any aspiration to be equal, in socio-economic terms, to non-
Aboriginal people? This is a complex question that I look to address in 
my conclusion. This question matters to me personally because, since 
the late 1970s, I have worked at various times with and/or on behalf of 
traditional owners, Aboriginal groups, governments, statutory authorities 
and non-government organisations to strengthen the ALRA and to resist 
the dilution of its provisions. 
The ALRA’s immediate antecedents: 1972
Ruling on a case brought by residents of Yirrkala mission in the Northern 
Territory Supreme Court, in April 1971 Justice Blackburn found that 
Australian law did not recognise Aboriginal title to land; this meant 
that the Commonwealth Government was under no legal obligation to 
consult with Aboriginal residents about a massive bauxite mine on Crown 
land reserved for their exclusive use. The Australian Government had 
to respond to the public perception that while the ruling was correct in 
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law it was unfair in its effect on the plaintiffs’ community. On Australia 
Day 1972, Prime Minister McMahon announced that the Australian 
Government would create a new form of tenure – a lease, lasting 50 years, 
available to individuals, groups or communities who could demonstrate 
to a Land Board their intention and ability to make economic and social 
use of the land.3 As in other leases, mineral and forest rights would be 
reserved for the Crown. It was assumed by the McMahon Government 
(and more widely) that the interest of Aboriginal people themselves would 
be served by mineral exploration and development on Aboriginal reserves.
The prime minister’s Australia Day statement angered Aboriginal activists; 
they immediately set up the ‘Aboriginal Tent Embassy’ on the lawns of 
Parliament House. By early February activists associated with the Embassy 
had drawn up a five-point plan for land rights: Aboriginal control of the 
Northern Territory as a state within the Commonwealth, legal title and 
mining rights to all reserves throughout Australia, the preservation of all 
sacred sites throughout Australia, legal title and mining rights to areas 
in and around all Australian capital cities, and compensation (6 billion 
dollars, worth about $200 billion in 2019) for lands not returnable and an 
annual percentage of gross national income.4 According to John Newfong, 
‘the figure of six billion was chosen in order to establish in the minds of the 
white men and their governments not only this right of prior ownership 
but also our right to compensation’.5 Like the McMahon statement, 
the demands of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy encompassed competing 
logics: a call for social justice and compensation for past wrongs, and for 
land as the economic base for self-sufficiency as well as for its spiritual and 
sacred importance. 
On 8 February 1972 a delegation of activists met Opposition leader 
Gough Whitlam who gave partial endorsement of the five-point plan and 
made a commitment to Aboriginal land rights that was widely reported 
in the media.6 In his election speech of November 1972 Whitlam stated:
We will legislate to give aborigines land rights – not just because 
their case is beyond argument, but because all of us as Australians 
are diminished while the aborigines are denied their rightful place 
in this nation.7 
3  McMahon, Australian Aborigines Commonwealth Policy.
4  Newfong, ‘Aboriginal Embassy’, 139.
5  Newfong, ‘Aboriginal Embassy’, 142. 
6  Robinson, ‘Aboriginal Embassy’, 8; Foley, ‘Reflection’, 36.
7  Whitlam, ‘It’s Time’.
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At the same time Whitlam, like McMahon, promoted northern 
development: ‘Labor’s objective is to develop the vast and valuable 
resources of Northern Australia for the benefit of the Australian nation 
and future Australians’.
From Woodward’s royal commission 
to land rights: 1972–77
Exactly 12 months after Whitlam met with Aboriginal activists on the 
lawns of Parliament House, his government (elected 2 December 1972) 
commissioned Mr Justice Woodward, who had represented the Yolngu 
plaintiffs in the Gove case, to advise how to recognise in legislation the 
traditional land rights of the Aboriginal people of the Northern Territory. 
Woodward’s inquiry was limited to the Northern Territory in part because 
his commission was a direct political response to the Blackburn decision, 
but also because the Territory was administered from Canberra and 
the Australian Constitution empowered the Commonwealth to make 
laws there.8
Woodward produced a template for land rights law. The 20 per cent of 
the Northern Territory that had been reserved for Aboriginal use was to 
be transferred to land trusts to be managed by statutory land councils 
as instructed by the owners of that land. All unalienated Crown lands 
were to be open to claim by people who could demonstrate before an 
Aboriginal land commissioner that they were a local descent group with 
primary spiritual responsibility for land and associated sacred sites and 
were entitled ‘as a right to forage over the land claimed’.9
Woodward was determined to complete his inquiry quickly and so chose 
an approach that he assessed as measured, ‘taking into account financial 
and political realities’.10 Woodward did not engage with, or receive 
submissions from, the Black activists from the Aboriginal Tent Embassy; 
he may have assessed their more radical demands as unrealistic.
8  Neate, Land Rights Law, 3.
9  Section 3 of Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth).
10  Woodward, One Brief Interval, 141.
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Woodward’s ‘measured’ approach had shortcomings. Although the Letters 
Patent of his commission directed him to include ‘rights in minerals and 
timber’, he did not recommend that landowners be vested with property 
rights in subsurface minerals.11 The question of mineral rights probably 
caused Woodward the most difficulty and concern.12 But in the end, he 
was persuaded by mining industry submissions that Aboriginal traditional 
owners should be treated no differently from other Australians. This 
decision undoubtedly reduced the economic potency of land rights. 
Instead, he recommended a right of veto, so that Aboriginal landowners 
would have the legal authority to determine what happens on their land: 
‘I believe that to deny Aborigines the right to prevent mining on their 
land is to deny the reality of their land rights’.13 Woodward thought it 
‘likely, particularly in the long term, that consent will generally be given’.14 
On the ‘difficult question’15 of how to distribute money paid by miners, 
he recommended that:
All statutory payments for permits and leases be paid over by 
the Government to the regional Land Council for distribution 
among traditional owners; all royalty payments be paid over by 
the government to the regional Land Council for distribution as 
follows: two tenths to be retained by the Land Council, two tenths 
to be paid to the other regional Land Council, three tenths to be 
paid to the local community, and three tenths to be paid to the 
A.B.T.F [Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund].16
Passed by the Australian Parliament in 1976, the ALRA established 
Aboriginal land councils as statutory authorities to represent traditional 
owners with a  degree of independence from governments. In other 
respects, Woodward’s recommendations had been diluted. For example, 
the ALRA excluded the possibility that land could be claimed based on 
need or in towns. Some responsibilities that Woodward had imagined 
for the Commonwealth were delegated to the new Northern Territory 
Government, effective 1  July 1978, so that Aboriginal people have 
found themselves in a politically fraught tripartite arrangement. Mining 
royalties that were to be paid to land councils were now to be paid to 
the Northern Territory Government. The Commonwealth was to pay 
11  Woodward, Commission, 1.
12  Woodward, Commission, 103–04.
13  Woodward, Commission, 104.
14  Woodward, Commission, 104.
15  Woodward, Commission, 108.
16  Woodward, Commission, 109.
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an equivalent amount to the newly established Aboriginals Benefit Trust 
Account that superseded the existing Aboriginal Benefits Trust Fund. This 
changed the way that the use of royalties was to be accountable. Because 
these Commonwealth payments were now from consolidated revenue, 
royalty-equivalents were not the ‘private’ income that Aboriginal people 
might derive from consenting to the commercial use of their property but 
‘public moneys’ subject to ministerial directions and scrutiny.17
Woodward’s hope was that ‘Aboriginal communities should have as much 
autonomy as possible in running their own affairs’.18 As a law enabling 
self-determination, the ALRA’s version of land rights goes beyond any 
land or native title laws passed since. However, while Aboriginal people 
own considerable tracts of land, most of what happens on that land where 
Aboriginal people are invariably in the clear majority is legally subject to 
external governance, not local Aboriginal regulation. Political jurisdiction 
over Aboriginal lands, mineral exploration aside, remains almost 
exclusively with mainstream forms of government. Both Woodward’s 
proposals and the ensuing the ALRA combine the visions of becoming 
equal and remaining different, though Woodward seemed to privilege 
difference over sameness. While ‘Aborigines should be free to choose their 
own manner of living’, their land rights would be ‘a first essential step 
for people who are economically depressed and who have at present no 
real opportunity for achieving a normal Australian standard of living’.19 
He warned that ‘the granting of land rights can only be a first step on 
a long road towards self-sufficiency and eventual social and economic 
equality for Aborigines’ and that ‘there is little point in recognising 
Aboriginal claims to land unless the Aboriginal people concerned are also 
provided with the necessary funds to make use of that land in any sensible 
way which they wish’.20
17  Altman, Mining Royalties, 42–47.
18  Woodward, Commission, 10.
19  Woodward, Commission, 10, 2.
20  Woodward, Commission, 133, 9.
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Equality and difference as a practical 
research problem
Almost on the day the ALRA was proclaimed, my Aboriginal economic 
policy research commenced at the University of Melbourne collaborating 
with John Nieuwenhuysen. Our project, funded by the Commonwealth 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs, was to document the economic situation 
of Indigenous people across Australia.21 We were aware of the postcolonial 
optimism of those with newly acquired property rights in land, especially 
among those people who had moved to outstations or homelands from 
the government settlements and missions where they had been centralised, 
voluntarily and involuntarily, under colonial regimes. We were no less 
aware of an emerging tension between the rights of groups to enjoy their 
land rights, a form of difference, and a government goal shared by many 
Aboriginal people for socio-economic sameness. Like Woodward, we were 
careful to argue that it would be difficult, and in some situations perhaps 
impossible, to achieve socio-economic equality. We sought to reduce 
expectations that land rights would enable economic independence from 
government, especially for remote outstation communities.22
Shifting from the academic discipline of economics to anthropology, in 
1979 I was granted permission by the late Anchor Kulunba and his family 
to live with them at an outstation called Mumeka located on their Kurulk 
clan estate in western Arnhem Land. I wanted to understand how Kuninjku 
people made their living and what they thought about development.
Kuninjku-speaking people had moved to the government settlement of 
Maningrida, established in 1957 under the policy of assimilation. In the 
early 1970s, when rights to land were emerging as a national issue, they 
returned to live on their ancestral lands at outstations, including Mumeka, 
as ‘an experiment in self-determination’ assisted administratively and 
logistically by unusual and sympathetic officials like the enigmatic John 
Hunter in their particular situation (see Haynes chapter).23 Kuninjku 
people who had maintained only vestiges of their pre-colonial hunter-
gatherer way of living in Maningrida went back to live on their land as 
‘modern hunter-gatherers’.24
21  Altman and Nieuwenhuysen, Economic Status.
22  Altman and Nieuwenhuysen, Economic Status, 195–96.
23  Peterson and Myers, Self-determination.
24  Altman, Hunter-Gatherers.
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My research showed that people were sustained from three sources. First, 
they worked consistently to self-provision, exploiting the resources on 
their country; much of their dietary intake was from bush foods. When 
I quantified the value of this food, I found that most of their ‘income’ 
(cash and non-cash) came from hunting and fishing. At the same time, 
Kuninjku engaged with market capitalism. Assisted by a community-
controlled arts centre based at Maningrida, they produced art for sale. Over 
time they became increasingly adept at refiguring their artistic traditions 
using local materials and references to sacred places and mythology. Their 
third source of support was the social security benefits to which they 
had recently become entitled as Australian citizens. Inequitably, as poor 
Australians, they received very little else from the state in terms of health 
or education or community services. The plural (or hybrid) economy 
they fashioned for themselves fundamentally challenged evolutionary 
thinking, dominant in policy circles, about the superiority of capitalism 
in remote regions such as Arnhem Land.
This was land rights and self-determination at work. Kuninjku people 
were taking primary spiritual responsibility for their clan lands, protecting 
sacred sites while exercising their economic right to make a living off their 
land and resources. In 1985, when a mining company sought permission 
to explore their land for minerals, the Northern Land Council mediated, 
as  required by law, to identify and consult traditional owners. Key 
landowners had observed the nearby Nabarlek and Ranger uranium mines 
and had talked to these mines’ beneficiaries, so they were aware of the 
potential monetary benefits of consenting to exploration and mining.25 
However, their experience of the ALRA was that it secured their access 
to their lands and resources, and Kuninjku people were now relatively 
economically and politically autonomous. Vetoing exploration, they 
implicitly accepted a social compact that enabled them to lead a materially 
modest, but spiritually rich and socially cohesive, lifeway.
Over a two-year period from 1985 to 1987 I used my Mumeka research in 
submissions to two national inquiries. In each case I advocated for policies 
to support people who chose to live at outstations on their ancestral lands. 
The Miller Committee on Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs 
saw economic value in people living off the land and recommended 
the rapid expansion of the Community Development Employment 
25  Altman, Mining Royalties.
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Projects (CDEP) scheme as a form of unconditional income support 
for outstation residents.26 While the ensuing Aboriginal Employment 
Development Policy (AEDP) partly implemented this recommendation, 
the AEDP also aimed to deliver economic equality between Indigenous 
and other Australians by 2000, which I had advised was impossible to 
achieve in very remote Australia.27 The second inquiry – a national review 
of outstations – was conducted by the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs. The committee’s report Return to 
Country not only lauded the relative autonomy of outstation residents 
but also recommended the flexible delivery of citizenship entitlements 
such as education and health and municipal services to these small 
and remote communities.28 The committee also endorsed the Miller 
recommendations for investment in appropriate forms of income support 
and economic development. In my view, it is an enduring indictment 
of Australian fiscal federalism and of the lack of intergovernmental 
cooperation and accountability that the Commonwealth and Northern 
Territory governments never properly implemented the recommendations 
from these national inquiries. Policy innovation and its implementation 
might well have ameliorated the emerging tensions and conflicted logics 
of simultaneously supporting forms of difference and sameness that 
continue to undermine the aspirations of many traditional owners today.
Defending land rights and 
self‑determination from equality 
as sameness
Twenty years after the ALRA’s passage, and with the election of a conservative 
government in March 1996, self-determination’s land rights were subject 
to increasing criticism as an obstacle to socio-economic equality. Policy 
thinking swung to focus more on the socio-economic status of individuals 
and households and less on collective rights and Indigenous-specific 
approaches to governance and development. In  the period since 1996, 
governments have revisited assimilationist goals – adopting Western norms 
26  Miller, Aboriginal Employment.
27  Australian Government, Aboriginal Employment. The Miller Committee also endorsed capital 
programs to build an economic base and new industries in Aboriginal-owned remote Australia. This 
recommendation resonated with the Aboriginal Tent Embassy’s claim for compensation in 1972 but, 
as Dillon’s chapter in this book argues, implementation of this idea has been disappointing.
28  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Return to Country.
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and values in judging wellbeing and in comparing Indigenous people living 
remotely on their land with all other Australians.29 In 1993, many of the 
conservative parliamentarians who now made up the Howard Government 
(1996–2007) had opposed the Native Title Act 1993. Pandering to 
populism, the incoming Prime Minister John Howard represented native 
title as endangering national economic development.30 Because the ALRA’s 
free prior and informed consent provisions conferred stronger negotiating 
rights on traditional owners than the Native Title Act, the ALRA was in the 
new government’s sights for reform.31
To describe my own engagements in these policy debates I will focus on 
two episodes of attempted reform before revisiting Mumeka to outline 
what this has meant on the ground.
In 1997, the Howard Government commissioned John Reeves QC to 
review the ALRA. His report Building on Land Rights for the Next Generation 
sought to make the ALRA an instrument to secure economic and social 
advancement for all Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory, not only 
for Aboriginal landowners.32 In this respect, Reeves’s vision resonated with 
McMahon’s in 1972. Reeves proposed diluting the rights of traditional 
owners and the political power of their representative land councils. The 
Territory government, having consistently opposed land claims made 
under the ALRA since 1978, welcomed Reeves’s reforms as strengthening 
its territorial and political jurisdictions. The land councils fought back, 
armed with activist expertise and – reminiscent of the Aboriginal Tent 
Embassy in 1972 – support from a substantial section of national public 
opinion. Aboriginal people in several Central Australian communities 
burned copies of the Reeves Report. John Herron, Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs, referred the review and its recommendations to the public scrutiny 
of a parliamentary inquiry. Sir Edward Woodward, now in his late 70s, 
was so disappointed with the Reeves Report that he made submission to 
the inquiry highlighting the shortcomings of its recommendations.33 
29  Sullivan, Belonging Together; Strakosch, Neoliberal Indigenous.
30  John Howard, television interview with Kerry O’Brien, 7.30 Report, ABC, 4 September 1997, 
transcript, PM Transcripts, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, accessed 26 February 2019, 
pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-10469.
31  McKenna ‘Assessing the Relative’. In 1984, the Hawke Government had similarly proposed to 
weaken the ALRA’s right of veto as an element of its unsuccessful plan for a ‘preferred national land 
rights model’. Libby, Hawke’s Law.
32  Reeves, Next Generation.
33  Woodward, One Brief Interval, 150.
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I was among a group of academics at The Australian National University 
that collaborated with the Northern Territory land councils to convene 
a conference whose proceedings were quickly published.34 Among the 
conference contributors were Nicolas Peterson, who had been Woodward’s 
expert anthropological adviser, Ian Viner, the government minister who 
had chaperoned the ALRA through parliament in 1976, and John Reeves. 
My own contribution took aim at Reeves’s proposal that the land councils 
and royalty associations be replaced by a Northern Territory Aboriginal 
Council (NTAC). NTAC’s function would be to receive and redistribute 
money earned from the agreed commercial use of Aboriginal land. I argued 
that this mechanism would blur an important distinction: between 
money coming to Aboriginal people as owners who had consented to 
others’ extraction of mineral resources from their land and money coming 
to Aboriginal people, at the discretion of the minister, via the Aboriginals 
Benefit Trust Account. One likely effect of implementing NTAC, I argued, 
was that it would greatly reduce any incentive for traditional owners to 
negotiate royalty-generating agreements counter to Reeves’s purported 
intention.35
In Unlocking the Future: The Report of the Inquiry into the Reeves Review 
the parliamentary standing committee unanimously rejected Reeves’s 
recommendations.36 The unanimity of this rejection, given that the Reeves 
inquiry was government-initiated, was surprising, as was the committee’s 
lead recommendation that the ALRA should not be amended without the 
free, prior and informed consent of traditional Aboriginal owners in the 
Northern Territory.37 Unlike Woodward in 1974, Reeves in 1998 clearly 
underestimated the support for what the ALRA had achieved: political 
representation and property rights in land.
The conservatives’ desire to reform the ALRA re-emerged in 2005, during 
the fourth Howard Government. This government was emboldened by 
its control of both houses of parliament; by the bipartisan abolition of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), leaving the 
34  Altman, Morphy and Rowse, Land Rights. By 1999 there were four land councils, the original 
Northern and Central Land Councils augmented by the Tiwi Land Council (established in 1978) and 
the Anindilyakwa Land Council (established in 1991). 
35  Altman, ‘The Proposed’.
36  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 
Unlocking the Future.
37  House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 
Unlocking the Future, xvii.
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ALRA politically exposed with only land councils as its defenders; and by 
intensifying assault on the institutions of Indigenous Australia.38 To replace 
ATSIC, the Howard Government appointed a National Indigenous 
Council (NIC). The NIC called for Indigenous Australians to have more 
opportunity for private home ownership and for business development. 
Warren Mundine, a New South Wales Aboriginal member of the NIC, 
was mistaken in describing tenure over Aboriginal land as ‘communal’ 
but his label was endorsed by powerful officials and the government. 
Mundine and others argued that the ‘communal’ title conferred by the 
ALRA inhibited both private home ownership and business development 
on Aboriginal land. Some commentators also managed to link the need 
for better security for women and children – widely acknowledged – with 
the need to reform ‘communal’ land tenure. In June 2007, the Howard 
Government exploited the Little Children Are Sacred report of the Board 
of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, 
and seeming inaction by the Northern Territory Government, to launch 
the Northern Territory Intervention and harness public outrage to attack 
the ALRA by suggesting the permit system provided a protective umbrella 
for child sexual abusers.39 The government judged that it had public 
support to intervene in the Territory’s remote communities, including by 
changing the ALRA, for the good of Aboriginal people.
Under the Howard Government’s Northern Territory Intervention, 
entire townships located on Aboriginal land were leased compulsorily 
by the Australian Government for a five-year period. In response, the 
traditional owners of Maningrida brought an action in the High Court 
of Australia. The court ruled in 2009 that such unilateral acquisition of 
property was constitutionally legal only if the government paid just 
terms compensation.40  After protracted legal negotiations the Gillard 
Government paid. This incident was a clear reminder about power 
relations in Australia – the settler state retains radical land title. Self-
determination’s land rights are qualified, a gift that can be withdrawn. 
The ALRA is vulnerable to deleterious amendment, even abolition, by 
the same parliament that conferred the rights, as long as it meets its 
constitutional obligation to compensate.
38  Sullivan, Belonging Together.
39  Hinkson, ‘Introduction’.
40  Brennan, ‘Wurridjal v Commonwealth’.
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The ‘national emergency’ amendments to the ALRA abolished the need 
for a  permit to enter public areas of Aboriginal-owned townships and 
promoted new arrangements for 99-year leasing of land within townships 
(under a new Section 19A of the ALRA) to implement earlier NIC and 
government proposals. The leases were to be managed by a Canberra-
based executive director of township leasing appointed by the minister and 
funded from royalties raised on Aboriginal land. This last reform was an 
ironic reversal of McMahon’s (1972) proposal that Aboriginal people hold 
leases over Crown land; now Aboriginal landowners could issue a  lease 
over their land to a government agency that in turn would issue subleases. 
Few land trusts have embraced the Section 19A leasing option. To transfer 
ultimate control of their land to the executive director of township leasing 
has had very limited appeal.
To understand what these struggles over land tenure have meant to those 
pursuing their lifeways on Aboriginal land, let us return to the Kuninjku. 
They have remained committed to their country for decades in the 
face of deepening ambivalences and underfunding by Commonwealth 
and Territory governments. Until the Northern Territory Intervention, 
Kuninjku had maintained what I have described as a plural economy in 
which minimal, unconditional state support facilitated self-provisioning 
and engagement with the extremely limited market opportunities available 
in remote Australia.41 In this adaptive economy, they enacted Woodward’s 
freedom ‘to choose their own manner of living’ and ‘freedom to change 
traditional ways as well as a freedom to retain them’.42
Wary that fundamental reform of the ALRA would be politically difficult 
and could incur high compensation costs, Australian governments since 
2007 have instead amplified a project of improvement to reform the 
people. A suite of paternalistic measures has been introduced seeking to 
convert the norms and values of remote living Aboriginal people to match 
those of some imagined responsible neoliberal subject. These measures are 
not about land rights per se, but about the owners’ commitment to live on 
the land. Kuninjku, like homelands people everywhere, have been under 
enormous administrative pressure to recentralise to larger townships. 
Some wish to do so, but to the extent that traditional owners cease to live 
on their land, their territorial rights have little meaning.
41  Curchin, ‘Economic Hybridity’.
42  Woodward, Commission, 10.
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Kuninjku are aware of the strategies designed to recentralise them, 
to eliminate their mobile way of living, and to inculcate them with 
Western norms and values ostensibly to close statistical gaps via enhanced 
engagement with market capitalism. They understand that they are losing 
the right to sustain themselves with a ‘hybrid’ economy dependent on 
continuing connection to their traditional lands and resources. They 
are deeply frustrated and angered that if they resist this second wave 
of colonisation they will be punished with impoverishing loss of the 
welfare payments on which their adapted economy has been dependent 
since the 1970s. The government is also coopting their regional support 
organisation, the Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation, to assist delivery of 
programs, like compulsory work for the dole and income management, 
that close rather than open on-country possibilities.43
The recent actions of government have not extinguished all possibility of 
on-country living. For example, traditional owners in western Arnhem 
Land residing within the Warddeken Indigenous Protected Area have 
garnered support for living on country by voluntarily committing their 
biodiverse lands to the Australian conservation estate. These same lands 
have also been committed to a carbon farming commons, the Arnhem 
Land Fire Abatement project that extends over most of Arnhem Land’s 
100,000 sq kms. Managing wild fires contributes to the abatement of 
greenhouse gas emissions, and such abatement is sold. By attracting 
payments from diverse public, private and philanthropic sources to 
conserve biodiversity and reduce carbon emissions, some groups have 
managed to maintain enough independence from the state to successfully 
exercise their ongoing desire to live at outstations and make a living. This 
replicable example might prove a harbinger of how proactive members 
of remote communities might refigure their relations with the state and 
capitalism to be more politically and economically autonomous.
Conclusion
Was self-determination’s land rights destined to disappoint? Did the ALRA 
deliver simple justice to people unfairly dispossessed and betterment 
to people who are economically depressed? At the start of this chapter, 
I identified twin logics embedded in the ALRA: to deliver simple justice 
43  Altman, ‘Raphael Lemkin’.
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by returning ancestral lands and to encourage the utilisation of this land 
to improve socio-economic marginality. I have argued that the tension 
between these logics has been exacerbated in the last two decades by 
policy settings that measure the wellbeing of Aboriginal people (and thus 
the success or failure of policy) by assessing only the degree to which they 
live in the same way as non-Aboriginal people. In such assessment, no 
value is accorded to people’s self-determining choice to live in accord with 
elements of their customs and traditions.
The ALRA has contributed to simple justice by assuring legal title to vast 
tracts of ancestral land. However, by excluding the mineral rights that the 
land councils had argued were of fundamental importance to achieving 
full land rights, both Woodward’s recommendations and the ALRA failed 
Aboriginal expectations. The ALRA’s concession to the enduring influence 
of the mining industry in capitalist Australia marked the limits of settler 
state recognition.44
And why only in the Northern Territory? A request was made to 
Woodward to expand his inquiry to cover all Australia.45 He declined 
because he believed this would take six years and he considered it 
preferable to treat the Northern Territory as a pilot study. In its limited 
spatial coverage and lack of political empowerment and compensation, 
the ALRA did not meet the demands made by Black activists in Canberra 
in 1972. The ALRA applies only to the Northern Territory, less than one-
fifth of the Australian continent; the Territory’s Indigenous population, 
the ALRA’s potential beneficiaries, constitute less than 10 per cent of the 
total Indigenous population estimated from the 2016 Census (compared 
to 20 per cent in 1971). From the perspective of those at the Aboriginal 
Tent Embassy, the early commitment to national land rights made by 
Whitlam soon turned to bitter disappointment. As Gary Foley, one of the 
Black activists now a professor of history notes, the young Black radicals 
got their first major lesson about ‘political deceit and duplicity’ owing to 
the failure of Whitlam to deliver on his promises.46
Perhaps there has been unrealistic expectation that land rights would 
deliver too much too quickly? Woodward cautioned that ‘the granting of 
land rights can only be a first step on a long road towards self-sufficiency 
44  Altman, Mining Royalties, 39.
45  Woodward, One Brief Interval, 138; Woodward, Commission, 130.
46  Foley, ‘A Reflection’, 41.
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and eventual social and economic equality for Aborigines’. He went on: 
‘it is an essential step even though its outcome may not be apparent for 
many years’.47 While some tentative steps forward were taken in the early 
years of the ALRA, in the last two decades the steps have been backward. 
Those living on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory are not only 
the most impoverished people in Australia, but also they are becoming 
relatively poorer.48 This trend is the result of policy to discourage and 
even financially penalise those who live on their country. The most 
recent estimates from a Centre for Appropriate Technology (2016) 
survey indicated that there are over 600 homelands in the Northern 
Territory.49 People may have land rights, but because the Commonwealth 
and Northern Territory governments fail to support living at outstations, 
people are leaving their ancestral lands. To pressure Aboriginal people for 
whom connection to country, sacred sites and ancestors in the landscape 
are paramount values to live in the same way as non-Aboriginal people is 
a form of cultural genocide.50
According to Woodward, one of the aims of land rights was to remove, 
as far as possible, the legitimate grievance of an important minority 
group within the community.51 After nearly half a century, we can see 
that this aim has failed. The Aboriginal Tent Embassy stills stands in 
Canberra as a potent symbolic reminder of outstanding Aboriginal claims 
against the settler state. Gary Foley predicts that ‘the Embassy can only 
be removed when Aboriginal people achieve their goals of land rights, 
self-determination and economic independence’.52 
This chapter makes two broad arguments. First, that the ALRA was 
initially designed as an innovative and progressive institution. However, as 
Commonwealth law, the ALRA is always vulnerable to change, especially 
if a government controls both houses of parliament. The ALRA has been 
increasingly poorly applied, adversely amended and associated with other 
increasingly misconceived policies of betterment. Second, the twin logics 
of the land rights agenda – to enable both difference and equality – are in 
so much tension that the ALRA, as a settler colonial project, must always 
fail to some degree irrespective of how it is attempted. The underlying 
47  Woodward, Commission, 133.
48  Markham and Biddle, ‘Income’.
49  Centre for Appropriate Technology, Northern Territory Homelands.
50  Altman, ‘Raphael Lemkin’; see also Short, Redefining Genocide.
51  Woodward, Commission, 2.
52  Foley, ‘A Reflection’, 41.
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principle of land rights policy should be to align with and support the 
aspirations of traditional owners and to assure them the resources they 
need. Government policy must acknowledge that Aboriginal people 
in some regions have very limited possibilities of becoming the same in 
statistical terms as the other Australians with whom they are so often 
compared. Informed by such realism, steps along Woodward’s long road 
can yet again be forwards, not backwards.
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How Torres Strait Islanders shaped 
Australia’s border
Tim Rowse
As an Opposition member of parliament in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Gough Whitlam took a keen interest in Australia’s responsibilities, under 
the United Nations’ mandate, to develop the Territory of Papua New 
Guinea until it became a self-determining nation. In a chapter titled 
‘International Affairs’, Whitlam proudly recalled his government’s steps 
towards Papua New Guinea’s independence (declared and recognised on 
16 September 1975).2 However, Australia’s relationship with Papua New 
Guinea in the 1970s could also have been discussed by Whitlam under 
the heading ‘Indigenous Affairs’ because from 1973 Torres Strait Islanders 
demanded (and were accorded) a voice in designing the border between 
Australia and Papua New Guinea. Whitlam’s framing of the border issue 
as ‘international’, to the neglect of its domestic Indigenous dimension, 
is an instance of history being written in what Tracey Banivanua-
Mar has called an ‘imperial’ mode. Historians, she argues, should ask 
to what extent decolonisation was merely an ‘imperial’ project: did 
‘decolonisation’ not also enable the mobilisation of Indigenous ‘peoples’ 
to become self-determining in their relationships with other Indigenous 
1  H. C. Coombs to Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (Gordon Bryant), 11 April 1973, cited in 
Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 355.
2  Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 4, 10, 26, 72, 115, 154, 738.
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peoples?3 This is what the Torres Strait Islanders did when they asserted 
their political interests during the negotiation of the Australia–Papua 
New Guinea border, though you will not learn this from Whitlam’s 
‘imperial’ account.
In this chapter, after describing the border that resulted from Australia’s 
negotiations with Papua New Guinea from 1973 to 1978 under the 
Whitlam and Fraser governments, I will describe how the Torres Strait 
Islanders’ interests shaped the Australia–Papua New Guinea border. I will 
conclude by discussing how this passage of events illustrates the possibility 
of a history of the decolonising of peoples and not merely of territories.
Map 11.1: The Australia–Papua New Guinea boundary.
Source: Annex 7 to the treaty between Australia and the independent state of Papua New 
Guinea concerning sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the area between the two 
countries, including the area known as Torres Strait, and related matters . Prepared by the 
Division of National Mapping, Canberra, and the National Mapping Bureau, Port Moresby .
3  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 8–9.
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The Australia–Papua New Guinea border
The Torres Strait Treaty4 was signed on 18 December 1978 and became 
effective in 1985, expressing the agreement by Australia and Papua New 
Guinea that the border between them should have the following features: 
• Distinct seabed and fisheries jurisdictions. While a fisheries jurisdiction 
line and a seabed jurisdiction line are in exactly the same position 
over much of their lengths – that is, running approximately halfway 
between the Australian and the Papua New Guinea mainlands – they 
diverge, so that the fisheries line includes the islands Saibai, Dauan 
and Boigu within Australian fisheries jurisdiction. In this area between 
the divergent seabed and fishery lines (known as the ‘top hat’ or ‘box’) 
Papua New Guinea has jurisdiction in matters relating to the seabed 
(such as sedentary fisheries, minerals and petroleum), while Australia 
has fisheries jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the inhabitants of 
Saibai, Dauan and Boigu and over uninhabited islands and reefs that 
are sometimes visited by both Papuans and Torres Strait Islanders.
• A ‘protected zone’. This area overlaps both seabed and fisheries 
jurisdiction lines, covering most of Torres Strait, excluding Thursday 
Island (the administrative centre of the Torres Strait region). According 
to Article 10 of the Treaty, what the ‘protected zone’ protects are 
‘the marine environment and indigenous fauna and flora’ and ‘the 
traditional way of life and livelihood of the traditional inhabitants’ 
living in the Torres Strait and in 13 villages on the Papuan coast. 
‘Protection’ has included an embargo on oil drilling. 
• Provision for the ‘traditional inhabitants’ of the Strait. The ‘traditional 
inhabitants’ are understood to include certain citizens of both Australia 
and Papua New Guinea, so that each set of persons may move about 
within the protected zone as if there were no national boundaries 
running through it. That is, the protected zone has the effect of 
suspending, in ways significant to these people, the operation of the 
border between the two nation-states, so that relationships between 
Papuans and Torres Strait Islanders are governed by evolving custom. 
4  ‘Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning 
sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the area between the two countries, including the area known 
as Torres Strait, and related matters, 18 December 1978’ (15 February 1985): Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Australian Treaty Series 1985 No. 4.
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• A governing body. A Joint Advisory Council, with members from 
both Australia and Papua New Guinea, contributes to both nations’ 
practices of implementation of the treaty. 
This was not what the Australian Government initially intended. Whitlam 
came to power in December 1972 believing that Australia’s border with 
the soon to be independent Papua New Guinea was too far north, and 
that shifting the border to a point halfway (latitude 10˚ south) between 
the two nations (giving more of the Torres Strait to Papua New Guinea) 
would respect the new nation’s legitimate interests. However, Whitlam’s 
advisers told him that the Torres Strait Islanders passionately opposed 
any change in a boundary that – since colonisation – had placed all 
Torres Strait Islanders within the same jurisdiction – first Queensland’s 
(1879–1900) and then Australia’s (from 1901). The Torres Strait Islanders 
persuaded both the Whitlam and Fraser governments to honour their 
territorial unity as a sea-going people. 
Notwithstanding that the Torres Strait Islanders, throughout negotiations 
from 1973 to 1978, opposed any boundary that bisected the Strait 
– begrudging even the median line that now apportions only ‘seabed’ 
sovereignty – the treaty makes major concessions to Torres Strait Islanders 
that I will underline. First, all inhabitants and all fisheries of the islands 
of the Torres Strait remain within Australia’s jurisdiction and thus within 
Australia’s duty of care, as Islanders continue to expect it. Second, marine 
resources that continue to form a significant part of their livelihood are 
under protection against threatening ‘development’. Third, the treaty 
makes space for customary jurisdiction: Papuans and Torres Strait 
Islanders behave towards each other according to their evolving protocols, 
as they use the seas and lands of the Torres Strait. 
How the wishes of Torres Strait Islanders 
came to matter
In 1901, when the Australian colonies confederated to form the 
Commonwealth, the new nation’s border in the Torres Strait was where 
the colony of Queensland had drawn it in 1879, thus including within 
Queensland (and consequently Australia) all residents of 17 inhabited 
islands (out of 100 islands in total) in the Torres Strait. Three of 
these islands are very close to the Papuan coast: Saibai, Dauan and Boigu. 
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Under  the federal compact, Queensland controlled the Strait’s seaways 
and  sea bottom. Some of this power shifted to the Commonwealth 
when the Whitlam Government passed the Sea and Submerged Lands 
Act 1973, but Queensland retained authority over the fishing rights of 
the entire Strait. Queensland also administered the lives of those living 
on Torres  Strait’s 13  reserves. The 1967 referendum had given the 
Commonwealth concurrent power over these people, but by the time the 
Whitlam Government was elected in December 1972, the Commonwealth 
had declined to use this new power, respecting Queensland’s continuing 
legal and administrative supremacy over Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples.
The imminence of Papua New Guinea’s independence forced the 
Commonwealth to rethink its relationship to the Torres Strait. Australians 
who wished to deal equitably with Papua New Guinea saw the boundary 
as unjustifiably favouring Australia. Whitlam had hypothesised in May 
1972 that, if the future nation of Papua New Guinea were to litigate 
the International Court of Justice, Australia would not be able to defend 
a  border that enlarged Australia at the expense of the new nation. 
Whitlam would have been aware of a motion passed by Papua New 
Guinea’s House of Assembly in May 1972, moved by Ebia Olewale and 
Naipura Maina, that the border be moved south to latitude 10˚ south. 
Olewale continued in the next few years to press this view, asserting that 
‘the people are Papuans, and my elders can trace the history of how these 
people migrated down to those islands’. While Olewale conceded that 
‘they might be rightful owners’, he thought it relevant that: 
They have relatives on the Papuan coast, who also claim that they 
own those islands. There are relatives living on those islands and 
there are relatives living on the Papuan coast … these same people 
have got to be brought together, and the only solution is to move 
this border south.5
The Queensland Government understood itself to be in a strong position 
to block such a change because, under Section 123 of the Colonial 
Boundaries Act (passed by the British Parliament in 1895, but binding the 
Commonwealth from 1901), the Commonwealth Parliament may alter 
the boundary of a state only with the consent of the parliament of that 
state and the approval, by referendum, of the majority of the electors 
5  Quoted in Griffin, The Torres Strait, xxii; and see Griffin, ‘Impasse’.
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of that state. The Premier of Queensland, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, told 
Canberra that he would not give a portion of his state to another country. 
Queensland’s conservative government was confident that Queenslanders 
would support standing up to ‘Canberra’. Over the next five years, the 
government of Queensland presented itself to the public (and especially 
to the Torres Strait Islanders) as if it should be a third party to a border 
negotiation that was, strictly speaking, a matter for Australia and Papua 
New Guinea only. The tactics of Queensland were always to claim to be 
the only legitimate representative of the Torres Strait Islanders.
The Torres Strait had long had structures of political representation 
enabled by colonial government – the closest that Australia’s domestic 
colonial administration has come to ‘indirect rule’.6 The policy of the 
London Missionary Society (from its arrival in the Strait in 1871) had 
included the formation of Indigenous enterprises from 1897. In 1899, 
‘without precedent anywhere in the Pacific’, the Government Resident 
John Douglas (on Thursday Island) had initiated elected councils to 
advise administrators on each island.7 Against the advice of Douglas, the 
Queensland Government in 1904 subjected the Islanders to the Aboriginals 
Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 1897; however, the 
councils continued. They were among a series of secular and religious 
institutions through which the Islanders participated actively in their 
own governance throughout the twentieth century. The Islanders staffed 
and, to a significant extent, managed the marine industries initiated by 
mission and government – the collection of trochus, trepang, pearls and 
pearl-shell. These industries were effectively subsidised by a continuing 
Indigenous economy of gardening and fishing, for the declaration of the 
islands as reserves left natural resources in Islander hands. In 1936, angered 
by officials’ control over their earnings, they demonstrated the strength 
of this Indigenous economy when they withdrew their labour from the 
commercial fishing fleet for four months. The Queensland Government 
response eventually included allowing each elected council authority over 
police and courts. A meeting of councillors in 1937 cancelled certain state 
by-laws, and the state government wrote these changes into the Torres 
Strait Islanders Act 1939, which differentiated the Islanders’ governance 
from the administration of Queensland Aboriginal people’s lives. Wartime 
6  Silverstein, Governing Natives has recently argued that reforms proposed in the Commonwealth’s 
administration of the Northern Territory in 1939 would have produced ‘indirect rule’ had they been 
implemented. 
7  Beckett, Torres Strait Islanders, 45.
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service further confirmed the Islanders’ sense of worth and entitlement. 
Over 700 Islanders served, most of them in the Torres Strait Light Infantry 
Battalion or the Torres Strait Pioneer Company (in contrast, there was 
no distinct ‘Aboriginal’ corps in the Second World War). From 1949, 
the state’s system of ‘indirect rule’ included recognising a trio of Strait 
representatives – those elected from the Western, Central and Eastern 
island reserves. Beckett has pointed out the continuity of representative 
personnel, each man’s community standing sustained by his job – boat 
captain, local official, store-manager. The Islanders were also proud of the 
persistence of the Strait’s two languages, Miriam and Mabuiag, and their 
fervent adherence to Christianity did not extinguish reverence for the 
ancestors of their pre-colonial cosmology. Their mainland contact with 
Aboriginal people told them that Islanders were a comparatively well-
treated colonised people. Most Islanders residing in the Strait were not 
restless for change, but anxious to continue the security that Queensland’s 
hegemony afforded.8 The Queensland premier was therefore building 
confidently on a long tradition of government-solicited Islander politics 
in his February 1973 tour of the island reserves, when he endorsed the 
formation of a ‘Border Action Committee’.
For the Whitlam Government to develop a border policy, it had either 
to accept what amounted to a Queensland/Islander veto on any change 
in the border’s position (a hopeless start to any conversation with the 
leaders of Papua New Guinea) or to open its own line of communication 
with the Torres Strait Islanders, so that its public negotiating position 
(when talks with Papua New Guinea began) would be safe from the Torres 
Strait Islanders’ denunciation. Once in power, Whitlam was advised to 
be less specific about where he would like the boundary. The Chair of 
the Council for Aboriginal Affairs (CAA), Dr H. C. Coombs, warned 
Whitlam in January 1973 that he must take seriously not only that the 
Islanders felt ‘genuine anxiety and concern’ about the possible border 
change, but also that they were evidently pleased that the Queensland 
Government was voicing their opposition to it. In the same memorandum, 
Coombs recommended that Whitlam set up a series of meetings between 
the CAA and the Islanders, between the Islanders’ representatives 
and members of Whitlam’s Cabinet (Whitlam, Bill Morrison, Foreign 
Minister, and Gordon Bryant, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs), and 
between representatives of Papua New Guinea and the Islanders. 
8  Fisk and Tait, ‘Rights’.
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Perhaps, from such meetings, the Islanders would assent to the border 
change in exchange for security of land tenure, joint citizenship and the 
continuation of Australia’s social service and other benefits. ‘It would be 
important that Islanders’ representatives see [the solutions resulting from 
these meetings] as successes won by their personal efforts. They would 
then be more likely to advocate them among their own people.’9 In a joint 
statement with Michael Somare (Chief Minister of Papua New Guinea) 
on 17 January 1973, Whitlam declared that Australia was willing to 
negotiate the relocation of the border with Papua New Guinea, and that 
the Queensland Government and the Islanders would be consulted.
What could the Whitlam Government offer Torres Strait Islanders that 
they were not already getting from Queensland’s patronage? The national 
government, at that time, had little first-hand knowledge of a people that 
had long been administered exclusively by the Queensland Government. 
The 1971 Australian Census had counted 9,664 people of Torres Strait 
Islander descent. Of the 3,926 living on the islands of the Strait, 2,348 
were residents of reserves administered by the Queensland Government. 
If we add the residents of Bamaga Reserve, on the tip of Cape York, we 
can say that there were 2,932 Islanders living under the Queensland 
Government’s direct supervision in 1971. More than half (59 per cent) 
of those identifying as Torres Strait Islanders in 1971 did not live on the 
islands of the Strait but on the mainland: 37 per cent in Queensland, the 
other 22 per cent in the other states and territories of Australia. Islanders 
were numerous on the mainland because they were confident that they 
could improve their lot by selling their labour in the wider Australian 
economy. This diaspora maintained a sense of connection with the land, 
seas and people of the Strait, despite long absences, but they were not the 
subjects of Queensland Government patronage, and indeed some had left 
the reserves because they had fallen foul of the Queensland Government 
and of Torres Strait Islanders to whom the state had delegated a degree of 
power. Was their estrangement from the reserves an opportunity for the 
Whitlam Government to (in Coombs’s words to Bryant) ‘break the nexus 
between the Torres Strait Islanders and the Queensland government’? 10 
Could transactions between the Commonwealth and the Islanders form 
a new public version of the Islanders ‘interest’, removing a domestic 
political obstacle to negotiating a new border? 
9  Coombs to Whitlam, 10 January 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 360–61.
10  Coombs to Whitlam, 16 March 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 363.
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The Whitlam Government did not tackle this question in a unified way in 
1973; the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Gordon Bryant, competed with 
the CAA in finding a way to talk to the Islanders. Since 1970, the Office 
of Aboriginal Affairs (OAA), the executive arm of the CAA, had been 
reaching out to the people of the Strait in an exploration of possible paths 
of regional economic development. The OAA had funded a zoologist 
from The Australian National University (ANU), Dr Robert Bustard, 
to experiment in the farming of turtles in the Strait. When Bustard left 
ANU in 1971, the OAA recommended further funding for his project – 
now known as Applied Ecology. Bustard was necessarily in continuous 
dialogue with turtle-farming Islanders about how they saw their future. 
The CAA was also briefed by Jeremy Beckett, an anthropologist who had 
started to visit the Strait in 1958, leading to his 1964 PhD thesis and 
to ongoing visits. Initiating their own contact in Cairns on 14 February 
1973, the CAA (Coombs, Barrie Dexter and William Stanner) met with 
Tanu Nona, Getano Lui (Snr) and George Mye (who currently represented 
the Western, Central and Eastern island reserves), confirming that the 
Islanders wished to send a delegation to Canberra.
Bryant did not want the CAA to be the only source of his government’s 
knowledge of Strait politics; he sought to establish his own ‘task force’ 
for consultations, but this was quickly vetoed by Whitlam, acting on 
Coombs’s advice.11 Bryant sent a staff member to the Strait in March 1973 
to prepare the Islanders for a visit from Bryant himself in April. Believing 
the council chairmen to be too beholden to the state government, Bryant 
and his staff paid a lot of attention to Islanders not living on the reserves 
(i.e. to politically articulate Islanders on Thursday Island). These two visits 
made the councillors on the reserves uneasy; their coolness towards Bryant 
confirmed his assessment of them as no more than ‘favoured sons of the 
Queensland government’, unlike the progressive Islanders he had been 
able to speak to on Thursday Island.12 Bryant’s visit placed Barrie Dexter, 
Secretary of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, in an awkward position. 
Formally responsible for carrying out his minister’s plans, Dexter had 
become convinced that they were ill-conceived. The cardinal rule guiding 
Commonwealth diplomacy in the Strait must be to avoid offending 
the men who were powerful in the reserve councils and who were, for the 
moment, supporting the Border Action Committee; Bryant’s overtures 
11  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 364.
12  Bryant to Whitlam, 29 May 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 293–94.
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had broken that rule. This tension within the Whitlam Government’s 
early diplomacy towards the Islanders reflected not only wider tensions 
between Bryant’s and the CAA’s approach to ‘Aboriginal affairs’, they also 
were rooted in the differentiating impact of Queensland’s years of indirect 
rule. Some Islanders had flourished under Queensland reserve supervision 
and others had found it better to escape the reserves (to Thursday Island 
or the mainland). Those who had left were apt to be regarded as exiles 
by those who stayed, their claims to political participation sometimes 
contested by the reserve chairmen and by Queensland’s officials.
Between February and June 1973, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs 
was arranging to bring Islander representatives to Canberra for a face-
to-face meeting with Prime Minister Whitlam, and the department 
felt it had no choice but to respect the wishes of the Island Advisory 
Council chairmen about who could speak for the Torres Strait Islanders. 
Bryant sought to include an additional 12 Islanders whom he judged 
less compliant with Queensland Government wishes. When the official 
delegation of 42 gathered in Canberra on 12 and 13 June, it voted to 
exclude Bryant’s 12. This and other missteps by Bryant led to Whitlam 
replacing him with James Cavanagh on 9 October 1973. Cavanagh 
trusted the CAA’s approach to giving Islanders voice to Canberra, and so 
his appointment confirmed that the Torres Strait Islanders to whom the 
Whitlam Government would listen were those established leaders with 
whom both the Queensland Government and (increasingly) the CAA 
felt comfortable.
The Torres Strait Islands as a 
Commonwealth territory?
Before describing what the Whitlam Government learned from its June 
1973 meeting with Torres Strait Islanders, we should note the wider 
context of the Australian Government’s Strait diplomacy: the Whitlam 
Government’s aspiration to end the Queensland Government’s control 
over Aboriginal and Islander lives.
To ‘break the nexus between the Torres Strait Islanders and the Queensland 
government’, as the CAA advised Whitlam on 16 March (and substantially 
repeated to Bryant on 11 April 1973), the Australian Government should 
legislate Commonwealth control over all reserves in all states, and then 
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give Aboriginal residents title ‘in accordance with traditional native 
law and practice’.13 The government could then establish the Torres 
Strait reserve islands as a separate Commonwealth territory, governed 
by a council representing the former island reserves. To legitimise such 
an intervention, the government should conduct a referendum among 
Islanders ‘to ratify (a) the relocation of the border, (b) the establishment of 
the Commonwealth Torres Strait Territory, (c) the legislation to confirm 
traditional land tenure, [and] (d) the measure to protect Islanders’ fishing 
rights within the Torres Strait area’.14 This would remove the Queensland 
Government from the politics of negotiating a new boundary with Papua 
New Guinea and give Australia an explicit Islander mandate to negotiate 
a border change with Papua New Guinea. In such negotiations with Papua 
New Guinea, the CAA further advised, Australia should seek agreement 
that Australia would continue to be sovereign over the islands, rocks and 
reefs to the north of the new boundary. Repeating this advice to Bryant 
on 11 April 1973, the CAA gained Bryant’s support.15
Barrie Dexter later acknowledged that one of the CAA’s greatest political 
failures was not persuading the Whitlam or Fraser governments to take 
over Queensland’s reserves.16 Although Whitlam and Bryant announced 
in September 1973 that they would do so, and that they would fight 
Queensland in the High Court if necessary, Whitlam referred the policy 
to an interdepartmental committee that took until April 1975 to make 
a submission to Cabinet. Cabinet sent the idea back to this committee for 
reconsideration of the policy’s administrative complexities and financial 
costs. By the time the Whitlam Government fell on 11 November 1975, 
Cabinet had still not agreed to a workable course of action.
There is no doubt that some Torres Strait Islanders supported the idea of 
making the Torres Strait a territory of the Commonwealth. At a Townsville 
seminar to discuss the border issue, held under the joint auspices of the 
Townsville College of Advanced Education and the North Queensland 
branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs on 29–31 
October 1976, Murray Island–born Eddie Mabo endorsed the proposal 
as a step towards Torres Strait Islanders’ autonomy – first within Australia 
and then (possibly) outside Australia:
13  Coombs to Whitlam, 16 March 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 363.
14  Coombs to Whitlam, 16 March 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 363.
15  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 356.
16  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 477.
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We are a people of unique identity and we should work towards 
an ultimate goal of independence. We want to be recognised 
separately from our Papuan brothers and from our Australian 
brothers. We are the Islanders … I would like to suggest that the 
Federal Government take over all the Torres Strait region from 
Queensland and then negotiate with the Islanders themselves to 
vest their administration in their own hands. The area could then 
be declared an autonomous region within the Commonwealth of 
Australia with its own sovereign rights and the right to secede.17 
Australian Government caution about taking over all Aboriginal and 
Islander reserves in Queensland meant that a referendum was never held 
to test Islander support for making the Torres Strait a Commonwealth 
territory. More pertinent to this chapter is that the idea of such a territory 
quickly became irrelevant to solving the specific political problem of 
securing an Islander mandate for border negotiation, because another 
solution emerged from the June 1973 meeting between the Australian 
Government and the Islander delegation.
Towards the protected zone
In the June 1973 meeting, Islanders rejected a border change, asserting that 
‘everything that is contained within the [current] border – land and waters 
– are ours by tradition’.18 According to the CAA’s notes, they rejected as 
misconception that, historically and culturally, they were linked with the 
Papuans. They did not acknowledge Papuan fishing rights in the Strait, 
though they admitted to tolerating Papuans fishing at Warrior Reef. They 
spoke proudly of establishing their supremacy over Papuans in nineteenth-
century battles. The representatives were unanimous also in rejecting oil 
drilling in the Strait: ‘any spills would destroy everything that means 
life for our people’.19 When questioned on the possibility of petroleum 
royalties, they insisted that they were interested in survival, not in wealth. 
They said that they wanted their Australian citizenship to continue, and 
they wished Australia to retain the uninhabited islands close to the Papuan 
coast, seeing them as belonging to residents of islands  nearby.20 When 
17  Mabo, ‘Perspectives’, 35. Emphasis in original.
18  George Mye cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 367.
19  Mye cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 367.
20  The DAA notes on this meeting are included in H. C. Coombs’s Minutes to Whitlam, H. C. 
Coombs Papers, National Library of Australia (NLA) MS 802, Box 46, between Minutes 135/73 and 
136/73.
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Whitlam joined this meeting (welcomed by the Islanders’ hymns), he 
made it clear that he wanted them to consider a border change. He cited 
United Nations’ interest in the border issue since 1971, and foreshadowed 
that Papua New Guinea would get self-government on 1 December 1973 
and full independence 12 or 15 months after that.
Assessing these discussions for Whitlam, Coombs summarised what he 
understood to be the Islanders’ position:
1. the land and sea is all one region owned by them; 2. they are 
ethnically distinct from Papuans; 3. they opposed any oil or 
mineral development of the seabed, at any price; 4. they feared 
PNG control over the seas, as Japanese interests would be given 
permission to fish; 5. they did not like the proposal to move the 
border, and nor did their Papuan friends see any point in 
the change.21
The meeting made it possible for the Australian Government to discern 
differences among the Islanders’ hopes and fears. Not only were they 
fearful that parts of the Strait would be ceded to Papua New Guinea 
(a point already being made effectively by the Queensland premier), but 
they were worried that their seas would be despoiled by oil drilling (which 
the Queensland Government was more likely to permit). The prime 
minister told the Islander representatives in June that Queensland, not 
the Commonwealth, had been promoting off-shore oil drilling in the 
Strait.22 Thus was revealed a point of leverage for the Commonwealth: 
perhaps the Commonwealth could distinguish itself as the Islanders’ 
better champion by linking the change in the border with a promise of 
environmental protection?
At the June meeting in Canberra, Whitlam persuaded the Islanders to 
meet with Papuans from the coastal villages and discuss border change. 
They did so on Yam Island on 19 and 20 September 1973. Getano Lui 
(Snr) said of this discussion:
We told the Papuan people we did not want our border changed. 
They said they did not ask for it to be changed either. The Papuan 
people asked about fishing – they wanted to know if they could go 
on fishing in the Torres Strait. We said we were happy to share the 
21  Coombs to Whitlam, 12 June 1973, Minute 127/73, NLA MS 802, Box 46.
22  The 28-page transcript of the 12–14 June meeting of the Torres Strait Islander delegation in 
Canberra is in NLA MS 802, Box 11, folder 81.
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fishing. Both peoples said they were worried about the damage to 
our fishing grounds and islands if there was oil drilling or mining 
and we decided to ask for protection against this. Out of the 
conference there came an agreement between us – and we are the 
people directly involved.23
Coombs, who also attended the meeting, was quick to convey its 
resolutions to Whitlam:24
That the waterways between the Torres Strait and the coastal area 
of the western district of Papua New Guinea be reserved wholly 
and solely for the use of our two peoples, namely the coastal people 
of the villages of the western district of Papua New Guinea and the 
Islander inhabitants of the Torres Strait Islands as was tradition 
practised by our forebears; drilling for oil in such waters which 
could result in possible oil spillage and the consequent threat 
of pollution to the environment be banned; fishing by outside 
interests should also be banned.25 
In combination, the Canberra and Yam Island meetings gave the CAA 
confidence that the border change proposal could be reformulated so 
that environmental protection would be its central feature, a regime 
acknowledging the customary fishing practices of both Torres Strait 
Islanders and coastal Papuans. Referring to the ‘unique and integrated 
environment on which the livelihood and the culture and traditions of 
the Islanders and the peoples of the South-western coast of Papua-New 
Guinea depend’, the earliest draft of this proposal (in October 1973, 
shortly after Cavanagh succeeded Bryant as minister) outlined possible 
government guarantees of residents’ free movement and fishing. The 
Islanders and Papuans would have the benefit of scientific scrutiny of 
future ‘economic projects’ before any were submitted for approval by the 
chairmen of the councils of the Torres Strait Islands and of the coastal 
communities of south-western Papua New Guinea. In this proposal, 
the licensing of marine harvesting would be restricted to locals and to 
companies in which locals had at least 85 per cent equity. The Torres 
Strait would be administered ‘as a National Park in accordance with 
internationally accepted practices for such Parks’. If the governments 
of Australia and Papua New Guinea could agree to administer jointly 
a marine park in the Strait, perhaps they would not need to plot a precise 
23  As reported in the Courier Mail, 10 May 1976, and cited by Griffin, ‘Impasse’, 230.
24  Coombs to Whitlam, 24 September 1973, cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 369.
25  Resolutions of the Yam Island meeting are cited in Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 369.
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boundary between the two nations. Referring to permanent residents 
of the Torres Strait Islands and the south-western coast of Papua New 
Guinea, the draft recognised ‘traditional and customary practices of 
the local inhabitants with respect to the taking of fish and other living 
marine products’ and the right of ‘traditional and customary freedom of 
movement of local inhabitants’ including navigation.26 
Negotiations by the Fraser Government
Although in 1974 and 1975 the concept of a jointly administered 
protected zone without boundary found favour among some of the 
departments that were determining the Whitlam Government’s 
approach to negotiating with Papua New Guinea, the negotiations had 
not commenced by the time the Whitlam Government was sacked in 
November 1975. Champions of the Torres Strait Islander interest now 
had to pitch the protected zone model within an interdepartmental 
committee that would advise a government led by Malcolm Fraser. 
Their advocacy succeeded. On 26 February 1976, Cabinet (in Dexter’s 
summary) ‘endorsed the concept of a Protected Zone, preferably with no 
seabed boundary through it, and the concept of no prospecting or mining 
initially’.27 What remained in dispute, within the Fraser Government, was 
how closely the Australian Government should involve the Islanders in the 
consideration of its tactics once the negotiations started. As the Australian 
Government was anticipating pressure from Papua New Guinea to 
concede a hard border bisecting the Strait, it had to consider at what point 
to make tactical concessions to Papua New Guinea’s expectations. Unless 
there were close communications between Canberra and the Islander 
leaders, it was possible for the Queensland Government, not party to the 
border negotiation, to embarrass the Australian Government by telling 
the Islanders that Canberra was about to sell them out by allowing a new 
line to be drawn through the Strait.28 
26  In this paragraph I draw on two documents drafted by Coombs: ‘Drafting notes on Torres Strait 
Border’, 8 October 1973, NLA MS 802, Box 11, folder 81; and ‘Draft Agreement’, 29 October 1973, 
NLA MS 802, Box 12, folder 88.
27  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 451.
28  Dexter gives a detailed account of the battles within the Australian Government in Pandora’s Box, 
450–60.
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Islander leaders such as Getano Lui (Snr) were quick to warn the Fraser 
Government that, were the negotiators to concede such a new border, 
the Islanders would complain to the International Court and the United 
Nations; the Queensland Government said it would support them.29 
Within the Australian Government, some officials were more willing than 
others to take this risk; they saw justice in Papua New Guinea’s wish for 
a hard border bisecting the Strait, and they thought that there was a good 
chance that international adjudicators would agree. In this perspective, 
Australia’s tactics should be to signal early in the negotiations that it was 
sympathetic to pressure from Papua New Guinea to draw a hard median 
border. In April 1976, Commonwealth departments (Aboriginal Affairs 
and Attorney-General’s) that continued to present the Torres Strait Islander 
interest in a borderless protected zone found themselves standing between 
Australian officials preparing to concede a new border and those, outside 
the negotiations, opposed to this concession. Trying to persuade the Torres 
Strait Islanders not to turn back to the Queensland Government as their 
champion, the departments of Aboriginal Affairs and Attorney-General’s 
struggled against the Department of Foreign Affairs, seeking to maintain the 
Torres Strait Islander perspective within the Australian negotiating position.
In the ensuing negotiations, a compromise position emerged. A seabed 
resources line bisecting the Strait gave Papua New Guinea something 
of what it wanted, partly satisfying those who had thought it equitable 
between nation-states that the people and resources of the Strait be 
bisected, and partly satisfying those who wanted Australian sovereignty 
to continue over all the lands and seas that the Torres Strait Islanders 
understood to be their customary territory. The seabed resources boundary 
was a line of potential, not immediate, significance because the protected 
zone disallowed mining and drilling of the seabed for 10 years after the 
treaty’s commencement (and this embargo has since been extended).
Concluding reflections
This story would have made an apt case for the kind of history of 
decolonisation practised by Tracey Banivanua-Mar – a perspective on 
decolonisation made possible, she once wrote, by ‘the angle of vision 
offered from the Pacific’.30 That is, instead of supposing that the only 
29  Dexter, Pandora’s Box, 452.
30  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 8.
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significant territorial results of decolonisation have been clearly bounded 
independent nation-states, historians of decolonisation should look for 
evidence of what the colonised peoples wanted and considered themselves 
entitled to have. If we ‘refocus on people rather than territory, as agents 
of decolonisation’, then we may notice Pacific Indigenous ‘formations 
of decolonisation’ that have ‘exceeded the nation’. Banivanua-Mar’s 
framework sensitises the historian to Pacific peoples’ aspirations to devise 
political structures that correspond with their own evolving sense of who 
the Pacific’s peoples are and how they want to relate to each other; such 
a history would note the distinctions that such peoples would make 
among themselves and the relationships that they wish to sustain. Such 
histories ‘may learn of the innovative means by which independence and 
self-determination were practised in the absence of it being gifted by 
administering states’.31 
I have puzzled over why Banivanua-Mar did not see the possible richness 
of the Torres Strait case for her 2016 book; perhaps she would have 
tackled it had her productive life not ended so early. But her professed 
interest in what she calls ‘stateless forms of decolonisation’ may be a clue 
to the absence of the Torres Strait border story from her work.32 For Torres 
Strait Islander agency in the period 1973–78 was hardly ‘stateless’. On the 
contrary, the historical conditions of their awkward force (awkward from 
the point of view of the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea) 
included the fact that Australia is a federation with a long heritage of 
states (Queensland, at least) jealously preserving their patronage over their 
Indigenous people. Torres Strait Islander intransigence was amplified by 
Queensland’s insistence on its rights as a state. It is partly an effect of the 
politics of Australian federalism that two nation-states had to consider 
what Banivanua-Mar calls the ‘primarily transnational lateral connections 
and networks throughout the peripheries’ – in this case, the customary 
relationships between the Torres Strait Islanders and their nearest 
Papuan neighbours.33 
The Torres Strait Islanders, in the story that I have told, were 
simultaneously Queenslanders, Australians and familiar neighbours of 
coastal Papuan villagers. As Queenslanders they had long experience 
of  indirect rule. As  Australians they had recently become fully eligible 
31  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 8.
32  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 20.
33  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 9.
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for welfare payments that were generous by the standards of their region. 
As sea-going peoples of the Strait, they saw value in state protection of 
shared marine resources. In 1973 they began to announce themselves as 
critics of a particular instance of what Banivanua-Mar calls the ‘imperial’ 
assumption that decolonisation is a two-party transaction – in this case, 
between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Such an ‘imperial’ view of 
the border issue persists in Donald Denoon’s 2009 remark: ‘a deal could 
perhaps have been struck much sooner, if not for the Islanders stubborn 
resistance.’34 His words express both ‘imperial’ frustration that a two-
sided transaction became devilishly three-sided and admiration for Torres 
Strait Islander gumption. 
The resulting Torres Strait Treaty hopefully expresses a community of 
interest among those living partly on the marine resources of the Torres 
Strait. Olewale represented this community of interest as ‘Papuan’, but 
in the September 1973 Yam Island meeting it was possible to represent 
the people of the Strait without such singular ethnicity. Before that 
meeting, when briefing Canberra in June 1973, Torres Strait Islanders 
had clearly stated their longstanding sense of distinction from, and even 
superiority over, the coastal Papuans who also used parts of the Strait’s 
fisheries. Political circumstances generated a search for common interests. 
The resulting protected zone is not only an agreed jurisdictional overlap 
between two nation-states, but also the continuing commons of these 
sea-going peoples. With the emergence of Papua New Guinea from 
Australia’s mandate, and with the currency of the idea that equitable 
dealing required Australia to cede seas and islands to the new nation, it 
became politically necessary for the Papuans and the Torres Strait Islanders 
to state joint opposition to nation-state partitioning and economic 
development of a  region of their customary mingling. The Papua New 
Guinea independence process and the politics of Australian federalism 
were the contexts in which the Strait’s ‘primarily transnational lateral 
connections and networks throughout the peripheries’ could be 
simultaneously Papuan and Torres Strait Islander.35
34  Denoon, The Hundred, 12. 
35  Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation, 9.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW 






UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 





Indigenous peoples in Australia are not seeking full political independence 
(or external self-determination) but rather the right of Indigenous 
self-determination as spelled out in articles 3–15 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).1 This 
chapter explores how this notion of self-determination has developed in 
international law and how it applies to Indigenous peoples in Australia. 
I have written this chapter from the standpoint that self-determination 
could and should apply in a regionally differentiated way as determined 
freely by each group in accordance with their own customs and 
traditions.2 I will illustrate ways that Australia’s approach to Indigenous 
self-determination has been and is still affected by the institutions of 
Australia’s federation.
1  UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
2  See also, Wood, ‘Constitutional Recognition’, 104–13.
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First, I show how Australia’s dualistic approach to international legal 
obligations influences the domestic implementation of self-determination. 
Second, I examine the legal lacuna that have arisen from the interactions 
between Australia’s constitutionally entrenched notion of terra nullius 
and Australia’s common law and legislative recognition of Indigenous 
people.3 Third, I will examine the evolution of the concept of self-
determination, with particular attention to the meanings of ‘peoples’ and 
‘self-determination’ in international law. I will conclude by considering 
the prospects for self-determination for Indigenous peoples in Australia.
Dualism: International law in Australia
‘Dualism’, as it applies in Australia, can be explained by citing High Court 
of Australia Justice Anthony Mason: 
It is a well settled principle of the common law that a treaty not 
terminating a state of war has no legal effect upon the rights and 
duties of Australian citizens and is not incorporated into Australian 
law on its ratification by Australia.4 
International law is not self-effecting. After Australia ratifies an instrument 
of international law, the Parliament of Australia must then decide whether 
to incorporate this instrument to give domestic effect to its provisions. 
For example, Australia signed the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on 13 October 1966, 
but it was not until 1975 that the Australian Parliament legislated the 
Racial Discrimination Act to implement Australia’s obligations under that 
convention. Below, I will describe Australia’s approach to instruments of 
international law that codify the right of self-determination. First, it is 
necessary to examine the implications of ‘dualism’. 
Dualism affects the analysis of self-determination in this chapter in two 
ways. First, self-determination is largely a creature of international law, 
but Australian law does not automatically recognise international law 
concepts deriving in the international plane. For international law that 
is not already a part of the broader common law or unambiguously 
3  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1.
4  Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 224–25 (per Mason J).
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part of customary international law to be binding under Australian law, 
the parliament must decide whether to incorporate these international 
obligations into domestic law, as I have explained.5 
Second, Australia is not a unitary legal or political entity but a federation, 
so the six states retain plenary power, and Section 106 of the Australian 
Constitution preserves state constitutions. States’ plenary powers include 
jurisdiction over land and inland waters, likely to be material to self-
determination for Indigenous people for whom land is significant. If the 
Australian Government wishes to bind state governments to take a certain 
approach to land rights that originate in the international plane, it has 
the power to do so. Under Section 51(xxix), the federal parliament has 
primary responsibility for external affairs, and it is empowered by the 
Constitution to enter into and incorporate international obligations into 
laws that could be made binding on the states and territories. Further, the 
Australian Constitution was amended by referendum in 1967 to give the 
Australian Government power to pass law in respect of ‘the people of any 
race’; in the recent past, only Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
have been subject to laws enacted under this provision. If an Australian 
government has the constitutional power to make a law and thinks it is 
necessary to invalidate state law, to the extent of any inconsistency with 
federal laws, it has that power to do so under Section 109, thus enabling it 
to create national laws, including treaty-based laws with respect to land.6 
While the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory have 
been self-governing since 1989 and 1978, respectively, under Section 
122, the federal parliament ‘may make laws for the government of any 
[Australian] territory’ – a very broad power that can negate territory 
laws, in effect allowing the federal parliament domestically to incorporate 
international obligations that can then apply nationally.7
Australian common law and this model of federation affect the way that 
Australia acts on its international obligations. A decision by the national 
government to act in accordance with an international instrument on 
5  That is, opinio juris or that Australia must believe that it is legally bound (by a law through custom): 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Merits, International Court of Justice (ICJ) Reports 1986, 14, para. 176, 194, 237. Customary 
international law is binding on all nations: North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, 
para. 39, 77. See Higgins, Problems, 204.
6  Australian Constitution, s. 109, and s. 122 for matters related to territories.
7  For example, the rights created under the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT) were negated 
by the federal parliament’s Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth).
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Indigenous self-determination (such as the UNDRIP) could trigger 
political negotiations among Australian governments. This mediation of 
international law through Australia’s domestic, intergovernmental politics 
may affect how self-determination will operate in practice. Conversely, 
and to avoid the heavy hand of the parliament, Indigenous people would 
like to ensure that the principles of the UNDRIP will frame future 
negotiations and would seek to maintain the integrity of the instrument 
and the spirit in which the UNDRIP was formulated.
The interaction between such a federal system and self-determination 
‘models’ for Indigenous peoples in Australia is likely to give rise to 
separate agreements between Indigenous groups and between the different 
jurisdictions in the federation. Consequently, a number of different self-
determination models may emerge from the interplay between the various 
Indigenous groups and federal, state, territory and international laws. 
Further, Indigenous traditional territories do not necessarily fall neatly 
within state or territory boundaries, potentially creating a conflict of laws 
between different Australian jurisdictions.
Australian sovereignty: A legal question 
yet to be resolved
At Possession Island, Cape York, on 22 August 1770, Captain James Cook 
claimed possession of what he called ‘New South Wales’ for the British 
Crown. Colonisation began in January 1788, with Britain’s formation 
of a  penal colony at Port Jackson. When the British Crown asserted 
sovereignty over the Australian continent, international law provided three 
separate grounds for the acquisition of territory: (a) conquest, (b) cession 
or (c) the settlement of an uninhabited tract of land.8
Apart from ‘treaty’ negotiations in 1835 between the Kulin people and 
settlers led by John Batman – the outcome of which the Crown refused to 
recognise as legitimate – Indigenous peoples have never negotiated with 
a view to possibly ceding territory.9 Further, in Australian legal doctrine, 
the British did not win sovereignty over the continent by conquest, even 
though at certain times the colonial governors in New South Wales 
8  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1; Dodson, Bailey and Wood, ‘Australia and 
International Protection’.
9  Attwood (with Doyle), Possession, 13–101.
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(in 1824) and in Van Diemen’s Land (1828–32) declared martial law in 
response to armed Aboriginal resistance.10 If neither cession nor conquest 
was the basis of Britain’s sovereignty, Australian law developed on the basis 
of what Andrew Fitzmaurice calls the ‘enlarged notion of terra nullius’ 
(that the continent, while not strictly uninhabited, was not populated by 
people capable of exercising sovereign power over it).11 British control over 
the continent was consistent with (c): the doctrine that the Aboriginal 
inhabitants did not live under a system of government and law. That is, 
Australian federal law until 1992 implicitly or explicitly denied the prior 
existence of a civilised human population on the continent, denying 
‘visibility’ (or legal personality) to Indigenous peoples as the original 
sovereigns; instead, colonial law had treated Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples as British subjects whose rights could be (and were) 
limited by legislation. That Australia’s colonial law was based on the legal 
fiction of ‘terra nullius’ was explicitly enunciated and rejected by the High 
Court in 1992, as factually and morally flawed and as a ‘narrow and … 
rigid’ doctrinal basis for Australia’s sovereignty.12
Although the High Court recognised that Australia was not terra nullius 
(negating ‘settlement’ as a lawful means of acquiring inhabited lands), it 
did not declare a substitute legal basis for Australia’s claim of sovereignty, 
saying that the question of sovereignty was a matter outside the competence 
of a municipal court.13 This posture leaves no further domestic legal 
avenues for plaintiffs wanting to test the legality of Australian claims of 
sovereignty. Litigation and/or negotiations on questions of sovereignty 
and self-determination should be conducted on the international plane.
Further, in the absence of a treaty between Australia and the Indigenous 
peoples of Australia, the principle of uti possidetis holds that territory 
remains with its (original) possessor (i.e. Indigenous people, at the end 
of a conflict).14 Therefore, in the absence of an Australian common law 
theory as to how sovereignty was acquired, at international law Australia 
arguably remains under its original possessors. Their common law rights 
became ‘visible’ to Anglo-Australian law in 1992 when the High Court 
recognised customary law as a source of law for Indigenous peoples 
10  Connor, The Australian, 58, 91. And see Reynolds, Aboriginal.
11  Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, 328.
12  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. See paragraph 12 of the joint judgment of Justices 
Deane and Gaudron.
13  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 2.
14  Steiner and Alston, International.
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in Australia. As the legal question of Australia’s sovereignty remains 
unresolved, there is both an opportunity and a space for negotiations and 
discussions on self-determination without preconditions. Because there 
is no doctrinal answer to the question of how sovereignty was acquired, 
the principle of uti possidetis puts Indigenous Australians in a position to 
negotiate under international law.
Although this is not a relevant consideration for Indigenous peoples 
who have never ceded sovereignty, one objection by the Australian state 
to allowing disputes over Australian sovereignty to be resolved in the 
international plane is that such negotiations would diminish the Crown’s 
own claim to sovereignty. However, and again while this is not directly 
relevant from an Indigenous perspective, there are other domains of law in 
which UN member states have voluntarily agreed to weaken their claims 
to absolute sovereignty – such as multilateral commercial treaties that give 
rights to corporations to litigate the policies and laws of nation-states.15 
While acknowledging that claims over sovereignty and self-determination 
are complex matters, it is particularly for this reason that I suggest that 
these discussions are better if conducted under international law and 
that negotiations take place in the international plane.16
Legal personality: Domestic 
and international
Indigenous people have always maintained their own sense of who they 
are as sovereign peoples. This chapter is a critique of the common law 
in Australia and consequently does not examine the question of the 
recognition of the Australian state by Indigenous peoples. Australia, while 
initially denying their existence through the legal fiction of terra nullius 
has recently recognised their ‘legal personality’ that would now lawfully 
(under the common law) enable the Australian state to engage in such 
negotiations. The constitutive theory of recognition broadly holds in the 
realm of sovereigns, such that legal personality and its rights and obligations 
can only occur through mutual recognition.17 Recognition is a  branch 
15  See, for example, UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) 
Arbitration Rules, as revised in 2010, www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 2010 
Arbitration_rules.html.
16  Wood and Gardiner, ‘Identifying’.
17  See Lauterpacht, Recognition, xxxi.
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of international law administered by the executive.18 ‘Recognition’ of a 
‘People’ in international law, however, is a complex issue with a broader 
technical discussion outside the scope of this chapter.19 How might 
recognition be effected under Australian law?
‘Indigenous recognition’ in Australia has gradually, over time, been 
effected under the law. The rescission, by referendum, of Section 127 
of the Australian Constitution in 1967 is a striking example of a slow 
recognition of Indigenous people under Australian law. While Aboriginal 
people have been enumerated by various colonial administrations since 
the early nineteenth century, an administrative practice continuing under 
every federal census, the population data so generated could not be used 
(in the words of Section 127) to ‘reckon the numbers of the people of the 
Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth’. This 
section had not stopped governments from counting and estimating an 
‘Aboriginal population’, but it had stopped them from including those 
numbers in the published tables of the ‘Australian population’; their 
exclusion materially affected the calculation of the number of House 
of Representatives electorates in each state. One effect of the rescission 
of Section 127 was that, from 1968, when authorities compiled tables 
of the ‘Australian population’ the people known as ‘Aborigines’ and 
as ‘Torres Strait Islanders’ were now added to the nation’s total; at the 
same time, governments continued to publish figures on the ‘Aboriginal 
population’.20 Many Indigenous people welcome this revised approach 
(combining inclusion and distinction) as Australia’s recognition of them 
as distinct populations within the Australian population – a step towards 
the recognition in the common law of their peoplehood in 1992.
From time to time, Australian prime ministers have used words that 
arguably recognise Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders as 
‘peoples’. In 1988, Prime Minister Bob Hawke attended the annual 
Barunga Sport and Cultural Festival, hosted by the Jawoyn community. 
Galarrwuy Yunupingu and Wenten Rubuntja, chairs of the Northern 
and Central land councils, there presented Hawke with ‘The Barunga 
Statement’, a painted declaration of the aspirations of ‘the Indigenous 
owners and occupiers of Australia’; the statement requested that the 
18  Lauterpacht, Recognition, xxv. Alternatives, such as the declarative theory of recognition, are not 
considered here.
19  Lauterpacht, Recognition.
20  For the Australian Government’s and others’ reasoning in making these changes see Rowse and 
Smith, ‘The Limits’.
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Australian Government and people ‘recognise our rights’. Hawke’s speech 
at the festival agreed to the statement’s request for a treaty-making process. 
Prime Minister John Howard’s government reiterated this recognition of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples as the first inhabitants of the 
continent, and articulated it in an ultimately unsuccessful referendum 
in 1998.21
Under international law, prime ministers’ words are significant. In the 
Eastern Greenland Case (1933), the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) held that a country is bound by the undertakings given 
by its Minister of Foreign Affairs (in this case, a Norwegian minister) 
speaking in his official capacity.22 Thus, the words used by a head of 
government must also have significant, if not binding, effect on the 
international plane, even if subsequent words (including from some of 
the leader’s successors) do not explicitly reiterate that recognition. That 
is, even if these Australian leaders’ actions do not honour their words, the 
utterance of the words of recognition reinforces their sense of obligation 
and hence opinio juris on Indigenous recognition under international 
law. Determining the exact point at which custom crystallises into law is 
now a matter for the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which replaced 
the PCIJ in 1946. Further, while precedent does not strictly apply in the 
ICJ, the PCIJ’s decision in the 1933 Eastern Greenland Case is strongly 
indicative that, if litigated, the ICJ is likely to hold Australian leaders to 
their word. How such a case would be mounted is, however, a different 
issue. Fortunately, the existence of the notion of opinio juris allows 
groups such as Indigenous peoples with an emerging international legal 
personality to apply these concepts to states and to hold their leaders to 
their words even when litigation is not possible.
The executive (through parliament) has explicitly recognised Indigenous 
peoples in legislation – the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples 
Recognition Act 2013. The Act acknowledges that Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people are the first inhabitants of this nation; it includes 
a  broad timeframe for the holding of the referendum on recognition 
in the Constitution, without anticipating what forms such recognition 
will take. This law confirms the common law notion that Indigenous 
21  McKenna, ‘The Need’. The fact that the referendum was not successful is not relevant to 
international law.
22  Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Norway v Denmark), Judgement, 1933 Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) (ser. A/B) No. 53 (5 April).
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peoples are ‘peoples’ for purposes of domestic Australia law, permitting 
the parliament lawfully to enter into negotiations with Indigenous 
peoples.23 However, under Australia’s Westminster system, the parliament 
(at the executive’s will) can also rescind this legislation. This is an issue 
for Indigenous people, as the various parties here live on the same land 
but only one of these parties – the Australian state – possesses military 
capacity to enforce its will.
Constitutional amendment would be a more secure and lasting way to 
recognise Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders as ‘peoples’, and 
there is a ‘recognition process’ currently in train. Without constitutional 
recognition there is a significant gap between the common law, legislation 
and the Constitution. The significance of this lack of a comprehensive 
legal recognition of Indigenous Australian peoples under Australia’s 
domestic law is that Indigenous people are vulnerable to the whims of the 
executive. These deficiencies in the domestic law have a minimal impact 
for international law considerations.24
Notwithstanding the absence of constitutional recognition of Aboriginal 
peoples and Torres Strait Islander peoples as ‘peoples’, which, as mentioned 
above, can have practical implications for Indigenous peoples, legislative 
recognition by the parliament and executive clearly and unambiguously 
satisfies the technical test of mutual recognition according to international 
law. That is, Australia has recognised that Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples have legal personality; consequently, each of these 
groups is ‘a people’ in the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations 
(‘UN Charter’).25 As the ICJ said:
What [legal personality] does mean is that it [the body, in that case 
the UN but here Indigenous people] is a subject of international 
law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, 
and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing 
international claims.26 
23  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples Recognition Act 2013 (Cth).
24  Wood, ‘Constitutional Recognition: A Case’; Wood, ‘Constitutional Recognition and Racial 
Equality’. See also Article 27 (Internal law and observance of treaties) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, which prohibits states from using their domestic laws to avoid their 
international obligations.
25  United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. Approval by the Australian parliament: Charter of 
the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth).
26  Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ 
Rep, 180,183.
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For the purposes of Australian law and thus the Australian state, Indigenous 
Australians have the legal standing to negotiate treaties and to pursue self-
determination in both the domestic and international planes. This chapter 
examines the notion of self-determination only. The broader content of 
these treaties is outside the scope of the chapter and is examined elsewhere.27 
With international supervision, perhaps through the UN’s Human Rights 
Commission or (preferably, but less likely) the ICJ, Indigenous Australians 
could pursue self-determination.28 Internationally supervised treaty 
processes, including the rights to self-determination, are the better, more 
secure option for Indigenous people because they offer a degree of protection 
from the absolute, unilateral control of the executive, the parliament and 
the perils of trusting a dualistic legal system.29 
The development of the putative ‘right’ to 
self‑determination in international law
The right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination has developed in 
international law since the Second World War. There was no reference 
to ‘self-determination’ in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the draft 
UN Charter in late 1944.30 As a result of pressure from the Soviet Union, 
however, the charter accepted at San Francisco in June 1945 refers to 
self-determination:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and 
to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.31
Further, with reference to promoting international economic and social 
cooperation, the charter says:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
27  Wood and Gardiner, ‘Identifying’.
28  Wood, ‘Constitutional Recognition: A Case’.
29  Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. While this 
Convention refers to states as parties, it is arguable that these provisions could by agreement between 
the parties apply to ‘the Peoples’ entering into and concluding the treaty.
30  Hula, ‘Dumbarton’.
31  Article 1(2) UN Charter.
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a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems; and international cultural and educational 
cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion.32
The UN Charter does not refer to a ‘right to self-determination’ nor does it 
clarify who, beyond the charter’s broad reference to ‘Peoples’ (i.e. a group 
right), is the subject referred to by the word ‘self ’.
After the UN commenced, the Soviets continued to present 
‘self-determination’ as a ‘right’. At the second session of the General 
Assembly, the Soviet delegation proposed that the following words be 
included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
Each people and each nation has the right to national self-
determination. A state which has responsibility for the administration 
of self-determining territories, including colonies, must ensure the 
realisation of that right, guided by the principles and goals of 
the United Nations in relation to the peoples of such territories.33
However, the members of the UN that were still colonial powers opposed 
these words, and so the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
does not mention ‘self-determination’ of peoples.
In the 1940s, the concept of ‘self-determination’ was understood 
to apply  to the anticipated process of decolonisation. That is, it was 
understood to refer to the ‘external self-determination’ that would be 
enabled by the formal withdrawal of imperial dominion from colonised 
territories. As the European empires receded and enabled the formation of 
new nations, this concept of ‘self-determination’ was reinforced. Seventeen 
newly independent states were present at the opening of the Fifteenth 
Session of the General Assembly in 1960. The effect was to intensify the 
UN’s attention on the right of external self-determination, resulting in 
the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
32  Article 55 UN Charter.
33  Quoted by Bowring, ‘Positivism’, 159.
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and Peoples’ in December 1960.34 The Preamble and Article 2 of this 
declaration had a broad reference to self-determination and required 
all states to ‘end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’.35 This 
declaration did not receive unanimous support. Nine colonial member 
states, including Australia, abstained from this vote. Although Australia 
was an independent state, it cherished colonial connections, with a deep 
and enduring commitment to Britain, as demonstrated in its founding 
documents, language, parliamentary processes and conventions, and the 
judicial system that invokes the prayer of ‘God save the Queen’ (albeit 
the Queen of Australia).36 However, the anti-colonial mood was powerful 
within the UN in the 1960s, resulting in General Assembly Resolution 
1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, ‘Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources’ and Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1965, ‘The Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’. 
In such resolutions, the General Assembly reaffirmed colonised peoples’ 
right to self-determination.
In tracking the rapid evolution of international law, we must note the 
significance of some member nations’ dissent from such resolutions: 
dissent means that the resolution ranks lower in the hierarchy of the 
sources of international law as set out in the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.37 Unanimous adoption arguably reflects that a resolution 
codifies international custom and state practice, and so unanimous 
resolutions rank higher as a source of law.38 Conventions and covenants 
(when ratified or when they become customary law), on the other hand, 
are binding at international law. So it was significant that, in 1966, the 
UN General Assembly expanded the human rights regime founded on the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights by producing new international 
agreements that included the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
34  UN General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, UN Doc. A/RES/1514(XV). 
Adom Getachew has emphasised the discontinuity between the UN’s 1945 agreement that ‘self-
determination’ is a ‘principle’ and the 1960 resolution declaring ‘self-determination’ to be a ‘right’. 
In Getachew’s account, the ‘reinvention’ of self-determination as a ‘right’ was a hard-won victory for 
global (particularly African) anti-colonial diplomacy as it faced the persistent strength of the colonial 
powers in League of Nations and then United Nations affairs in the 1940s. Getachew, Worldmaking, 
Chapter Three.
35  UN General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV).
36  Wilson, International Law, 68.
37  Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the citation, 33 UNTS 993.
38  Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the citation, 33 UNTS 993.
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and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).39 Article 1 of the ICCPR is identical 
to Article 1 of the ICESCR and they are known as Common Article 1. 
It declares the right to self-determination for all peoples:
Article 1.
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their 
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, 
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international 
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those 
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-
Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization 
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that 
right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.
Steiner and Alston refer to the right to self-determination in Common 
Article 1 as ‘one of the most influential, debated and contested 
provisions’.40 Member states sought to limit the meaning and scope 
of self-determination in Common Article 1 so that it applied only to 
countries under ‘foreign domination’ and so that the words did not 
apply to independent states. Their efforts strengthened the concept of the 
territorial integrity of nation-states recognised by the UN.41 Thus, in the 
evolution of the concept of self-determination, it has become both possible 
and important to distinguish external self-determination (the right of 
a people to independent statehood) from internal self-determination that 
does not challenge the territorial integrity of the nation-state (the right 
of peoples to self-determination in the UNDRIP). Indigenous peoples are 
relatively weak politically and demographically and, consequently, settle 
pragmatically for internal self-determination only.
39  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, accessed 29 August 2018, www.refworld.org/docid/ 3ae 
6b3 aa0.html. UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
16 December 1966, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, accessed 29 August 2018, www.ref 
world.org/ docid/3ae6b36c0.html.
40  Steiner and Alston, International, 527.
41  Hannum, Autonomy, 41.
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Fear of internal fracturing by states is understandable as the drafting of the 
covenants goes back to the mid-1950s, a time when many states had just 
received independence and others were still to become independent of the 
colonising power. For example, India had received political independence 
from Britain in 1949 and then immediately experienced the breakup of 
its territory as West Pakistan (renamed Pakistan from 1971) and East 
Pakistan (renamed Bangladesh from 1971). Sensitive to the threat of 
further fragmentation, India declared in 1979 that the words ‘the right of 
self-determination’ ‘apply only to the peoples under foreign domination 
and that these words do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a 
section of a people or nation – which is the essence of national integrity’.42 
More recently, the situation in ex-Yugoslavia is a reminder that the UN’s 
member states do not want international law to be used to promote a 
general ‘Balkanisation’ of the globe.43 There remain instances of the 
tension between the principle of the territorial integrity of a member state 
and the principle of external self-determination, as distinct and relatively 
large minorities in some nation-states (such as the Catalan in Spain) seek 
political and/or economic independence.
As international law has developed, the UN has produced further 
statements that support the self-determination of peoples. In 1970, the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations (Friendly Relations Declaration) imposed on states 
the authoritative interpretation of seven charter principles. Principle 5 
of this declaration is ‘the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples’.44 In 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted the Friendly 
Relations Declaration without vote and so this decision represents 
consensus on the interpretation of these principles.45 Professor James 
Crawford includes self-determination in a list of jus cogens (peremptory) 
norms.46 The significance of the inclusion of this particular right by 
a judge of the ICJ is that, in his view, no derogation is possible from the 
right to self-determination.
42  India’s Reservation to the Common Article 1 [Dated 10 April 1979], United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Status of Treaties, treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
3&chapter=4&clang=_en.
43  Tomuschat, Modern.
44  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Adopted on 24 October 1970, A/RES/ 25/ 
2625(XXV).
45  Lowe, International, 100.
46  United Nations, International Law Commission, The International, 246–47.
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The development of the UNDRIP
The UNDRIP is the result of years of diplomacy and research by the UN’s 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations.47 The UN Human Rights 
Committee noted in 1982 that ‘the precise contours under international 
law of the right of self-determination remain in a state of flux’.48 One 
reason for this flux, by then, was that new answers were being given to 
the question of who could be recognised as a ‘minority’. In the 1970s, 
an international ‘indigenous’ lobby emerged within the broader UN 
bureaucracy, encouraged by the interest that the ECOSOC’s (Economic 
and Social Council’s) Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities expressed in 1971 in the problem of 
discrimination against Indigenous populations. While commissioning 
research, the subcommittee in 1982 also established a Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP). The flexible working methods adopted 
by the WGIP enabled many Indigenous people to present their historical 
experiences as distinguishing them from ethnic, religious and other 
minorities. The WGIP produced a draft declaration that was referred to 
the Commission on Human Rights, which established another working 
group. This second working group met on 11 occasions. Progress was 
slow because of certain states’ concerns regarding some key provisions of 
the declaration, such as Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination 
and the control over natural resources existing on Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional lands. The final version of the declaration was adopted on 
29 June 2006 by the 47-member Human Rights Council (the successor 
body to the Commission on Human Rights), with 30 member states in 
favour, 2 against, 12 abstentions and 3 absentees. The declaration was 
then referred to the General Assembly, which voted on the adoption 
of the proposal on 13 September 2007.49 Through these episodes in 
international diplomacy, the idea that there were specifically ‘indigenous’ 
groups with legitimate claims to self-determination became thinkable.50 
47  While the issues of Indigenous and Tribal peoples were originally considered by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) this chapter will not examine the resulting Conventions, as Australia 
refused to ratify both Convention 107 ‘Indigenous and Tribal Populations’ (1957) and Convention 
169 ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ (1989).
48  UN Human Rights Commission, ‘Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee: Fact 
Sheet no. 15 (rev. 1)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf; Pomerance, 
Self-determination.
49  Adopted by the General Assembly on 13 September 2007 with four states voting against and 11 
abstentions, www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm.
50  Pritchard, ‘Working’; Reed, Indigenous.
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Australia had actively participated in the drafting of the UNDRIP and, 
along with some other colonial states, it significantly slowed the draft’s 
evolution. When the resolution was put to vote in 2007, Australia voted 
against the UNDRIP and did so with three other countries: Canada, 
the United States of America and Aotearoa/New Zealand (all states that 
have a very similar colonial history to Australia). Australia subsequently 
endorsed the UNDRIP on 3 April 2009, reiterating that, as a declaration 
(as  opposed to a convention or covenant) the UNDRIP was not 
binding.51 This claim is technically true in Australia on two grounds. 
As a  declaration, in effect a resolution of the General Assembly, the 
instrument is not binding.52 Further, the instrument is not binding in 
Australia, as a dualistic nation, until incorporated into domestic law.53
Incorporating the UNDRIP into domestic law would provide a level of 
certainty and a collective understanding, including to legal terms related 
to self-determination when treaty negotiations within Australia begin. 
Constitutional recognition of Indigenous people would also remedy the 
defect of the inconsistency of ‘recognition’ between the common law 
and the Constitution as discussed above. Domestic incorporation of the 
UNDRIP in its original form would provide recognition of internationally 
framed rights of Indigenous peoples in Australian courts.
51  Endorsed by the Australian Government on 3 April 2009; ‘Chart of Australian Treaty 
Ratifications as of May 2012 – Human Rights at Your Fingertips’, Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 14  December 2012, www.humanrights.gov.au/chart-australian-treaty-ratifications-
may-2012-human-rights-your-fingertips-human-rights-your.
52  Öberg, ‘Legal’.
53  Indigenous people have argued that the UNDRIP codifies already existing international custom, 
which is binding on all nations. Australia does not accept this position as indicated by its vote against 
the adoption of the UNDRIP (Australia would not be able to vote against internationally accepted 
customary law). Further, while Indigenous peoples have a strong moral claim to their position the 
fact that the instrument (the UNDRIP) is a declaration and not a convention gives strength to 
the position of countries such as Australia, Canada, the US and Aotearoa/New Zealand.
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The prospects for Australia
It took about 10 years for the ICESCR and the ICCPR to receive the 
required number of ratifications and to enter into force in the international 
plane.54 Australia ratified the ICESCR in 1975 and the ICCPR in 1980.55 
Australia included the ICCPR as a schedule to the Australian Human 
Rights Commission Act 1986 and so the ICCPR forms part of Australian 
domestic law.56 The ICCPR arguably provides a broad but untested legal 
basis for the pursuit of self-determination. The UN’s Human Rights 
Commission says of the group right to self-determination granted in 
Common Article 1 that:
This right differs from the other Covenant rights in that it is 
a  right expressly ascribed to ‘peoples’ rather than to individuals 
… [I]t can safely be taken that a precondition for a full and 
genuine expression of self-determination on the part of a people 
is the enjoyment by its members in whole measure of the rights 
contained in the Covenant.57 
However, actions by Australian governments both domestically and in the 
international plane have given reason to doubt Australia’s commitment to 
self-determination. For example, after legislating the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 1989, the Australian Government 
extinguished it in two steps in 2004 and 2005. ATSIC – a body with 
specific executive powers, elected by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
adults – had been a substantial step towards self-determination. Further, 
in 1998, the Australian Government amended the Native Title Act 1993 
54  ICESCR entered into force on 3 January 1976; Australia ratified the ICESCR on 10 December 
1975: humanrights.gov.au/our-work/commission-general/international-covenant-economic-social-and-
cultural-rights-human-rights.
55  Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (New York, 16 December 1966), Entry into force generally: 3 January 1976; Entry into force 
for Australia: 10 March 1976’, Australian Treaty Series 1976 No. 5 (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service).
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New 
York, 16 December 1966), Entry into force generally (except Article 41): 23 March 1976; Entry into 
force for Australia (except Article 41): 13 November 1980; Article 41 came into force generally on 28 
March 1979 and for Australia on 28 January 1993’, Australian Treaty Series 1980 No. 23 (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service).
56  In Section 3 of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ‘Covenant’ is defined as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A copy of the English text of that Covenant 
is in Schedule 2, as that International Covenant applies in relation to Australia.
57  UN Human Rights Commission, Fact Sheet no. 15 (rev. 1).
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in ways that were calculated to appease non-Indigenous critics of native 
title. In 1998, the High Court held that the Australian Government’s use 
of the ‘race’ power was not limited to legislation that parliament judged 
to be beneficial.58 In 2006–07, the Australian Government amended the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 unilaterally.59 The 
parliament’s unilateral, lawful power to act against Indigenous interests 
within Australia, coupled with some examples of Australia’s current record 
on self-determination above, show that Indigenous rights are not likely to 
improve without at least some general international supervision. Further, 
and without resiling from the broader call for international supervision, 
since Indigenous peoples will exercise this specific right to internal 
self-determination under the umbrella of domestic law and domestic 
courts, domestic incorporation of the international definitions of self-
determination is crucial.
The UNDRIP’s vision of self-determination does not fragment the nation-
state; rather it explicitly articulates what internal self-determination means. 
If Australia is reluctant to incorporate the whole UNDRIP, incorporating 
into domestic law the provisions quoted below would arguably provide 
a reasonable, internationally accepted basis and common understanding 
for self-determination negotiations between Indigenous peoples, the 
Commonwealth and the states and territories (and not discounting other 
legal entities, which may wish to participate). 
The UNDRIP preamble reiterates that:
The Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, affirm the fundamental 
importance of the right to self-determination of all peoples, by virtue 
of which they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, Bearing 
in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any 
peoples their right of self-determination, exercised in conformity 
with international law…60
58  Kartinyeri v Commonwealth [1998] HCA 22; (1998) 195 CLR 337, 355.
59  Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth).
60  UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
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The UNDRIP then provides substance to the notion of self-determination:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating 
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, 
while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, 
in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
Articles 3–5 provide a useful legal content to the expression of 
self-determination. Incorporated into domestic legislation, they would 
provide a common internationally recognised legal basis and a touchstone 
for the negotiation of self-determination for Indigenous peoples. Any 
possibility of domestic incorporation depends on the parliament taking 
an interest in the principle of Indigenous self-determination as defined by 
international law and, at present, this seems unlikely.
Conclusion
The international community and international law have come some 
way in recognising the group rights of Indigenous peoples to self-
determination and to ‘freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.61 For the right 
fully to be realised in Australia, there is a further barrier: the necessity to 
incorporate the international obligations into domestic law.
The complexities of Australia’s federal structure mean that the various 
treaties that result through different groups’ expressions of self-
determination will likely form a complex web of rights and obligations. 
61  UNDRIP Preamble.
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On the other hand, the Australian political elite fears, as it did with native 
title, that potential litigation will clog up the courts, and that Australia’s 
claims to sovereignty will be subject to the jurisdiction and supervision of 
international bodies. 
Australia’s dualistic approach has a detrimental effect on Indigenous 
peoples. The hierarchy of sources is mentioned here to highlight the 
weakness of Indigenous arguments in domestic law. Further, Australia has 
ratified very little of the international law explicitly spelling out Indigenous 
rights.62 On the other hand, Indigenous people can also rely upon general 
human rights instruments, which are part of Australian law, to strengthen 
their claims to a right to self-determination under international law. That 
is why I have argued for negotiations taking place in the international 
plane. Domestic incorporation of the relevant international law provisions 
on self-determination will also allow the higher domestic courts to help 
adjudicate disputes, having regard to the vast international law and 
literature on this matter. Failure to resolve matters within Australia in 
the first instance will still leave open the possibility of a resolution of the 
disputes in the international plane.
While international law in the eighteenth century enabled the British 
Crown to claim sovereignty over the Australian continent, as a colony 
of settlement, this claim has resulted in great historical wrongs. 
Contemporary international law and norms, as they have evolved over 
the last two centuries, are legal and political resources for arresting and 
reversing the processes of colonisation. It is possible for parliament to take 
steps in this direction by working in good faith with Indigenous peoples 
to identify and resolve the problems of self-determined groups.
Since 1949, Australian governments have slowly dismantled the statutory 
discriminations against Indigenous peoples, and in recent years more and 
more Indigenous peoples have acquired formal education, making the 
fight for Indigenous rights and equality a little more practical and realistic 
than has been the case in the past.
This has made it possible for Indigenous people to acquire the skills and 
knowledge to negotiate and slowly recover their lost rights dating back for 
two centuries or more. They are getting to the point where they can do this 
almost as equals (although without the vast financial resources available to 
the state and with the parliament’s ability still, in the domestic plane, to 
62  For example, the ILO’s C169 – Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989.
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discriminate explicitly against them under the law and the Constitution). 
Nonetheless, the law and public opinion are slowly evolving to recognise 
the truth of the existence and survival of First Nations Peoples in Australia. 
Since the graduation of the first Indigenous person through an Australian 
university about 50 years ago, Indigenous people have gradually been 
receiving tertiary and post-tertiary education in Western and international 
laws and ways, although there is still a long way to go in achieving 
population parity in this regard. Nonetheless, there is a critical mass of 
Indigenous Australians able to assert their rights as peoples. Subject to 
a few, very significant, remaining legal and constitutional barriers, they 
are on the threshold of being able to achieve their aim of exercising their 
peoplehood under the law.
Parties entering into good faith negotiations could right some of the 
most egregious wrongs of history. Recognising Indigenous peoples’ rights 
truly and fully to self-determine and to evolve their cultures alongside 
the majoritarian Anglo-Australian law and culture will enrich, rather than 
diminish, our broader community.
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In 1788 the whole of Australia was covered with people speaking one 
or more of at least 300 languages. In well-watered areas there were 
many languages; elsewhere one language (with different dialects) was 
spoken across more than a quarter of the continent. People were often 
multilingual,  speaking the language of their community and those of 
neighbouring communities. There was no need for a common language 
across Australia, because people in each area spoke the language of their 
neighbours and perhaps those of their neighbours’ neighbours. If they 
moved to another area, they generally expected to learn the language 
of the other area.
At the start of colonisation, the British colonists often made use of 
interpreters, but warfare, dispossession and new diseases resulted in 
an immediate and rapid decline in the number of people speaking the 
languages of the regions around the colonies. Once the British had 
become well established in an area, they imposed English as the language 
of government and as the language in which to access services (e.g. shops, 
paid work, medical help, justice and schooling). They saw no need to learn 
or recognise the languages of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, 
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who then had to learn some English. A few missionaries encouraged 
literacy in Aboriginal languages and promoted mother-tongue medium 
instruction (‘bilingual education’) in schools.
In 1972, when Australia’s policy of self-determination for Indigenous 
people was proposed, nearly 200 years of colonisation had resulted 
in many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups with different 
aspirations, and whose opinions were rarely considered. The policymakers 
were not Indigenous, and were trying to implement a policy of self-
determination at a time when everyone was struggling to understand 
what self-determination actually meant.
Internationally, the right to self-determination had been adopted a few 
years earlier by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. It was 
Article 1.1 of two covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR):
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.1 
ICCPR included rights related to language, the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of language (Articles 2.2, 24, 26), 
the right when charged to be given information in a language one can 
understand, and the right to an interpreter (Article 14.3a, f ). But most 
significant was Article 27: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language.2
The ICESCR became part of Australian law in 1976, but it was not until 
1986 that the ICCPR, with its stronger emphasis on language rights as 
individual liberties, became part of Australia’s law.
1  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; UN General Assembly, 
International Covenant on Economic, 3.
2  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3.
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One thing missing in 1972 was the recognition that language rights 
are essential for effective self-determination. As primarily monolingual 
speakers of English, the policymakers had difficulty in imagining the 
needs and wants of people who did not speak English, and found it hard 
to realise that language rights, which they took for granted, might not be 
shared by others. For example, as Australian English speakers, they took it 
for granted that they could use English to talk with government officials, 
and that their children would be educated through their mother-tongue, 
English. These rights were not enjoyed by speakers of Indigenous languages 
in remote communities in 1972.
As language is both an individual and a social phenomenon, language 
rights are complex, bringing in both the rights of individuals and the rights 
of groups. Language is used both to communicate ideas (communicative 
rights) and to express associations (identity rights). The  identity right to 
speak one’s mother-tongue language or heritage language is guaranteed 
by ICCPR Article 27. Communication rights include the right to access 
information in a language one understands. ICCPR Article 14 guarantees 
this only for court proceedings, not for other important information 
such  as  health, education and government services. People cannot 
make the most of self-determination if they do not have access to the 
best information to make the best decisions for themselves and their 
family, because it is only presented in a language they do not understand. 
This was certainly the case in 1972 for many Indigenous people in 
remote communities.
Apart from the right to an interpreter, the language rights mentioned in 
ICCPR were basically individual liberties; they did not guarantee positive 
support for languages. For example, they do not mention the communication 
right for children to receive an education in a language they understand, 
as well as being taught effectively the language of wider communication. 
In the Australian context this was known as ‘bilingual education’. When 
self-determination became policy in 1973, ‘bilingual education’ was given 
new legitimacy by the Whitlam Government. I  will discuss the gradual 
acceptance and implementation of these rights from the start of the 
self-determination policy, focusing mostly on the literature and reflections 
of people involved in Indigenous education in the Northern Territory3 and, 
to a lesser extent, South Australia.4
3  Black and Breen, ‘The School of Australian Linguistics’; Devlin, Disbray and Devlin, History 
of Bilingual; Hoogenraad, ‘Critical Reflections’; Huijser et al., Finding Common Ground.
4  Simpson, Amery and Gale, ‘I Could Have Saved You’.
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Twentieth century
A step towards recognising identity and communication rights came 
with the establishment of the Presbyterian mission at Ernabella in 1937. 
It had a strong policy of using the local language in preference to English,5 
as part of a general policy of ‘no compulsion or imposition of our way 
of life’, which could be seen as an earlier recognition of the right to 
self-determination.6
In 1950, missionary organisation the Summer Institute of Linguistics 
(SIL) began work in Australia. Teams of SIL linguists worked with 
Indigenous people in remote Australia on Bible translation and language 
documentation. The linguistic and cultural insights gained in this 
translation work gave both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people 
better understanding of each other’s languages and societies. Some other 
missionaries performed similar roles in the 1950s and 1960s: Beulah 
Lowe (Methodist Overseas Missions, Milingimbi) documented Yolŋu 
varieties and helped communication between Yolŋu and non-Aboriginal 
people, and Judith Stokes (Church Missionary Society, Groote Eylandt) 
learned Anindilyakwa and taught some Anindilyakwa people to read and 
write in their own language. But, as Rademaker shows, the attitudes of 
missionaries towards Indigenous languages and towards communicative 
rights was nuanced, in part because of the tension between assimilation, 
self-determination, and the uncertainty of the place of missionaries if 
they were not needed as brokers between Indigenous people, the wider 
Australian populace and the state.7
For non-Indigenous people, cross-cultural understanding received a boost 
when, in 1966, Presbyterian missionaries collaborated with the University 
of Adelaide to teach Pitjantjatjara as a university course.8 Another major 
step was taken in 1969 when the Uniting Church established the Institute 
for Aboriginal Development (IAD) in Alice Springs and then, in 1971, 
transferred it to an Aboriginal-controlled board of management.9 Its aim 
was to ‘assist community development for Aboriginal people and provide 
cross-cultural education between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal society’.10 
5  Trudinger, ‘Converting Salvation’.
6  Pybus, ‘We Grew Up This Place’, 10.
7  Rademaker, Found in Translation.
8  Simpson, Amery and Gale, ‘I Could Have Saved You’.
9  Zoellner, Vocational Education, 77.
10  Institute for Aboriginal Development (Aboriginal Corporation) website, 2018, iad.edu.au/.
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These two-way exchanges through community development and attempts 
to learn Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages were essential for 
Indigenous people gaining information that they needed in order to make 
the choices that the later policy of self-determination required.
The communication right of children to be educated in a language they 
understood also gained some traction when, in 1950, the Commonwealth 
Office of Education adopted a policy recognising that in some 
circumstances Indigenous languages should be used in education:
The language of instruction in Native schools shall be English, 
except where local conditions (e.g., where natives are still in a 
tribal or semi-tribal state) render bilingual instruction desirable.11 
In practice, while education for Indigenous children in remote communities 
was greatly expanded, an assimilation drive promoted English above 
Indigenous languages.12 Rademaker discusses the implementation of this 
among Anindilyakwa children at a mission school on Groote Eylandt.13
Mother-tongue medium instruction was put forward as an ideal in 1964 
with the Watts-Gallacher report on curriculum and teaching methods used 
in Aboriginal schools in the Northern Territory.14 Watts and Gallacher saw 
the importance of reducing the cultural divide between home and school. 
But they deemed bilingual education impractical at the time, given the 
lack of teachers who could speak Indigenous languages, among other 
factors. Other consequences of the Watts-Gallacher report included the 
establishment in 1967 of Kormilda College, a post-primary boarding school 
in Darwin for Indigenous children from remote areas. Once schooling for 
Indigenous children expanded, the importance of Indigenous teaching 
assistants as interpreters and classroom support was soon recognised, 
and so Kormilda College also ran short courses for Indigenous teaching 
assistants. This teacher training grew into an Indigenous tertiary institute, 
which was moved to Batchelor, Northern Territory, renamed Batchelor 
College, and established as a teacher training college in 1975.15 It is now 
called Batchelor Institute of Indigenous Tertiary Education (BIITE).
11  Quoted in Brian Devlin, ‘Government Support for NT Bilingual Education after 1950: A Longer 
Timeline’, 12, FOBL: Friends of Bilingual Learning, last revised 7 March 2019, accessed 2 June 2019, 
www.fobl.net.au/index.php/au-TI/history/71-government-support-for-nt-bilingual-education-after-
1950-a-longer-timeline.
12  Devlin, ‘A Glimmer of Possibility’; Sommerlad, Kormilda.
13  Rademaker, Found in Translation, 70–84.
14  Watts and Gallacher, Report on an Investigation.
15  Reaburn, Bat and Kilgariff, ‘Looking for a New Common Ground’.
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Self‑determination policy
Access to information for Indigenous people was greatly expanded 
following the election in 1972 of the Labor Government, the adoption 
of the policy of self-determination and the great expansion of educational 
opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.
In 1972 at Nhulunbuy, Northern Territory, Dhupuma College was 
established as a bicultural/bilingual high school, with Gumatj as 
a  school language. The seeds of ‘both-ways’ or ‘two-way’ education 
were sown.16 Many Indigenous people gained access to better English 
literacy, spoken Standard Australian English (SAE), numeracy and an 
increased understanding of non-Indigenous society through education 
at Indigenous  high schools like Dhupuma, and through BIITE.17 
However, the great gulf between the residential colleges and the home 
communities caused severe stress for many Indigenous students who felt 
they belonged nowhere.18
With the election of a Labor Government on 2 December 1972 there 
was a major push for mother-tongue medium instruction, spearheaded 
by the minister for education, Kim Beazley Senior, and the new Prime 
Minister, Gough Whitlam.19 The first five pilot programs began in 1973. 
While the initial programs were imposed from above, some programs 
were later established at community request.20 The bilingual educational 
approaches were informed by two reports, the Watts-McGrath-Tandy 
report by educators,21 and the O’Grady-Hale report by linguists.22 Both 
reports recognised the importance of Indigenous teachers. The O’Grady-
Hale report also highlighted local control by Indigenous communities of 
education as a goal of bilingual education.23 
The bilingual programs were not limited to traditional languages. 
Educators and missionary linguists also spearheaded a movement for 
bilingual education using Kriol (a new contact language that had developed 
16  White, ‘Finding the Common Ground’.
17  Huijser et al., Finding Common Ground.
18  Sommerlad, Kormilda.
19  Hoogenraad, ‘Critical Reflections’.
20  Vaarzon-Morel and Wafer, ‘“Bilingual Time”’.
21  Watts, McGrath and Tandy, Recommendations.
22  O’Grady and Hale, ‘Recommendations Concerning’.
23  O’Grady and Hale, ‘Recommendations Concerning’, 2.
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in the Katherine and Roper River area). They recognised the importance 
of using in classrooms a language that children felt comfortable with,24 
regardless of whether it was a traditional Indigenous language or a new 
language. The O’Grady-Hale report endorsed this view, which departed 
from the widespread view that contact languages like Kriol were to be 
discouraged as broken, inferior English.25
The new bilingual programs faced many obstacles: lack of models, lack 
of trained teachers, lack of materials (all foreshadowed in the reports), 
as well as opposition from senior education department officials. But 
the school workers were enthusiastic.26 Highlights of the bilingual 
education programs were the collaborations between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people in team teaching and in producing stories and 
materials in Indigenous languages through Literature Production centres. 
The team teaching approach was strongly supported by Beth Graham, 
an experienced teacher in Aboriginal schools who became an adviser in 
bilingual education in the Northern Territory Education Department in 
1979. As she said, ‘if children are to learn effectively, teachers have to teach 
together, plan together and learn together’.27 Team teaching produced 
much greater understanding between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people, and affirmed the role of Indigenous teachers in the classroom.
The need for more Indigenous teachers led the federal government to 
establish a Remote Area Teacher Education (RATE) program in 1976 
through Batchelor College, as well as the School of Australian Linguistics 
(SAL) in Batchelor, Northern Territory (later the Centre for Australian 
Languages and Linguistics and part of BIITE).28 Both SAL and RATE 
students acquired skills in language documentation, literature production 
and translation expertise. An example is one of the first linguistics papers 
co-authored by an Indigenous person, the Ngalkbun and Kriol linguist 
David Nangan:golod Jentian, and a non-Indigenous linguist, John Sandefur:
David Jentian began the compilation of the wordlist and gave 
invaluable help in the analysis because of his knowledge of 
elementary linguistics gained while at the Aboriginal teacher 
Trainees course in Darwin.29 
24  Meehan, ‘Starting Out at Bamyili’; Sandefur, Kriol of North Australia.
25  Rademaker, Found in Translation, 54, 59.
26  Gale, ‘Lessons Learned’; Gale, ‘Boom and Then Bust’.
27  Graham, ‘Reflecting on Team’, 31.
28  Black and Breen, ‘The School of Australian Linguistics’.
29  Sandefur and Jentian, ‘A Tentative Description’, 57.
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Meanwhile, in Western Australia, from 1975, around 600 people living 
at Strelley speaking mostly Nyangumarda and Manjiljarra began moves 
towards having their own independent school, the Strelley Community 
School. They wanted an Aboriginal-controlled school, a bilingual 
curriculum that was not purely for transition to English, a focus on 
adults as well as children and a curriculum that reflected their priorities. 
Liberman has described the community’s belief that this type of school 
would ‘guarantee Aboriginal self-determination in the future’. He quotes 
an elder: ‘When the whitefellas come to this country, he bin kill ’em 
blackfella. Now we learn all this literacy, we win the country back’.30
Communication between many Indigenous people and governments 
was still poor. In 1979 the Aboriginal linguist and anthropologist Gloria 
Brennan published a research report for the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs pointing out the need for interpreters for Indigenous people, 
especially in the Northern Territory.31 In Alice Springs, IAD began 
training Indigenous people as interpreters and as language teachers, 
teaching Indigenous languages such as Warlpiri and Arrernte, often 
to people who were working in Indigenous communities. Then, when 
mother-tongue medium instruction programs started, school staff 
sometimes organised language learning programs, which were seen as 
exciting and empowering.32 IAD staff also worked on major resources for 
communication, learners’ guides, handbooks and dictionaries of Central 
Australian languages.33 Although IAD trained interpreters and provided 
free interpreting services, they had difficulty persuading courts and 
hospitals to make much use of them.34 
Self-determination policy, with respect to language, addressed both 
identity rights and communication rights. Assertion of identity rights 
received bipartisan support in 1972 when the then Prime Minister 
William McMahon said on Australia Day that Aboriginal people ‘should 
be encouraged and assisted to preserve their own culture, languages, 
traditions and arts so that these can become living elements in the diverse 
culture of the Australian society’.35 
30  Liberman, ‘Aboriginal Education’, 141.
31  Brennan, The Need for Interpreting.
32  Ross and Baarda, ‘Starting Out at Yuendumu’.
33  Simpson, Amery and Gale, ‘I Could Have Saved You’.
34  John Henderson pers. comm. to J. Simpson.
35  McMahon, Australian Aborigines, 1.
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Respect for identity rights also grew concomitantly with respect for 
communication rights. The first person to make a speech in an Indigenous 
language in parliament was Neil Bell who had learned Pitjantjatjara as 
a schoolteacher working at Areyonga School. In 1981, as Labor member 
for MacDonnell, he made his maiden speech in Pitjantjatjara in the 
Northern Territory Legislative Assembly. It was a statement of respect 
for his constituents, and an important symbolic use of an Indigenous 
language in a parliament. For the first time also, the government began 
to have access to information about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
languages, with the introduction of a question on language into the 
1976 Census.
The self-determination policy of the 1970s both supported and was 
supported by the assertion of communication rights, both in the education 
sector and in the interpreting domain. The new access to secondary school 
education and tertiary training, the bringing together of Indigenous 
people from across the Northern Territory for classes at Batchelor, and the 
training and placement of Indigenous teachers in schools, created a new 
generation who could share ideas and understandings about the changes 
that the self-determination policy could make possible. The new bilingual 
education programs provided a springboard for demands for more local 
Indigenous control of education.
Beginning of reversal of self‑determination
In 1978 the Northern Territory was granted self-government, and the 
Northern Territory Government pushed back against the mother-tongue 
medium instruction model. Without warning, in 1980 the government 
closed down Dhupuma College in the midst of the school year.36 This was 
deeply shocking to the students, to their communities and to other schools 
across the Northern Territory. Bilingual education programs continued 
after self-government in the Territory, but always under threat.37
However, the 1980s provided much greater access to tertiary education 
for Indigenous people, access for non-Indigenous people to learn 
Indigenous languages and increased job opportunities for Indigenous 
people particularly in the school sector. A major achievement was the 
36  Amagula and McCarthy, ‘Red Ochre Women’.
37  Hoogenraad, ‘Critical Reflections’; Nicholls, ‘Death by a Thousand Cuts’.
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expansion and establishment of remote area teacher training schemes, 
so that Indigenous people living in remote communities could study 
at least part of the time based in their home community. By 1985 the 
number of campus-based students (80+) at Batchelor College was close 
to the number of RATE students (75).38 These included Indigenous 
people from bilingual schools as well as from English-medium instruction 
schools. South Australia began the Anangu Teacher Education Program 
(AnTEP) in 1984,39 which provided similar training and opportunities 
for Aboriginal Education Workers in the APY (Anangu Pitjantjatjara 
Yankunytjara) Lands. At this time, the APY Lands schools, under South 
Australian education policy, were still bilingual.
Many Indigenous people saw higher education as a chance for taking 
control of their lives and communities:
Through RATE, we Yolngu see our chance of getting loose and 
getting rid of the harness and the bridle that the Balanda has long 
used to steer us in the direction that they wanted us to go and 
that is the way of Balanda. Through this type of teacher training 
we have a chance of getting educational skills so that we can work 
in our communities and put our qualification and what we’ve 
learnt into use in our own Homeland communities. We Yolngu 
would like to gather enough understanding and knowledge about 
Balanda law and system so as to understand and live with both 
laws and worlds. … This will also make communications better 
between Yolngu and Balanda.40
The new cohort of Indigenous educators looked beyond presence in the 
classroom for presence in the curriculum. They proposed a ‘both-ways’ or 
‘two-ways’ curriculum, to incorporate Indigenous perspectives in school 
education.41 It was most famously described by the late Dr Marika in 
her Wentworth Lecture when she talked about the ‘both-ways’ maths 
curriculum that staff at Yolŋu schools had developed:
Ganma is a still lagoon. The water circulates silently underneath, 
and there are lines of foam circulating across the surface. 
The swelling and retreating of the tides and the wet season floods 
can be seen in the two bodies of the water. Water is often taken to 
38  Reaburn, Bat and Kilgariff, ‘Looking for a New Common Ground’.
39  Underwood, Response to: Achieving Equitable.
40  Ngurruwutthun, cited in Marika-Mununggiritj et al., ‘The History’, 43–44. 
41  Keeffe, From the Centre to the City; Reaburn, Bat and Kilgariff, ‘Looking for a New Common 
Ground’; White, ‘Finding the Common Ground’.
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represent knowledge in Yolŋu philosophy. What we see happening 
in the school is a process of knowledge production where we have 
two different cultures, Balanda and Yolŋu, working together. Both 
cultures need to be presented in a way where each one is preserved 
and respected. This theory is Yirritja.42
There was a continued push for greater Aboriginal control of schools and, 
in 1983, Yipirinya School, an independent school in Alice Springs, finally 
achieved registration. Arrernte language was a medium of instruction.
The desire for Aboriginal control extended beyond running schools to 
other related matters. In 1982 David Wilkins, a linguist working for the 
Yipirinya School Council, prepared a draft research policy for Central 
Australia. Its first article was:
1.1 a) All research in Central Australia involving Aboriginal 
people must be approved, controlled and monitored by a body 
representing, and chosen by, the Aboriginal community, or 
communities, in which the research will take place.43
Wilkins’s call for responsible linguistics was echoed in other work, as 
linguists and communities began to understand the devastating effect 
of English on the Indigenous language ecologies of Australia. Keeping 
Language Strong: Report of the Pilot Study for the Kimberley Language 
Resource Centre appeared in 1984 and made the case for establishing 
Indigenous-run language centres to help Indigenous people maintain 
their languages.44 
Nationally, an important step forward in identity rights and for 
preservation of languages came with the first national policy on languages 
‘to recognize, value and take action to enhance the survival of Aboriginal 
languages and promote an appreciation and an awareness of them among 
non-Aborigines’.45
From 1987 onwards, the Commonwealth Government began providing 
funds for Indigenous language maintenance and revival, through a grants 
scheme operated by the National Aboriginal Languages Program. 
Language centres were set up, along with many out-of-school initiatives, 
since school education is a state responsibility.
42  Marika, ‘The 1998 Wentworth Lecture’, 7.
43  Wilkins, ‘Linguistic Research’, 189.
44  Hudson and McConvell, Keeping Language Strong.
45  Lo Bianco, National Policy, 7.
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In terms of communication rights, reflections by Indigenous people 
involved in the schools of the 1970s and 1980s reveal the benefits that 
they saw in the new approaches to schooling, and the hopes they held for 
the future,46 although there was continued suspicion of formal schooling, 
especially when it seemed to be controlled by non-Indigenous people.47
Generally, understanding and communication was strengthened among 
Indigenous people and non-Indigenous people working with Indigenous 
people. Indigenous politicians, such as Bess Price and Alison Anderson, 
trained at Batchelor College and/or SAL, as did Indigenous leaders such 
as the late Jeannie Nungarrayi Egan, Mandawuy Yunupingu, John Joshua, 
Norma Nangali Joshua, Alice Limbiari Nangala/Napurrula Nelson, 
Michael Jampin Jones, Valda Napurrula Shannon and Geoffrey Jupurrula 
Shannon. Inspired by working in Indigenous schools, several non-
Indigenous teachers became politicians, such as Neil Bell, Trish Crossin, 
Peter Toyne and Warren Snowdon.
When non-Indigenous authorities were mindful of the principle of self-
determination, Indigenous people were consulted more often about their 
wishes. But it was often hard for people who did not speak English well to 
make truly informed decisions when there was little information accessible 
in their own languages. Complex concepts conveyed by the English 
words ‘right’, ‘freedom’ and ‘non-discrimination’ do not have one word 
equivalents in most Indigenous Australian languages. Holcombe describes 
the difficulties and length of time it took to unpack such concepts when 
translating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into Pintupi-
Luritja.48 That project took two years and involved two Pintupi-Luritja 
speakers, Lance Macdonald, an experienced interpreter, and Sheila Joyce 
Dixon, a Papunya local authority member; an anthropologist, Sarah 
Holcombe; and a missionary linguist, Ken Hansen, who had worked out 
of Papunya since 1966. It was published in 2015, more than 40 years after 
the self-determination policy was launched.49 The fact that in 2015 these 
ideas were still so hard to convey in an Indigenous language shows how far 
short Australia has fallen in protecting the communicative right of access 
to information in an understandable form.
46  Devlin, ‘A Glimmer of Possibility’; Huijser et al., Finding Common Ground.
47  Keeffe, From the Centre; Liberman, ‘Aboriginal Education’.
48  Holcombe, Remote Freedoms.
49  Macdonald et al., Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Pintupi-Luritja.
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Increasing awareness of Indigenous 
languages
Throughout the 1990s the identity rights of Indigenous people were 
strengthened. The National Aboriginal Languages Program funded more 
language centres and language revival programs. Renaming or restoring 
Indigenous placenames began.50 The ritual of ‘welcome to country’ 
increased,51 and began to contain words or sentences in the relevant 
local Indigenous languages. Using Indigenous languages in parliament 
has continued: in 2016, for the first time, a prime minister, Malcolm 
Turnbull, spoke in parliament in Ngunnawal.52
The communicative right to receive information in a language one 
understands was gradually strengthened, but with opposition. While a full-
time free interpreter service was available for immigrant languages, only 
in 1997 was an interpreter service for Indigenous languages trialled in the 
Top End of the Northern Territory. According to Senator Trish Crossin 
(who spoke on this matter in 1999), Denis Burke, the then Territory’s 
chief minister, had rejected the need for an Aboriginal interpreter service, 
saying that it was a disgrace that Aboriginal people still needed them: 
‘to my mind (that) is akin to providing a wheelchair for someone who 
should be able to walk’.53
Only in 2008 did TAFE SA begin operating an interpreter training 
program on the APY Lands. Before that, two elderly people – Mona Tur 
and Bill Edwards – did much of the interpreting for Pitjantjatjara people 
in Adelaide, covering high stakes legal and medical interpreting.54
This lack of awareness of communicative language needs continued to 
cause serious problems for Indigenous people. It also caused problems 
for the federal government during the Northern Territory National 
50  Amery and Williams, ‘Reclaiming Through’; Committee for Geographical Names in Australasia, 
‘Guidelines for the Recording’; Reid, ‘Creating Aboriginal Placenames’.
51  Merlan, ‘Recent Rituals’.
52  Jacqueline Battin, ‘Indigenous Languages in Australian Parliaments’, AIATSIS (blog), Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Studies, 21 May 2018, accessed 2 June 2019, aiatsis.gov.au/
news-and-events/blog/Indigenous%20Australian%20Languages. 
53  Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, Matters of Public Interest, 8 December 1999, 
11416.
54  House Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, Our Land, Our 
Languages; Bill Edwards pers. comm. to Jane Simpson. See also Simpson, Amery and Gale, ‘I Could 
Have Saved You’, 100.
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Emergency Response (the ‘Intervention’) of 2007: how to convey the 
unpleasant information that Indigenous people’s freedoms would be 
curtailed in the name of improving their general welfare. In 2008, the 
head of the federal government Intervention taskforce, Major General 
David Chalmers, said that a major and unforeseen challenge had been 
the difficulty of communicating with Aboriginal people.55 The responsible 
policymakers simply had not understood that many Northern Territory 
Aboriginal people did not speak English well, and the taskforce had not 
made effective use of interpreters. 
Finally, with respect to the communicative right to mother-tongue medium 
education, the promise and hopes of the 1970s and 1980s faded in the 
1990s and 2000s. Right from the start, ‘bilingual education’ programs had 
suffered from public conflation of different language rights: the identity 
right to preserve Indigenous languages, the communicative right to learn 
the language of wider communication (SAE) and the communicative 
right of children to be taught in a language they understand. Opponents 
of mother-tongue medium education argued that its supporters simply 
had a romantic desire to preserve Indigenous languages at the expense 
of the children learning English. They did not realise that children could 
grow up bilingual with proper teaching of English and maintenance 
of their first languages.
Some Indigenous people also argued against mother-tongue medium 
instruction as they were convinced of the importance of learning SAE, 
and they blamed a mother-tongue medium instruction program for 
the poor English language skills of their children. The longstanding 
Pitjantjatjara program fell victim to this argument in 1990 when 
the Indigenous-controlled Pitjantjatjara/Yankunytjatjara Education 
Committee recommended an English-only approach, asserting that 
schools should focus on teaching children English and that families could 
maintain Pitjantjatjara at home.56 The results did not bear out their hopes, 
and older teachers began calling for a return to mother-tongue medium 
instruction. In 2018 the state government announced a return to mother-
tongue medium instruction.57
55  Smiles, ‘Five Years’.
56  Aṉangu coordinators, ‘Submission 116’.
57  Department of Education South Australia, Aboriginal Education Strategy.
307
13 . SELf‑DETERMINATIoN WITH RESPECT To LANGUAGE RIGHTS
A major blow to bilingual education and, indirectly, to real 
self-determination was caused by changes to BIITE’s and SAL’s funding 
and educational frameworks58 that made it hard for remote area Indigenous 
people to gain teacher qualifications. While BIITE expanded its student 
numbers in the early 2000s, reaching over 3,000 in 2003,59 the numbers 
of Indigenous students from remote communities declined rapidly, due 
in part to the abolition of in-community training. In 2008 only two 
Aboriginal teachers graduated from BIITE.60 By 2017 BIITE had stopped 
operating a teacher training program. The Institute for Aboriginal 
Development had had to wind down its vocational training role and, in 
2019, it went into voluntary administration. Because these decisions have 
choked off the source of young trained Indigenous teachers and other 
professionals, the consequences are terrible for communities, with the loss 
of support for the plans, hopes and enthusiasm of this generation.
Conclusion
The language ecologies of Indigenous Australians are changing rapidly. 
Fewer people are speaking traditional Indigenous languages as their first 
language, while more are speaking new Indigenous languages as their 
first languages.61 At the same time, the diaspora of speakers of Indigenous 
languages in cities such as Darwin, Alice Springs and Adelaide is growing, 
as people seek better access to services. This means that the chances for 
communities to maintain their traditional Indigenous languages are 
rapidly diminishing.
Since the beginning of the self-determination policy, identity rights 
have been strengthened. Governments and communities are investing in 
Indigenous language revival, and in emblematic gestures such as naming 
places with Indigenous names and using Indigenous languages at public 
events. However, with respect to communication rights, the picture is 
patchier.62 Major polices, such as the Intervention, were implemented 
58  Black and Breen, ‘The School of Australian Linguistics’; Reaburn, Bat and Kilgariff, ‘Looking for 
a New Common Ground’.
59  Gilbey and McCormack, ‘Telling Histories’.
60  Devlin, Disbray and Devlin, History of Bilingual, 206.
61  Simpson and Wigglesworth, ‘Language Diversity’.
62  See papers in Jane Simpson, Samantha Disbray and Carmel O’Shannessy, eds, ‘Teaching and 
Learning Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Languages’, special issue Babel (Journal of 
the Australian Federation of Modern Language Teachers’ Associations) 54, no. 1–2 (2019).
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without proper consideration of communication needs. Subsequently, 
interpreter services in Indigenous languages have expanded, and 
governments have made more effort to put information in Indigenous 
languages. But children still have only limited access to education in their 
mother-tongue along with proper explicit teaching of English. The move to 
monolingual English immersion education has been accompanied by the 
reduction of opportunities for remote Indigenous communities to obtain 
tertiary training (whether as teachers, interpreters or health workers) in 
their home communities. These two factors have greatly reduced the 
opportunities for people living in remote Indigenous communities to 
access information in order to make the best decisions for themselves and 
their families. At the same time, the aims of giving children good access to 
English, and to the content of education, have not so far been achieved.
In 1981 Kenneth Liberman wrote:
The problem, as the Aboriginal people view it, is that too many of 
the important everyday decisions in their remote communities are 
being made by European officials who work for one of these three 
government bureaucracies. At each Aboriginal central settlement, 
European officials live in a mini-suburb of portable houses, 
surrounded by high fences. The majority of Europeans do not 
speak the Aboriginal language and know little about Aboriginal 
life. In most cases, they remain for only one or two years, and yet 
they are actively involved in setting administrative policies for the 
settlements.63
The policy of self-determination was supposed to change that perception. 
In 2019 it seems that not much has changed for Indigenous people in 
remote communities.
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Insights from theory, practice and history
Elizabeth Ganter
Introduction
In the period of Indigenous ‘self-determination’, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander representatives have moved between the public service 
and Indigenous organisations. In this chapter, I will draw on normative 
political theory to argue that such movements have contributed to self-
determination in a way that was anticipated by a neglected source of 
advice on Indigenous administration and representation: the 1974–76 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (‘the Royal 
Commission’), chaired by H. C. Coombs.1 The Royal Commission 
commenced one year after the Whitlam Government had announced 
a policy to ‘restore to the Aboriginal people of Australia their lost power 
of self-determination in economic, social and political affairs’ on 6 April 
1973.2 Although the Royal Commission did not use the term ‘self-
determination’, its recommendations on how to encourage Aboriginal 
participation in government, I will argue, canvassed the central issues that 
1  Phillips, Politics of Presence; Mansbridge, ‘Should Blacks Represent Blacks’; Dovi, ‘Preferable 
Descriptive Representatives’; Dovi, The Good Representative.
2  Whitlam, ‘Aborigines and Society’.
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have been raised by political theorists about ‘descriptive representation’. 
That is, the Royal Commission’s reflections on an unrepresentative public 
service and its 10 recommendations to address that problem were about 
how to constitute and then draw upon Indigenous voices to build the 
means of Indigenous self-determination.
The concept ‘descriptive representation’ is central to my argument. 
Political theorists use this term to refer to the possibility that political 
systems will be more democratic if minorities and politically marginal 
sections of society (such as women) are enabled to be visibly present in 
positions of power. Political parties, legislatures and bureaucracies enact 
descriptive representation when they ensure that a certain proportion 
of their personnel are members of constituencies (e.g. women, ethnic 
minorities and disabled people) that are considered to be (unjustifiably) 
marginal to, and lacking influence over, decisions that affect them. Those 
who have debated the worth of descriptive representation have argued that 
it is not sufficient for members of historically disadvantaged groups to be 
visibly present in positions of power. To gain strength and legitimacy in 
the processes of government, descriptive representatives need also to speak 
and act in ways that are accountable to their people – some have argued, 
through robust mutual relationships with members of the communities 
for which they speak.
Self-determination by Indigenous Australians needs descriptive 
representation. The normative political theory outlined above was 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the words of some Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander senior public servants in the Northern Territory 
of Australia whom I interviewed in the period 2006–8. Unwilling to 
accede to the tokenistic ‘any Indigenous person will do’, some Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander officials were applying stricter criteria to their 
representation of communities. Oscillating between jobs in the public 
service and in Indigenous organisations, they were searching for roles 
that both grounded them in their communities and empowered them 
in government decision-making. Their ambivalence about upward career 
mobility implied a standard by which they judged ‘good’ representation: 
maintaining community connection. Some found this standard hard to 
meet while they remained in government settings, though I do not mean 
to suggest that long-term Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander public 
servants apply a different standard, as my research found them similarly 
motivated. I characterised Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander officials 
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as ‘reluctant representatives’ when their work neither connected them to 
their communities nor empowered them within the public service, but 
still made demands of their Indigeneity.3 
‘Reluctant representatives’
In interviews in the Northern Territory in 2007, I invited 76 Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander senior public servants to reflect on whether 
they believed the Northern Territory Government’s claim, in regularly 
published Indigenous employment statistics, that the Northern Territory 
Public Service was becoming an increasingly representative bureaucracy.
The interviewees described not only their family connections and 
their workplace experience, but also their motivations for entering and 
leaving the public service. The snowballing effect of my word-of-mouth 
recruitment had brought me into contact with nearly as many former 
employees as current employees, suggesting a high level of movement 
between the public service and Indigenous organisations. More than half 
the interviewees had worked in Indigenous sector organisations before 
becoming a public servant, or were still working in these organisations 
having left the public service. Of the 33 interviewees who were in 
senior government positions at the time of their interview, three years 
later, 10 or nearly one-third had moved into Indigenous servicing roles 
outside government, and one had already returned to government service. 
In response to these intriguing statistics, I observed that ‘a professionally 
mobile group was in some kind of orbit between the public service and its 
publicly funded, arm’s length organisations’.4 
To understand the significance of this mobility, we need to appreciate the 
relationship between the public service and the ‘Indigenous sector’ – ‘the 
most important product of the policy era known as “self-determination”’.5 
The publicly funded Indigenous representative and service organisations 
are ‘neither the “state” … [nor] “civil society”’ but a ‘third thing created 
out of the interaction … of government and the Indigenous domain’.6 
In 2011, anthropologist Patrick Sullivan argued that recent policy reform 
3  Ganter, Reluctant Representatives.
4  Ganter, Reluctant Representatives, 48-49.
5  Rowse, Indigenous Futures, 1; see also Rowse, ‘Indigenous Sector’.
6  Rowse, Indigenous Futures, 13.
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had glossed over important distinctions between this ‘unacknowledged 
community sector’ and other not-for-profit organisations.7 Indigenous 
organisations are like other not-for-profits in their reliance on public 
funding, but unlike other not-for-profits, Indigenous organisations 
incorporated under what was now the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander) Act 2006 (or its state equivalents) are the ‘institutional 
framework of Aboriginal civil society’ and, for many communities, the 
main source of civic engagement, political identity and material security.8 
Indigenous organisations are also like other not-for-profits in the larger 
sense of providing government ‘at a distance’.9 As I have noted elsewhere, 
they are ‘government’ in the sense that they are part of government’s 
outsourced service delivery arm and comply with the government’s 
terms of reference and rules of contracting.10 Indeed, a department 
and its funded providers may have more in common than that which 
divides them. One interviewee’s career illustrated this well. After having 
been in the public service in a role servicing Indigenous communities 
earlier in his career, this interviewee had taken on a leadership position 
in an Indigenous representative organisation dealing with similar issues. 
He recalled having been actively recruited back into the public service 
to manage the government’s side of an agreement he had helped set up 
while leading the organisation. This agreement required the government 
to match funding that had been granted to his former organisation with 
an in-kind contribution. This interviewee had agreed to the new public 
service role so he could follow up on the project from the inside or, as he 
put this to his recruiters, ‘to know exactly what sort of in kind they were 
giving’.11 At the time of his interview, he was again working for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people from the outside; by the conclusion 
of the research, he was back in the government in a more senior role. 
He  would later leave this position for an even more senior role as an 
external Indigenous representative spokesperson.
For this interviewee, as for others, the public service and the Indigenous 
sector were co-dependent and formed a combative relational space. 
Mobility within this space provided not only employment but also 
political identity. As I observed:
7  Sullivan, Belonging Together, 48–66.
8  Sullivan, Belonging Together, 50, 55–57.
9  Rose and Miller, ‘Political Power’, 180–81.
10  Ganter, ‘Representatives in Orbit’; Ganter, Reluctant Representatives.
11  Ganter, Reluctant Representatives, 107.
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The interviewees did not describe a purely external political 
identity, but an orbital one in which Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander participants were courted by both sectors as an asset in the 
government’s engagement with [its] people. As long as Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander participants were respectful of the 
concerns and priorities of their employers, they could move easily 
across sectors, and through this mobility forge an identity that was 
relatively autonomous of both.12
The public service was the employer of choice for many interviewees, as 
they found it better resourced and closer to decision-making. So why did 
some become frustrated and leave? If representation ‘makes something 
present’, descriptive representatives do this by the degree to which they 
resemble their group. In the same way, when Indigenous employment 
programs identified and selected Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
public servants, they did so on the basis of their likeness to, or identity 
with, the ‘under-represented’ Indigenous population. Yet, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander public servants have been selected by the public 
service because they have skills and capacities other members of their 
group may not have. To participate in the public service was to accede 
to the construction of their people as the subjects of remedial policies 
and programs, which also distanced them from communities. Working 
in Indigenous organisations took Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
officials closer to communities but further away from government 
decision-making. When in government, they clearly brought their identity 
to their work. But it was not this that distinguished them from other 
public servants: all public servants bring their identity into their work. 
It was their difference that made Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
public servants distinct, or, in the words of political philosopher Charles 
Taylor, the fact that ‘only the minority or suppressed cultures are being 
forced to take alien form’.13 That is, while the identity of public servants 
from majority populations was mostly unacknowledged, Indigenous 
employment programs marked Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
recruits as different. Many interviewees commented that they felt singled 
out as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander public servants, perceived as 
representatives whether or not they sought that role or felt comfortable 
speaking for their communities. The interviews suggested that Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander public servants saw the need to be more than 
12  Ganter, Reluctant Representatives, 113.
13  Taylor, ‘Politics of Recognition’, 43.
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just statistics, or the passive representatives of their population; yet they 
were mindful of public service ethics, which made them unwilling to call 
themselves representatives in any other sense. ‘Reluctant representatives’ 
have no clear mandate to engage in the active representation of their people, 
yet they look to respond to invitations to speak up.14 To do otherwise is 
to begrudge their people a source of assistance. Not all interviewees had 
left the public service, but it was a possibility in the mind of all of them.
Indeed, to resist the formalistic, principal-agent view of representation, 
most interviewees were ‘reluctant’ to call themselves ‘representatives’ in 
any sense. They did not see themselves as acting on direct instruction 
from their constituency as a ‘delegate’, nor did their accounts suggest 
it. Their accounts more commonly suggested the ‘trustee’ relationship, 
bringing their own judgement to the role. When governments invite 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people into their bureaucracies, 
they are often not just seeking the passive, or descriptive, representation 
of their population, but their substantive judgements and advice as 
Indigenous people. To accept a  job in Indigenous affairs, which my 
research showed is the most likely area in which a job will be available to 
an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person, is to field calls on one’s 
empathy, knowledge and connections – but represent who, how?15 What 
if a program is not working well in a community, and providing that 
advice appears subjective or rubs against unacknowledged public service 
norms? Public administration scholars long ago expressed doubts about 
how well administrative structures could reflect communities, arguing 
that the institutional norms of the public service would always prevail 
over the social identity of those recruited from under-represented sections 
of society,16 and some scholars have more recently observed that the 
link between passive and active representation had never been proven.17 
In other words, minority personnel did not necessarily mediate between 
the government and the communities from which they were recruited.
A paradox of representative bureaucracy bedevils every public sector 
employment strategy that invites Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people to bring their Indigeneity to bear on Indigenous policies and 
programs. If identity is not important, why seek Indigenous contributions? 
14  Ganter, Reluctant Representatives, 155.
15  Ganter, Reluctant Representatives, 59–70.
16  See, for example, Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service. 
17  Meier and Hawes, ‘Ethnic Conflict’, 274.
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If identity is important, how can Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
public servants be accountable to their communities and to government 
at the same time? To tease out these tensions, we need to look beyond the 
public administration account. 
‘Good’ representatives – developments 
in normative political theory
When political theorist Hanna Pitkin in 1967 questioned the 
accountability of descriptive representatives who seek to act for their 
people, she initiated a prolonged and continuing defence of the descriptive 
representation of historically disadvantaged groups.18 Originally focusing 
on electoral representatives, scholars have gradually come to consider the 
role of informal descriptive representatives in a wider range of democratic 
contexts, including bureaucracies.19 
Scholars have agreed that descriptive representation risks ‘essentialising’ – 
that is, assuming that all members of the group have the same view of its 
interests. In the process of descriptive representation, divisions within the 
group are likely to become evident and may be exacerbated. Descriptive 
representation also creates the expectation that the point of view attributed 
to a group is unique to that group, forcing representatives to speak only 
for that bounded group, and leaving them ‘isolated and marginalized at 
the representational level’.20 The interviewees’ many stories about meeting 
invitations, corridor conversations and job interviews illustrated these 
problems. Yet, as political theorist Virginia Sapiro highlighted and my 
interviewees also theorised through their reflections, even if it is not easy to 
get right, descriptive representation is still necessary for the accountability 
of democratic government.21
The historical circumstances of the Northern Territory resemble the 
conditions that Jane Mansbridge has described as justifying descriptive 
representation: an extended history of distrust necessitating repairs to 
communication; the group’s interests not ‘crystallized’ into a known 
18  Pitkin, Concept of Representation.
19  For an excellent genealogy of the literature, see Suzanne Dovi, ‘Political Representation’, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, last updated 29 August 2018, 
accessed March 2019, plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/political-representation/.
20  Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 150.
21  Sapiro, ‘When Are Interests Interesting’.
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agenda of reform; and the dominant group’s ‘fitness to rule’ in question, 
so that the polity is seen to have a low level of legitimacy.22 Not all 
Australian Indigenous communities are in such circumstances, but it 
is common for Australian governments to underestimate Indigenous 
political capacities, despite the sophistication of some interlocutors. 
The Turnbull Government’s rapid dismissal of Indigenous Australians’ 
carefully prepared and executed ‘Statement from the Heart’ in 2017 is 
an illustration.
Among the models of descriptive representation that have emerged, Anne 
Phillips’s ‘politics of presence’ comes the closest to justifying Indigenous 
public sector employment as a strategy for the descriptive representation 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australian bureaucracies. 
Phillips argues that it is better for minorities to be present in, than absent 
from, the corridors of power – even if, as she acknowledged, being in high 
places can seem elitist. The members of disadvantaged or dispossessed 
groups are likely to be better trustees of their group interests than 
individuals from more advantaged groups. As well, she argues, descriptive 
representatives provide role models, contribute ‘overlooked’ perspectives 
and increase democratic legitimacy.23 The interviewees mentioned these 
benefits, role modelling in particular. However, Phillips’s theory does 
not explain other concerns of the interviewees: their exit rate and their 
wariness of substituting themselves for their absent people. Their accounts 
suggested that the ‘politics of presence’ sometimes worked against ‘good’ 
representation by making it easier for governments not to communicate 
directly with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander constituencies.24
By what standards should descriptive representatives be judged? Suzanne 
Dovi offered a single criterion: that ‘preferable descriptive representatives 
possess strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups of 
historically disadvantaged groups’.25 Dovi later argued the importance 
of this demanding criterion for any ‘good representative’, not just for 
descriptive representatives.26 Dovi’s norm seems to go to the heart of the 
matter for the ‘reluctant representatives’ who spoke to me. They were 
reluctant to represent their people without authority or accountability; 
22  Mansbridge, ‘Should Blacks Represent Blacks’, 644, 646, 649.
23  Phillips, Politics of Presence, 167–68.
24  Ganter, Reluctant Representatives, 97–103, 184–85; and see Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 123, 
126–28.
25  Dovi, ‘Preferable Descriptive Representatives’, 729. Emphasis in original.
26  Dovi, Good Representative.
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yet, applying Mansbridge’s conditions, their circumstances justified them 
trying. Political theory identifies the conditions under which descriptive 
representatives may substitute for the absent: when it would be remiss 
not to do so, because there would be a clear situational benefit to absent 
constituencies who in that particular instance could not possibly speak 
for themselves.27
Those interviewees who were in orbit between the public sector and 
Indigenous organisations were judging themselves more harshly; feeling 
that they were merely token was the most agonising of their concerns. 
What they really cared about was not their relationship with government, 
but how their communities would judge them. They wanted to sustain 
strong mutual relationships, to be recognised by disadvantaged members 
of their group as belonging to the same group and sharing the same aims 
or vision. Descriptive representatives ideally have ‘a sense of sharing their 
fate with a historically disadvantaged group’.28 The ‘good representative’ 
must have this relationship with ‘dispossessed subgroups’ (Indigenous 
communities), who might otherwise be excluded twice – once by 
being a  member of the historically disadvantaged group (Indigenous 
Australians), and a second time by the routine substitution of their own 
representative. It was in order to address this problem of connection and 
disconnection that many interviewees were moving between the public 
sector and Indigenous organisations. The careers of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander public servants who are seeking to influence the lives of 
their people are legitimately unsettled. The public sector positions them in 
places where they believe they can make a substantial difference to policies 
and programs, but where it is more difficult to have a robust interactive 
relationship with communities. The Indigenous sector positions them 
back with their dispossessed subgroup. Here they feel more grounded, 
but less empowered. Their mobility supplies the missing elements of 
each, and authenticates their efforts to be descriptive representatives with 
something to say.
27  Alcoff, ‘Problem of Speaking’; see also Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’.
28  Dovi, ‘Preferable Descriptive Representatives’, 736.
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The Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration
In 1976, the Australian Government received good advice from  the 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration. 
The Royal Commission’s central task was ‘to adapt the national public 
administration to the needs of contemporary government’ through 
a  ‘fundamental rethinking of administrative principles and practices’.29 
One of the Royal Commission’s aims was to make the public service more 
representative of, and responsive to, sections of Australian society that 
had recently emerged as politically significant – for example, women, 
Indigenous Australians and non-English speaking migrants. The Royal 
Commission report was released under the Fraser Government in 1976. 
By then, ‘self-determination’ had been replaced by that government’s 
preferred term ‘self-management’ for its policy approach in Indigenous 
affairs. Notwithstanding this change in language, the Fraser Government 
was in broad sympathy with the Whitlam Government’s policy towards 
Indigenous Australians. Acknowledging ‘the persistence of attitudes 
based on now rejected policies of assimilation and “protection”’, the 
Royal Commission endorsed ‘respect for Aboriginal aspirations’ as an 
objective of reformed government practice.30 The Royal Commission 
saw Aboriginal aspirations as twofold: to ‘restore a distinctive Aboriginal 
culture’ and to ‘seek significant authority in the determination of 
policies and the management of programs concerned with their affairs’.31 
The  commissioners deliberated at length over how to respond so that 
Aboriginal people would be involved in both ‘the processes of decision 
and … the decisions themselves’, that is, in both administration and 
policymaking.32
Ten recommendations of the Royal Commission, many of them multi-
part, touched on Aboriginal administration and representation, spread 
over two chapters of the report:33 
29  Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (Royal Commission), Report, 3.
30  Royal Commission, Report, 336.
31  Royal Commission, Report, 336.
32  Royal Commission, Report, 337.
33  In government writing, Torres Strait Islander people were not referenced as a separate people 
until the 1980s. 
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• In Chapter 8, ‘Staffing the Administration – I Efficiency and Equity’, 
under the heading ‘equal opportunity and equity’, Recommendation 
136 (a–g) outlined ‘a 5–10 year program of special recruitment 
and training’.34 
• In Chapter 10, ‘Special problems of Administration’, under the heading 
‘the administration of Aboriginal affairs’, recommendations 289–97 
covered external representation, the coordination of programs, processes 
for ministerial advice and the growth of Aboriginal institutions.35 
The opening paragraphs of Chapter 8 outlined two concepts framing the 
Royal Commission’s approach to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
participation in the public service: first, the government as an ‘enlightened 
employer’ and, second, ‘government employment as a community 
instrument of policy’.36 The first concept encouraged the government 
to open the public service to diverse social categories, and the second 
suggested a broad channel of ideas between society and government. 
Without using the term, the two recommendations effectively proposed 
‘descriptive representation’, which challenged conventional ideas of 
bureaucratic neutrality. Even though it is the basic premise of representative 
bureaucracy that people bring their identity into their work, the notion 
that this affects the judgements they make troubles the conventional 
presumption that executive government is the neutral instrument of 
policymaking, and that the legislature is policy’s authoritative source. 
The Royal Commission did not see the bureaucracy as having been 
politically neutral: ‘procedures for selection and the choice of the tests of 
merit’ had introduced ‘effective, if unintentional, discrimination against 
members of particular groups’.37 The Royal Commission was clear in its 
warning that the under-representation of any significant citizen group in 
government employment ‘must be regarded as prima facie evidence of 
discrimination or disadvantage or, at the very least, of a matter deserving 
investigation’.38 The report announced ‘a bold and imaginative program 
of special recruitment, training and experience’ towards the aim of 
achieving ‘substantial Aboriginal participation in departmental work 
within a few years’.
34  Royal Commission, Report, 184–89.
35  Royal Commission, Report, 335–42.
36  Royal Commission, Report, 165–66.
37  Royal Commission, Report, 170–71.
38  Royal Commission, Report, 185.
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Recommendation 136 outlined ‘a 5–10 year program of special 
recruitment and training of Aboriginals’ – not only in the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), which had been established by the Whitlam 
Government in December 1972, but also in ‘other departments with 
significant Aboriginal to total client ratios’ as well as in ‘the administration 
generally’.39 What was ‘bold and imaginative’ here? Recommendation 
136 was a systematic effort to equip Aboriginal people to meet their 
own aspirations by respecting and supporting their social identity and 
community grounding. Recommendation 136 required that:
Appropriately designed programs of general education, specialised 
training and graduated experience be developed to equip different 
categories of trainees to enter, at various levels, Commonwealth 
Government employment and Aboriginal incorporated organisations 
[emphasis added] (Recommendation 136d).40 
The Royal Commission was here including Aboriginal organisations, 
the locally incorporated structures of self-determination for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander communities, in the proposed program 
of recruitment and training. By recommending further that ‘formal 
educational programs required for this purpose be provided as far as 
possible by institutions outside the government service [emphasis added]’ 
(Recommendation 136e), the Royal Commission sought to prevent the 
public service from monopolising training.41 Not only was the Royal 
Commission seeking to raise the number of Aboriginal public servants 
(to be at least population proportionate), it was trying to breathe fresh air 
into the public service by asking it to embrace Indigenous public sector 
employment as a ‘community instrument’.
During the Royal Commission hearings, Aboriginal rights activist, Arrernte 
man and DAA Assistant Secretary Charles Perkins publicly questioned 
his public service seniors’ commitment to his people’s self-determination. 
Perkins had a wide public and media following, and must have provided 
the commissioners with a constant reminder of the risk of unrestrained 
internal representation by Aboriginal senior public servants. In A Bastard 
Like Me, the autobiography Perkins published during the time of the 
Royal Commission, he warned government seniors that Aboriginal public 
39  Royal Commission, Report, 188.
40  Royal Commission, Report, 188.
41  Royal Commission, Report, 188.
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servants were no longer their ‘black messenger boys’.42 Did respecting 
Aboriginal aspirations mean accepting such challenges to public service 
authority? While Coombs was open to individual challenges to public 
service authority, his vision for Indigenous self-determination encouraged 
widely representative voices. Coombs heard Perkins as a witness to the 
Royal Commission, but he listened to other Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people and communities as well. Wisely, Recommendation 136 
recognised that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participation in 
government would grow both outside and inside government. The Royal 
Commission sought to support individual careers not only to improve 
government, but also to advance communities’ self-determination.
Chapter 10’s ‘administration of Aboriginal affairs’ recommendations 
(recommendations 289–97) took ‘inside’ administrative skills outside 
into Indigenous representative bodies and corporations. The first three 
recommendations (recommendations 289–91) focused on political 
expression, or building the skills and effectiveness of the Aboriginal elected 
body, the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC).43 
The  remaining recommendations (recommendations 291–97) followed 
four points of reform in the administration of Aboriginal affairs. The first 
point of reform faced inward. This recommendation asked the DAA to 
explore in centres with significant Aboriginal populations the feasibility 
of combining Aboriginal programs, while affirming continued 
responsibility by functional departments (Recommendation 292). Like 
the NACC recommendations, the remaining three points and associated 
recommendations faced outward. These were: 
• To support ‘the increasing participation, at the policy level, of representatively 
chosen Aboriginals’: appoint a Ministerial Council comprising relevant 
department heads and NACC members, to be mirrored by regional 
and community committees reporting to the Ministerial Council 
half-yearly (Recommendation 293a–e), including on the evaluation 
of DAA programs (Recommendation 297) and informed by research 
on welfare indicators through collaboration between the DAA and 
the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies (as it was then known) 
(Recommendation 296).
42  Perkins, A Bastard Like Me, 172.
43  Royal Commission, Report, 337–38.
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• To support the ‘growth of Aboriginal institutions’: confirm the policy of 
‘steadily shifting responsibility for appropriate local and community 
tasks to Aboriginal institutions’ (Recommendation 294) and 
conduct ‘systematic study of the prerequisites of success for emerging 
institutions’ through collaboration as above (Recommendation 295).
• To support ‘the increasing participation of Aboriginals in administration 
and service delivery’: implement Recommendation 136’s 5–10 year 
recruitment and training program. Without this, the report explains, 
the recommendations for the administration of Aboriginal affairs 
would increase Aboriginal participation but would not meet the equal 
opportunity requirement.44
These recommendations sought to build Aboriginal capacity outside 
the public service because the commissioners did not view the Australian 
Public Service as constituted so as to listen to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people. In taking this position, the commissioners may have been 
influenced by Charles Rowley, a consultant to the Royal Commission, 
who advised that Aboriginal policy input should come only from external 
representatives through a ‘bargaining process’ and not through Aboriginal 
public servants at all.45 This was consistent with Rowley’s earlier argument 
that Aboriginal people needed a protective ‘carapace’ within which to 
build their own leadership and coalesce their political interests.46 Rowley 
was deeply sceptical of Aboriginal people’s ability to participate in the 
bureaucracy without losing their identity, stating, ‘“Aboriginality” has to 
be a significant qualification; this also must conflict with the Weberian 
values of the service in general’.47 Rowley was not opposed to recruiting 
Aboriginal public servants; he recommended a recruitment target 
of population-proportionate Aboriginal representation (1 per cent), 
across the entire public service.48 However, he had no faith that the 
channels of advice inside the government would serve them well, and he 
recommended replacing the DAA over time with a more representative 
‘Aboriginal Commission’.49 
44  Royal Commission, Report, 339–42.
45  Royal Commission, Report, 361.
46  Rowley, The Remote Aborigines, 11.
47  Royal Commission, Report, 362.
48  Rowley, ‘Aboriginals and the Administration’, 363.
49  Rowley, ‘Aboriginals and the Administration’, 360.
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While the Royal Commission rejected Rowley’s Aboriginal Commission 
and recruitment target, it adopted his other advice to build skill sharing, 
career mobility and external representation into the recommendations on 
the administration of Aboriginal affairs. Coombs must have hoped that 
narrow attitudes within the Australian Public Service would be challenged 
by more contact with Aboriginal public servants and organisations. 
Coombs’s strategy for Indigenous political development was dual: 
providing for the sharing of ‘inside’ administrative skills with outside 
representative bodies, while at the same time bringing ‘outside’ personnel 
into the public service through employment and training.
It is possible to express this strategy in terms of the political theory 
outlined above: the Royal Commission saw descriptive representation 
through the inclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as 
public servants as necessary but not sufficient for their inclusion in the 
democratic process. The Royal Commission appreciated the importance 
of Indigenous public sector employment, both for equal opportunity 
and to ensure that there was some Indigenous trusteeship of Indigenous 
policies and programs, but it also saw the risk of obliging Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander public servants to serve political authorities other 
than the communities they were supposed to be representing. The Royal 
Commission’s outward-facing recommendations for Aboriginal affairs 
administration – strengthen external representation, support Aboriginal 
institutions and mobilise Indigenous administrators – supported robust 
connections by building relationships between Indigenous administrators 
on the inside and their communities and organisations on the outside. 
Addressing both the internal and external dimensions of government, the 
Royal Commission’s 10 recommendations on Aboriginal administration 
and representation urged the Australian Public Service to respond to 
a complex social and political circumstance. Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people had been promised self-determination, and the Royal 
Commission was empowering the public service by insisting that it reach 
out to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. 
Concluding comments
As a package, the recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration have been all but forgotten. While 
the Commonwealth, state and territory public sectors put considerable 
effort into employing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander public 
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servants, they have been content with merely the passive representation 
afforded by such social diversity, and they have struggled to understand 
the job mobility of these recruits.50 Experiments in building representative 
institutions external to the Australian Government have faltered. We have 
seen the demise of the NACC in 1977, the formation and dissolution of 
the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC, 1977–85) and the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC, 1989–2005). There has 
been some investment in capacity building, including by training people 
to be functionaries in the many continuing Indigenous corporations, but 
this partial fulfilment of the Royal Commission recommendations has 
been offset by creating markets for public services in which Indigenous 
organisations must tender competitively for public money. The impact 
of this managerialism is still playing out in Indigenous affairs, where 
an Australian Public Service that has been hollowed out by decades of 
outsourcing has overlooked the importance of encouraging Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander voices through external representation, and 
of keeping direct connections with service delivery.
Some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are participating in 
government by working beyond its conventional boundaries. They are 
operating in a more permeable, fluid and responsive zone of service delivery 
and representation than the public service, because their operational 
zone includes locally incorporated Indigenous organisations. They are 
drawing on public sector employment opportunities, taking their skills 
into the Indigenous sector and bringing their grounded knowledge and 
experience back into the public service. They are seeking robust mutual 
relationships that acknowledge that, as members of a people, they share 
fates with all Indigenous communities. Wherever they are positioned on 
the governmental spectrum, they are enriching the Indigenous polity. In 
these respects they are fulfilling the vision of the Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration. But they are doing this on their 
own initiative and at their own financial cost, not through good public 
policy, so the public service is not the meaningful player and instrument 
of Indigenous self-determination that it could be. If Indigenous career 
mobility is an indicator, many key players would prefer to speak through 
properly constituted representative voices than through the substitutive 
administrative voices that the public service currently encourages. 
50  Biddle and Lahn, Understanding Decisions to Exit; Lahn, ‘Being Indigenous’; Lahn and Ganter 
‘Representation, Recognition and Relationships’; see also Smith, ‘Representative Bureacracy’.
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people’s participation in the 
administration of Indigenous affairs is a matter of the utmost importance 
for their self-determining future and their right to be heard – but their 
participation in the public service will remain compromised while they 
have to leave it in order to speak and act in ways that meet their own 
standards of authenticity as representatives. 
An opening observation of this chapter was that self-determination 
needs descriptive representation, and that both self-determination and 
descriptive representation need Indigenous Australians to be present 
in politically relevant and efficacious ways. Career mobility is building 
political efficacy for Indigenous representatives. They are crossing over the 
inside and outside dimensions of government to realise their ambitions 
and their people’s ambitions. Through their movement between the public 
service and Indigenous organisations, they are presenting a model of 
Indigenous self-determination through administrative representation and 
applying performance criteria to themselves as descriptive representatives. 
Some Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people stay in the public 
service and try to improve its connection with external organisations. 
Some leave to work for similar agendas from the outside, where they often 
work in inadequately supported organisations. Of course, some never 
join the public service – but theirs would be a different story. Whatever 
their strategy of participation, when Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people are striving for an ethic of service and a standard of connection 
that involves mutual recognition with their disadvantaged communities, 
they are within reach of being ‘good’ representatives in political theory. 
And whatever else it needs, Indigenous self-determination must surely 
need good representatives. 
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In Australia, as in other settler colonial states, self-determination could 
not be practised as a process of decolonisation in which the coloniser 
exits the territory of the Indigenous sovereign. Rather, Indigenous self-
determination in Australia from the 1970s to the turn of the twenty-first 
century was focused upon the transformation of an ongoing Indigenous–
settler relationship, in which the settler state might be compelled or 
persuaded to transfer some decision-making powers to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples. As other chapters in this book illustrate, 
these transfers took many forms with different effects in different parts 
of the continent. However, in this century, we have seen a rhetorical and 
substantive shift away from self-determination towards constitutional 
recognition – particularly since the 2010 establishment of the Expert Panel 
on Recognising Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in the Constitution 
and through to the 2017 delivery of the Referendum Council report 
(inclusive of the Uluru Statement from the Heart). Constitutional 
recognition would be a structural reform, a pathway towards Indigenous 
justice in the context of ongoing colonisation.
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This chapter explores the history of the idea of self-determination in 
an effort to understand the difference between the discourse of self-
determination and the discourse of constitutional recognition. While they 
are clearly related, I will argue that they place differentiated emphasis and 
demands upon processes of self-identification.
Self-identification has been an important element of self-determination, 
connecting the formation of individual identity to the collective assertion of 
nationhood. Internationally, policies that have enabled self-identification 
have enabled Indigenous nation-building and decolonisation. In the 
settler colonial context of Australia, however, self-determination has been 
associated not so much with nation-building and more with increasing 
Indigenous control of policy design, implementation and service 
provision; self-determination practised in this way has resulted in less than 
fully independent governance. As a result, the question of who is the ‘self ’ 
in self-determination has been answered through the implementation 
of publicly verifiable criteria, through a three-part definition, allowing 
for clear delineation between those individuals to whom Indigenous 
policy applies and those to whom it does not.1 With the emergence of 
a politics of constitutional recognition, this delineation has become less 
important because specific material benefits are less immediately at stake 
in constitutional recognition discourses; thus the politics of constitutional 
recognition do not require the state or Indigenous communities and 
organisations to police Indigenous identities in the same way, or for the 
same purpose. Instead, constitutional recognition attends to the historical 
fact of colonisation as a foundation of the nation-state, and recognises 
the ongoing presence of First Australians generally, rather than through 
individual-level identification processes.
In being less prescriptive, this politics of recognition allows more complexity 
of historically emergent Indigeneities to be expressed by Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples. Any transfers of political power that might 
flow from such recognition are less immediately dependent upon the 
question: who is the self in Indigenous self-determination?
The chapter will first place Indigenous self-determination in its historical 
and local context. It will then consider the ‘recognition’ turn in political 
theory, and the academic debates this has produced with respect to 
Indigenous politics. In the third part, I engage with the ways Indigenous 
1  See Gardiner-Garden, Defining Aboriginality.
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Australians describe their identity as a site of contestation through 
Bronwyn Carlson’s book The Politics of Identity. My purpose is not to 
expand our understanding of ‘who’ the Indigenous self is in Indigenous 
self-determination; rather I seek to understand how the question 
of Indigenous identity became a site of both personal and political 
contestation. This contestation persists even as discourses of Indigenous 
claims to justice are shifting from the language of self-determination 
to constitutional recognition and beyond.
Indigenous self‑determination in 
historical context
From the perspective of Western law and politics, self-determination 
can be considered a longstanding principle that relates the sovereignty of 
individual selves to the political legitimacy of state power. The principle 
of self-determination was evident in both the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen (1791). In both, the consent of the governed underpinned 
the political legitimacy of the sovereign. As an organising principle of 
international relations on the European continent, self-determination can 
be dated back further, to at least the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It was an 
expression of a much more longstanding commitment in Western moral 
and political philosophy: Autonomy. Freedom. Sovereignty. These are 
Western concepts that attach as much to individual human beings as they 
attach to nations and states. Thus, self-determination operates not only at 
the level of institutions and organised political communities but also at 
the level of autonomous individuals. Sovereign states are self-determining, 
but only because they are constituted of sovereign, individualised, selves. 
Discourses of self-determination then come to focus on the postcolonial 
formation of Indigenous individuals and their identity claims, not only 
on formations of self-determination in Indigenous institutions and 
governing bodies. Indeed, the normative value of these concepts of 
autonomy, freedom and sovereignty as they relate to individuals underpins 
the whole premise of a legitimate political order in the West: the people 
are sovereign, and the power of the state is legitimate only insofar as it 
commands the willing consent of the people.
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Asmi Wood, in his chapter for this book, has told how ‘self-determination’ 
acquired new significance in the twentieth century as the European and 
Ottoman empires came to an end and as norms of international conduct 
issued from first the League of Nations and later the United Nations. Self-
determination is now a keystone in the new international order – present 
not only in the UN Charter, but also in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the General Assembly in 2007 attached 
Indigenous peoples’ claims for justice to that principle. Australia endorsed 
UNDRIP in 2009 as a non-binding framework for better recognising and 
protecting the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians. 
As other chapters of this book show, the Australian Government began to 
label its approach to Indigenous affairs as ‘self-determination’ in 1973 – 
a framework that guided policy on land rights, native title and Indigenous 
political rights, including on questions of representative structures 
and organisations.2 
The ‘idea’ of self-determination can produce different forms of politics 
and political claim-making. Internationally, the discourse of Indigenous 
self-determination initially and primarily emerged as a framework 
for decolonisation following the vacating of colonised territories by 
diminished empires, in which the legitimacy of state claims to sovereignty 
is put under external examination. Domestically, in the context of 
ongoing settler colonial governance, self-determination has necessarily 
operated as a framework for Indigenous governance within a context 
of contested but near invincible state sovereignty. Internationally, the 
principle of self-determination allows the question: is the state’s claim to 
sovereignty legitimate? Domestically, the principle of self-determination 
asks a different kind of question: what forms of policy and governance 
can legitimately be enacted over Indigenous peoples by the colonial state? 
Dylan Lino helpfully expresses an important distinction in the literature 
on the right to self-determination between its external and internal 
aspects: ‘the former generally being conceived of as the right of a people 
to be free from external domination, the latter as the right of a people to 
freely choose their political regime and to be autonomous’.3 He describes 
the internal register as an ‘appropriation’ of self-determination, as a way 
2  Lino, ‘Towards’, 840; Hunt, ‘Between’, 27.
3  Lino, ‘The Politics’, 846.
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Indigenous Australians have been able to ‘frame’ their political claims.4 
The language of peoplehood – and its corollary, self-determination – is 
a language of international law, and this too has bolstered Indigenous 
demands. When the collective right of peoples to self-determination 
became prominent in the decolonisation era, Indigenous minorities 
in settler colonies were not seen to be among the right’s beneficiaries 
(at  least not independently of the settler states in which they resided). 
But especially from the 1970s onwards, Indigenous advocates globally, 
including in Australia, appropriated the linked ideas of peoplehood and 
self-determination to frame their political struggles.5 
As a framework for decolonisation and as an appropriated framework for 
Indigenous people within settler colonies, self-determination operates to 
transfer power and resources from the coloniser to the colonised, giving 
rise to critical questions and challenges about policy, institutions and their 
governance. In both registers, self-determination operates as a practice or 
a mechanism to facilitate this transfer between political communities.
It is in this second ‘internal’ mode that self-determination has 
predominantly operated in Australia, superseding policies of ‘protection’ 
and ‘assimilation’ in which there had been 67 definitions, descriptions and 
classifications of Aboriginality written into over 700 pieces of legislation 
across the states and federal government to 1986.6 Just before the official 
inception of self-determination as a national policy in 1973, Section 127 
of the Australian Constitution was deleted by the 1967 referendum so 
that the exclusion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders from Australia’s 
total official population was no longer justified. This encouraged the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) to publish national population 
totals that included Indigenous Australians. At the same time, the ABS 
sought to improve the accuracy of its counting by changing the census 
question so that it no longer asked respondents to differentiate themselves 
as ‘full-bloods’, ‘half-castes’ and ‘quarter castes’. Official recognition that 
‘Aboriginal identity’ was a social and not a biological construct was part 
of a wider shift in Australians’ thinking of which the rise of the land 
rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s was another example. The 
land rights movement encouraged Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples to assert their diverse forms of social and political practice across 
4  Lino, ‘Towards’, 121.
5  Lino, ‘Towards’, 121.
6  McCorquodale, ‘The Legal’, 9.
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the continent in ways that have produced recognition of their humanity, 
their rights and their social and political identities. Another effect of the 
1967 referendum was that it empowered the Australian Government to 
develop national policies, and this encouraged the Australian Government 
to produce a nationwide definition of ‘Aboriginal’ that conceded that 
Aboriginal identity was not determined by descent but by subjective 
identification and social recognition. The new three-part definition of 
‘Aboriginal’ – formulated in 1968 and confirmed after a review in 1981 
– was composed of (1) descent, (2) self-identification and (3) community 
recognition.7 This three-part definition was adopted by governments 
as a way to determine which Australians were eligible to benefit from 
targeted government programs, and it remains the dominant definition 
of Indigeneity in Australia today.8 A positive result from what is known as 
the Confirmation of Aboriginality process is recorded as an official written 
document in which an incorporated Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
organisation endorses an individual’s claim to Aboriginal or Islander 
identity; this is the operational form of ‘community recognition’.9
Self-determination was a departure from assimilatory policies; it operated 
by developing legal and administrative devices to recognise and manage 
the ‘Aboriginal domain’.10 This included changes to land title from the late 
1960s onwards, and the statutory encoding of ‘native title’, as well as the 
creation of statutory bodies in the form of land councils that are ongoing. 
As well, self-determination included the (now defunct) Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission, and a range of other incorporated 
Indigenous bodies and organisations that deliver services to Indigenous 
peoples and communities, including forms of Indigenous local government 
that have superseded old missions and settlements. The proliferation of 
community-controlled health organisations, land councils, legal services 
and housing cooperatives indicates the transformative impact of self-
determination in Australia. Nonetheless, the self-governing capacity of 
Indigenous communities has emerged without serious engagement with 
the complexities and multiplicities of Indigenous Australian’s identity.
7  Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Report. For a description of the circumstances in which the 
Australian government reformed its definition, see Rowse and Smith, ‘The Limits’.
8  See Gardiner-Garden, Defining Aboriginality.
9  Carlson, The Politics, 7.
10  Rowse, Remote.
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The recognition turn – within and beyond 
self‑determination
To understand the similarities and the differences between the discourses 
of self-determination and of constitutional recognition we need to see 
how recognition is a requisite for justice.11 Recognition theory takes 
up a  Hegelian master/slave dialectic to emphasise that identities are 
constructed in relational, rather than autonomous terms: constituted by 
a self-consciousness that allows us to understand who we are, in terms of 
who we are not. Identity is, in short, intersubjectively produced and takes 
shape especially in relation to our ‘significant other’. Our significant others 
are those whose acts have a strong bearing on our sense of self. This might 
be immediate members of family and community, who may have positive 
or negative views of you. It is also those who hold positions of authority, 
and wield control, influence and power over us whether for good or for bad. 
As a site of justice, recognition produces an alignment between our sense 
of self and the sense with which our significant others understand us. As a 
site of injustice, non-recognition and mis-recognition risks the diminishment 
of self-esteem, self-respect and self-confidence in ways that do harm and 
violence to individuals and communities.12 Such accounts are compelling, 
but Indigenous political theorists Glen Coulthard and Audra Simpson 
remind us that not all slaves seek recognition of their master: Indigenous 
peoples are not necessarily looking to the settler colonial state to recognise 
or affirm our existence. On the contrary, Coulthard and Simpson remind 
us, in different ways, that, for many, justice lies in turning away from the 
coloniser’s gaze, refusing the right of the coloniser to know us at all.
It is relevant to understand that issues of identity and recognition have 
been grappled with from within the self-determination discourse. For 
example, the 1986 report of UN Special Envoy Martinez Cobo identifies:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations [as] … those which, 
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial 
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves 
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those 
territories.13 
11  See Taylor, ‘The Politics’; Honneth, The Struggle; cf. Coulthard, ‘Subjects’ and Red Skin; Simpson, 
Mohawk.
12  See Honneth, The Struggle.
13  Martinez Cobo cited in Daadaoui, ‘The Western’, 154.
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Daadaoui’s social constructivist critique of Cobo highlights the disjuncture 
between two elements of this definition: the need for historical continuity 
in Indigenous identities and the need to acknowledge that colonisation 
has produced ‘divergent self-perceptions and political discourses of groups 
and national societies, and diverse state-society relations’.14 The colonising 
process had the effect of dislocating Indigenous peoples from country; 
it reordered their social and family lives, and it deployed disciplinary 
practices that allowed the coloniser to know the colonised. Against this 
process, the requirement that Indigenous peoples must be able to assert 
pre-colonial identities, practices and knowledge systems against the 
colonial state as a condition for either self-determination or recognition 
is problematic.
In both self-determination and constitutional recognition, the importance 
of identity and the ‘self ’ (individuated or collective) is easily displaced 
because it is so difficult to comprehend the multiplicities of being and 
subjectivities that produce Indigenous identity. Instead of grappling 
with the question of who is the self in Indigenous self-determination 
or of asking who seeks recognition from the Australian settler order, it 
is understandable that both the self-determination and constitutional 
recognition discourses must get on with the urgent and essential task of 
how we can develop mechanisms for the transfer of power from the settler 
order to Indigenous peoples, even if we cannot comprehend who those 
peoples are. 
Both discourses maintain a focus on the transfer of power and resources, 
with attendant focus on issues of policy, governance and institutions, 
and both discourses continue to return to questions of identity. As Dylan 
Lino observes: 
Australia’s recent politics of Indigenous constitutional recognition 
can be seen as contests over Indigenous identity – over who 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are – and what it 
means to respect that identity within the constitutional norms 
of the settler state.15 
14  Daadaoui, ‘The Western’, 154.
15  Lino, ‘Towards’, 119.
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By the late twentieth century, Australian political discourse had shifted 
from a language of self-determination predominantly pursued through 
the domain of policy to one of ‘constitutional recognition’: for example, 
the 2012 report of the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of 
Indigenous Australians, the 2014 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Peoples Act of Recognition Review Panel, and the 2015 Parliamentary 
Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Peoples. Most recently, the 2017 Referendum 
Council report has emphasised constitutional reform demanding deep 
structural change beyond mere symbolic recognition.16 This points to a shift 
to constitutional reform beyond the politics of recognition: constitutional 
reform demands the rewriting of the Australian Constitution not only to 
‘recognise’ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples but also to provide 
a constitutionally protected representative body that gives Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander First Nations a Voice to Parliament, including 
the ability to monitor the use of the heads of power in Section 51(xxvi) 
(the ‘race’ power) and Section 122. While recognition is a dimension of 
this proposed reform, and while matters of identification are relevant in 
understanding representativeness, questions of who the Indigenous self is 
are less acute than the question of who the Australian state is constituted 
for in the first place.
The discourse of constitutional recognition presents different terrain upon 
which we might make sense of the relation between identity and justice. 
Recent efforts to mobilise towards constitutional recognition are in some 
ways a response to the limits of self-determination. Glen Coulthard 
described in the Canadian context in 2007 that ‘self-determination 
efforts and objectives … have been increasingly cast in the language of 
“recognition”’.17 On the one hand, recognition can be understood as an 
effort to better capture the plurality of identities within and across groups 
and nations. On the other hand, as Coulthard makes clear, recognition 
offers up relational configurations between the coloniser and Indigenous 
peoples that risk reproducing rather than transcending historical 
oppression.18 If one is to turn towards recognition to take more seriously 
the constituting role of a sovereign self in claims for justice, then one 
will also find they are turned towards their coloniser (their master), their 
significant other, asking – indeed, begging – to be recognised.
16  See Davis and Langton, ‘Introduction’.
17  Coulthard, ‘Subjects’, 437.
18  Coulthard, ‘Subjects’, 439.
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In Australia, this problematic politics of recognition played out in 
the efforts of the ‘Recognise’ campaign (2012–16), which sought to 
create a  public movement in support for constitutional recognition of 
Australia’s First Peoples.19 Megan Davis and Marcia Langton, in 2016, 
made clear that the gap between substantive reform desired by most 
Indigenous Australians and the public messaging required for a ‘Yes’ 
vote, ‘explains why the ambiguity of the word recognition has led to 
a dissonance between the campaign to recognise and the Aboriginal 
political domain’.20 This dissonance was evident in two competing 
surveys on constitutional recognition in 2015: the first by Recognise 
suggested 87 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
supported a symbolic form of  constitutional recognition. IndigenousX 
initiated its own survey and found support for this was much lower at 
25 per  cent.21 The IndigenousX survey, which also returned more than 
50 per cent support for an Indigenous parliamentary body being included 
in a referendum for constitutional change, highlighted the unwillingness 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders to accept mere recognition of 
their ongoing presence in the Constitution and their insistence that 
substantive, structural reform of representation and political decision-
making processes was necessary. Megan Davis also emphasises that there 
are many competing meanings of ‘recognition’ that are deployed in public 
conversation and debate about constitutional reform from the shallow and 
symbolic to substantive, structural reform.22 These competing meanings 
risk its operation as an ‘empty signifier’ in contexts in which precise details 
matter most. The relevance to this paper is to complicate assumptions 
surrounding a singular, unified, potentially essentialist understanding of 
Indigenous identities and political claim-making in discourses that are 
ever-preoccupied with the need to determine who the ‘self ’ in Indigenous 
self-determination is, to determine who it is that seeks recognition 
from whom.
These two discourses can be usefully understood as having shared purpose: 
to remedy the injustice of dispossession and disempowerment enacted 
through historical and ongoing practices of colonisation. But this produces 
19  Maddison, ‘Recognise’, 9.
20  Davis and Langton, ‘Introduction’, 5.
21  Celeste Liddle, ‘87% of Indigenous People Do Not Agree on Recognition. You’d Know if You 
Listened’. The Guardian, 19 June 2015, accessed 16 December 2019, www.theguardian.com/comment 
isfree/2015/jun/19/87-of-indigenous-people-do-not-agree-on-recognition-youd-know-if-you-listened.
22  Davis, ‘Competing Notions’; see Davis, ‘Correspondence’.
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a shared problem: the incomprehensibility of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander identity.23 In the discourse of Indigenous self-determination, 
the Indigenous ‘self ’ has persistently sought expression and recognition 
within the Australian settler order, not only as individual human beings 
but also as a coherent collectively – a ‘peoples’.
Comprehending the politics of Indigenous 
identity in the settler colonial order
For all that distinguishes self-determination from constitutional 
recognition, they are united by this shared purpose and shared problem. 
There is a historical continuity between the idea of self-determination 
(from the 1970s onwards) and efforts towards constitutional recognition 
(2006–16) and it is grounded in the incomprehensibility of Indigenous 
peoples within ongoing colonial contexts. In Australia, ‘Aboriginal’ is little 
more than the projection of a coloniser’s taxonomy of the natural world. 
But the Aboriginal person has always been a real, embodied, human being 
– an individual nestled into family, kin, clan and nation – named by 
themselves, in their own languages, for their own needs. The ‘Torres Strait 
Islander’ is a specific invention of the Queensland legislature of 1939. 
Yet, here I am: both a fiction brought into being by the colonial order 
and also something else. This is the incomprehensibility of Aboriginal 
people.24 And it is to this incomprehensibility that I now turn.
In The Politics of Identity, Bronwyn Carlson expresses the deep plurality 
of Indigenous Australian identities and provides some insight into why 
the question of ‘who’ is so difficult in settler colonial contexts. She 
writes that, ‘Aboriginal identity, whether we think of it in individual, 
local community or pan-Aboriginal terms, is a product of our position 
within and our relationship to the nation-state’.25 Here, she is not only 
23  The turn toward recognition was partly a response to the limits of self-determination to engage 
seriously with the politics of identity alongside the politics of territory. However, constitutional 
recognition (and recognition theory more broadly) are also gravely limited in their capacity to 
comprehend Indigenous identities (Coulthard, ‘Subjects of Empire’; Coulthard, Red Skin; Simpson, 
Mohawk Interruptus). This historical continuity of the incomprehensibility of Indigenous peoples 
suggests that what distinguishes self-determination from constitutional recognition may be less 
significant than sometimes suggested.
24  See Langton, Well; Langton, ‘Aboriginal Art’, 122.
25  Carlson, The Politics, 269.
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referring to colonial impact in its generic, all-encompassing sense, she is 
making quite specific reference to the three-part test for Confirmation 
of Aboriginality.26
This presents a central perversion of the principle of self-determination. 
The establishment of Aboriginal councils and community-controlled 
organisations is a key outcome of the self-determination effort in 
the early 1970s, allowing for the material transfer of some power and 
resources back to Indigenous Australian communities. Alongside this, 
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 was crucial in making it illegal for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders to be discriminated against, while 
still allowing for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders to be positively 
discriminated towards in order to redress the inequitable distribution 
of resources and opportunities due to historical, structural and ongoing 
practices of colonisation. As with many things in Indigenous affairs, 
the perversion arises from ‘good’ intentions. If some people are to 
receive positive discrimination on account of their group identity, then 
it becomes necessary for those people to prove their membership to the 
group. However, it becomes incumbent upon Aboriginal communities 
and organisations themselves to act as the arbiters of Indigenous identity 
claims for reasons that have less to do with their own nationhood and 
more to do with the need to accommodate the settler order of things. 
As Carlson explains:
Any government, agency, employer, service or benefit provider 
which requires proof of Aboriginal identity to allocate a government 
benefit or service can accept a Confirmation of Aboriginality 
document from an individual only if it has been verified by an 
Aboriginal organisation, and only if that organisation has been 
formally incorporated under State or Territory legislation … 
The Confirmation of Aboriginality is accepted as a pseudo-legal 
document by institutions and their officers, and demonstrates 
due diligence.27
The dislocation of people from their families, land, language and cultural 
practices is colonisation’s defining characteristic wherever and whenever 
it occurs in the world. This means that supporting the self-determination 
of communities to provide them with the right to control and make 
decisions with respect to membership (producing and maintaining the 
26  Carlson, The Politics, 7.
27  Carlson, The Politics,133.
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self ) also makes it exceptionally difficult for some Indigenous peoples 
to meet the three-part test (eliminating and diminishing the self ). This 
is an uneasy tension from the perspective of self-determination. On the 
one hand, it is a form of self-determination. On the other hand, it is 
the devolvement of the very same colonial administrative regime that 
‘sorted’ Aboriginal and Islander peoples for the purpose of implementing 
policies of family separation, education and employment to Aboriginal 
communities themselves. As Carlson concludes:
My study indicates that this wider picture [of the complexity of 
Indigenous identities] is a necessary one for us, the Aboriginal 
community, to understand how we are complicit agents of 
oppressive practices that restrict the creative regeneration and 
production of Aboriginal identities.28
Carlson persuasively sets out how this concern is not one of mere 
principle.  The substantive contribution of her research is to detail the 
experiences of those Aboriginal people whose identity status might be 
ambiguous – whether due to family disconnection, or those of mixed 
heritage who may or may not be recognisably Aboriginal – with respect 
to the Confirmation of Aboriginality process. That some speak positively, 
and others negatively, is less significant than the way in which the 
process operates to keep ‘colonial binaries alive’, not only in terms of the 
significance of being able to distinguish between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous peoples within the settler colonial context, but also in terms of 
a colonial binary between the power of the ‘identifier’ and the ‘identified’.29 
The binary here refers to the power relation between the  institution 
who ‘knows’ and the individual who must be ‘known’. That is, here it 
becomes evident that the question of who is the self in Indigenous self-
determination is not the only question we should be asking. The other 
question is: how do the politics of identity come to be contested in the 
pursuit of the Indigenous ‘self ’? What power relations between institutions 
and individuals are taking place to sustain self-determination as a practice 
for Indigenous governance? And what are the effects of these relations 
on those subject to those power relations? This is not about the tension 
produced towards individual identity and selfhood and the legitimacy 
of collective Indigenous authority: the individual self and the self as 
a collective ‘peoples’ will always sit in relation to one another, sometimes 
28  Carlson, The Politics, 269.
29  Carlson, The Politics, 122.
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easily and sometimes uneasily. What is of core concern from a perspective 
of law and politics is to understand how the ‘self ’ – individual or collective 
– is transformed from an embodied, lived expression to a  politically 
strategic manoeuvre necessary for ontological existence.
Whether the people she talks to have always known or only recently 
discovered their Aboriginal heritage, Carlson is able to describe diverse 
experiences and ways that people make sense of their Indigenous selves. 
In  the cases of those who have always known, there is a sense that 
‘recognition’ through Confirmation of Aboriginality is disconnected from 
one’s actual identity:
It’s not just about that piece of paper. I think to be Aboriginal you 
need to identify with a group of people. Actually, that could be 
really hard to identify too because you don’t know that family.30
For some, it does not necessarily mean connection to community:
I think it means acknowledging … my ancestry and just knowing 
who I am in that respect. Not necessarily being what I am doing 
or where I live … not necessarily being part of community 
involvement and all that stuff.31
For others, it does:
[Aboriginality] means basically belonging to here and family. 
I  guess association to the land and culture as well as knowing 
where I come from … It’s the search of wanting to know that deep 
meaning of where they’ve come from.32
So I am endeavouring to get connection back with culture. I was 
brought up in a white society, a white culture and I probably relate 
more to white society than Aboriginal society. But yeah, I feel 
there is an imbalance now, and I want to get a balance in my life 
with my Aboriginal side of the family.33
While for another, ‘a part of that Diaspora of almost lost and forgotten 
Aboriginal Australians’, the effect of colonisation means that his identity 
cannot be connected to land or community: 
30  P10 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 183.
31  P1 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 186. 
32  P7 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 189. 
33  P16 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 193.
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I live in a world in which I don’t belong in the sense that I was 
born in Leichhardt [suburb of Sydney] which is in Gadigal 
country but I have no connection to Gadigal people [apart from 
growing up there].34
But for some, this is part of the injustice that defines Aboriginal identity:
Aboriginal people have had it hard and that is what makes us 
Aboriginal in some way, we all know about our past and what it 
means to be Aboriginal. So that is why, when people aren’t really 
Aboriginal because they haven’t faced these things, it isn’t right 
they can say they are Aboriginal.35
In this context, it is unsurprising that Carlson’s research showed that 
many Aboriginal people spoke about the ‘gaps in their knowledge about 
what it means to be Aboriginal’.36 Thus, for many this means seeking out 
opportunities to learn and perform their identity, all the while having 
diverse experiences of how to do so:
I’m at a loss at the moment. I just find it really hard to find culture 
and I want to learn language.37
To my knowledge being Aboriginal was what I was taught at 
school as a whitefella. They lived in the bush a long time ago, wore 
loin cloths and speared roos and that was my understanding of 
being Aboriginal. So I was lost and just had no idea of who I was 
after that.38
I’ve changed the way I talk and everything … I don’t know … 
have to be on the same level as people in the community so I don’t 
look upper-class or I don’t look like or I don’t identify.39
We are still in limbo, don’t know which world to fit in… I don’t 
know when I should start saying ‘cuz’ or ‘bruz’, yeah, I don’t know 
when I should start acting Aboriginal.40
34  P13 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 192.
35  P23 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 190.
36  Carlson, The Politics, 226.
37  P10 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 230. 
38  P8 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 231.
39  P10 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 236.
40  P10 [anonymised interviewee] quoted in Carlson, The Politics, 247.
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I labour these personal expressions of Aboriginal identities here to 
demonstrate the diverse experiences that Indigenous Australians have 
in comprehending, or making sense, of the ‘self ’ in the modern settler 
colonial context. What comes through so strongly in Carlson’s work is 
that this process of comprehension takes place at a ‘cultural interface’.41 
She writes that:
There was evidence in the transcripts of the interviews of the push-
pull of the discourses of Aboriginality. A push against them as they 
operated to exclude some subjectivities, and the pull of them for 
the newly identifying trying to enter into the world of Aboriginal 
meaning or those wanting to belong and work as a member of the 
collective community.42
What Carlson exposes through these diverse experiences is the manner 
in which Indigenous Australian communities themselves have taken on 
the surveillance required for the settler colonial order to determine which 
persons count as Aboriginal today.43 Carlson’s task is not to resolve these 
tensions but to:
Suggest there is room for Aboriginal people [as individuals] to 
reflect on and examine our own practices and our compliance with 
a de facto government regime that insists on applying definitional 
criteria for access to government resources as the complete 
‘truth’ of what it also means to be Aboriginal in all aspects of our 
daily lives.44
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to place the recommendations of the 
2017 Referendum Council, which call for constitutional and structural 
reform, in a historical and theoretical context. The proposed reforms offer 
a move beyond ‘the politics of identity’ in Indigenous affairs potentially 
displacing the question of ‘who’ is the Indigenous self in Indigenous self-
determination with a new question: how can the Australian state be made 
to hear the many voices of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
on the issues that affect them? The determination of who is and who is 
41  See Nakata Disciplining; Carlson, The Politics, 239–50. 
42  Carlson, The Politics, 239.
43  Carlson, The Politics, 273.
44  Carlson, The Politics, 273.
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not an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person should and could never 
become redundant. But the question of who we are, as individuals and 
collectives, ought to be reclaimed as a question for our many selves, as 
we navigate the complexities of being First Nations in a settler colonial 
order. The question of our identity needs no longer be a question for 
the state’s organisation of our lives. Who is the ‘self ’ in Indigenous self-
determination matters less than understanding how and why and under 
what conditions that ‘self ’ must be produced.
This is an effort to present a problematisation: an effort to reframe the 
ways in which we seek to understand who Indigenous Australians are and 
instead to focus upon why we ask for Indigenous expressions of self and 
sovereignty in the ways that we do. The final lines of Carlson’s book ask:
In what other ways can we express ourselves and conduct 
a community discourse that is open to all Aboriginal experiences? 
What can we achieve in our relations with the wider nation-state 
if we are not so preoccupied in our community with regulating 
and surveilling each other for a few crumbs thrown under the 
master’s table?45
My argument is a simple one: the question of who is the self in self-
determination is a question that reveals the ways in which the politics 
of Indigenous identity helps to organise the settler colonial state’s 
organisation of our lives, families and justice claims. In self-determination, 
the politics of our identities must produce a coherent and organised social 
and political community as a basis for our justice claims. In constitutional 
recognition, particularly in its symbolic form, our justice claims are 
predicated upon receiving recognition of the very master whose authority 
we refuse. In both, the politics of identity deepen our entanglements with 
the state in ways that risk deepening tensions within and between our 
many, diverse, ‘Indigenous’ selves. Problematising this is an effort to find 
space outside of the discourses that bind us.
The self in Indigenous self-determination is an idea: both a colonial idea 
and a colonising idea. A necessary fiction, and also a real body: educatable, 
incarcerable, governable. The self in Indigenous self-determination is also 
an ideal: that something past can be recovered, and that something new 
will be made. Having grappled with the history of self-determination, and 
as we turn towards future debate about deep, structural, constitutional 
45  Carlson, The Politics, 273.
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reform, the answer to the question who is the self in Indigenous 
self-determination ought to begin to matter far less than an answer to the 
question: will Australia finally hear our many voices? 
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